Supreme Court of India

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10836 OF 2014, CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10837-10839 OF 2014, CIVIL APPEAL NO.10840 OF 20 Judgment Date: Dec 08, 2014

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10836 OF 2014
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.30832 OF 2011]


Narinder  S.  Chadha  &  Ors.                                            ...
                                                                  Appellants


                                   VERSUS


Municipal  Corporation  of                                               ...
                                                                 Respondents
Greater Mumbai & Ors.

                                    WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10837-10839 OF 2014
            [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 31048-31050 OF 2011]

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10840 OF 2014
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.33140 OF 2011]

                                    WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10841-10843 OF 2014
            [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.33141-33143 OF 2011]

                                    WITH

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10844-10845 OF 2014
            [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.19247-19248 OF 2012]

                                     AND

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10846 OF 2014
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.8143 OF 2014]


                               J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.


1.    Leave granted.

2.    In this  batch  of  matters,  we  are  concerned  with  the  Municipal
Corporations  of  various  cities  implementing  the  Cigarettes  and  other
Tobacco Products        (Prohibition  of  Advertisement  and  Regulation  of
Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply & Distribution) Act,  2003.   In  the
first case before us, namely, civil appeal arising out  of  SLP(C)  No.30832
of 2011 - Narinder S. Chadha and others v. Municipal Corporation of  Greater
Mumbai and others, a judgment of the Bombay High Court  dated  11th  August,
2011 disposed of a writ petition in which several wide  ranging  contentions
were urged, and ultimately decided that  the  impugned  circular  dated  4th
July, 2011 only  implemented  the  Cigarettes  and  other  Tobacco  Products
(Prohibition  of  Advertisement  and  Regulation  of  Trade  and   Commerce,
Production, Supply & Distribution) Act, 2003  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
the "Cigarettes Act") and  the  Prohibition  of  Smoking  in  Public  Places
Rules, 2008 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  "Rules")  and  dismissed  the
challenge to the said circular.  Similarly,  in cases arising  from  Chennai
and Ahmedabad, similar circulars/notices were under challenge  and  in  both
the impugned judgments in SLP(C) Nos.19247-19248 of 2012  (Temperature  etc.
v. Deputy Police Commissioner,  Zone-1  Ahmedabad  and  Others)  and  SLP(C)
No.8143 of 2014 (Robustaa (Hyglow Caf) v. The Commissioner  Corporation  of
Chennai and others), the Gujarat and Madras High Courts followed the  Bombay
High Court judgment dated 11th August,  2011  and,  consequently,  dismissed
the writ petitions filed before them.  It  is  from  these  three  judgments
that appeals have been preferred.

3.    Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior advocate appearing  on  behalf  of  the
appellants in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.30832 of  2011  made
wide ranging arguments on the genesis of the Cigarettes  Act  and  the  fact
that it was legislation made under Entry 52 List I read with Entry  33  List
III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution of India. He cited  Godawat  Pan
Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC  68,
particularly the concluding  paragraph 77 (6) stating  that  the  Cigarettes
Act is a  special Act dealing only with tobacco and tobacco products,  while
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is general and must  therefore
yield to the Cigarettes Act.  He also  cited  Bajinath  Kedia  v.  State  of
Bihar  & Ors.,   (1969)  3  SCC  838  for  the  proposition  that  once  the
requisite declaration under Section 2 of the Cigarettes  Act  is  made,  the
State Government is denuded of any power to legislate in the field  occupied
by the Cigarettes Act.  He also cited Paluru Ramakrishnaiah & Ors. v.  Union
of India & Anr., (1989)  2  SCC  541  for  the  proposition  that  executive
instructions and conditions cannot  be  contrary  to  statute  or  statutory
rules.  Ultimately, however, he contended that there were three features  of
the impugned circular which required to be struck  down  being  ultra  vires
the Cigarettes Act and the Rules made therein.

4.    The first condition did not allow a licensee of a restaurant  to  keep
or sell or provide any tobacco or tobacco related products in  any  form  in
the licenced premises.  This, according to him, was contrary  to  Section  6
of the Cigarettes Act and  the  Rules  made  thereunder.   Further,  smoking
areas which are to be used only for the purpose of smoking cannot  have  any
apparatus  designed  to  facilitate  smoking.   This   in   his   respectful
submission puts a bar on Hookah smoking and is also  outside  the  scope  of
the Cigarettes Act read with the Rules.  Further,  smoking  area  dimensions
laid down in paragraphs (D) and (E) of Condition No.35 were also  conditions
which one did not find either in the Cigarettes Act or  in  the  Rules  made
thereunder and, hence, were ultra vires.  Other  learned  counsel  appearing
for other appellants and interveners adopted the arguments of Shri Singh.

