Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1912 of 2015, Judgment Date: Feb 16, 2015

 Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, however, has rightly  relied
on a series of Judgments of this Court, including O.P.  Gupta  v.  Union  of
India 1987 (4) SCC 328, where this Court has enunciated that the  suspension
of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be  continued  for
an unreasonably long period; that, therefore, an order of suspension  should
not be lightly passed.   
 Suspension,  specially  preceding  the  formulation  of  charges,  is
essentially transitory or temporary in  nature,  and  must  perforce  be  of
short duration.  If it is for an indeterminate period or if its  renewal  is
not based on sound reasoning  contemporaneously  available  on  the  record,
this would render it  punitive  in  nature.        Departmental/disciplinary
proceedings   invariably   commence   with   delay,   are    plagued    with
procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of  Charges,
and eventually culminate after even longer delay.
Protracted periods  of  suspension,  repeated  renewal  thereof,  have
regrettably become the norm and not the exception that  they  ought  to  be.
The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations,  the  scorn  of
society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this  excruciation
even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour,  indiscretion  or
offence.  His torment is his knowledge that if and  when  charged,  it  will
inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or  inquiry  to  come
to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or  iniquity.    
The right to speedy trial begins  with  the  actual
restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration  and  continues  at
all stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry,  trial,  appeal  and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result  from  impermissible
and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence  till  it
consummates into a finality, can be averted.  
 It seems to us that if Parliament considered  it  necessary  that  a
person be released from incarceration after  the  expiry  of  90  days  even
though accused  of  commission  of  the  most  heinous  crimes,  a  fortiori
suspension should not be continued after the expiry of  the  similar  period
especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been  served  on
the suspended person.   
 As in the case  in  hand,  the
Government is free to transfer the concerned person  to  any  Department  in
any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any  local  or
personal contact that he may have and which he may  misuse  for  obstructing
the investigation against him.   The Government may also prohibit  him  from
contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the  stage  of
his  having  to  prepare  his  defence.    We  think  this  will  adequately
safeguard the universally recognized principle  of  human  dignity  and  the
right to a speedy  trial  and  shall  also  preserve  the  interest  of  the
Government in the prosecution.   

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL No.  1912    OF 2015
                   (Arising out of SLP  No. 31761 of 2013


AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY                                     ...... APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS.                             ......RESPONDENTS
SECRETARY & ANR.

                               J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.

1     Leave granted.

2     The Appellant assails his suspension which was effected  on  30.9.2011
and has been extended and continued ever since.   In November, 2006, he  was
posted as the Defence Estate Officer (DEO) Kashmir Circle, Jammu &  Kashmir.
  During this tenure it was discovered that a  large  portion  of  the  land
owned by the Union of  India  and  held  by  the  Director  General  Defence
Estates had not been mutated/noted in the Revenue records as Defence  Lands.
 The Appellant  alleges  that  between  2008  and  2009,  Office-notes  were
prepared by his staff, namely, Shri Vijay Kumar, SDO-II, Smt. Amarjit  Kaur,
SDO-III, Shri Abdul Sayoom Technical Assistant, and Shri  Noor  Mohd.,  LDC,
that approximately four acres of land  were  not  Defence  Lands,  but  were
private lands in respect of which NOCs could be issued.    These  NOCs  were
accordingly  issued  by  the  Appellant.    Thereafter,  on  3.4.2010,   the
Appellant was transferred to Ambala  Cantt.    However,  vide  letter  dated
25.1.2011 the Appellant was asked to give his explanation  for  issuing  the
factually  incorrect  NOCs.    In  his  reply  the  Appellant  admitted  his
mistake, denied any mala fides in  issuing  the  NOCs,  and  attributed  the
issuance of the NOCs to the notes  prepared  by  the  subordinate  staff  of
SDOs/Technical Officer.   It was in this background  that  he  received  the
Suspension  Order  dated  30.9.2011.   Various  litigation  was  fruitlessly
initiated  by  the  Appellant  in  the  Central   Administrative   Tribunal,
Chandigarh Bench, as well as in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, with  which
we are not concerned.  The Appellant asserts that  since  the  subject  land
was within the  parameter  wall  of  the  Air  Force  Station,  no  physical
transfer thereof has occurred.  On  28.12.2011  the  Appellant's  suspension
was extended for the first time for a further period  of  180  days.    This
prompted the Appellant to  approach  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,
Chandigarh Bench (CAT), and during  the  pendency  of  the  proceedings  the
second extension was ordered with effect from 26.6.2012 for  another  period
of 180 days.   The challenge to these extensions did not meet  with  success
before the  CAT.    Thereafter,  the  third  extension  of  the  Appellant's
suspension was ordered on 21.12.2012, but for a  period  of  90  days.    It
came to be followed by the fourth suspension for yet another  period  of  90
days with effect from 22.3.2013.

