तलाक (Divorce)

13. तलाक-

(1) कोई विवाह, भले वह इस अधिनियम के प्रारम्भ के पूर्व या पश्चात् अनुष्ठित हुआ हो, या तो पति या पत्नी पेश की गयी याचिका पर तलाक की आज्ञप्ति द्वारा एक आधार पर भंग किया जा सकता है कि -

(i) दूसरे पक्षकार ने विवाह के अनुष्ठान के पश्चात् अपनी पत्नी या अपने पति से भिन्न किसी व्यक्ति , के साथ स्वेच्छया मैथुन किया है; या

(i-क) विवाह के अनुष्ठान के पश्चात् अर्जीदार के साथ क्रूरता का बर्ताव किया है; या

(i-ख) अर्जी के उपस्थापन के ठीक पहले कम से कम दो वर्ष की कालावधि तक अर्जीदार को अभित्यक्त रखा है; या

(ii) दूसरा पक्षकार दूसरे धर्म को ग्रहण करने से हिन्दू होने से परिविरत हो गया है, या

(iii) दूसरा पक्षकार असाध्य रूप से विकृत-चित रहा है लगातार या आन्तरायिक रूप से इस किस्म के और इस हद तक मानसिक विकार से पीड़ित रहा है कि अर्जीदार से युक्ति-युक्त रूप से आशा नहीं की जा सकती है कि वह प्रत्यर्थी के साथ रहे।

स्पष्टीकरण -

(क) इस खण्ड में 'मानसिक विकार' अभिव्यक्ति से मानसिक बीमारी, मस्तिष्क का संरोध या अपूर्ण विकास, मनोविक्षेप विकार या मस्तिष्क का कोई अन्य विकार या अशक्तता अभिप्रेत है और इनके अन्तर्गत विखंडित मनस्कता भी है;

(ख) 'मनोविक्षेप विषयक विकार' अभिव्यक्ति से मस्तिष्क का दीर्घ स्थायी विकार या अशक्तता (चाहे इसमें वृद्धि की अवसामान्यता हो या नहीं) अभिप्रेत है जिसके परिणामस्वरूप अन्य पक्षकार का आचरण असामान्य रूप से आक्रामक या गम्भीर रूप से अनुत्तरदायी हो जाता है और उसके लिये चिकित्सा उपचार अपेक्षित हो या नहीं, या किया जा सकता हो या नहीं, या

(iv) दूसरा पक्षकार याचिका पेश किये जाने से अव्यवहित उग्र और असाध्य कुष्ठ रोग से पीड़ित रहा है; या

(v) दूसरा पक्षकार याचिका पेश किये जाने से अव्यवहित यौन-रोग से पीड़ित रहा है; या

 (vi) दूसरा पक्षकार किसी धार्मिक आश्रम में प्रवेश करके संसार का परित्याग कर चुका है; या

(vii) दूसरे पक्षकार के बारे में सात वर्ष या अधिक कालावधि में उन लोगों के द्वारा जिन्होंने दूसरे पक्षकार के बारे में, यदि वह जीवित होता तो स्वभावत: सुना होता, नहीं सुना गया है कि जीवित है।

स्पष्टीकरण -

इस उपधारा में 'अभित्यजन' पद से विवाह के दूसरे पक्षकार द्वारा अर्जीदार का युक्तियुक्त कारण के बिना और ऐसे पक्षकार की सम्मति के बिना या इच्छा के विरुद्ध अभित्यजन अभिप्रेत है और इसके अन्तर्गत विवाह के दूसरे पक्ष द्वारा अर्जीदार की जानबूझकर उपेक्षा भी है और इस पद के व्याकरणिक रूपभेद तथा सजातीय पदों के अर्थ तदनुसार किये जायेंगे।

(1-क) विवाह में का कोई भी पक्षकार चाहे वह इस अधिनियम के प्रारम्भ के पहले अथवा पश्चात् अनुष्ठित हुआ हो, तलाक की आज्ञप्ति द्वारा विवाह-विच्छेद के लिए इस आधार पर कि

(i) विवाह के पक्षकारों के बीच में, इस कार्यवाही में जिसमें कि वे पक्षकार थे, न्यायिक पृथक्करण की आज्ञप्ति के पारित होने के पश्चात् एक वर्ष या उससे अधिक की कालावधि तक सहवास का पुनरारम्भ नहीं हुआ है; अथवा

(ii) विवाह के पक्षकारों के बीच में, उस कार्यवाही में जिसमें कि वे पक्षकार थे, दाम्पत्य अधिकारों के प्रत्यास्थापन की आज्ञप्ति के पारित होने के एक वर्ष पश्चात् एक या उससे अधिक की कालावधि तक, दाम्पत्य अधिकारों का प्रत्यास्थापन नहीं हुआ है;

