SURYA VADANAN Vs. STATE OF TAMILNADU & ORS

Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Crl.), 395 of 2015, Judgment Date: Feb 27, 2015

•  The question before us relates to the refusal by the Madras High  Court
  to issue a writ of habeas corpus for  the  production  of  the  children  of
  Surya Vadanan and Mayura Vadanan. The appellant sought their  production  to
  enable him to take the children with him to the U.K. since they  were  wards
  of the court in the U.K. to enable the foreign court to decide the issue  of
  their custody.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 395 OF 2015
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3634 of 2014)


Surya Vadanan                                                  ...Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.                                   ...Respondents


                                  JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.
1.   Leave granted.
2.   The question before us relates to the refusal by the Madras High  Court
to issue a writ of habeas corpus for  the  production  of  the  children  of
Surya Vadanan and Mayura Vadanan. The appellant sought their  production  to
enable him to take the children with him to the U.K. since they  were  wards
of the court in the U.K. to enable the foreign court to decide the issue  of
their custody.
3.   In our opinion, the High Court was in error in declining to  issue  the
writ of habeas corpus.

The facts
4.   The appellant (hereafter referred to  as  Surya)  and  respondent  No.3
(hereafter referred to as Mayura) were married in Chennai on  27th  January,
2000.  While both are of Indian origin, Surya is a resident and  citizen  of
U.K. and at the time of marriage  Mayura  was  a  resident  and  citizen  of
India.
5.     Soon after their marriage Mayura joined her  husband  Surya  in  U.K.
sometime in March  2000.  Later  she  acquired  British  citizenship  and  a
British passport sometime in February 2004.  As such, both Surya and  Mayura
are British citizens and were ordinarily resident in  U.K.  Both  were  also
working for gain in the U.K.
6.     On 23rd September, 2004, a girl child Sneha Lakshmi Vadanan was  born
to the couple in U.K.  Sneha Lakshmi is a  British  citizen  by  birth.   On
21st September, 2008 another girl child Kamini Lakshmi Vadanan was  born  to
the couple in U.K. and she too is a British citizen  by  birth.   The  elder
girl child is now a little over 10 years  of  age  while  the  younger  girl
child is now a little over 6 years of age.

7.     It appears that the couple was having some matrimonial  problems  and
on 13th August, 2012 Mayura left U.K. and came to India along with  her  two
daughters.  Before leaving, she had purchased  return  tickets  for  herself
and her two daughters for 2nd September, 2012. She says that the  round-trip
tickets were cheaper than one-way tickets and that is why she had  purchased
them.  According to  Surya,  the  reason  for  the  purchase  of  round-trip
tickets was that the children's schools were  reopening  on  5th  September,
2012 and she had intended to return to  U.K.  before  the  school  reopening
date.
8.     Be that as it may, on her arrival in India, Mayura and her  daughters
went to her parents house in Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu) and have  been  staying
there ever since.
9.     On 21st August, 2012 Mayura prepared  and  signed  a  petition  under
Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage  Act,  1955[1]  seeking  a  divorce
from Surya.  The petition was filed in the Family  Court  in  Coimbatore  on
23rd August, 2012. We are told that an application for the  custody  of  the
two daughters was also filed by Mayura but  no  orders  seem  to  have  been
passed on that application one way or the other.
10. On or about 23rd August,  2012  Surya  came  to  know  that  Mayura  was
intending to stay on in India along with their two daughters. Therefore,  he
came to Coimbatore on or about 27th August, 2012 with  a  view  to  amicably
resolve all differences with  Mayura.  Interestingly  while  in  Coimbatore,
Surya lived in the same house as Mayura and their two  daughters,  that  is,
with Surya's in-laws. According to Surya, he was  unaware  that  Mayura  had
already filed a petition to divorce him.
11. Since it appeared that the two daughters of the couple were  not  likely
to return to U.K. in the immediate future  and  perhaps  with  a  view  that
their education should not be disrupted, the children  were  admitted  to  a
school in Coimbatore with Surya's consent.
12. Since Surya and Mayura were unable to amicably  (or  otherwise)  resolve
their differences, Surya returned to U.K. on or about 6th  September,  2012.
About a month later, on 16th October, 2012 he received a summons  dated  6th
October, 2012 from the Family Court in Coimbatore in  the  divorce  petition
filed by Mayura requiring him to enter appearance and present  his  case  on
29th October, 2012. We are told  that  the  divorce  proceedings  are  still
pending in the Family Court in Coimbatore and no  substantial  or  effective
orders have been passed therein.
Proceedings in the U.K.
13. Faced with this situation, Surya also seems to have decided to  initiate
legal action and on 8th November, 2012  he  petitioned  the  High  Court  of
Justice in U.K. (hereinafter referred to as 'the foreign court') for  making
the children as wards of the court. It seems that along with this  petition,
he also annexed documents to indicate (i) that he had paid the fees  of  the
children for a private school in U.K. with the intention that  the  children
would continue their studies in U.K. (ii) that the  children  had  left  the
school without information that perhaps  they  would  not  be  returning  to
continue their studies.
14. On 13th November, 2012 the High Court of Justice passed an order  making
the children wards of the court "during their minority or  until  such  time
as this provision of this order is varied  or  alternatively  discharged  by
the further order of the court" and requiring Mayura to return the  children
to the jurisdiction of the foreign  court.   The  relevant  extract  of  the
order passed by the foreign court on 13th November, 2012 reads as under:-
"IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The children SNEHA LAKSHMI VADANAN AND KAMINI LAKSHMI VADANAN shall  be  and
remain wards of this Honourable Court during their minority  or  until  such
time as this provision of this order is varied or  alternatively  discharged
by the further order of the court.