3     It appears that the Tribunal gave partial relief to the  Appellant  in
terms of  its  Order  dated  22.5.2013  opining  that  no  employee  can  be
indefinitely suspended; that disciplinary proceedings have to  be  concluded
within a reasonable period.  The CAT directed that if  no  charge  memo  was
issued to  the  Appellant  before  the  expiry  on  21.6.2013  of  the  then
prevailing period the Appellant would be reinstated in  service.    The  CAT
further ordered that if it was decided to conduct an Inquiry it  had  to  be
concluded "in  a  time  bound  manner".   The  Appellant  alleges  that  the
suspension was not extended beyond 19.6.2013 but this is not correct.    The
Respondent, Union of India filed a  Writ  Petition  before  the  Delhi  High
Court contending that the Tribunal had exercised power not possessed  by  it
inasmuch as it directed that the suspension would not  be  extended  if  the
charge memo was served on the Appellant after the expiry  of  90  days  from
19.3.2013 (i.e. the currency of the then  extant  Suspension  Order).   This
challenge has found favour with the Court in terms of the impugned  Judgment
dated September 04, 2013.   The Writ Court formulated  the  question  before
it to be "whether the impugned directions  circumscribing  the  Government's
power to continue the suspension and also to issue a  chargesheet  within  a
time bound manner can be sustained".   It opined that  the  Tribunal's  view
was "nothing but a substitution of a judicial determination to that  of  the
authority possessing the power, i.e., the Executive  Government  as  to  the
justification or rationale to continue  with  the  suspension".    The  Writ
Petition was allowed  and  the  Central  Government  was  directed  to  pass
appropriate orders "as to whether it wishes to continue with the  suspension
or not having regard to all the relevant factors, including  the  report  of
the CBI, if any, it might have received by now.   This  exercise  should  be
completed as early as possible and within two weeks from today."

4     This has led to the filing of the Appeal before this Court.    In  the
hearing held on 11.07.14, it was noted that by letter  dated  13.6.2014  the
suspension of the Appellant had been continued for a period of 90 days  with
effect from 15.6.2014 (i.e. the fourth extension),  and  that  investigation
having been completed, sanction for prosecution was to be granted  within  a
period of two weeks.   When the arguments were heard in great detail on  9th
September, 2014 by which date neither a  Chargesheet  nor  a  Memorandum  of
Charges had been served  on  the  Appellant.    It  had  been  contended  by
learned counsel  for  the  Appellant  that  this  letter,  as  well  as  the
preceding one dated 8.10.2013, had been back-dated.   We had called for  the
original records and on perusal this  contention  was  found  by  us  to  be
without substance.

5     The learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  has  submitted  that  the
original suspension was in contemplation of  a  departmental  inquiry  which
could not be commenced because of  a  directive  of  the  Central  Vigilance
Commission  prohibiting  its  commencement  if  the  matter  was  under  the
investigation of the CBI.   The sanction  for  prosecution  was  granted  on
1.8.2014.   It was also submitted that the Chargesheet was  expected  to  be
served on the Appellant before 12.9.2014, (viz., before the  expiry  of  the
fourth extension).   However, we need to underscore that the  Appellant  has
been continuously on suspension from 30.9.2011.

6     It is necessary to record that all the relevant files  were  shown  to
us, on the perusal of which it was evident  that  reasons  were  elaborately
recorded for the each extension of suspension and  within  the  currency  of
the then prevailing period.    Therefore, the  reliance  of  learned  Senior
Counsel for the Appellant on Ravi  Yashwant  Bhoir  v.  District  Collector,
Raigad 2012 (4) SCC 407, is of no avail since the  salutary  requirement  of
natural justice, that is of spelling out the reasons for the passing  of  an
order, has been complied with.

