Tags Rape

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 1767 of 2011, Judgment Date: Oct 04, 2016

                                                                [REPORTABLE]

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1767 OF 2011


RAJA AND OTHERS                                    …APPELLANTS
                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA                                 …RESPONDENT

                              J U D G E M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.

1 Distressed by the reversal  of  their  acquittal  from  the  charge  under
Sections 366/376(g)/392 read with Section 34 IPC, as recorded by  the  trial
court, the appellants have impeached the impugned  judgement  and  order  of
their conviction rendered by the High Court in the State appeal.

2.          We have  heard  Mr.  Basava  Prabhu  S.  Patil,  learned  senior
counsel for the appellants and Mr. Joseph Aristotle S, learned  counsel  for
the respondent-State.

3.          The prosecution was  set  rolling  by  an  oral  report  by  the
prosecutrix with the Sampangiramanagara  Police Station  between  2.00  A.M.
and 3.00 A.M. of 11.10.1997, which was in Tamil language and was  translated
and recorded by S. Shiva Lingaia, ASI,  whereafter  a  case  was  registered
under Sections 366, 376(g), 392 r/w 34 IPC.

4.          The prosecutrix revealed that  she  was  a  resident  of  No.81,
Jasari Kaleeli,  Rustum  ji  Compound,  Richmond  Road,  Bangalore  and  was
earning her livelihood by rendering  services as a  maid  in  the  house  of
Shilpa Shetty at Shanti Nagar, Bangalore.  According to her, because of  the
ill-treatment of her husband, she shifted to Bangalore about 8 months  prior
to the incident by separating from him.

            She alleged that at about 7.30 P.M.  in  the  previous  evening,
while she was coming back from work and was at the Richmond  Park,  an  auto
rickshaw ,with two persons  in it including the driver stopped by  her  side
and  she  was  pulled  inside.  According  to  her,  after  travelling  some
distance,  two  other  persons  also  got  into  the  auto  rickshaw.    The
miscreants then blindfolded her, by her chudidar cloth and took  her  to  an
auto garage where there was no  light.   The  prosecutrix  stated  that  the
abductors lit a candle, spread 2 seats of the auto rickshaw on  the  ground,
laid her forcibly thereon and in spite of  her  resistance  and  objections,
forcibly undressed her and raped her by turn.  She disclosed that 3  of  the
four persons ravished her. Out of them, two committed the act twice and  the
third only once.

            The prosecutrix further stated that one of the  persons  brought
dosa and idli and also offered the same to her,  whereafter  they  tried  to
repeat the same act, to which she protested for which  she  was  kicked  and
fisted and further they snatched her  Tali  (mangalsootre)  gold  ear-studs.
They then made her to wear her clothes, brought her in the auto rickshaw  to
a vacant place and discarded her.  According to her, these  violators   were
addressing each other as Raju, Venu, Parkash and Francis  and  claimed  that
she could identify them, if produced.  Investigation  followed  and  in  the
course thereof, the appellants were apprehended.  The fourth person  Francis
could not be nabbed as he  absconded.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  the
submission of  the  charge-sheet  against  the  appellants,  the  trial  was
conducted by segregating the absconding accused.  They   denied  the  charge
under the above provisions of law.

5.               At the trial, the prosecution  examined  11  witnesses  and
also marked several documents and exhibited material objects  seized  during
the investigation. The appellants rendered their  statements  under  Section
313 Cr.P.C. reiterating their innocence and also  examined  one  witness  in
defence.  The trial court, to reiterate, acquitted  the  appellants  of  the
charges levelled against them.  The High Court by the impugned decision  has
reversed the  acquittal  and  the  appellants  thus  stand  convicted  under
Sections 376(g) and 392 IPC r/w 34 IPC and have  been  sentenced  to  suffer
rigorous imprisonment for 10 years.

6.          The instant adjudication being one  to examine   the  tenability
of the conviction of the appellants on the reversal of their  acquittal,  an
independent assessment of the evidence on record  is  indispensable  in  the
interest of justice, two courts of facts having arrived  at   irreconcilable
conclusions on the same materials on records.  It would thus  be  expedient,
to analyse the evidence, oral and documentary before adverting to the  rival
arguments  based thereon.