2.  The Respondent mother shall :
By no later than 4 p.m. on 20th November 2012  inform  the  father,  through
his solicitors (Messrs Dawson Cornwell, 15 Red  Lion  Square,  London,  WC1R
4QT. Tel: 0207 242 2556 Ref: SJ/AMH), of the current care  arrangements  for
the children;

By no later than 4 p.m. on 20th November 2012  inform  the  father,  through
his said  solicitors,  of  the  arrangements  that  will  be  made  for  the
children's return pursuant to paragraph 2(c) herein;

Return the children to the jurisdiction of England and  Wales  by  no  later
than 11.59 p.m. on 27th November 2012;

d.  Attend at the hearing listed pursuant to paragraph  3  herein,  together
with solicitors and/or counsel if so instructed.

A penal notice is attached to this paragraph.

3.  The matter shall be adjourned and relisted  for  further  directions  or
alternatively  determination  before  a  High  Court  Judge  of  the  Family
Division sitting in chambers at the Royal Court of Justice,  Strand,  London
on 29th November 2012 at 2 p.m. with a time estimate of 30 minutes.

4.  The mother shall have  leave,  if  so  advised,  to  file  and  serve  a
statement in response  to  the  statement  of  the  Applicant  father.  Such
statement to be filed and served by no later than 12 noon on  29th  November
2012.

5.  Immediately upon her and the children's return to  the  jurisdiction  of
England and Wales the mother shall lodge her and  the  children's  passports
and any other travel documents with the Tipstaff (Tipstaff's  Office,  Royal
Courts of Justice, Strand, London) to be held by him to  the  order  of  the
court.

6.  The solicitors for the Applicant shall have permission  to  serve  these
proceedings, together with this order, upon the  Respondent  mother  outside
of the jurisdiction of England and  Wales,  by  facsimile  or  alternatively
scanned and e-mailed copy if necessary.

7.  The Applicant father shall have leave to disclose this order to:

    a. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
       b. The British High Commission, New Delhi;
    c. The Indian High Commission, London
 d. Into any proceedings as the mother may have issued of  India,  including
any divorce proceedings.

8.   Costs reserved.

AND  THIS  HON'BLE  COURT  RESPECTFULLY  REQUESTS  THAT  the  administrative
authorities of the British  Government  operating  in  the  jurisdiction  of
India and the judicial and administrative authorities  of  India,  including
the Indian High Commission in England, assist in any way within their  power
and control in ascertaining the current whereabouts of the children  herein,
who have been made wards of court, and in assisting in repatriating them  to
England and Wales, the country of their habitual residence."

15. In response to the petition filed by  Surya,  a  written  statement  was
filed by Mayura on 20th November, 2012. A rejoinder was filed  by  Surya  on
13th December, 2012.
16. Apparently, after taking into consideration the written  statement,  the
foreign  court  passed  another  order  on  29th  November,  2012  virtually
repeating its earlier order and renewing its request to  the  administrative
authorities of  the  British  Government  in  India  and  the  judicial  and
administrative authorities in India for assistance for repatriation  of  the
wards of the court to England and  Wales,  the  country  of  their  habitual
residence.  The relevant extract of the  order  dated  29th  November,  2012
reads as under:-

"IT IS ORDERED THAT :

The children SNEHA LAKSHMI VADANAN AND KAMINI VADANAN shall  be  and  remain
wards of this Hon'ble Court during their minority and  until  such  time  as
this provision of this Order is varied or alternatively  discharged  by  the
further Order of the Court.

The 1st Respondent mother,  2nd  Respondent  maternal  Grandfather  and  3rd
Respondent maternal Grandmother shall:

Forthwith upon serve of this Order upon them inform the father, through  his
said solicitors, of the arrangements that will be made  for  the  children's
return pursuant to paragraph 2(c) herein;[2]

Return the children to the jurisdiction of England and Wales forthwith  upon
service of this Order upon them;

A penal notice is attached to this paragraph.