5.    Mr. R.P. Bhatt, learned senior counsel  appearing  for  the  Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai argued before us that on  a  true  reading  of
the Cigarettes Act and  the  Rules  made  thereunder,  all  that  the  added
conditions did was to implement the Cigarettes Act and the Rules  and  on  a
true construction of the Act and Rules nothing was really added to  what  is
already there.  Miss  Pinky  Anand,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General
appearing on behalf of the Union, broadly supported Mr. Bhatt's stand.

6.    In view of the rival contentions, the point that needs to  be  decided
in this case is in a narrow compass.  We have basically to see  whether  the
impugned circular dated 4th July, 2011 travels outside  the  Cigarettes  Act
and the Rules or merely seeks to implement the said Act  and  the  Rules  as
they stand.

7.    For a determination of this case, it will be necessary to set out  the
relevant statutory provisions. First, the Cigarettes Act-

      "Section 3- Definitions. - In this Act, unless the  context  otherwise
requires,-

(k) "production", with its grammatical variations and  cognate  expressions,
includes the making  of  cigarettes,  cigars,  cheroots,  beedis,  cigarette
tobacco, pipe tobacco, hookah tobacco, chewing tobacco, pan  masala  or  any
chewing material having tobacco as one of its ingredients (by whatever  name
called) or snuff and shall include-

(i) Packing, labeling or re-labelling, of containers;

(ii) Re-packing from bulk packages to retail packages; and

(iii) The adoption of  any  other  method  to  render  the  tobacco  product
marketable;

(l) "public place" means any place to which the public have access,  whether
as of right or not, and includes  auditorium,  hospital  buildings,  railway
waiting  room,  amusement  centres,  restaurants,  public   offices,   court
buildings, educational institutions, libraries, public conveyances  and  the
like which are visited by general public  but  does  not  include  any  open
space;

(m) "sale", with its grammatical variations and cognate  expressions,  means
any transfer of property in goods by one  person  to  another,  whether  for
cash or on credit, or by way of exchange, and whether wholesale  or  retail,
and includes an agreement for sale, and offer  for  sale  and  exposure  for
sale;

(n) "smoking", means smoking of tobacco in any form whether in the  form  of
cigarette, cigar, beedis or otherwise with the aid of  a  pipe,  wrapper  or
any other instruments;

(p) "tobacco products" means the products specified in the Schedule."


                                "THE SCHEDULE

                             [See Section 3(p)]

1. Cigarettes

2. Cigars

3. Cheroots

4. Beedis

5. Cigarette tobacco, pipe tobacco and hookah tobacco

6. Chewing Tobacco

7. Snuff

8. Pan masala or any chewing material having tobacco as one of its
ingredients (by whatever name called).

9. Gutka

10. Tooth powder containing tobacco."

"Section 4. Prohibition of smoking in a public place.-No person shall  smoke
in any public place:

      Provided that in a hotel having thirty rooms or  a  restaurant  having
seating capacity of thirty persons or more and in the airports,  a  separate
provision for smoking area or space may be made.

Section 6. Prohibition on sale of cigarettes or other tobacco products to  a
person below the age of eighteen years and in particular areas.-  No  person
shall sell, offer for sale, or  permit  sale  of,  cigarette  or  any  other
tobacco product-

(a) to any person who is under eighteen years of age, and

(b) in an area within a radius of  one  hundred  yards  of  any  educational
institution.

Section  21.  Punishment  for  smoking  in  certain  places.-  (1)   Whoever
contravenes the provisions of section 4 shall be punishable with fine  which
may extend to two hundred rupees.

(2) An offence under this section shall be compoundable and shall  be  tried
summarily in accordance with the procedure provided for  summary  trials  in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

Section 24. Punishment for sale of cigarette or any other  tobacco  products
in certain places or to persons below the age of eighteen  years.-  (1)  Any
person who contravenes the provisions of section 6 shall  be  guilty  of  an
offence under this Act and shall be punishable with fine  which  may  extend
to two hundred rupees.