7.          PW1, the prosecutrix on oath stated that she has a female  child
through her husband who lived separately with another lady and she  and  her
daughter lived in the compound of PW2 Geeta.  She deposed that she had  been
working in the house of Shilpa Shetty for the  last  three  years  and  that
even prior to the incident, the  appellants  used  to  tease  her  and  pass
remarks on the way.  She stated that in the  evening  of  the  date  of  the
incident along with the appellants,  another person  had  boarded  the  auto
and that the two persons sitting on her sides  were  appellants  Venu  Gopal
and Parkash. She testified that she also did peep out of the  auto  thinking
that someone would save her, for which the person  with  the  beard  in  the
auto slapped her and therefore she felt  frightened  and  sat  behind.   She
stated that the  abductors  then  blindfolded  her  with  her  own  dupatta,
molested her inside the auto and ultimately took her to an auto  garage  and
in spite of her objections, raped her one by one.   According  to  her,  she
was raped by Venu Gopal, Parash and the bearded person in that order.

            In her deposition, however she stated that appellant  Raja  also
assaulted her and had forcible intercourse with her.   She  reiterated  that
the violators then brought dosa and idlis  and  also  offered  some  to  her
which she on being  assaulted, did eat.  In a departure from  her  FIR,  the
prosecutrix deposed that thereafter all the four performed  one  more  round
of intercourse by turn.  Thereafter according to  her,  the  bearded  person
snatched her Tali (mangalsootre) and the other, her  ear  studs.   They  did
assault her by kicks and thereafter by making her  wear  her  clothes,  took
her in the same auto and left her near a bridge.  She complained  of  having
sustained injuries on her thighs.

            She stated that thereafter she took water  from  a  person  near
the garage road and ascertained from him the area where  she  was  situated.
According to her, from the location of the place, she could  understand  the
site of the garage and on reaching there,  she  saw  broken  pieces  of  her
glass bangles and also the litter and left overs of the food  taken  in  the
garage and could convincingly identify the place.  She deposed further  that
at that time, a man came in a  bicycle  to  whom  she  narrated  the  entire
incident, who asked her to wait and went to the Hoysala  Police  Station  to
report, whereafter the police did come, inspect the place as  shown  by  her
and took her to the Sampangiramanagara P.S. past  midnight  where  she  made
her verbal complaint which was reduced into writing and she  put  her  thumb
impression thereon.

            The prosecutrix  proved the complaint/FIR as Ex.  P1.  According
to her, in the next morning at 6 A.M., the appellants  were brought  to  the
police station.   She admitted to have been taken to the Vanivilas  Hospital
where she was  medically  examined.  She  also  identified  the  ear  studs,
material Ex. 1 and also her inner-wear material Ex. 2 and  broken pieces  of
glass bangles material Ex  3.   She  also  stated  to  have  identified  the
appellants in the test identification parade conducted in the central  jail.
She also identified the seats of the auto rickshaw as  material  Ex  P4  and
P5.

            In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that she  was
not married and that she had come to Bangalore with Saravana  whom  she  had
referred to in her examination-in-chief, as her husband.   She  stated  that
she lived with Saravana for three years in Bangalore and that they  used  to
earn their living as labourers.  She  stated  that  Saravana  deserted  her,
following frequent quarrels with her, whereafter PW2  Geeta   gave  her  and
her daughter, shelter.  She testified that she used to earn Rs. 700 p.m.  by
working in the house of Shilpa Shetty  and  that   there  was  none  in  the
family or in her village  to  support her  financially.  She  admitted  that
from one week prior  to the incident, the appellants  used to tease her  and
that from then she knew them.  She admitted that the  road  from  which  she
was abducted was a public thorough fare but  asserted  that  she  could  not
scream as she was gagged.  She admitted that though the auto travelled   for
10 minutes thereafter, she did not try to get down as she was scared of  her
abductors.  She further disclosed that the appellants used to speak  to  her
from 2/3 days prior to the incident.

