M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.

 

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 49-50 of 2017, Judgment Date: Jan 04, 2017

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      49-50 OF 2017
              (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 21865-21872 OF 2016)



M/S PATEL BROTHERS                                     .....APPELLANT(S)
            
                                   VERSUS 
                                                                 
STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.                               .....RESPONDENT(S)           


                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

                 Leave granted.

2.    The question of law  which  has  fallen  for  determination  in  these
appeals is as to whether provisions of Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act,
1963 are applicable in respect of revision petition filed in the High  Court
under Section 81 of  the  Assam  Value  Added  Tax  Act,  2003  (hereinafter
referred to as the 'VAT Act').

In order to decide this question, which is a pure question  of  law,  it  is
not necessary to state the facts  in  greater  detail.   The  seminal  facts
which require reproduction are mentioned below:
            The appellant was running a business of purchasing tea and is  a
registered dealer under the Assam General Sales Tax Act,  1993  as  well  as
the VAT Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.  Based on the sales of  his
business, the appellant had submitted the declaration in Form  ‘C’  for  the
years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 reflecting the value  of
sales. Based on the representation made by  the  appellant,  Respondent  No.
2/Superintendent of Tax allowed full exemption of sales tax as  per  Section
8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.  But,  the  information  given  by  the
appellant turned out to be false and as a result of which Respondent  No.  2
passed an order dated 29.06.2004  reducing  the  exemption  granted  to  the
petitioner for the  year  19998-99  along  with  imposing  penalty.  Similar
orders of re-assessment were passed  in  respect  of  the  other  assessment
years giving rise to the  connected  proceedings.  Aggrieved  by  the  order
dated, 29.06.2004, the appellant preferred  appeals  before  Respondent  No.
3/Appellate Authority along with applications for the stay  of  the  demand.
By order dated 29.07.2005, Respondent No. 3 had directed  the  appellant  to
deposit 25% of the demanded dues within 30  days  and  stayed  rest  of  the
demand.   The  appellant  preferred  appeals  before  the  Assam  Board   of
Revenue/Appellate Tribunal against the order  dated  29.07.2005,  which  was
dismissed by  the  order  dated  26.08.2008.   A  review  application  filed
against the aforesaid order came to be dismissed by the  Appellate  Tribunal
by  the  order  dated  27.08.2013.   Aggrieved,  appellant  filed   Revision
Petitions under section 81(1) of the VAT Act.

Section 81 of the VAT Act also prescribes a limitation  period  of  60  days
within which such revision petition  is  to  be  preferred  to  High  Court.
Since there was a delay of 335 days  in  filing  these  revision  petitions,
these petitions were filed along with applications under Section  5  of  the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of  delay.   The  High  Court  has
dismissed the applications for condonation of delay holding that  provisions
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,  1963  are  not  applicable.   For  this
purpose, the High Court has referred to Section 84  of  the  VAT  Act  which
makes provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act,  1963  to  such
petitions.  On that basis, it is held by the  High  Court  that  since  only
Sections 4 and  12  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  are  made  specifically
applicable to these proceedings, by necessary implication Section 5  of  the
Limitation Act stands excluded.

It  was  argued  by  Mr.  Chowdhury,  learned  counsel  appearing  for   the
appellant, that  the  approach  of  the  High  Court  in  dealing  with  the
provisions of VAT Act and applicability of  Limitation  Act,  1963  to  such
proceedings was faulty inasmuch as the High Court did not take note  of  and
discussed other provisions of the VAT  Act  and  also  failed  to  give  due
weightage to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

                 In the first instance, he referred to  Section  79  of  the
VAT  Act  which  is  a  provision  relating  to  appeals  to  the  Appellate
Authority.  As per Section 79(1) of the VAT Act, appeal  against  the  order
of the taxing authority can be filed with the appellate authority within  60
days from the date of receipt of such order of the taxing  authority.   Sub-
section (2) of Section 79 of the VAT Act empowers  the  appellate  authority
to entertain the appeal even  beyond  60  days,  provided  it  is  presented
within a  further  period  of  180  days,  if  the  appellate  authority  is
satisfied  that  the  appellant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause  from
presenting the appeal within the stipulated period of 60 days[1].