(2) All offences under this section  shall  be  compoundable  and  shall  be
tried summarily in  accordance  with  the  procedure  provided  for  summary
trials in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

Section 31. Power of the Central Government to make rules.- (1) The  Central
Government may, by notification in  the  Official  Gazette,  make  rules  to
carry out the provisions of this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,  such  rules
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: -

(a) specify the form and manner in which warning shall be given  in  respect
of cigarettes or other tobacco products under clause (o) of section 3;

(b) specify the maximum permissible nicotine and tar contents in  cigarettes
or other tobacco products under the proviso to sub-section  (5)  of  section
7;

(c) specify the manner in which the specified warning shall be inscribed  on
each package of cigarettes or other tobacco products or its label under sub-
section (2) of section 8;

(d) specify the height of the letter  or  figure  or  both  to  be  used  in
specified  warning  or  to  indicate  the  nicotine  and  tar  contents   in
cigarettes or other tobacco products under section 10;

(e) provide for the manner in which entry into and search  of  any  premises
is to be conducted and the manner in which the seizure  of  any  package  of
cigarettes or other tobacco products shall be made and the manner  in  which
seizure list shall be prepared  and  delivered  to  the  person  from  whose
custody any package  of  cigarettes  or  other  tobacco  products  has  been
seized;

(f) provide for any other matter  which  is  required  to  be,  or  may  be,
prescribed.

(3) Every rule made  under  this  Act  and  every  notification  made  under
section 30 shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is  made,  before  each
House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total  period  of  thirty
days which may be comprised in one session or  in  two  or  more  successive
sessions, and if, before the expiry of  the  session  immediately  following
the session or the  successive  session  aforesaid,  both  Houses  agree  in
making any modification in the rule or notification  or  both  Houses  agree
that the rule or notification should not be made, the rule  or  notification
shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no  effect,
as the case may be; so, however, that any  such  modification  or  annulment
shall be without prejudice to  the  validity  of  anything  previously  done
under that rule or notification."


The Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008 are also relevant.

 "2.  Definitions.-In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(d) "public place" defined in Section 3(1) of the  Act  shall  also  include
work places, shopping malls, and cinema halls.

(e) "smoking area or space" mentioned in the proviso to  Section  4  of  the
Act shall mean a separately ventilated smoking room that-

(i) is physically separated and surrounded by full height walls on all  four
sides;

(ii) has an entrance with an automatically closing  door  normally  kept  in
close position;

(iii) has an air flow system, as specified in schedule I,

(iv) has negative air pressure in  comparison  with  the  remainder  of  the
building.

(f) Words and expressions used herein and not defined  in  these  rules  but
defined in the Act shall have the meanings, respectively, assigned  to  them
in the Act.

3. Prohibition of smoking in a public place.-  (1)  The  owner,  proprietor,
manager, supervisor or in charge of the affairs  of  a  public  place  shall
ensure that:

(a) No person smokes in the public place (under his jurisdiction/implied).

(b) The board as specified in schedule II is displayed  prominently  at  the
entrance of the public place, in case there are more than  one  entrance  at
each such entrance and conspicuous place(s) inside. In  case  if  there  are
more than one floor, at each floor including the staircase and  entrance  to
the lift/s at each floor.

(c) No ashtrays, matches, lighters or other things  designed  to  facilitate
smoking are provided in the public place.

(2) The owner, proprietor, manager, supervisor or incharge  of  the  affairs
of a public place shall notify and cause to  be  displayed  prominently  the
name of the person(s) to whom a complaint may be made  by  a  person(s)  who
observes any person violating the provision of these Rules.

(3) lf the owner, proprietor, manager, supervisor or the authorized  officer
of a public place fails to act on  report  of  such  violation,  the  owner,
proprietor, manager, supervisor or the authorized officer  shall  be  liable
to pay fine equivalent to the number of individual offences.

4. Hotels, Restaurants and Airports. - (1) The owner,  proprietor,  manager,
supervisor or in-charge of the affairs of a  hotel  having  thirty  or  more
rooms or restaurant having seating capacity of thirty persons  or  more  and
the manager of the airport may provide  for  a  smoking  area  or  space  as
defined in rule 2(e).

(2)   Smoking area or space shall not be  established  at  the  entrance  or
exit of the hotel, restaurant and the airport  and  shall  be  distinctively
marked as "Smoking Area" in English and one Indian language, as applicable.