            According to her, while she was near Fatima  Bakery,  which  was
opposite to Johnson market, she was taken inside the auto. She admitted   to
have known the accused Francis then.  She claimed to  have   identified  two
persons in the   auto rickshaw when she was first  picked up from  the  road
as   appellants  Parkash  and  Francis.   She  admitted  that  none  of  the
abductors did speak to her while in the auto rickshaw.   She  also  conceded
that she did not scream for help from the passers-by on the road.   She  was
confronted with her disclosure in  the  FIR  that  only  three  persons  had
committed rape on her  though four had been  named  therein.   She  admitted
that at the time when she was offered two idlis and a glass  of  water,  she
did not cry for help  and  instead  had  made  up  her  mind  to  teach  the
miscreants a lesson by informing the police.  She also stated, by  departing
from the FIR that for  the  second  time,  three  persons  committed  sexual
intercourse with her.  According to her, the ear studs  had  been  given  to
her by her husband who got them made at Kaveripattinam in Tamil  Nadu.   She
claimed that her FIR was written by one Anthony in the police  station  whom
she came to know at that point of time.

            In her cross-examination, she further deviated by  stating  that
apart from the 4th person referred to by her, there was yet  another  person
of short stature and that she had forgotten to refer to  him  in   her  FIR.
She admitted that her mouth was never shut but  her abductors  did  threaten
and  scold  her.   She  admitted  that  after  she  was  abandoned   by  the
miscreants, she did alone return to the garage where the act was  committed.
 She also stated to have  narrated her incident  to  five  more  persons  at
different places before the police had intervened,  who  according  to  her,
were watchmen.  She  stated  that  she  wanted  to  see  the  place   before
informing the police  and,  therefore  she  went  in  search  thereof.   She
deposed that she saw the jeep of the Hoysala police   and  called  for  help
whereafter she was taken in the jeep.  She took the  jeep  near  the  garage
and from there, she was taken to two more  police  stations  before  lodging
the FIR at Sampangiramanagara Police Station.

            She contradicted herself by stating that the complaint  was  not
written by Anthony. She also stated that her report was typed, read  out  to
her whereupon she put her left thumb  impression.   When  Ex.  P1,  FIR  was
shown to her, she admitted that it was not typed. She admitted as well  that
while  narrating  the incident  and  lodging  the  complaint,  she  did  not
disclose the names of the accused persons.  She conceded as well  that  when
she was taken to the hospital, there were no wounds.

            She admitted as well  that PW 2 Geeta  had  advised her to  take
money and return to her native village and not to file a case  as  otherwise
she would disclose that she was a prostitute.   She  denied  the  suggestion
that she had requested for  financial help  from  the  appellants  and  when
they expressed their inability, she lodged  a false  case  against  them  to
wreak  vengeance.    She  also  denied  the  suggestion  that  the  material
exhibits,  more particularity ear studs and  tali  (mangalsootre)  were  not
hers and that the police had procured the same from elsewhere, to frame  the
accused persons.   In the context of her  identification of  the  appellants
in the TIP, she admitted in her cross-examination that  even  prior  to  the
incident, she had seen the accused persons and that not only  they  used  to
talk to her, she knew them as well.

8.          PW2  Geeta,  on oath stated that she also did  earn  her  living
as a labourer.   She  admitted  that  she  knew   the  prosecutrix  who  was
deserted by her husband and that she had  accommodated her and her  daughter
and had provided shelter to them about 7 years prior to the  incident.   She
stated that about four years back (coinciding approximately  with  the  date
of the incident),  the prosecutrix had disclosed to  her  that  on  her  way
back home, she had  been teased, on which she advised  her  to  be  careful.
The witness stated that in the evening of the  date  of  the  incident,  the
prosecutirx did not return home and that  at  about  mid-night,  the  police
brought her back.  She stated that she saw  marks of assault on the body  of
 prosecutrix and on being  enquired, she stated that “they did  not  pay  me
any money but have snatched my ear studs.  They have extracted all the  work
needed”.  The witness volunteered to explain “work” meant prostitution.