The learned counsel next referred to Section 80  of  the  VAT  Act[2]  which
deals with appeals to the Appellate Tribunal inter alia against  the  orders
of the Appellate Authority.  Here also, period of  60  days  for  preferring
such an appeal is provided under sub-section (3) of Section 80  of  the  VAT
Act and proviso to  sub-section  (3)  empowers  the  Appellate  Tribunal  to
condone the delay, if the appeal is preferred within  a  further  period  of
120 days, on sufficient cause being shown for not filing the  appeal  within
60 days of limitation prescribed.  The  learned  counsel    contrasted   the
aforesaid  provisions  of  Sections 79 and 80  with

      Section 81[3] of the VAT Act and pointed out that  whereas  there  was
specific  provision  for  condonation  of  delay  in  filing  appeals  under
Sections 79 and 80 of the VAT Act, no such equivalent provision was made  in
Section 81 of the VAT Act.  As per Section 81 of the VAT Act,  revision  can
be preferred to the High Court against the order of the  Appellate  Tribunal
within 60 days.  However, there is no provision  giving  specific  power  to
the High Court to condone the delay if the revision is preferred  beyond  60
days.  As per the learned counsel, the  reason  for  not  providing  such  a
provision was that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963  including  Section  5
thereof were applicable.

Insofar as Section 84 of the VAT Act[4] is concerned, it was submitted  that
Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation  Act,  1963  were  made  applicable  for
specific purpose of computing  the  period  of  limitation  under  the  said
Chapter and High Court committed a grave error while  holding  that  because
of the aforesaid provision only Sections 4 and 12  of  the  Limitation  Act,
1963 were made applicable to the VAT Act thereby excluding other  provisions
of the Act.

For this purpose, the learned counsel  relied  upon  Section  29(2)  of  the
Limitation Act, 1963[5] which makes provisions contained in  Sections  4  to
24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act,  1963  applicable  in  case  of  suit,
appeal  or  application  under  any  special  or  local  law,  where   these
provisions are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

It was argued that in the absence of any provision expressly  excluding  the
applicability of Sections 4  to  24  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963,  those
Sections were applicable qua revision petitions filed under  Section  81  of
the VAT Act and, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963  was  also
applicable to such proceedings.  To placate his aforesaid  submissions,  the
learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of  Mangu
Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi &  Anr.[6].   In  that  case,  special
leave  petitions  were  filed  against  the  condonation  of  delay  to  the
application for grant of special leave  under  Section  417,  Cr.P.C.,  1898
against acquittal of the petitioners by the trial court,  in  spite  of  the
mandatory period of limitation provided in sub-section (4) of  Section  417.
Question arose whether in the case of  Kaushalya  Rani  v.  Gopal  Singh[7],
which  held  Section  417,  Cr.P.C.,  1898  a  special  law   and   excluded
application of Section 5 on a construction of Section 29(2)(b)  of  the  old
Act of 1908 applied under the corresponding  provision  of  Limitation  Act,
1963 which governed the case.  The  Court  held  that  since  the  case  was
governed by Limitation Act, 1963, judgment in Kaushalya Rani  case  did  not
apply.  For applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to  such  proceedings,
the Court referred to Section 29(2) of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  holding
that there is an important  departure  made  by  the  Limitation  Act,  1963
insofar as the provision  contained  in  Section  29,  sub-section  (2),  is
concerned.  Under the Indian  Limitation  Act,  1908,  clause  (b)  to  sub-
section (2) of Section 29 provided that for the purpose of  determining  any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application  by  any
special or local law the application of Section 5 was in clear and  specific
terms excluded.  But under Section 29(2) of Act, the provisions  of  Section
5 shall apply in case of special or local law to the extent  to  which  they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.   Since  under  the
Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is specifically made applicable  by  Section
29 (2), it is only if the  special  or  local  law  expressly  excludes  the
applicability of Section 5 that it would stand displaced.   The  Court  held
that there is  nothing  in  Section  417(4),  Cr.P.C.,  which  excludes  the
application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.

Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to  the  case  of  State  of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Anshuman Shukla[8].   In  that  case,  question  of
applicability of Section 5 of  the  Limitation  Act  arose  in  relation  to
revision petition that can  be  preferred  under  Section  19  of  the  M.P.
Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (as it stood prior  to  its  amendment
in 2005).  The Court held that since unamended Section 19  did  not  contain
any express rider on power of the High Court to entertain  applications  for
revision after expiry of prescribed  limitation  thereunder,  provisions  of
Limitation Act, 1963 would become applicable  vide  Section  29(2)  thereof.
It further held that as the High Court was conferred  with  suo  moto  power
under Section 19 of Adhiniyam, 1983 to call for record of an  award  at  any
time, there was no  legislative  intent  to  exclude  the  applicability  of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  respondents,  on
the other hand, submitted that the High Court had  exhaustively  dealt  with
the issue and rightly found that since Section 84 of the  VAT  Act  confined
the applicability of Limitation Act only in respect of  Sections  4  and  12
thereof to the proceedings under the said Chapter, by necessary  implication
the other provisions  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  including  Section  5
thereof stood excluded.  He  submitted  that  for  the  purpose  of  finding
whether other provisions are excluded or not, the focus  should  be  on  the
scheme of the special law as laid down in Hukumdev  Narain  Yadav  v.  Lalit
Narain Mishra[9] wherein it was held that even if there  exists  no  express
exclusion in the special law, the Court has right to examine the  provisions
of the special law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether  the  legislative
intent was to exclude the operation of the  Limitation  Act.   According  to
him, Section 84 of the VAT Act clearly depicted such a  legislative  intent.

After examining the matter  in  the  light  of  law  laid  down  in  various
judgments cited by both the parties, we are of the view that the High  Court
has given correct interpretation to the provisions of Section 81 of the  VAT
Act, when this provision is read along with Section 84 thereof.

In the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central  Excise  v.  Hongo  India
Private Limited & Anr.[10], the question that  fell  for  determination  was
that as to whether the  High  Court  had  power  to  condone  the  delay  in
presentation of the reference application under  unamended  Section  35-H(1)
of the Central Excise Act, 1994 beyond the  period  prescribed  by  applying
Section 5  of  the  Limitation  Act.   Unamended  Section  35-H  dealt  with
reference application to the High Court.   Under  sub-section  (1)  thereof,
such reference application could be preferred within a period  of  180  days
of the date upon which the aggrieved party  is  served  with  notice  of  an
order under Section 35-C of the Central Excise Act. There was  no  provision
to extend the period of limitation for filing the application  to  the  High
Court beyond the said period and to condone the delay.   Pertinently,  under
the scheme of the Central Excise Act as well,  in  case  of  appeal  to  the
Commissioner under Section 35 of the Act, which should be  filed  within  60
days, there was a specific provision for condonation of delay upto  30  days
if sufficient cause is shown.  Likewise, appeal to  the  Appellate  Tribunal
could be filed within 90 days under Section  35-B  thereof  and  sub-section
(5) of Section 35-B gave power to the  Appellate  Tribunal  to  condone  the
delay irrespective of the number of days,  if  sufficient  cause  is  shown.
Further, Section 35-EE provided 90 days time  for  filing  revision  by  the
Central Government and proviso thereto empowers the revisional authority  to
condone the delay for a further period of 90 days.  However,  when  it  came
to making reference to the High Court under Section 35-G  of  the  Act,  the
provision only prescribed  the  limitation  period  of  180  days   with  no
further clause empowering the High Court to condone  the  delay  beyond  the
said period of 180 days.  It was, thus,  in  almost  similar  circumstances,
the judgment was rendered by this Court.  The  categorical  opinion  of  the
Court was that in the absence of any such power,  the  High  Court  did  not
have power to condone the delay.  In that case also, provisions  of  Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963  were  pressed  into  service.   But  this
argument  was rejected in the following manner:
      30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter  VI-
A  of  the  Act  which  provides  for  appeals  and  revisions  to   various
authorities. Though  Parliament  has  specifically  provided  an  additional
period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner,  it  is  silent
about the number of days if there is sufficient cause  in  the  case  of  an
appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of  90  days  in
the case of revision by the Central Government has been  provided.  However,
in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and  reference
application to the High Court under Section 35-H,  Parliament  has  provided
only 180 days and  no  further  period  for  filing  an  appeal  and  making
reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act.