(3)   A smoking area or space shall be used only for the purpose of  smoking
and no other service(s) shall be allowed.

(4)   The  owner,  proprietor,  manager,  supervisor  or  in-charge  of  the
affairs of a hotel having  thirty  or  more  rooms  may  designate  separate
smoking rooms in the manner prescribed as under:

(a)   all the rooms so designated shall form a separate section in the  same
floor or wing, as the case may be.  In case of more than one  floors/  wings
the room shall be in one floor/wing as the case may be.

(b)   all such rooms shall be distinctively marked  as  "Smoking  rooms"  in
English and one Indian language, as applicable.

(c)   the smoke from such room shall be  ventilated  outside  and  does  not
infiltrate/permeate into  the  non-smoking  areas  of  the  hotel  including
lobbies and the corridors."

8.    The Cigarettes Act  was  really  in  implementation  of  World  Health
Assembly Resolutions and was enacted to put a total ban  on  advertising  of
tobacco products and to prevent the sale of tobacco products to  minors.  It
is also legislation which seeks to implement Article 47 of the  Constitution
which reads as under:-

"47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the  standard  of
living and to improve public health.-The State shall regard the  raising  of
the level of nutrition and the standard of living  of  its  people  and  the
improvement  of  public  health  as  among  its  primary  duties   and,   in
particular, the State shall endeavour to  bring  about  prohibition  of  the
consumption, except for medicinal purposes of  intoxicating  drinks  and  of
drugs which are injurious to health."


9.    It all began vide an order dated 5th May, 2011 in  a  Public  Interest
Litigation which is No.111 of 2011 in which the Bombay High Court asked  the
Municipal Corporation to incorporate  terms  and  conditions  while  issuing
licences under Section 479 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act so as  to
comply with the  provisions  of  the  Cigarettes  Act  and  the  Rules  made
thereunder.  This was directed to be done within a period of six  weeks.  It
is as a result of this direction that the impugned circular dated 4th  July,
2011 was issued in which Conditions  35  to  37  in  general  conditions  of
licence issued under Section 394 of the  Mumbai  Municipal  Corporation  Act
were to be added. These conditions read as under:

      "Condition No. 35:      The licensee shall not keep or allow  to  keep
or sell or provide any tobacco or  tobacco  related  products  in  any  form
whether in the form of cigarette, cigar, bidis or otherwise with the aid  of
a pipe, wrapper or any other instrument in the licensed premises.

      The  Commissioner  may  permit  smoking  area  as  per  Section  4  of
Cigarette and other  Tobacco  Products  (Prohibition  of  Advertisement  and
Regulation of Trade and Commerce Production Supply  and  Distribution)  Act,
2003 (COTPA) in an eating house having seating capacity  of  thirty  persons
or more.

The smoking area shall mean separately ventilated smoking room that:

is physically separated and surrounded by full  height  walls  on  all  four
sides.

has an entrance with an automatically closing doors normally kept  in  close
position.

has an air flow system that

is exhausted directly to the outside and not mixed back into the supply  air
for the other parts of the building.

is fitted with a non-recirculation exhaust  ventilation  system  or  an  air
cleaning system, or by a combination of the two,  to  ensure  that  the  air
discharges only in a manner that does not re-circulate or transfer  it  from
a smoking area or space to non-smoking areas.

iv.   has negative air pressure in comparison  with  the  remainder  of  the
building.

B)    The smoking area shall not be established at the Entrance or  Exit  of
the eating house and shall be distinctively  marked  as  "Smoking  Area"  in
English & in Marathi as per the COTPA.

C)    The Smoking area shall be used only for the purpose of smoking and  no
other service(s) or any apparatus designed to facilitate  smoking  shall  be
provided.

D)    The smoking area shall not be less than 100 sq. ft. with each side  of
the room shall not be less than 8 ft. and height of the room  shall  not  be
less than 9 ft.  The smoking area shall be included in the licensed area  of
the eating house.

E)    The total area of the smoking room shall not be more than 30%  of  the
total licensed service area of the eating house.

Condition No.36: No person below the age of 18 years shall be  permitted  in
the smoking area.

Condition No.37: The owner, proprietor, manager,  supervisor  in  charge  of
the eating house shall notify and caused to  be  displayed  prominently  the
name of the person(s) to whom a complaint may be made  by  a  person(s)  who
observes any person violating the provisions of COTPA.

