Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 1119-1120 of 2016, Judgment Date: Nov 30, 2016

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1119-1120 OF 2016

              [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6754-55 of 2014]


MUKARRAB ETC.                                              APPELLANTS


                                   Versus

STATE OF U.P.                                              RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.


      The present  appeals  by  special  leave  impugn  the  judgment  dated
27.05.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby  the
appeal  filed  by  the  appellants  herein  was  dismissed  affirming  their
conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 and Section  148  IPC
and also sentence of  imprisonment  for  life  under  Section  302  IPC  and
rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 148 IPC.

2.    Totally six accused including the appellants  herein  were  convicted.
The Special Leave Petitions preferred by the other  accused  namely  Babban,
Moazzam, Jahangir and Jamil were dismissed by this Court  at  the  admission
stage itself on 12.09.2014. Since the appellants  Mukarrab  and  Arshad  had
raised the claim of juvenility before this  Court,  notice  was  issued  qua
these accused to examine their claim that they  are  juveniles  in  conflict
with law under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000.

3.    Case of the prosecution is that  on  22.03.1994,  present  appellants,
Mukarrab and Arshad alongwith four others  viz.  Babban,  Moazzam,  Jahangir
and Jamil had a quarrel with the deceased, Azamul Haq while  he  was  coming
back to his house from the market at around 5.30 p.m., the  accused  persons
abused the deceased on the  pretext  that  he  was  causing  obstruction  in
Mangal Bazaar. Deceased tried to escape from the clutches of the  appellants
and other accused; but he was caught  and  attacked  by  tamanchas/guns  and
knives and killed. The occurrence was witnessed by five  eye  witnesses  who
were coming behind the deceased.

4.    The accused Moazzam, Jahangir,  Jamil,  Mukarrab  (appellant),  Babban
and Arshad (appellant), were charge-sheeted under Sections  147,  148,  149,
302 IPC and the case was committed  to  the  Court  of  Session.  Trial  was
conducted and  a  number  of  witnesses  were  examined  on  behalf  of  the
prosecution  as  well  as  the  defence.  Vide  judgment  and  order   dated
16.09.1995 passed by the VIIIth  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,
Moradabad in Session Trial No. 484 of 1994, all the accused  were  convicted
under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC  and  Section  148  IPC  and
sentence of imprisonment  for  life  under  Section  302  IPC  and  rigorous
imprisonment for two years under  Section  148  IPC  was  imposed.  All  the
sentences were to run concurrently. The accused challenged their  conviction
and sentence imposed on them by filing three  separate  appeals  before  the
High Court. The High Court disposed of all the  three  appeals  vide  common
judgment and order dated 27.05.2014, thereby  affirming  the  conviction  of
the accused persons and sentence imposed thereof.

5.    The above judgment  and  order  dated  27.05.2014  was  challenged  by
filing special leave petition before this  Court.  Appellants  Mukarrab  and
Arshad for the very first time raised the claim of  juvenility  before  this
Court. This Court vide order dated  12.09.2014  issued  notice  qua  present
appellants only viz. accused-Mukarrab and accused-Arshad, only  with  regard
to their claim that they  are  minors  under  Section  7A  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The trial  court  which
had conducted the trial was directed to examine the aspect of juvenility  of
the present appellants and submit a report. As noted  earlier,  the  special
leave petitions qua other accused were dismissed.

6.    VIIIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad conducted  an
inquiry and recorded his findings in a report dated 28.10.2014. The  learned
Judge concluded that  in  all  probabilities  on  the  date  of  occurrence,
accused-Mukarrab could not have been younger than 22 years 2 months 21  days
and accused-Arshad, than 19 years 2 months  21  days  on  the  date  of  the
incident, thereby negatived the  claim  of  juvenility  raised  by  the  two
accused-appellants.  However,  on  perusal  of  the   above   report   dated
28.10.2014 as well as the  objections  filed  thereagainst,  certain  doubts
were raised concerning the genuineness  of  the  report.  Accordingly,  vide
order dated 06.04.2016, this Court observing that there is no document  from
which date of  birth  of  the  appellants  could  be  ascertained,  directed
ossification test to be conducted,  so  as  to  ascertain  the  age  of  the
appellants.