            At this stage, the witness was declared hostile and  was  cross-
examined.  In her cross-examination, she admitted that when the  prosecutrix
returned that night, she had  suffered wounds and was limping.   She  denied
to have stated before the police that the appellants had snatched  her  gold
ornaments and had committed rape on her. She also denied to have  identified
 the ear studs, as those of the prosecutrix   and  instead   asserted   that
the same were not hers. She denied  the  suggestion  that   her   retraction
from the statement made before the police  was  with  a  view  to  help  the
accused persons.  She volunteered to state that  the reason for her  husband
to desert the prosecutrix was her activities of prostitution which had  come
to his knowledge.

            The witness further disclosed in her cross-examination   by  the
defence that about a fortnight before the incident, the  prosecutrix   along
with her had approached the accused persons  for  an  amount  of  Rs.  10000
which she intended to  invest for living in  a  separate  house,  which  was
however declined.  PW2 testified that this was not  to  the  liking  of  the
prosecutrix, who  was  enraged  by  such  refusal  and  left  the  place  by
intimidating them of adverse  consequences.   The  witness  on  oath  stated
further that the prosecutrix after returning  home   in  the  evenings   and
after  completing the house hold work,  used  to  go  around  in  the  night
indulging in prostitution and when asked  as  to  why  she  had  lodged  the
complaint against the  accused  persons,  she  disclosed  that   this  would
compel them to part with the money that she wanted.

9.           PW3  Dr.  B.R.S.  Kashyap   had  examined  the  appellants  and
opined that there was  nothing  to  suggest  that  they  were  incapable  of
performing sexual intercourse.  He also was of the view that the  injury  on
the body of the appellant Raju could have been sustained also in the  course
of attending his auto rickshaw or could be self- inflicted as well.

10.          PW4 Muthu produced as  a  seizure  witness  of  the  ear  studs
denied that same had been seized in his presence and instead testified  that
on the insistence of the police he put  his  signature  on  a  paper.   This
witness was declared hostile but did not budge from  his  statement  in  his
examination-in-chief.

11.             PW5 M.K. Srirangaiah  was  the  Tehsildar,  Bangalore  North
Taluk  at the relevant time and he proved  the conduct  of   TIP,  in  which
the prosecutrix  identified the appellants.

12.         PW8 K.M. Nandagopal was the Assistant Professor, OBG,  Vanivilas
Hospital on 11.10.1997 where at about 9 a.m. on that  day,  the  prosecutrix
was medically examined.  He deposed that the prosecutrix was found  to  have
sustained red colour injury on her  left  thigh.   While  stating  that  the
vaginal swab of the prosecutrix was sealed and sent to the Forensic  Science
Laboratory, he was of the clear opinion that she was accustomed  to the  act
of sexual intercourse.  In his cross-examination, the doctor  admitted  that
the prosecutrix did not reveal  any  evidence  or   sign  of  having  sexual
intercourse at the time of her examination.  Vis-a-vis the injuries  on  her
thigh, the witness stated that this could happen due to reasons  other  than
sexual intercourse.

13.          PW11 B.S.  Mudumadeviah,  the  Investigating  Officer  affirmed
that the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix at 2 a.m. on  11.10.1997  at  the
police station.  He deposed  that  after  the  medical  examination  of  the
prosecutrix, he accompanied her  to  the  place  of  occurrence  and  seized
therefrom a red colour drawer, one box of Nirodh (contraceptive),  two  auto
rickshaw seats, two broken pieces of black bangles and three  black  bangles
found strewn around.   He  identified  the  seized  articles  in  court.  He
referred to the disclosure statement of the  appellant  Parkash  leading  to
the discovery of the ear studs of the prosecutrix  from his house  which  he
identified in the court as well. He also claimed to  have  seized  the  auto
rickshaw  identified  by  the  same  appellant  used   for   abducting   the
prosecutrix.  According to him, he had written down  the  complaint  of  the
prosecutrix made verbally