31. In this regard, it is useful to refer  to  a  recent  decision  of  this
Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner  of  Customs,
Central Excise, Noida was the appellant in this case. While considering  the
very same question, namely, whether the High Court has power to condone  the
delay in presentation of the reference under Section  35-H(1)  of  the  Act,
the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and the other  related
provisions following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3  SCC  70]  concluded
that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd. case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)

“8. … the High Court was justified in holding that there was  no  power  for
condonation of delay in filing reference application.”

32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35,  35-B,  35-EE,
35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference  to  the
High  Court  should  be  made  within  180  days  only  from  the  date   of
communication of the decision or order. In other words,  the  language  used
in other provisions makes the position clear that the  legislature  intended
the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay  only
up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is  the  preliminary  limitation
period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning  the
delay by showing sufficient cause after  the  prescribed  period,  there  is
complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High  Court  was,
therefore, justified in holding that there  was  no  power  to  condone  the
delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.


33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the  Commissioner,  and  to  the
Appellate Tribunal as well  as  revision  to  the  Central  Government,  the
legislature has provided 60 days and 90  days  respectively,  on  the  other
hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period  of
180 days has been provided with to enable the  Commissioner  and  the  other
party to avail the same. We are of the view that  the  legislature  provided
sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference  to  the  High  Court
which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision.”

In  the  process,  the  Court  also  explained  the  expression   'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the  Limitation  Act,  1963  in  the
following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29  of  the  Limitation
Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what  we  have  to
determine is whether the provisions of this section are  expressly  excluded
in the case of reference to the High Court.

      35. It was contended before us that  the  words  “expressly  excluded”
would mean that there must be an express reference made in  the  special  or
local law to the specific provisions of the  Limitation  Act  of  which  the
operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see  the  scheme  of
the special law which here in this case  is  the  Central  Excise  Act.  The
nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature  intended
it to be a complete code by itself which alone  should  govern  the  several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of  the  relevant  provisions,
it is clear that the  provisions  of  the  Limitation  Act  are  necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be  called  in  aid  to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that  even  in
a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of  Sections  4
to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference,  it  would  nonetheless
be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent,  the  nature  of
those provisions or the nature of  the  subject-matter  and  scheme  of  the
special law exclude their operation. In other words,  the  applicability  of
the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be  judged  not  from
the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central  Excise
Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.”

                  The  aforesaid  judgment  is  a  complete  answer  to  the
arguments of the appellant.

It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment  in  Hongo  India
Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central  Excise  Act,  1994  was
amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of  2003  with  effect  from  14.05.2003
giving power to the High Court  to  condone  the  delay  by  inserting  sub-
section (2A).  It is, therefore,  for  the  legislature  to  set  right  the
deficiency, if it intends to give power to the High  Court  to  condone  the
delay in filing revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.

Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force having  regard
to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev Narain  Yadav.   Therein,  the
Court made following observations while  examining  whether  the  Limitation
Act would be applicable to the  provisions  of  the  Representation  of  the
People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the scheme  of  the  special  law,
that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided  therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete  code  by  itself
which alone should govern the several matters  provided  by  it.  If  on  an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that  the  provisions  of
the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded,  then  the  benefits  conferred
therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act.  In
our view, even in a  case  where  the  special  law  does  not  exclude  the
provisions of Sections  4  to  24  of  the  Limitation  Act  by  an  express
reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether  and
to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the  subject-
matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”

Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such cases  is  to
examine the provisions of special law  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion  as  to
whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of  Limitation
Act.  In the instant case, we find that Section 84 of the VAT Act made  only
Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings  under
the VAT  Act.   The  apparent  legislative  intent,  which  can  be  clearly
evinced, is  to  exclude  other  provisions,  including  Section  5  of  the
Limitation Act.  Section  29(2)  stipulates  that  in  the  absence  of  any
express provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to  24  of  the
Limitation Act would apply.  If the intention  of  the  legislature  was  to
make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the  Limitation  Act
applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no  necessity  to
make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making only Sections  4  and
12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch  as  these
two Sections would also have become applicable by virtue  of  Section  29(2)
of the Limitation Act.  It is, thus, clear  that  the  Legislature  intended
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections  4  to  24  of
the  said  Act,  applicable  under  the  VAT  Act  thereby   excluding   the
applicability of the other provisions.