7.    Accused-Mukarrab and accused-Arshad who were  lodged  in  Mathura  and
Hardoi jails respectively in U.P. were produced  before  the  Medical  Board
constituted at the All India  Institute  of  Medical  Science  (AIIMS),  New
Delhi  on  02.05.2016  for  medical  examination  (ossification   test   for
ascertaining bone age). Medical Board constituted at  AIIMS,  New  Delhi  in
its report dated 05.05.2016, opined that the age of both the accused  ranges
between 35-40 years on the date of the examination.

8.    The short question falling for consideration in these appeals is  that
whether the appellants Mukarrab and Arshad were juveniles  on  the  date  of
the occurrence and the question of admissibility and reliability of  medical
opinion  in  age  determination  under  the  Juvenile  Justice   (Care   and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 vis-à-vis juvenility  of  the  accused  at
the time of committing the offences.

9.    We have heard the parties before us and  have  perused  the  materials
and the medical report available on record.

10.   Age determination is essential to find out whether or not  the  person
claiming to be a child is below the cut-off age prescribed  for  application
of the Juvenile Justice Act. The issue of age  determination  is  of  utmost
importance as very few children subjected to the provisions of the  Juvenile
Justice Act have a birth certificate.  As  juvenile  in  conflict  with  law
usually do not have any documentary evidence, age determination,  cannot  be
easily ascertained,  specially  in  borderline  cases.  Medical  examination
leaves a margin of about two years on either side even if ossification  test
of multiple joints is conducted.

11.   Time and again, the questions arise:  How  to  determine  age  in  the
absence of birth certificate? Should documentary evidence be preferred  over
medical evidence? How to use  the  medical  evidence?  Is  the  standard  of
proof, a proof beyond reasonable doubt or  can  the  age  be  determined  by
preponderance of evidence? Should the person whose age cannot be  determined
exactly, be given the benefit of doubt and be treated as  a  child?  In  the
absence of a birth certificate issued soon  after  birth  by  the  concerned
authority, determination of age becomes a very difficult  task  providing  a
lot of discretion to the Judges to pick and choose  evidence.  In  different
cases, different evidence  has  been  used  to  determine  the  age  of  the
accused.

12.   This Court in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488,  clarified
that the review of judicial opinion shows that the Court should not  take  a
hyper-technical approach while appreciating evidence  for  determination  of
age of the accused. If two views are possible,  the  Court  should  lean  in
favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile  in  borderline  cases.  This
approach was further reiterated by this Court in Rajindra Chandra  v.  State
of Chhatisgarh and Another (2002) 2 SCC 287, in which it laid down that  the
standard of proof for age determination is the  degree  of  probability  and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

13.   It is noteworthy that the Juvenile Justice  (Care  and  Protection  of
Children) Act, 2000 does not lay down any  fixed  criteria  for  determining
the age of the person. Section 49(1)  of  the  Juvenile  Justice  (Care  and
Protection  of  Children)   Act,   2000   provides   for   presumption   and
determination of age as under:-

“49. Presumption and  determination  of  age.—(1)  Where  it  appears  to  a
competent  authority  that  person  brought  before  it  under  any  of  the
provisions of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of  giving  evidence)
is a juvenile or the child, the competent authority shall make  due  inquiry
so as to the age of that  person  and  for  that  purpose  shall  take  such
evidence as may be necessary (but not  an  affidavit)  and  shall  record  a
finding whether the person is a juvenile or the child or  not,  stating  his
age as nearly as may be.”


From a reading of the above provision, it is clear  that  it  provides  that
when it appears to the  competent  authority  namely,  the  Board  that  the
person brought before it is a juvenile, the Board  is  obliged  to  make  it
clear as to the age of that person and for  that  purpose  the  Board  shall
take such evidence as may be necessary and then  record  a  finding  whether
the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his  age  as  nearly  as
may be.