            He conceded that the prosecutrix did  not  state  that  at  that
point of time, that she had been abducted  by  five  persons  and  raped  by
four.  She also did not disclose that there was  another  short  person  who
had raped her as well.  The witness admitted that she did not disclose  that
she was abducted while near the Fatima Bakery but referred to  the  spot  as
Richmond Park.  He denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix  at  the  time
of lodging of the complaint did not name  the  miscreants.   He  denied  the
suggestion  as  well  that  the  ear  studs  were  bought  from  Man  Pasand
Jewellers, Shanti Nagar  by taking  Rakesh,  a  friend  of  accused  No.  3-
Parkash for the purpose. He denied the suggestion with  regard  to  seizures
from the spot and also the identification by the  prosecutrix  at  the  test
identification parade.

14.         The defence witness Rakesh  deposed  on  oath  that   after  the
incident,  while one day he was in the house of Parkash, the police  visited
the  place  and   threatened  the  grand-father  of  the  appellant  Parkash
alleging that he (Parkash) had snatched  a  pair  of  ear  studs   from  the
prosecutrix, to which his grand-father objected.  The  witness  stated  that
then the police took him and the grand-father of the  appellant  Parkash  to
Man Pasand Jewellers, a local jewellery shop, where  the  police  threatened
the old man to pay the amount to purchase a pair of ear studs for Rs.  4000.
 The witness identified the ear studs through the emblem “M.P.” thereon.  He
denied that the material Ex. 1, the ear studs belonged  to  the  prosecutrix
and that the same  had been seized from the appellant Parkash.