      The Licensee shall comply with the aforesaid conditions and breach  of
any of the condition shall entail  cancellations/  suspensions/  revocations
of License.

      The proposal regarding inclusion of the smoking area in  the  licensed
area of Eating House shall be approved by the concerned DEHO.

      All concerned officers of Health Department & Licence  Department  are
hereby instructed to stringently enforce the above mentioned condition  nos.
35 to 37 of the general conditions of Licences  under  Section  394  of  MMC
Act. These conditions should be incorporated in all  existing  as  well  new
Eating House Licenses.

      A notice may be issued to all the  existing  Eating  Houses  Licensees
that condition nos. 35 to 37 shall be  deemed  to  be  incorporated  in  the
existing   licenses   and   any   breach   of   the   same   shall    entail
suspension/revocation of the said License.

      All the concerned Officers of the Health Department  are  directed  to
take special drive against those eating houses against  whom  complaints  of
serving hukkah are received and  take  stringent  action  by  following  due
procedure."


10.   Mr. Bhatt appearing for the  Municipal  Corporation  urged  that  this
circular would be valid being issued under Section 394 (1)(d) of the  Mumbai
Municipal Corporation Act which reads as under:-

"394. Certain articles or  animals  not  to  be  kept  and  certain  trades,
processes and operations not to be carried on without a licence; and  things
liable to be seized destroyed, etc., to prevent danger or nuisance.

(1) Except under and in accordance with the  terms  and  conditions  of  the
licence granted by the Commissioner, no person shall-

(d) keep or use, or suffer or allow to be kept  or  used,  in  or  upon  any
premises, any article or animal which, in the opinion of  the  Commissioner,
is dangerous to life, health or property, or likely  to  create  a  nuisance
either from its nature  or  by  reason  of  the  manner  in  which,  or  the
conditions under which, the same is, or is proposed to be, kept or  used  or
suffered or allowed to be kept or used;"


11.   According to Mr. C.U. Singh, the very  first  paragraph  of  Condition
No.35 is bad inasmuch as it does not allow the licensee to keep or  sell  or
provide any tobacco or tobacco related products in  the  licenced  premises.
We find considerable force in this submission.

12.   It will be noticed that Section 6 of the Cigarettes  Act  permits  the
sale of cigarettes and any other tobacco products, except to  persons  under
18 years of age and in  an  area  within  a  radius  of  100  yards  of  any
educational institution. It is clear that any condition which prohibits  the
sale of cigarettes or any other tobacco products  in  premises  licenced  by
the Municipal Corporation would amount to  adding  another  exception  which
would be impermissible in law. Mr. Bhatt sought  to  uphold  this  condition
with a reference to Rule 4(3) as, in his submission, in a smoking  area  "no
other service shall be allowed". According to him, the sale  of  tobacco  or
tobacco related products would  amount  to  a  service  that  cannot  be  so
allowed.

13.   We cannot accept this contention for more than one reason.  First  and
foremost, it is difficult conceptually to say that "sale" and "service"  are
interchangeable items.  "Sale"  is  defined  under  the  Act  as  meaning  a
transfer of property in goods for consideration.  It is obvious that  "sale"
has to be understood in this sense, and properly  so  understood  would  not
include "service" which would refer not to transfer  of  property  in  goods
but to "service" as is understood in its ordinary sense.  In Northern  India
Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor  of  Delhi  [1979]  1  S.C.R.  557,  a
distinction was made between sale of food and the provision of  services  in
hotels and restaurants. The Court held:-

"Like the hotelier, a restaurateur provides many  services  in  addition  to
the supply of food. He provides furniture and furnishings,  linen,  crockery
and cutlery, and in the eating places of  today  he  may  add  music  and  a
specially provided area for floor dancing and in some cases  a  floor  show.
The view taken by the English law found acceptance  on  American  soil,  and
after some desultory dissent  initially  in  certain  states  it  very  soon
became firmly established  as  the  general  view  of  the  law.  The  first
addition of American Jurisprudence [ Vol. 46, p. 207, para  13]  sets  forth
the statement of the law  in  that  regard,  but  we  may  go  to  the  case
itself, Electa B. Merrill v. James W. Hodson [1915 B  LRA  481]  from  which
the statement has been derived. Holding that the supply of food or drink  to
customers did not partake of the character of a  sale  of  goods  the  Court
commented:

"The essence of it is not an agreement  for  the  transfer  of  the  general
property of the food or drink placed at the command of the customer for  the
satisfaction of his desires, or actually appropriated by him in the  process
of appeasing his appetite or thirst. The customer does not become the  owner
of the food set before him, or of that portion which is carved for his  use,
or of that which finds a place upon his plate, or in side dishes  set  about
it. No designated portion becomes his. He is privileged to eat, and that  is
all. The uneaten food is not his. He cannot do  what  he  pleases  with  it.
That which is set before him or placed at his command is provided to  enable
him to satisfy his immediate  wants,  and  for  no  other  purpose.  He  may
satisfy those  wants;  but  there  he  must  stop.  He  may  not  turn  over
unconsumed portions to others at his pleasure, or carry away such  portions.
The true essence of the transaction is service  in  the  satisfaction  of  a
human need or desire,- ministry to a bodily want. A  necessary  incident  of
this service or ministry is the  consumption  of  the  food  required.  This
consumption involves destruction, and nothing remains of  what  is  consumed
to which the right of property can be said  to  attach.  Before  consumption
title does not pass; after consumption there remains nothing to  become  the
subject of title. What the customer pays for  is  a  right  to  satisfy  his
appetite by the process of destruction. What he thus pays for includes  more
than the price of the food as such. It includes all  that  enters  into  the
conception of service, and with  it  no  small  factor  of  direct  personal
service. It does not contemplate the transfer of  the  general  property  in
the food applied as a factor in the service rendered."

This led to the Constitution 46th Amendment Act by which Article  366  (29A)
was inserted. Article 366 (29A) reads as follows:-


"Article 366 (29-A) "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" includes-

(a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance  of  a  contract,  of
property  in  any  goods  for  cash,  deferred  payment  or  other  valuable
consideration;

(b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in  some
other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;

(c) a tax on the delivery  of  goods  on  hire-purchase  or  any  system  of
payment by installments;

(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use  any  goods  for  any  purpose
(whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment or  other
valuable consideration;

(e) a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated association  or  body
of persons to a member thereof for cash, deferred payment or other  valuable
consideration;

(f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part  of  any  service  or  in  any
other manner whatsoever, of goods, being  food  or  any  other  article  for
human consumption or any drink (whether or  not  intoxicating),  where  such
supply  or  service  is  for  cash,  deferred  payment  or  other   valuable
consideration,

and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to  be  a
sale of those goods by the person making the transfer,  delivery  or  supply
and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer,  delivery
or supply is made;".

It will be seen that the definition of tax on the sale or purchase of  goods
has been artificially expanded more particularly  by  sub-clause  (f),  with
which we are concerned, where the distinction between "sale"  and  "service"
has been  done  away  with.  In  the  present  case,  the  well  established
distinction between "sale" and "service" would continue to apply in view  of
the definition of "sale" contained in Section  3(m).   It  will  be  noticed
that the definition is a "means" and "includes"  one.  It  is  well  settled
that such definition is an exhaustive definition  (see:  P.  Kasilingam  and
others v. P.S.G. College of Technology and others 1995 Supp (2) SCC  348  at
para 19).   There  is  thus,  no  scope  to  include  "service'  in  such  a
definition.  Further, even if we were  to  accept  Mr.  Bhatt's  contention,
Rule 4(3) would become ultra vires Section 6  of  the  Act  inasmuch  as  it
would prohibit the sale of  cigarettes  and  other  tobacco  products  in  a
smoking area in hotels, restaurants and  airports,  thus,  adding  one  more
exception to the two exceptions already contained  in  Section  6.   It  is,
thus, clear that this condition would be ultra vires the Cigarettes Act  and
the Rules properly so read.

14.   It will be seen that Condition No.  35(C)  of  the  impugned  circular
essentially reproduces Rule 4(3) of the said Rules and then adds  the  words
"or any apparatus designed to facilitate smoking". The effect of  the  added
words is that a Hookah cannot  be  provided  by  the  hotel,  restaurant  or
airport being an apparatus designed to facilitate smoking.

15.   Mr. Bhatt sought to  derive  power  for  the  added  words  from  Rule
3(1)(c) and argued that the Hookah  would  be  "other  things"  designed  to
facilitate smoking which would be prohibited under Rule 3(1)(c).