14.    Under  Rule  12,  the  Board  is  enjoined  to  take   evidence   for
determination of age. Rule 12 is as under:-

“12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age: ?

 (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in  conflict  with  law,
the   court   or   the   Board   or    as    the    case    may    be    the
Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall  determine the  age of
such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law  within  a  period
of thirty days  from  the  date  of  making  of  the  application  for  that
purpose. 

(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall  decide
the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case  may
be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of   physical
 appearance  or  documents, if available, and  send him  to the  observation
home or in jail.

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with  law,  the
age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the  Board  or,
as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining –

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;  and  in
the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate  from  the  school  (other  than  a  play
school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal  authority
or a panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i),  (ii)  or  (iii)  of  clause  (a)
above, the medical opinion will be sought from a  duly  constituted  Medical
Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.  In  case  exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or  the  Board  or,  as  the
case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may,  if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile  by  considering
his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year.

and,  while  passing  orders  in  such  case  shall,   after   taking   into
consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, 

as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age  and  either   of
the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or  in  the
absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive  proof  of  the  age  as
regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.

(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict  with  law
is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the  basis  of  any
of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court  or  the  Board
or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an  order  stating
the age and declaring  the  status  of  juvenility  or  otherwise,  for  the
purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order  shall  be  given
to such juvenile or the person concerned.

(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is  required,  inter
alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the  Act  and  these  rules,  no
further inquiry  shall  be  conducted  by  the  court  or  the  Board  after
examining and obtaining the  certificate  or  any  other  documentary  proof
referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.

(6) The provisions  contained  in  this  rule  shall  also  apply  to  those
disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not  been  determined
in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-rule  (3)  and  the  Act,
requiring  dispensation  of  the  sentence  under  the   Act   for   passing
appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.”


15.   Summarizing the legal position as  to  the  claim  of  juvenility  and
observing that such plea can be raised at any stage and after  referring  to
various decisions, three-Judges Bench of this Court in Abuzar Hossain  alias
Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 held as under:-

“39. Now, we summarise the position which is as under:

39.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after the  final
disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this  Court
as well after the final disposal of the  case.  The  delay  in  raising  the
claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for  rejection  of  such  claim.  The
claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed  before  the
trial court and can be raised for the first time before  this  Court  though
not pressed before the trial court and in the appeal court.

39.2. For making a claim with regard to  juvenility  after  conviction,  the
claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the  court
that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is  necessary.  Initial  burden
has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility.

39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the  court  and/or  are
sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued  nor  can
it be laid down as to what weight should be given to  a  specific  piece  of
evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but  the
documents referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i)  to  (iii)  shall  definitely  be
sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the  age  of  the
delinquent necessitating  further  enquiry  under  Rule  12.  The  statement
recorded under Section 313 of the Code is  too  tentative  and  may  not  by
itself  be  sufficient  ordinarily  to  justify  or  reject  the  claim   of
juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents  like  the
school  leaving  certificate  or  the  voters’  list,  etc.  obtained  after
conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case  and  no
hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie  accepted
or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh (2009) 7 SCC 415 and Pawan (2009)  15  SCC  259
these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra  Singh
(2010) 13 SCC 523 the documents viz. school leaving  certificate,  marksheet
and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry  and
verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents prima  facie  inspire
confidence of the court, the court may  act  upon  such  documents  for  the
purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination  of  the  age
of the delinquent.

39.4. An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling  or  a
relative in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time  in
appeal or revision or before this Court during the pendency  of  the  matter
or after disposal of the case shall not be sufficient justifying an  enquiry
to determine the age of such person unless the  circumstances  of  the  case
are so glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of the  court  to  order
an enquiry into determination of the age of the delinquent.