15.         Mr. Basava Prabhu S.  Patil,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellants has insistently  argued  that  it  being  patent  on  a  combined
reading of the FIR and the testimony of the prosecutrix at the  trial,  that
she is wholly untrustworthy  and  that  the  appellants  have  been  falsely
implicated, the impugned judgement and order is liable to be set aside  lest
it perpetuates gross injustice.  The learned senior  counsel has urged  that
 not only  the  prosecutrix's  version  of  the  incident  as  a  whole   is
inherently improbable,  she has been  wholly  discredited  as  well  by  the
medical evidence belying the accusation of forcible  sexual  intercourse  by
the appellants in succession.  Castigating  the   investigating  agency  for
falsely foisting the articles claimed to have been seized on the  appellants
in its desperate attempt to  establish  their  culpability,  Mr.  Patil  has
maintained that as the  prosecutrix  admittedly  knew  the  appellants  from
before, their so called identification by her at  the  TIP  is  also  of  no
consequence. The learned senior counsel  asserted  that  PW2  Geeta,  though
having  been  declared  hostile,  her  evidence  at  the   trial   otherwise
consistent with  the  attendant  facts  and  circumstances  bearing  on  the
conduct and activities of the prosecutrix ought not to have  been  discarded
and this having vitiated the impugned decision as well, the  conviction  and
sentence recorded against the appellants is liable to  be  interfered  with.
As the prosecution has failed to  convincingly  prove  the  charge  levelled
against the appellants, they are entitled to be  acquitted,  he  urged.   To
buttress these pleas, reliance has been placed  on  the  decisions  of  this
Court in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal  Gupta  (Dr.)  and  others.  Vs.  State  of
Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657, Shyamal Saha Vs. State of West Bengal  (2014)
12 SCC 321. Himanshu alias Chintu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 2  SCC  36
and Raju and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 133.
16.         As against this, the learned state counsel wholly  endorsed  the
impugned decision contending that not only the testimony of the  prosecutrix
is true, cogent and convincing, having regard  to  the  charge  levelled  by
her, the same is deserving of full credence to base the  conviction  of  the
appellants  thereon.  According  to   the   learned   counsel,   the   minor
inconsistencies in the FIR and the  deposition  of  the  prosecutrix,  on  a
consideration  of  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,   are   acceptably
reconcilable.  As the identity of the appellants,  as  the  perpetrators  of
the crime, is not in doubt, they having been identified by  the  prosecutrix
in no uncertain terms, the prosecution case ought not to  be  jettisoned  by
relying on the evidence  of  PW2,   a  hostile  witness,  he  urged.   While
contending that the medical evidence is not mutilative  of  the  charge  and
that the  seizures  made  in  course  of  the  investigation  do  undeniably
establish the complicity of the  appellants,  their  conviction  is  legally
valid and does  not  merit  any  interference  in  the  instant  appeal,  he
maintained.
17.         We have lent our  anxious  consideration  to  the  materials  on
record as well as the competing arguments based thereon.  Having  regard  to
the charge levelled, the fulcrum of the prosecution case  logically  is  the
testimony of the prosecutrix.  Undeniably  therefore   the  credibility  and
trustworthiness of the victim’s version is the decisive  factor  to  adjudge
the culpability of the appellants.
18.         Filtering the unnecessary factual  details,  suffice  it  is  to
recount that the incident allegedly had occurred at 7.30 p.m.  on  a  public
road while the prosecutrix was returning home  after  the  day's  work.  Her
version is that while she was on the way, an auto rickshaw with two  persons
therein pulled up by her side  and  she  was  dragged  in  forcibly.   After
moving for about 10 minutes, the abductors were joined by two more  persons,
whereafter she was taken to a garage  and  was  molested  against  her  will
forcibly.
19.         To start with, the prosecutrix has contradicted herself qua  the
place of alleged kidnapping.  In the complaint, she mentioned  the  spot  to
be near Richmond  park, whereas in her evidence she referred to the same  as
opposite Johnson market.  It is more or less authenticated by  the  evidence
on record that after her abduction and on the way to the garage as  narrated
by her, she did not scream or cry for help.  This is of utmost  significance
as it is not alleged by her that the abductors had put  her  under  fear  on
the point of any weapon threatening physical injury thereby.  This  is  more