Judgment in the case of  Mangu  Ram  would  not  come  to  the  aid  of  the
appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under  the  Cr.P.C.
from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5  of  the  Limitation  Act
could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation  Act  was
taken aid of.  Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman  Shukla's  case.   On
the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act  goes
to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum  but  also
prescribing the time limit within which each forum  would  be  competent  to
entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the  Act  appears
to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under  the
different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality  of  the
decision made there under. The fact that the period of limitation  described
therein has been equally made applicable to the  assessee  as  well  as  the
revenue  lends  ample  credence  to  such  a  conclusion.   We,   therefore,
unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the  Limitation  Act,
1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act stands  excluded  by
necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in section 84.

The High Court has rightly pointed out the well  settled  principle  of  law
that “the court cannot interpret the statute the  way  they  have  developed
the common law ‘which in a constitutional sense means  judicially  developed
equity'. In abrogating or modifying a rule  of  the  common  law  the  court
exercises the same power of creation that built up the  common  law  through
its existence by the judges of the past. The  court  can  exercise  no  such
power in respect of statue, therefore,  in  the  task  of  interpreting  and
applying a statue, Judges have to be conscious that in the  end  the  statue
is the master not the servant of the judgment and  no  judge  has  a  choice
between implementing it and disobeying it.”   What,  therefore,  follows  is
that the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read  into
the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking  Section  5  of
the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the  VAT  Act
which excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications.

We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the judgment  rendered  by  the  High
Court.  The present appeals are devoid of any merit  and  are,  accordingly,
dismissed.

                             .............................................J.
                                                             (A.K. SIKRI)


                             .............................................J.
                                                    (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 04, 2017.


-----------------------
[1]   Relevant portion of Section 79 of the VAT Act reads  as  under:   “79.
Appeals to the appellate authority: (1)  Any person aggrieved  by  an  order
passed under the Act by a taxing authority  lower  in  rank  than  a  Deputy
Commissioner of Taxes, may appeal to the Appellate Authority, in the  manner
as may be prescribed, within sixty days from the date  of  receipt  of  such
order.
      (2)  Where the Appellate Authority is  satisfied  that  the  appellant
was prevented by sufficient cause from  presenting  the  appeal  within  the
aforesaid period of sixty days, it may admit an appeal after the  expiry  of
the said period provided it is presented within  a  further  period  of  one
hundred eighty days”
[2]       80.  Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal: (1)  Any person  aggrieved
by any of the following orders         may appeal to the Appellate  Tribunal
against such order,-

      (a)  an order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 79,  and

      (b)  an order passed by an authority not  below  the  rank  of  Deputy
Commissioner of Taxes.

      (2)  omitted.

      (3)  Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be  filed  within  sixty
days of the date on which  the  order  sought  to  be  appealed  against  is
communicated to the person;

      Provided that the Appellate tribunal may admit  an  appeal  after  the
expiry of sixty days if he is satisfied that the  Appellant  had  sufficient
reasons for not filing the appeal within  the  aforesaid  time,  if,  it  is
within a further period of one hundred twenty days.
[3]     “81. Revision to High Court : (1) Any dealer or  other  person,  who
is dissatisfied  with  the  decision  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal,  or  the
Commissioner may, within sixty days after being notified of the decision  of
the Appellate Tribunal, file a revision to the High Court,  and  the  dealer
or other person so appealing shall serve a copy of the  notice  of  revision
on the respondents to the proceedings.”
[4]     Section 84 of the VAT Act  reads  as  under:  “84.   Application  of
Section 4 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963  :   In  computing  the  period  of
limitation under this chapter, the provisions of Section 4  and  12  of  the
Limitation Act, 1963 shall, so far as may be, apply.”
[5]     Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads  as  under:  “29(2).
Where  any  special  or  local  law  prescribes  for  any  suit,  appeal  or
application a period of limitation different from the period  prescribed  by
the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall  apply  as  if  such  period
were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of ?