39.5. The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for  the  first  time
should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and  be  alive  to
the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions  contained  in  the
2000 Act are not defeated by the hypertechnical  approach  and  the  persons
who are entitled to get benefits of the 2000  Act  get  such  benefits.  The
courts should not be unnecessarily  influenced  by  any  general  impression
that in schools the parents/guardians understate the age of their  wards  by
one or two years for future benefits or that age  determination  by  medical
examination is not very precise.  The  matter  should  be  considered  prima
facie on the touchstone of preponderance of probability.

39.6. Claim of juvenility lacking  in  credibility  or  frivolous  claim  of
juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim  of  juvenility
must be rejected by the court at the threshold whenever raised.”


16.   In the present case,  the  appellants  by  filing  applications  under
Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2000 read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile  Justice  Rules,  2007  have  claimed
that at the time of committing the offences they were  juvenile  i.e.  below
the age of 18 years. Appellant-Mukarrab has claimed  that  he  was  born  on
01.07.1978 and thus, on the date of the incident i.e. 22.03.1994, he  was  a
child aged 15  years  8  months  22  days.  Likewise,  appellant-Arshad  has
claimed that he was born on 05.02.1979 and thus on the date of the  incident
i.e. 22.03.1994, he was a child aged 15 years 1 month  17  days.  Appellants
did not raise the plea of juvenility before any of the previous fora; it  is
only before this Court that they have raised the plea of juvenility.

17.   As already noted,  by  an  order  dated  18.02.2016,  this  Court  had
directed the concerned District and Sessions Judge  to  conduct  an  inquiry
and submit a report as to the age of the appellants (Mukarrab  and  Arshad).
As per the report submitted by the VIIIth Additional District  and  Sessions
Judge, Moradabad both the appellants (Mukarrab and  Arshad)  were  major  on
the date of the incident. After perusing the report of the  District  Judge,
by order dated 06.04.2016, this Court has directed  medical  examination  of
the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad) to be conducted by a  duly  constituted
Medical Board of the AIIMS, New Delhi. Accordingly,  the  doctors  of  AIIMS
have examined the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad) and given  their  opinion
as under:-

“Alleged history in Brief: On perusal of the documents submitted  to  AIIMS,
it was revealed that the year of commission of crime was 1994 i.e. 22  years
before today i.e. 02.05.2016.

The said accused Mukarrab alleged his date of birth to be 1st July, 1978.

The said accused Arshad has submitted  the  documentary  proof  of  his  age
stating date of Birth as 5th February, 1979.

Examination Proceedings: Both the accused were  examined  after  taking  due
informed consent along with signature and left thumb impression.

.....

Their physical, dental and radiological examinations were  carried  out.  X-
ray examination of Skull (AP and lateral  view),  Sternum  (AP  and  lateral
view) and Sacrum (lateral view) were advised and  performed.  There  was  no
indication for Dental X-rays since both accused were much  beyond  25  years
of age in any case.

Physical  and  Dental  Examination:  In   both   cases,   general   physical
examination findings are consistent with  findings  of  normal  adult  male.
Dental examination shows presence of complete 8 sets of permanent  teeth  in
all 4 quadrants.


      Report of Radiological Examination-

Mukarrab

Medical end of clavicle fused-age>more than 22 years

Xiphoid process not fused with sternal body-age<40 years

Manubrium not fused with sternal body-age<50 years

Complete fusion of sacral bodies-age>32 years

Saggital  suture  obliterated  in  posterior  1/3rd   and   coronal   suture
obliterated in lower ½-age<40 years.


Arshad

Medical end of clavicle fused-age>more than 22 years

Xiphoid process not fused with sternal body-age<40 years

Manubrium not fused with sternal body-age<50 years

Complete fusion of sacral bodies-age>32 years

Saggital suture obliterated in posterior 1/3rd and  coronal  suture  intact-
age<40 years.