so, as admittedly the prosecutrix at the  relevant  time  was  a  major  and
could very well foresee the disastrous  consequences  to  follow.   She  has
admitted in her deposition as well that while she was  ravished  inside  the
garage and even during the intermittent breaks, she did not  shout  for  any
help.  Her version in the complaint with regard to  the  offending  act  and
the number of persons, who had committed the same, is inconsistent with  her
testimony on oath at the trial.  Notably  in  the  complaint  she  mentioned
about four persons of whom three raped and out of them,  two  committed  the
act twice.  She did not disclose in her complaint that the  accused  persons
were known to her from before and disclosed that they during  the  time  had
been referring to themselves as Raju,  Venu,  Parkash  and  Francis.   This,
however has been  denied  by  the  investigation  officer.    On  oath,  she
however introduced a fifth  person  as  well.   She  accused  all  the  four
persons to have committed sexual intercourse with her for the  second  time.
 Though grudgingly,  as admitted by her,  she  also  consumed  the  food  as
offered to her by her molesters.
In cross-examination, she admitted that  she  was  not  married  to  Sarvana
though she claimed him to be her husband in her  examination-in-chief.   She
disclosed more than once that the accused persons  used  to  tease  her  for
about 5-6 months prior to the incident and that she used to talk to them  as
well. In view of  this  admission  of  hers  ,  the  identification  by  the
prosecutrix  of the accused persons in the TIP  pales  into  insignificance.
She contradicted herself in the cross-examination by stating that  three  of
the four did rape her for the second time.  She was also  inconsistent  with
regard to the writer of her complaint.
Her conduct during the alleged ordeal is also unlike a  victim  of  forcible
rape and betrays somewhat submissive and consensual disposition.   From  the
nature of the exchanges between her and the accused persons as  narrated  by
her, the same are  not  at  all  consistent  with  those  of  an  unwilling,
terrified and anguished victim of forcible intercourse, if   judged  by  the
normal human conduct.
Her post  incident  conduct  and  movements  are  also  noticeably  unusual.
Instead of hurrying back home in a distressed, humiliated and  a  devastated
state, she stayed back in and  around  the  place  of  occurrence,  enquired
about the same from persons whom she claims to have met in  the  late  hours
of night, returned to the spot to identify the garage and even look  at  the
broken glass bangles, discarded litter etc.  According to her, she  wandered
around the place and as  disclosed  by  her  in  her  evidence,  to  collect
information so as to teach the  accused  persons  a  lesson.  Her  avengeful
attitude in the facts and circumstances,  as  disclosed  by  her,  if  true,
demonstrably evinces a  conduct  manifested  by  a  feeling  of  frustration
stoked by an intense feeling of deprivation of something  expected,  desired
or promised. Her confident movements alone past midnight, in that state  are
also out of the ordinary.  Her testimony that she  met  a  cyclist  to  whom
she narrated her tale of woe  and  that  on  his  information,  the  Hoysala
police came to the spot and that thereafter  she  was  taken  to  successive
police stations before lodging the complaint  at  Sampangiramanagara  police
station  as well   has to be accepted with a grain of salt.
20.          PW8,  who medically examined her, opined in  clear  terms  that
she was accustomed to sexual  intercourse  and  that  no  sign  of  forcible
intercourse was discernible.  This assumes great significance   in  view  of
the allegation of forcible rape  by 3 to 4  adult persons  more  than  once.
The medical opinion that she was accustomed  to  sexual  inter  course  when
admittedly she was living separately  from her husband for  1  and  ½  years
before the incident also has its own implication.  The medical  evidence  as
such  in  the  attendant  facts  and  circumstances  in  a  way  belies  the
allegation of gang rape.
21.         The evidence of PW2 Geeta who admittedly had offered shelter  to
the prosecutrix and her minor daughter, though  had been  declared  hostile,
her testimony as a whole cannot be brushed aside.  In  her  testimony,  this
witness indicated that the prosecutrix  used to  take  financial  help  from
the accused persons and that she used  to  indulge  in  dubious  late  night
activities for which her husband had deserted  her.   The  defence  plea  of
false implication as  the  accused  persons  had  declined   to  oblige  the
prosecutrix  qua her demand for financial help therefore cannot  be  lightly
discarded in the overall  factual  scenario.  Her  version  therefore  is  a
plausible one and thus fit in  with  the  defence  plea   to   demolish  the
prosecution case.