7     Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, however, has rightly  relied
on a series of Judgments of this Court, including O.P.  Gupta  v.  Union  of
India 1987 (4) SCC 328, where this Court has enunciated that the  suspension
of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be  continued  for
an unreasonably long period; that, therefore, an order of suspension  should
not be lightly passed.   Our attention has also been drawn to  K.  Sukhendar
Reddy v. State of A.P.  1999 (6) SCC  257,  which  is  topical  in  that  it
castigates selective suspension perpetuated  indefinitely  in  circumstances
where other involved  persons  had  not  been  subjected  to  any  scrutiny.
Reliance on this decision is in the backdrop of the admitted facts that  all
the persons who have been privy to the making of the Office-notes  have  not
been  proceeded  against  departmentally.     So  far  as  the  question  of
prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned,  this  Court  in
State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4)  SCC  154,  has  observed  that  it
would be fair   to  make  this  assumption  of  prejudice  if  there  is  an
unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings.   However, the  decision
of this Court in Union of India v. Dipak Mali 2010  (2)  SCC  222  does  not
come to the succour of the Appellant since our  inspection  of  the  records
produced  in  original  have  established  that  firstly,  the  decision  to
continue the suspension was carried out within the  then  prevailing  period
and secondly, that it was duly supported by elaborate reasoning.

8      Suspension,  specially  preceding  the  formulation  of  charges,  is
essentially transitory or temporary in  nature,  and  must  perforce  be  of
short duration.  If it is for an indeterminate period or if its  renewal  is
not based on sound reasoning  contemporaneously  available  on  the  record,
this would render it  punitive  in  nature.        Departmental/disciplinary
proceedings   invariably   commence   with   delay,   are    plagued    with
procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of  Charges,
and eventually culminate after even longer delay.

9     Protracted periods  of  suspension,  repeated  renewal  thereof,  have
regrettably become the norm and not the exception that  they  ought  to  be.
The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations,  the  scorn  of
society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this  excruciation
even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour,  indiscretion  or
offence.  His torment is his knowledge that if and  when  charged,  it  will
inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or  inquiry  to  come
to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or  iniquity.    Much
too often this has now become an accompaniment to  retirement.   Indubitably
the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution  does  not  explicitly
guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to  the  incarcerated,  or
assume the presumption of innocence to the accused.  But  we  must  remember
that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable  tenets  of
common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna  Carta  of  1215,  which
assures that - "We will sell to no man, we will not deny  or  defer  to  any
man either justice or right."  In similar vein the Sixth  Amendment  to  the
Constitution of  the  United  States  of  America  guarantees  that  in  all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the  right  to  a  speedy  and
public trial.    Article 12 of the Universal Declaration  of  Human  Rights,
1948 assures that - "No one shall be  subjected  to  arbitrary  interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to  attacks  upon  his
honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the  law
against  such  interference  or  attacks".   More  recently,  the   European
Convention  on  Human  Rights  in  Article  6(1)  promises  that   "in   the
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal  charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair  and  public  hearing  within  a
reasonable time...." and in its second sub article  that  "everyone  charged
with a criminal offence shall  be  presumed  innocent  until  proved  guilty
according to law".

10    The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the  use  of  nolle
persequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent  postponement  of  civil
or criminal prosecution in Klapfer vs. State of North Carolina 386 U.S.  213
(1967).     In Kartar Singh vs.  State  of  Punjab  (1994)  3  SCC  569  the
Constitution Bench of  this  Court  unequivocally  construed  the  right  of
speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do  no  better  the  extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision -
" 86   The concept of speedy trial is read into Article  21 as an  essential
part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed  and  preserved
under our Constitution.  The right to speedy trial begins  with  the  actual
restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration  and  continues  at
all stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry,  trial,  appeal  and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result  from  impermissible
and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence  till  it
consummates into a finality, can be averted.  In this  context,  it  may  be
noted  that  the  constitutional  guarantee  of  speedy  trial  is  properly
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87.   This Court in Hussainara Khatoon  (I)  v.  Home  Secretary,  State  of
Bihar while dealing with  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  of  India  has
observed thus:
      "No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick  trial  can  be
regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would  fall  foul  of  Article
21.  There can, therefore, be no doubt that  speedy  trial,  and  by  speedy
trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is  an  integral  and  essential
part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in  Article  21.
The question which would,  however,  arise  is  as  to  what  would  be  the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and  is
sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of  a  long
delayed trial in violation  of  his  fundamental  right  under  Article  21.
Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed  from  the  charge
levelled against him on the ground that trying  him  after  an  unduly  long
period of  time  and  convicting  him  after  such  trial  would  constitute
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21."