Opinion: Both  accused  have  been  brought  for  examination  at  AIIMS  on
02.05.2016, 22 years after  the  alleged  date  of  incidence.  After  going
through  the  various  findings  of  physical,   dental   and   radiological
examinations; medical board  is  of  considered  opinion  that  the  age  of
accused viz. Mukarrab s/o Mr. Mulla Zafar as well as Arshad  s/o  Rashid  is
between 35-40 years on the date of examination i.e. 02.05.2016.


18.   The question falling for consideration is whether the opinion  of  the
Medical Board of AIIMS determining the age of the appellants  between  35-40
years, can be accepted or not.

19.   Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that  the  general
rule about age determination is that  the  age  determined  by  the  Medical
Board vary plus or minus two years but the Medical Board in  this  case  had
fixed the age of the appellants at 35-40 years  and  going  by  the  general
rule, the age of the appellants is to be estimated as 38 years on  the  date
of medical  examination  and  giving  additional  benefit  of  one  year  in
lowering the age in terms of Rule 12(3)(b), age of the appellants is  to  be
determined as 37 years as on the date of medical examination on  02.05.2016.
It was, therefore, submitted that taking the age of  the  appellants  as  37
years as on 02.05.2016 which means that at the time  of  commission  of  the
offence in 1994, the appellants would have been only  aged  about  15  years
and, therefore, the benefit of Juvenile Justice Act to be  extended  to  the
appellants.  Contending  that  the  benefit  of  benevolent  provisions   of
Juvenile Justice Act and the  Rules  must  be  extended  to  the  appellants
herein, learned Senior Counsel for  the  appellant  relied  upon  Darga  Ram
alias Gunga v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 2 SCC 775 wherein it has been  held
as under:-

“16. The medical opinion given by  the  duly  constituted  Board  comprising
Professors of Anatomy, Radio diagnosis and Forensic Medicine has  determined
his age to be “about” 33 years on the date of  the  examination.  The  Board
has not been able to  give  the  exact  age  of  the  appellant  on  medical
examination, no matter the advances made in that field. That  being  so,  in
terms of Rule 12(3)(b) the appellant may even be entitled to the benefit  of
fixing his age on the lower side within a margin of one  year  in  case  the
Court considers it necessary to do so in the facts and circumstances of  the
case. The need for any such  statutory  concession  may  not  however  arise
because even if the estimated age as determined  by  the  Medical  Board  is
taken as the correct/true age of the appellant he was just  about  17  years
and 2 months old on the date of the occurrence and thus  a  juvenile  within
the meaning of that expression as used in  the  Act  aforementioned.  Having
said that we cannot help observing that we have not  felt  very  comfortable
with the Medical Board estimating the age of the appellant in a range of  30
to 36 years as on the date of the medical examination.

17. The general rule about age determination is that the age  as  determined
can vary plus minus two years but the Board has in the case at  hand  spread
over a period of six years and taken a mean to fix the age of the  appellant
at 33 years. We are not sure whether that is the correct way  of  estimating
the age of the appellant. What reassures us about the  estimate  of  age  is
the fact  that  the  same  is  determined  by  a  Medical  Board  comprising
Professors of Anatomy, Radiodiagnosis and Forensic  Medicine  whose  opinion
must get the respect it deserves.  That  apart,  even  if  the  age  of  the
appellant was determined by the upper extremity  limit  i.e.  36  years  the
same would have been subject to variation of  plus  minus  2  years  meaning
thereby that he could as well be 34 years on the date  of  the  examination.
Taking his age as 34 years on the date of  the  examination  he  would  have
been 18 years, 2 months and 7 days on the date of the  occurrence  but  such
an estimate would be only an estimate and the appellant may be  entitled  to
additional benefit of one year in terms of lowering his age by one  year  in
terms of Rule 12(3)(b) (supra) which would then bring him  to  be  17  years
and 2 months old, therefore, a juvenile.”