16.   We find it difficult to accept this contention because,  if  carefully
read, Rule 3 deals with the prohibition of smoking in public  places,  which
is referable to Section 4 (main part) whereas Rule 4  is  referable  to  the
proviso to Section 4.  Rule 3 would  only  apply  where  there  is  a  total
prohibition of smoking in all public places as is clear  from  Rule  3(1)(a)
which makes it is incumbent on the  owner,  proprietor,  etc.  of  a  public
place to ensure that no person smokes in that place.  It is in that  context
that ashtrays, matches, lighters and other  things  designed  to  facilitate
smoking are not to be provided in public places where smoking is  prohibited
altogether.

17.   On the other hand, where smoking is  allowed  in  a  smoking  area  or
space, sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 makes it clear that such  place  can  be  used
for the purpose of "smoking".  Under Rule 2(f)  words  and  expressions  not
defined in these Rules but defined in  the  Act  shall  have  the  meanings,
respectively, assigned to them in the Act.

18.   This takes us to the definition  of  "smoking"  contained  in  Section
3(n) of the Act which has been  set  out  hereinabove.  A  perusal  of  this
definition shows that it includes smoking of tobacco in any  form  with  the
aid of a pipe, wrapper, or  any  other  instrument,  which  would  obviously
include a Hookah.  That being the case, "smoking" with  a  Hookah  would  be
permissible under Rule 4(3) and the expression "no other  service  shall  be
allowed" obviously refers to services other than the providing of a  Hookah.
 It is, thus, evident that the added words in clause (C) of Condition  No.35
are clearly ultra vires the Act and the Rules.

19.   Looked at from another angle, Rule 3(1)(c) and Rule 4(3)  have  to  be
harmoniously construed.  If the respondents' contention has to be  accepted,
Rule 4(3) would be rendered nugatory.  What is  expressly  allowed  by  Rule
4(3) cannot be said to be taken away  by  Rule  3(1)(c).   For  this  reason
also, Mr. Bhatt's contention will have to be turned down.

20.   Sub-clauses (D) and (E) of Condition No. 35 were stated by  Mr.  Bhatt
to be regulations  relatable  to  buildings  which  is  a  purely  municipal
function within the Municipal Corporation's ken.  There is no  challenge  to
the dimensions of the smoking area set out in these sub-clauses. So  far  as
these conditions are concerned, we agree with Mr. Bhatt and  the  dimensions
set out in (D) and (E) will have to be followed in all cases.

21.   Since we are deciding this case only on the  narrow  ground  that  the
High  Court  is  incorrect  when  it  holds  that  all  that  the  Municipal
Corporation did in the present case was to follow  the  Cigarettes  Act  and
the Rules made thereunder, we need not delve  on  other  aspects  that  were
urged before us.

22.   We, therefore, set aside the Bombay High  Court  judgment  and  delete
the first paragraph of Condition  No.35  and  the  added  words  in  (C)  of
Condition No.35.  The appeal succeeds to that extent.

23.   In the Madras High Court judgment a notice dated 5th  July,  2011  was
upheld by  the  High  Court.   The  notice  is  obviously  ultra  vires  the
Cigarettes Act and the Rules made thereunder as it  prevents  the  owner  of
the hotel/restaurant from providing tobacco to persons who  are  not  minors
and asking such persons  affirmatively  to  stop  people  from  sucking  and
swallowing tobacco.  Further, sale of tobacco can only be prohibited  within
a radius of 100 yards of an educational establishment and not  300  feet  as
is stated in the impugned notice. This judgment  also  deserves  to  be  set
aside.

24.   In the Gujarat High Court  case,  an  order  dated  14th  July,  2011,
purportedly made under Section  33  of  the  Bombay  Police  Act  read  with
Section 144  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  prohibited  hotels  and
restaurants from providing the facility  of  hookah  and  prohibited  hookah
bars.  In the course of a lengthy judgment, the Division Bench  referred  to
the  evil  effects  of  smoking  and  generally  of  tobacco  products   and
ultimately came to the conclusion that Section 33 of the Bombay  Police  Act
would include the power to prohibit, stating that the word "regulate"  would
include "restriction"  and  even  "prohibition".  Several  authorities  were
stated for this proposition, but the  one  authority  binding  on  the  High
Court  was  missed.  In  Himat  Lal  K.  Shah  v.  Commissioner  of  Police,
Ahmedabad, (1973) 1 SCC 227, the Supreme Court  had  to  construe  the  word
"regulate" under the very Act i.e. Section 33  of  the  Bombay  Police  Act.
The Court held:

"15. Coming to the first point raised by the learned counsel,  it  seems  to
us that the word "regulating" in Section 33(o) would include  the  power  to
prescribe that permission in writing should be taken a few days  before  the
holding of a meeting on a public street. Under Section 33(o) no  rule  could
be prescribed prohibiting all meetings or processions. The section  proceeds
on the basis that the public has a right to hold assemblies and  processions
on and along streets though it is necessary  to  regulate  the  conduct  and
behaviour or action of persons constituting such assemblies  or  processions
in order to safeguard the rights  of  citizens  and  in  order  to  preserve
public order. The word "regulate", according to Shorter  Oxford  Dictionary,
means, "to control, govern, or direct by rule or regulation; to  subject  to
guidance or restrictions". The impugned Rules do not  prohibit  the  holding
of meetings but only prescribe that permission should be taken  although  it
is not stated on what grounds permission could be  refused.  We  shall  deal
with this aspect a little later."


25.   From a reading of  Himat  Lal's  case,  it  is  clear  that  the  word
"regulate" would not include the power to prohibit.   Further,  Section  144
of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a power to grant  only  temporary
orders which cannot last beyond  2  months  from  the  making  thereof  (see
Section 144(6) of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure).  Despite  this  being
pointed out to the High Court, the High Court held:

"There is no dispute as regards the  position  of  law  and  we  accept  the
contentions on behalf of the petitioners so far as Section 144 of  the  Code
is concerned. However, solely on this ground alone the entire action on  the
part of the Police Commissioner cannot be said to  be  unlawful  or  beyond
his jurisdiction. Prima  facie,  we  are  convinced  that  the  notification
invoked under Section 144 of the Code was issued with a  definite  idea  and
the idea was to  immediately  give  true  effect  to  the  addition  of  the
condition   in   respect   of   licences   of   persons    running    eating
house/restaurant. It appears that the authorities  felt  that  it  would  be
difficult  to  stop   the   activity   of   providing   hookah   at   eating
house/restaurant by solely adding one  of  the  conditions  not  to  provide
hookah at a eating house/restaurant. It appears from the  affidavit-in-reply
filed by the Police Commissioner that with a  view  to  meet  with  such  an
emergent situation prevailing in the city and as it was  very  difficult  to
keep  constant  vigilant  and  monitoring  as  regards  compliance  of   the
condition which was added in the licence, the  Police  Commissioner  thought
fit to invoke Section 144 of the Code.

        Assuming for a moment that the action of the Police Commissioner  of
the city of Ahmedabad in issuing the notification in purported  exercise  of
powers under Section 144 of the Code is not tenable in law by  itself  would
not be sufficient to grant the relief as  prayed  for  by  the  petitioners.
Though we do not find error in the same but assuming for a  moment  that  it
is found to be illegal and invalid, the  High  Court  while  exercising  its
extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can  refuse  to  upset  it  in  public
interest. It is a settled principle of law that  the  remedy  under  Article
226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and in  a  given
case even if such action or order challenged in the petition is found to  be
improper and invalid, the High  Court  while  exercising  its  extraordinary
jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it."


26.   We are at a loss to understand the  aforesaid  reasoning.  If  Section
144 is to be invoked, the order dated 14th July, 2011 would have  expired  2
months  thereafter.   The  High  Court  went  on   to   state   that   while
administering the law it is to be tempered with equity  and if an  equitable
situation demands, the High Court would fail in its  duty  if  it  does  not
mould relief accordingly. It must never be forgotten that one of the  maxims
of equity is that `equity follows the law'. If the law is clear, no  notions
of equity can substitute the same.  We are clearly  of  the  view  that  the
Gujarat High Court judgment dated 2nd December,  2011  deserves  to  be  set
aside not only for following the Bombay High Court judgment impugned in  the
appeals before us but for the reasons stated hereinabove.

27.   All the appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.  There will be  no
order as to costs.

                                       ...................................J.
                                                            (Ranjan Gogoi)


                                      ....................................J.
                                                   (Rohinton Fali Nariman)
New Delhi;
December 08, 2014.