11    The legal expectation of expedition and  diligence  being  present  at
every stage of a criminal trial and a  fortiori  in  departmental  inquiries
has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions.   The  Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225,  underscored
that  this  right  to  speedy  trial  is  implicit  in  Article  21  of  the
Constitution and is also reflected in Section  309  of  the  Cr.P.C.,  1973;
that  it  encompasses  all  stages,  viz.,  investigation,  inquiry,  trial,
appeal, revision and re-trial; that the burden lies on  the  prosecution  to
justify and explain the delay; that the Court must  engage  in  a  balancing
test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular  case
before it.   Keeping these factors in mind the CAT had in the case  in  hand
directed that the Appellant's suspension would not  be  extended  beyond  90
days from 19.3.2013.   The High Court had set aside this direction,  viewing
it  as  a  substitution  of  a  judicial  determination  to  the   authority
possessing that power, i.e., the Government.   This conclusion of  the  High
Court cannot be sustained in view of  the  following  pronouncement  of  the
Constitution Bench in Antulay:
86. In view of the above  discussion,  the  following  propositions  emerge,
meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these  propositions  are
not exhaustive. It is  difficult  to  foresee  all  situations.  Nor  is  it
possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable  procedure  implicit  in  Article  21  of  the
Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily.  Right  to
speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a  speedy  trial  is
also in public interest or that it serves the  social  interest  also,  does
not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest  of
all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused  is  determined  as
quickly as possible in the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial  flowing  from  Article  21  encompasses  all  the
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal,  revision
and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this  right  and  there
is no reason to take a restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy  trial  from  the  point  of
view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short  as
possible.  In  other  words,  the  accused  should  not  be   subjected   to
unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation  and  peace,
resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry  or  trial  should
be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the  accused
to defend himself, whether on account of [pic]death, disappearance  or  non-
availability of witnesses or otherwise.
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact  that  it  is  usually  the
accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is  often  pointed
out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since  the  burden  of  proving  the
guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily  prejudices
the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses,  disappearance  of  evidence
by lapse of time really work against the interest  of  the  prosecution.  Of
course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason,  also
delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to  speedy
trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to  be  put  and
answered is - who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by  either
party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and  interest,  as  perceived
by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can  the  time  taken  in
pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes  without  saying
that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the  day
of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The  mere
fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of  stay  granted
by a superior court is by  itself  no  proof  that  the  proceeding  is  not
frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation.
 (5) While determining  whether  undue  delay  has  occurred  (resulting  in
violation of Right to  Speedy  Trial)  one  must  have  regard  to  all  the
attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused  and
witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local  conditions
and so on - what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it  is  the
obligation of the  State  to  ensure  a  speedy  trial  and  State  includes
judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be  adopted
in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice  the  accused.  Some
delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell,  J.
in Barke 33 L Ed 2d 101 "it cannot be said how long a delay is too  long  in
a system where justice is supposed to be swift  but  deliberate".  The  same
idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell 15 L Ed  2d  627  in  the
following words:
'... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial  is  necessarily  relative,
is consistent with delays, and has  orderly  expedition,  rather  than  mere
speed, as its essential ingredients;  and  whether  delay  in  completing  a
prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional  deprivation  of  rights  depends
upon all the circumstances.'
However, inordinately long delay  may  be  taken  as  presumptive  proof  of
prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of  [pic]accused  will
also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to  become  a
persecution.  But  when  does  the  prosecution  become  persecution,  again
depends upon the facts of a given case.
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect  to,  what  is  called  the  'demand'
rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the  behest
of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's  plea  of  denial  of  speedy  trial
cannot be defeated by saying that the  accused  did  at  no  time  demand  a
speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet  he  was
not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his  favour,  but  the  mere
non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against  the  accused.  Even  in
USA, the relevance of demand rule has been  substantially  watered  down  in
Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance  and  weigh  the  several  relevant
factors - 'balancing test' or 'balancing process' - and  determine  in  each
case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that  right
to speedy trial of  an  accused  has  been  infringed  the  charges  or  the
conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not  the  only
course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances  in  a  given
case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest  of
justice. In such a case, it  is  open  to  the  court  to  make  such  other
appropriate order - including an order to conclude the trial within a  fixed
time where the trial is not concluded or reducing  the  sentence  where  the
trial  has  concluded  -  as  may  be  deemed  just  and  equitable  in  the
circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor  practicable  to  fix  any  time-limit  for
trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be  qualified  one.  Such  rule
cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of  proving  justification
on to the shoulders of the  prosecution.  In  every  case  of  complaint  of
denial of right to speedy trial, it is  primarily  for  the  prosecution  to
justify and explain the delay. At the same time,  it  is  the  duty  of  the
court to weigh all the circumstances of  a  given  case  before  pronouncing
upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly  refused  to
fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth  Amendment.  Nor  do  we
think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates  the  guarantee  of
right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial  and  for  relief
on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court.  Even  if  the
High Court entertains such  a  plea,  ordinarily  it  should  not  stay  the
proceedings, except in a case of grave  and  [pic]exceptional  nature.  Such
proceedings in High Court must,  however,  be  disposed  of  on  a  priority
basis.