20.    Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  submitted  that  the
ossification test is not the sole criteria for determining the age and  that
the medical opinion has to be considered alongwith  other  cogent  evidence.
In support of this contention, reliance  was  placed  upon  Babloo  Pasi  v.
State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133.

21.   A reading of the above decision in Darga Ram alias Gunga’s case  shows
that courts need to be aware of the  fact  that  age  determination  of  the
concerned  persons  cannot  be  certainly  ascertained  in  the  absence  of
original  and  valid  documentary  proof  and  there  would  always  lie   a
possibility that the age of the concerned person may vary plus or minus  two
years. Even in the presence of medical opinion,  the  Court  showed  a  tilt
towards the juvenility of the accused. However,  it  is  pertinent  to  note
that such an approach in Darga Ram alias  Gunga’s  case  was  taken  in  the
specific facts and circumstances of that particular case and any attempt  of
generalising the said approach could not be justifiably entertained.

22.   It is well-accepted fact that  age  determination  using  ossification
test does not yield accurate and  precise  conclusions  after  the  examinee
crosses the age of 30 years, which  is  true  in  the  present  case.  After
referring to Bhola Bhagat’s case  and  other  decisions,  in  Babloo  Pasi’s
case, this Court held as under:-

“18. Nevertheless, in Jitendra Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2006)  9  SCC  428
the Court sounded a note of caution that  the  aforestated  observations  in
Bhola Bhagat (1997) 8 SCC 720 would not  mean  that  a  person  who  is  not
entitled to the benefit of the said Act would be dealt with  leniently  only
because such a plea is raised. Each plea must be judged  on  its  own  merit
and each case has to be considered on the basis of the materials brought  on
record.

22. It is well settled that it is neither  feasible  nor  desirable  to  lay
down an abstract formula to determine the age  of  a  person.  The  date  of
birth is to be determined  on  the  basis  of  material  on  record  and  on
appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as  to
the age of a person, though a very useful guiding factor, is not  conclusive
and has to be considered along with other cogent evidence.

23. It is true that in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000)  5  SCC  428  this
Court has, on a review of judicial  opinion,  observed  that  while  dealing
with a question of determination of the age of an accused, for  the  purpose
of finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a  hyper-technical  approach
should not be adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on  behalf  of
the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if  two  views
may be possible on the same evidence, the court should  lean  in  favour  of
holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. We  are  also  not
oblivious of the fact that being a welfare legislation,  the  courts  should
be zealous to see that a juvenile derives full benefits  of  the  provisions
of the Act but at the same time it is also  imperative  for  the  courts  to
ensure that the protection and privileges under the Act are not  misused  by
unscrupulous persons to escape  punishments  for  having  committed  serious
offences.”


23.   In Criminal Appeal No. 486  of  2016  dated  12.05.2016,  Parag  Bhati
(Juvenile) through Legal Guardian-Mother-Smt. Rajni Bhati v. State of  Uttar
Pradesh  and  Anr.,  after  referring  to  Abuzar  Hossain  case  and  other
decisions of this Court, this Court held as under:-

“26. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and  unambiguous  case  in
favour of the juvenile accused that he was a  minor  below  the  age  of  18
years on the date of the incident and  the  documentary  evidence  at  least
prima facie proves the same, he would be entitled to the special  protection
under the JJ Act. But when an accused commits a grave  and  heinous  offence
and thereafter attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise  of  being
a minor, a casual or cavalier approach while  recording  as  to  whether  an
accused is a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are  enjoined
upon to perform their duties with the object of  protecting  the  confidence
of common man in  the  institution  entrusted  with  the  administration  of
justice.

27. The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation attached  to  the
JJ Act would thus apply to only such cases wherein the accused  is  held  to
be a juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie  evidence  regarding  his
minority as the benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard  to  the
age of the alleged accused who is involved  in  grave  and  serious  offence
which  he  committed  and  gave  effect  to  it  in  a  well-planned  manner
reflecting his maturity of mind rather than innocence  indicating  that  his
plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a shield to dodge  or  dupe  the
arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his rescue.” [Emphasis added]


From the above decision, it is clear that the purpose  of  Juvenile  Justice
Act, 2000 is not to give  shelter  to  the  accused  of  grave  and  heinous
offences.