याचिका प्रस्तुत कर सकता है।

(2) पत्नी तलाक की आज्ञप्ति द्वारा अपने विवाह-भंग के लिए याचिका :-

(i) इस अधिनियम के प्रारम्भ के पूर्व अनुष्ठित किसी विवाह की अवस्था में इस आधार पर उपस्थित कर सकेगी कि पति ने ऐसे प्रारम्भ के पूर्व फिर विवाह कर लिया है या पति की ऐसे प्रारम्भ से पूर्व विवाहित कोई दूसरी पत्नी याचिकादात्री के विवाह के अनुष्ठान के समय जीवित थी;

परन्तु यह तब जब कि दोनों अवस्थाओं में दूसरी पत्नी याचिका पेश किये जाने के समय जीवित हो; या

(ii) इस आधार पर पेश की जा सकेगी कि पति विवाह के अनुष्ठान के दिन से बलात्कार, गुदामैथुन या पशुगमन का दोषी हुआ है; या

(iii) कि हिन्दू दत्तक ग्रहण और भरण-पोषण अधिनियम, 1956 की धारा 18 के अधीन वाद में या दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1973 की धारा 125 के अधीन (या दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1898 की तत्स्थानी धारा 488 के अधीन) कार्यवाही में यथास्थिति, डिक्री या आदेश, पति के विरुद्ध पत्नी को भरण-पोषण देने के लिए इस बात के होते हुए भी पारित किया गया है कि वह अलग रहती थी और ऐसी डिक्री या आदेश के पारित किये जाने के समय से पक्षकारों में एक वर्ष या उससे अधिक के समय तक सहवास का पुनरारम्भ नहीं हुआ है; या

(iv) किसी स्त्री ने जिसका विवाह (चाहे विवाहोत्तर सम्भोग हुआ हो या नहीं) उस स्त्री के पन्द्रह वर्ष की आयु प्राप्त करने के पूर्व अनुष्ठापित किया गया था और उसने पन्द्रह वर्ष की आयु प्राप्त करने के पश्चात् किन्तु अठारह वर्ष की आयु प्राप्त करने के पूर्व विवाह का निराकरण कर दिया है।

स्पष्टीकरण — यह खण्ड लागू होगा चाहे विवाह, विवाह विधि (संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1976 (1976 का 68) के प्रारम्भ के पूर्व अनुष्ठापित किया गया हो या उसके पश्चात्।

नवीनतम निर्णय हेतु कृपया यहाँ क्लिक करें

13. Divorce -

(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party -

(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or

(ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or

(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or

(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

Explanation - In this clause :(a) the expression "mental disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia; the expression "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or

(iv) has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or

(v) has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or

(vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or

(vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive;

Explanation — In this sub-section, the expression “desertion" means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground -

(i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or

(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.

(2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground

(i) in the case of any marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner:

Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition; or

(ii) that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality; or

(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)], a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards;

(iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.

Explanation - This clause applies whether the marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976).]

Commentary and Case Laws

1.  A. लंबे समय तक अलग रहना मात्र , तलाक का आधार नहीं हो सकता. अन्य तथ्यों को भी देखना आवश्यक (Mere long separation cannnot be only ground for divorce, other facts are also to be seen)  

   B. किसी भी पक्ष द्वारा दहेज़ सम्बन्धी क्रिमिनल मुकदमा जीतने का तथ्य ऊपरी न्यायालय में स्वमेव तलाक का आधार नहीं हो सकता जबकि यह आधार निचली अदालत में तलाक के केस में न रहा हो ( Mere  acquital in criminal case relating to dowery cannot be the ground automatically for divorce petition in the Higher Court unless it was the ground in divorce case in Lower  Court) [ Mangayakarasi Versus M. Yuvaraj-SC dated 03.03.2020]-     Supreme Court held that-

   1. The position of law is well settled that neither the High Court in the limited scope available to it in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code is entitled to reappreciate the evidence nor this Court.

   2. Questions raised does not qualify as substantial questions of law when the manner in which the parties had proceeded before the Trial Court is noticed. The questions framed in fact provides scope for re­appreciation of the evidence and not as substantial questions of law. If that be the position, a situation which was not the basis for initiating the petition for dissolution of marriage and when that was also not an issue before the Trial Court so as to tender evidence and a decision be taken, the High Court was not justified in raising the same as a substantial question of law and arriving at its conclusion in that regard. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court indicates that there is no reference whatsoever with regard to the evidence-based on which the dissolution of marriage had been sought, which had been declined by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and whether such consideration had raised any substantial question of law.