22.         That the evidence of a  hostile  witness  in  all  eventualities
ought not stand effaced altogether and that the same can be accepted to  the
extent found dependable on  a careful scrutiny was reiterated by this  Court
in Himanshu @ Chintu  (supra)  by  drawing  sustenance  of  the  proposition
amongst others from Khujii vs. State of M.P. (1991)  3  SCC  627   and  Koli
Lakhman Bhai Chanabhai vs. State of  Gujarat  (1999)  8  SCC  624.   It  was
enounced that the evidence of a hostile witness remains  admissible  and  is
open for a Court to rely on the dependable part thereof as found  acceptable
and duly corroborated by other reliable evidence available on record.

23.         The seizures  said to have been effected  by  the  investigating
agency also do not inspire confidence. Not only PW 4 Muthu denied  that  the
seizure of ear studs had been made  in  his  presence,   DW1   on  oath  had
stated that  this item of jewellery  had  in  fact  been  purchased  by  the
police from a local shop which he  could  identify  on  the  basis  of   the
symbol ‘MP’  inscribed thereon.  In any  view  of  the  matter,  the  seized
articles per se in absence of  any  evidence  of   corroboration  of  charge
would not, irrefutably prove  the  involvement  of  the  appellants  in  the
offence alleged.

24.         This Court in Raju (supra), while reiterating that the  evidence
of the  prosecutrix  in  cases  of  rape,  molestation  and  other  physical
outrages is to be construed to be that of an  injured  witness  so  much  so
that no corroboration is necessary, ruled  that  an  accused  must  also  be
protected against the possibility of false implication.  It  was  underlined
that the testimony of the  victim  in  such  cases,  though  commands  great
weight but the same, cannot  necessarily  be  universally  and  mechanically
accepted  to  be  free  in  all   circumstances   from   embellishment   and
exaggeration. It was ruled that the presumption of  absence  of  consent  of
the  victim,  where  sexual  intercourse  by  the  accused  is   proved   as
contemplated in Section 114A  of the Evidence Act, was extremely  restricted
in its application compared to the sweep and ambit of the presumption  under
Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.  It  was  exposited  that
insofar as the  allegation  of  rape  is  concerned,  the  evidence  of  the
prosecutrix must be examined as that of a injured witness whose presence  at
the spot is probable  but  it can  never  be  presumed  that  her  statement
should always  without exception, be taken  as gospel truth.
            The essence of this verdict which has stood  the  test  of  time
proclaims that though generally the testimony of a victim of  rape  or  non-
consensual physical assault  ought to be accepted as true  and  unblemished,
it would still be subject to judicial scrutiny lest a  casual,  routine  and
automatic acceptance  thereof  results  in  unwarranted  conviction  of  the
person charged.
25.          Vis-a-vis  the  scope  of   interference  with  a  judgment  of
acquittal, this Court  in Sunil Kumar Shabukumar Gupta (Dr.) (supra)  echoed
the hallowed proposition that if  two  views  are  possible,  the  appellate
court should not ordinarily  interfere therewith though its view may  appear
to be the more probable one.  While emphasizing that  the  trial  court  has
the benefit of watching the demeanour  of the witnesses  and  is  thus   the
best judge of their credibility, it was held that every accused is  presumed
to be innocent unless his guilt  is  proved  and  that  his  presumption  of
innocence gets reinforced with his acquittal by the trial  court's  verdict.
It was reiterated that only in  exceptionable  cases  and  under  compelling
circumstances, where the judgement of acquittal  is  found  to  be  perverse
i.e. if the  findings  have  been  arrived  at  by  ignoring   or  excluding
relevant materials or by taking into  consideration  irrelevant/inadmissible
material and are against the weight of evidence or  are so outrageously   in
defiance of logic so as to suffer from  the  vice  of  irrationality,   that
interference by the appellate court would be called for.
26.         That the appellate court is under an obligation to consider  and
identify the error in the decision of the trial court  and  then  to  decide
whether the error is gross enough to  warrant  interference  was  underlined
by this  Court  in  Shyamal  Saha  (supra).   It  was  emphasized  that  the
appellate court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion   for  that
of  the trial court  and  that  it  has  to  exercise  its  discretion  very
cautiously  to correct an error of law  or  fact,  if  any  and  significant
enough to warrant reversal of the verdict of the trial court.
27.          The  prosecution   case,  when  judged  on  the  touchstone  of
totality  of the facts and circumstances, does not generate the  unqualified
and unreserved satisfaction  indispensably required  to enter a finding   of
guilt against the appellants.   Having regard to the evidence on  record  as
a whole,   it is not possible for this Court to  unhesitatingly  hold   that
the  charge  levelled  against  the  appellants    has  been  proved  beyond
reasonable doubt. In our estimate, the view taken by  the  Trial  Court   is
the overwhelmingly possible one. In contrast,   the  findings  of  the  High
Court  are   decipherably     strained  in  favour  of  the  prosecution  by
overlooking many irreconcilable inconsistencies,  anomalies   and  omissions
rendering  the prosecution case unworthy of credit.   Noticeably,  the  High
Court has exonerated  the  appellants  of  the  charge  of  abduction  under
Section 366 IPC,  which  is  an  inseverable  component  of  the  string  of
offences alleged against them.   Judged by  the  known  parameters  of  law,
the view adopted by the High Court  is not  a plausible one when  juxtaposed
to that of the Trial Court.   We are of  the  unhesitant  opinion  that  the
prosecution has failed to prove the charge against  the  appellants  to  the
hilt as obligated in law  and thus, they are  entitled  to  the  benefit  of
doubt. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. The impugned  judgement  and
order is set-aside.  The appellants are  on  bail.   Their  bail  bonds  are
discharged.
                                                                           




NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 4, 2016.

                                                      ……....……………………..….J. 
                                                 (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)


                                                      ……....……………………..….J. 
                                                          (AMITAVA ROY)