24.   Keeping in view the above principles,  let  us  consider  the  medical
opinion of the Medical Board  determining  the  age  of  the  appellants  as
between 35-40 years on the date of examination that is on  02.05.2016.  This
wide variation in the age, even as per medical opinion  is  because  of  the
reason that it was now  too  late,  because  of  the  advanced  age  of  the
appellants to have precise determination of his age. As noted earlier,  such
a plea of juvenility is raised for the first time  in  this  Court  and  the
same has to be considered on the material  brought  on  record  before  this
Court. On the basis of the age  of  the  appellants  (Mukarrab  and  Arshad)
determined between 35-40 years in May,  2016,  giving  a  variation  of  two
years in upper age limit i.e. age of  the  appellants  would  be  38  years.
Giving additional benefit of lowering their age by  one  year  in  terms  of
Rule 12(3)(b) would bring their age as 37 years as on May, 2016. That  means
the appellants are  supposed  to  be  born  in  1979  and  at  the  time  of
occurrence in 1994, the appellants would have been of  around  15  years  of
age.

25.   Having  regard  to  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  a  blind  and
mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be  adopted  solely  on
the basis of the medical opinion by the radiological  examination.  At  page
31 of Modi’s Text Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,  20th  Edn.,
it has been stated as follows:

“In ascertaining the age of young persons radiograms  of  any  of  the  main
joints of the upper or the lower extremity of both sides of the body  should
be taken, an opinion should be given according to the following  table,  but
it must be remembered that too much reliance should not be  placed  on  this
table as it merely indicates an average and is likely to vary in  individual
cases  even  of  the  same  province  owing   to   the   eccentricities   of
development.”


Courts have taken judicial notice of this fact and  have  always  held  that
the evidence afforded by radiological  examination  is  no  doubt  a  useful
guiding factor for determining the age of a person but the evidence  is  not
of a conclusive and incontrovertible nature and it is subject  to  a  margin
of error. Medical evidence as to the age of a person though  a  very  useful
guiding factor is not conclusive and has to be considered along  with  other
circumstances.

26.   In a recent judgment, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh (2015)  7
SCC 773, it was held that the ossification test is  not  the  sole  criteria
for age determination. Following Babloo Pasi and  Anoop  Singh’s  cases,  we
hold that ossification test cannot be regarded as conclusive when  it  comes
to ascertaining the age of a person. More so,  the  appellants  herein  have
certainly crossed the age of thirty years which is an  important  factor  to
be taken into account as age cannot be determined with  precision.  In  fact
in the medical report of the appellants, it is  stated  that  there  was  no
indication for dental x-rays since both the accused were beyond 25 years  of
age.

27.   At this juncture, we may usefully refer to  an  article  “A  study  of
wrist  ossification  for  age  estimation  in  pediatric  group  in  central
Rajasthan”, which reads as under:-

“There are various criteria for  age  determination  of  an  individual,  of
which eruption of teeth and ossification activities of bones are  important.
Nevertheless age can usually be assessed  more  accurately  in  younger  age
group by dentition and ossification alongwith epiphyseal fusion.

[Ref: Gray H. Gray’s  Anatomy.  37th  ed.  Churchill  Livingstone  Edinburgh
London Melbourne and New York: 1996; 341-342];

A careful examination of teeth  and  ossification  at  wrist  joint  provide
valuable data for age estimation in children.

[Ref: Parikh CK. Parikh’s Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and  Toxicology.
5th edn.: Mumbai Medico-Legal Centre Colaba:1990;44-45];

……

Variations in the appearance of center of ossification at wrist joint  shows
influence of race, climate, diet and regional factors. Ossification  centres
for the distal ends of radius and ulna consistent with  present  study  vide
article “A study of Wrist  Ossification  for  age  estimation  in  pediatric
group in Central Rajasthan” by Dr. Ashutosh Srivastav,  Senior  Demonstrator
and a team of other doctors, Journal of Indian Academy of Forensic  Medicine
(JIAFM), 2004; 26(4). ISSN 0971-0973].