   3. The tenor of the substantial questions of law as framed in the instant case and decision taken on that basis if approved, it would lead to a situation that in every case if a criminal case is filed by one of the parties to the marriage and the acquittal therein would have to be automatically treated as a ground for granting divorce which will be against the statutory provision.

   4. In cases where there has been a long period of continuous separation and the marriage becomes a fiction it would be appropriate to dissolve such marriage. On the position of law enunciated it would not be necessary to advert in detail inasmuch as the decision to dissolve the marriage apart from the grounds available, will have to be taken on case to case basis and there cannot be a strait jacket formula. This Court can in any event exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in appropriate cases. However, in the instant facts, having given our thoughtful consideration to that aspect we notice that the parties hail from a conservative background where divorce is considered a taboo and further they have a female child born on 03.01.2007 who is presently aged about 13 years.

   5. In a matter where the differences between the parties are not of such magnitude and is in the nature of the usual wear and tear of marital life, the future of the child and her marital prospects are also to be kept in view, and in such circumstance the dissolution of marriage merely because they have been litigating and they have been residing separately for quite some time would not be justified in the present facts, more particularly when the restitution of conjugal rights was also considered simultaneously.

   6. In that view, having arrived at the conclusion that the very nature of the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court is not justified and the conclusion reached is also not sustainable, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside.

2.  A. पत्नी द्वारा साथ रहने की  मात्र औपचारिक  सहमति दिया जाना,जबकि वह वैवाहिक जीवन में सामंजस्य बिठाने एवं सही में साथ रहने हेतु तैयार नहीं, पति द्वारा  डिक्री प्राप्त करने  के  प्रयास को निरर्थक  करना ही  कहा जा सकता है. ऐसी सहमति डिक्री न दिए हेतु पर्याप्त कारण  नहीं है ( Mere giving formal willingness by the wife to live together, whereas she is not ready to make adjustment in married life and really not willing to live together, this is only to frustrate the endeavour of the husband to get a decree of divorce.Such willlingness is not sufficient for not not giving the decree.)

   B.यद्यपि तलाक के कानून में तलाक के आधार में असुधारयोग्य विवाह का विघटन का आधार सम्मिलित नहीं है किन्तु सर्वोच्च न्यायालय को अनुच्छेद 142 के तहत  पूर्ण न्याय किये जाने के प्रयोजन से यह अधिकार प्राप्त हैं, अतः इस आधार पर तलाक की  डिक्री जारी की गई.( Although the ground of irretrievable of marriage is not inserted in the law of divorce, yet the Supreme Court has unique power to grant decree of divorce for doing complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution and decree was divorce was granted.) [MUNISH KAKKAR VERSUS NIDHI KAKKAR: SC dated 17.12.2019]- Hon. Supreme Court held that-

   1. The fact, however,remains that the relationship appears to have deteriorated to such an extent that both parties see little good in each other, an aspect supported by the counselor’s report; though the respondent insists that she wants to stay with the appellant. In our view, this insistence is only to somehow not let a decree of divorce be passed against the respondent. This is only to frustrate the endeavour of the appellant to get a decree of divorce,completely losing sight of the fact that matrimonial relationships require adjustments from both sides, and a willingness to stay together. The mere say of such willingness would not suffice.

   2. It is no doubt true that the divorce legislations in India are based on the ‘fault theory’, i.e., no party should take advantage of his/her own fault, and that the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, as yet,has not been inserted in the divorce law, despite a debate on this aspectby the Law Commission in two reports.We, however, find that there are various judicial pronouncements where this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has granted divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage; not only in cases where parties ultimately, before this Court, have agreed to do so but even otherwise. There is, thus,recognition of the futility of a completely failed marriage being continuedonly on paper.No doubt there is no consent of the respondent. But there is also,in real terms, no willingness of the parties, including of the respondent to live together.

   3. There are only bitter memories and angst against eachother. This angst has got extended in the case of the respondent to somehow not permit the appellant to get a decree of divorce and “live his life”, forgetting that both parties would be able to live their lives in a better manner, separately, as both parties suffer from an obsession with legal proceedings, as reflected from the submissions before us.

   4. In numerous cases, where a marriage is found to be a dead letter, the Court has exercised its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to bring an end to it.The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution provide a unique power to the Supreme Court, to do “complete justice” between the parties, i.e., where at times law or statute may not provide a remedy, the Court can extend itself to put a quietus to a dispute in a manner which would befit the facts of the case.

   5. It is with this objective that we find it a ppropriate to take recourse to this provision in the present case.We, thus, exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, grant a decree of divorce and dissolve the marriage inter-se the parties forthwith.