12    State of Punjab  v.  Chaman  Lal  Goyal  (1995)  2  SCC  570  deserves
mention, inter alia,  because  action  was  initiated  on  25.3.1992  and  a
Memorandum of Charges was issued on 9.7.1992  in  relation  to  an  incident
which had occurred on 1.1.1987.   In the factual matrix  obtaining  in  that
case, this Court reserved and set aside the High  Court  decision  to  quash
the Inquiry because of  delay,  but  directed  that  the  concerned  officer
should be immediately considered for promotion without taking  the  pendency
of the Inquiry into perspective.

13    It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973  an  accused  could  be
detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15  days,  albeit,  after
judicial scrutiny and supervision.    The Cr.P.C. of  1973  contains  a  new
proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of  the  Magistrate
to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90  days  where
the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death,  imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond  a
period of 60 days where the investigation  relates  to  any  other  offence.
Drawing support from the observations contained of  the  Division  Bench  in
Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481,  and  more  so  of  the
Constitution  Bench  in  Antulay,  we  are  spurred   to   extrapolate   the
quintessence of the proviso  of  Section  167(2)  of  the  Cr.P.C.  1973  to
moderate Suspension Orders in cases of  departmental/disciplinary  inquiries
also.   It seems to us that if Parliament considered  it  necessary  that  a
person be released from incarceration after  the  expiry  of  90  days  even
though accused  of  commission  of  the  most  heinous  crimes,  a  fortiori
suspension should not be continued after the expiry of  the  similar  period
especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been  served  on
the suspended person.   It is  true  that  the  proviso  to  Section  167(2)
Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation  of  human
dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on  the
same pedestal.

14    We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension  Order  should
not extend beyond three months if  within  this  period  the  Memorandum  of
Charges/Chargesheet is not served on  the  delinquent  officer/employee;  if
the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a  reasoned  order  must  be
passed for the extension of the suspension.   As in the case  in  hand,  the
Government is free to transfer the concerned person  to  any  Department  in
any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any  local  or
personal contact that he may have and which he may  misuse  for  obstructing
the investigation against him.   The Government may also prohibit  him  from
contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the  stage  of
his  having  to  prepare  his  defence.    We  think  this  will  adequately
safeguard the universally recognized principle  of  human  dignity  and  the
right to a speedy  trial  and  shall  also  preserve  the  interest  of  the
Government in the prosecution.   We  recognize  that  previous  Constitution
Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the  grounds  of  delay,
and to set time limits to their duration.   However,  the  imposition  of  a
limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case  law,
and would not be contrary to the interests of  justice.    Furthermore,  the
direction of the  Central  Vigilance  Commission  that  pending  a  criminal
investigation departmental proceedings are to be  held  in  abeyance  stands
superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.

15    So far as the facts of the present case are concerned,  the  Appellant
has now been served with a Chargesheet,  and,  therefore,  these  directions
may not be relevant to him any longer.   However, if  the  Appellant  is  so
advised he may challenge his continued suspension in  any  manner  known  to
law, and this action of the Respondents will be subject to judicial  review.

16    The Appeal is disposed of in  the  above  terms  and  we  desist  from
imposing costs.

                                             ...........................J
                                                    [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

                                             ...........................J
                                                      [C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi;
February 16, 2015.