28.    In  the  present  case,  their  physical,  dental  and   radiological
examinations were carried out. Radiological examination  of  Skull  (AP  and
lateral view), Sternum (AP and lateral view) and Sacrum (lateral  view)  was
advised and performed. As per the medical report, there  was  no  indication
for dental x-rays since both the accused were much beyond 25 years  of  age.
Therefore, the age determination based on ossification test  though  may  be
useful is not conclusive. An X-ray ossification test can by no means  be  so
infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the correct  number  of  years
and days of a person’s life.

29.   Let us consider the medical report in the facts and  circumstances  of
the present case. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-State  has
brought to our notice that the  appellant-Mukarrab  is  involved  in  twenty
four cases of various offences allegedly committed between  1988  and  1995.
He is alleged to have  committed  murder  and  robbery  in  the  year  1988.
Likewise, appellant-Arshad is  also  allegedly  involved  in  commission  of
serious offences from 1993 to 2003.  Proceedings  in  the  context  of  such
offences are stated to  be  still  pending  against  the  appellants  before
various courts. Learned Counsel for the State has produced  a  chart  before
us to show that the appellant-Mukarrab is involved in at least twenty  cases
for various offences right  from  the  year  1988  in  Case  Nos.  160/1988,
327/1989, 96/1989, 184/1989 etc. and other cases  under  Sections  25A  Act,
394 IPC, 323, 352, 504, 506 IPC, 323, 352, 504, 506 IPC and  other  offences
till 2006. Likewise, appellant-Arshad is involved in at least ten cases  for
various offences right from the year 1993 in case  Nos.  102/1993,  50/1994,
80/1994, 878/1994 etc. and other cases under Sections 393,  363,  376,  147,
148, 149, 302, 147, 504, 506, 307 IPC respectively till 2003.

30.   We are referring to the  chart  produced  by  the  State  neither  for
taking into account the history sheet of  the  present  appellants  for  the
purpose of ascertaining criminal antecedents of the appellants  nor  casting
any remarks on the nature of the  offences  for  which  the  appellants  are
proceeded with. We are referring to the chart only for the  limited  purpose
of arriving at a logical and definite  conclusion  as  to  the  age  of  the
appellants. As discussed earlier, in para No. 24  had  the  appellants  been
born in 1979, in the years 1988, 1989, 1990,  the  appellant-Mukarrab  would
have been only in the age of 9, 10,  11  years  respectively.  In  the  year
1993, (first case in which appellant-Arshad involved)  the  appellant-Arshad
would have been only 14 years of age. Had it been so,  when  the  appellants
were produced in those cases the appellants would have  been  considered  as
‘children’  by  the  very  appearance.  They  would  have  been  dealt  with
accordingly by the concerned juvenile court and the matters would  not  have
been kept pending till this date. This, in our view, is yet  another  reason
that the opinion of the Medical Board determining the age of the  appellants
as 35-40 years in May, 2016 cannot be relied upon.

31.   In the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  opinion  of  the
medical board in determining the age of  the  appellants  cannot  be  relied
upon so as to give benefit under the provisions of  Juvenile  Justice  (Care
and Protection of Children) Act,  2000.  In  the  absence  of  other  cogent
evidence, the  plea  of  juvenility  of  the  appellants  is  liable  to  be
rejected. The  special  leave  petitions  qua  other  accused  were  already
dismissed vide order dated 12.09.2014 as mentioned hereinbefore. Hence,  the
appeals of these appellants are also dismissed.

                                                             ...……………………….J.

                                                              [A.K. SIKRI]



                                                              .………………………..J.

                                                            [R. BANUMATHI]

New Delhi;

November 30, 2016.


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