3.  जब दोनों पक्ष सहमत हों  तब ऐसी दशा में निश्चित रूप से सक्षम न्यायालय में  तलाक की डिक्री  प्राप्त करने हेतु जा सकते है किंतु जब एक पक्ष सहमत नहीं हो तब ऐसी दशा में संविधान के अनुच्छेद 142 के तहत पूर्ण न्याय के उद्देश्य से, जबकि असुधारयोग्य विवाह विघटन की परिस्थितियाँ पैदा हो थी एवं दोनों पक्ष 22 वर्ष से अधिक समय से अलग रह रहे थे, तलाक  की डिक्री दी गई  यद्यपि  पत्नी का भविष्य सुरक्षित  करने के उद्देश्य से एकमुश्त रूपये 25 लाख की राशि भी स्वीकृति की गई (If both the parties to the marriage agree for separation permanently and/or consent for divorce, in that case, certainly both the parties can move the competent court for a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Only in a case where one of the parties do not agree and give consent, only the the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India are required to be invoked to do the substantial Justice between the parties, However,a lump sum permanent alimony, quantified at Rs.20,00,000/­ (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) to granted to be paid )  [ R. Srinivas Kumar Versus R. Shametha dated 14.10.2019]-Hon. Supreme Court held that-

   1. If both the parties to the marriage agree for separation permanently and/or consent for divorce, in that case, certainly both the parties can move the competent court for a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Only in a case where one of the parties do not agree and give consent, only the the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India are required to be invoked to do the substantial Justice between the parties, considering the facts and circumstances of the case. However, at the same time, the interest of the wife is also required to be protected financially so that she may not have to suffer financially in future and she may not have to depend upon others.

   2. This Court, in a series of judgments, has exercised its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India for dissolution of a marriage where the Court finds that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not provide a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted. In the present case, admittedly, the appellant­-husband and the respondent­-wife have been living separately for more than 22 years and it will not be possible for the parties to live together. Therefore, we are of the opinion that while protecting the interest of the respondent­ wife to compensate her by way of lump sum permanent alimony, this is a fit case to exercise the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to dissolve the marriage between the parties.

   3. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the application for divorce filed by the appellant ­husband for dissolution of marriage is hereby allowed.

   4. The marriage between the appellant husband and the respondent ­wife is ordered to be dissolved in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on the condition and as agreed by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant- husband that the appellant ­husband shall pay to the respondent-wife a lump sum permanent alimony, quantified at Rs.20,00,000/­ (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) to be paid directly to the respondent ­wife by way of demand draft within a period of eight weeks from today. Till the permanent alimony as above is paid to the respondent-­wife, the appellant-­husband to continue to pay the maintenance as being paid to her.

4. अधिनियम के तहत असुधारयोग्य विवाह विघटन मात्र अपने आप में. तलाक प्राप्त करने का आधार नहीं है तथा वर्त्तमान प्रकरण में कुछ मिसअंडरस्टैंडिंग मात्र  को  सेक्शन  13 के तहत मानसिक क्रूरता नहीं कहा जा सकता. सर्वोच्च न्यायालय द्वारा उच्च न्यायालय के तलाक की डिक्री को अपास्त किया जाकर अधीनस्थ न्यायालय के निर्णय को बरक़रार रखा गया ( Mere irretrievable breakdown of marriage by itsef is not a ground provided under the statute for seekind dissolution of marriage and some misundertanding in the instant case  cannnot be considered as infliction mental cruelty under section 13 . The Supreme Court after quashing the decree of divorce granted by High Court, upheld the decision of Lower Court) [Ravinder Kaur Versus Manjeet Singh (Dead) Through Lrs. dated 21.08.2019]- Hon.Supreme Court held that-    

   1. As already noticed, the High Court,while taking note of the nature of allegations made has proceeded on the basis that there is irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Needless to mention that irretrievable breakdown of marriage by itself is not a ground provided under the statute for seeking dissolution of marriage.

   2.  Hence, merely because certain issues have been raised with regard to the same, even if it be on a misunderstanding in the instant facts, it cannot be considered as inflicting mental cruelty in the nature it is required for considering the petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolving the marriage.Though the learned counsel representing the respondents referred to the incidents by which the appellant had hurled false allegations against the respondent, presently when the respondent has died and in a circumstance where one of the legal representatives, namely Shri Iqbbal Singh was examined as RW­6 in support of the case of the appellant herein and the legal representatives No.1 and 3, though were majors had not been examined in the proceedings, any contention raised on their behalf would not be of any assistance to take any other view.Therefore, if all these aspects are kept in perspective, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in reversing the well ­considered judgment passed by the trial court.