The matter shall  be  adjourned  and  relisted  for  further  directions  or
alternatively  determination  before  a  High  Court  Judge  of  the  Family
Division sitting in chambers at the Royal Court of Justice,  Strand,  London
within 72 hours  of  the  return  of  the  children  or  alternatively  upon
application to the Court for a further hearing.

The father shall have leave, if so advised, to file and  serve  a  statement
of the mother.  Such statement to be filed and served by no  later  than  12
noon on 13th December 2012.

Immediately upon her and  the  children's  return  to  the  jurisdiction  of
England and Wales the mother shall lodge her and  the  children's  passports
and any other travel documents with the Tipstaff (Tipstaff's  Office,  Royal
Courts of Justice, Strand, London) to be held by him to  the  Order  of  the
Court.

The solicitors for the  Applicant  shall  have  permission  to  serve  these
proceedings, together with this Order, upon the  Respondent  mother  outside
of the jurisdiction of England and  Wales,  by  facsimile  or  alternatively
scanned and e-mailed copy if necessary.

The Applicant father shall have leave to disclose this order to:

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
The British High Commission, New Delhi;
The Indian High Commission, London;
Into any proceedings as the mother may have issued in  the  jurisdiction  of
India, including any divorce proceedings.

The maternal grandparents Dr. Srinivasan  Muralidharan  and  Mrs.  Rajkumari
Murlidharan shall be joined as Respondents to this application  as  the  2nd
and 3rd Respondents respectively.

The mother shall make the children  available  for  skype  or  alternatively
telephone contact each Sunday and each Wednesday at 5.30 p.m. Indian time.

Liberty to the 1st Respondent mother, 2nd  Respondent  maternal  Grandfather
and 3rd Respondent maternal grandmother to apply to  vary  and/or  discharge
this order (or any part of it) upon reasonable notice to the  Court  and  to
the solicitors for the father.

Costs reserved.

AND  THIS  HON'BLE  COURT  RESPECTFULLY  REQUESTS  THAT  the  administrative
authorities of the British  Government  operating  in  the  jurisdiction  of
India and the judicial and administrative authorities  of  India,  including
the Indian High Commission in England, assist in any way within their  power
and control in ascertaining the current whereabouts of the children  herein,
who have been made wards of court, and in assisting in repatriating them  to
England and Wales, the country of their habitual residence."

17. We are told that no further effective or substantial  orders  have  been
passed by the foreign court thereafter.
Proceedings in the High Court
18. Since Mayura was not complying with the orders  passed  by  the  foreign
court, Surya filed a writ petition in the  Madras  High  Court  in  February
2013 (being HCP No.522 of 2013) for a writ of habeas corpus on  the  ground,
inter alia, that Mayura had illegal custody of  the  two  daughters  of  the
couple that is Sneha Lakshmi Vadanan and Kamini  Lakshmi  Vadanan  and  that
they may  be  produced  in  court  and  appropriate  orders  may  be  passed
thereafter.
19. After completion of pleadings, the petition filed by Surya was heard  by
the Madras High Court and by a judgment and order dated 4th  November,  2013
the writ petition was effectively dismissed.
20. The Madras High Court, in its decision, took the view that  the  welfare
of the children (and not the legal right of either of the  parties)  was  of
paramount importance. On facts, the High Court was  of  opinion  that  since
the children were  in  the  custody  of  Mayura  and  she  was  their  legal
guardian, it could not be said that the custody was illegal in  any  manner.
It was also noted that Surya was permitted to take custody of  the  children
every Friday, Saturday and Sunday during the pendency of the proceedings  in
the Madras High Court; that the order passed by the foreign court  had  been
duly complied with and that Surya had also returned to  the  U.K.  On  these
facts and in view of the law, the Madras High Court  "closed"  the  petition
filed by Surya seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
21. Feeling aggrieved, Surya has preferred the present appeal  on  or  about
9th April, 2014.
Important decisions of this court
22. There are five comparatively recent and significant judgments  delivered
by this court on the issue of child  custody  where  a  foreign  country  or
foreign court is concerned on the one hand and India or an Indian court  (or
domestic court) is concerned on the other. These decisions are:  (1)  Sarita
Sharma v. Sushil Sharma[3], (2) Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal &  Anr.[4],
(3) V. Ravi Chandran v. Union  of  India[5],  (4)  Ruchi  Majoo  v.  Sanjeev
Majoo[6],  and  (5)  Arathi  Bandi  v.  Bandi  Jagadrakshaka  Rao.[7]  These
decisions were extensively read out to us and we propose to deal  with  them
in seriatim.
(1) Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma
23. As a result of matrimonial differences between  Sarita  Sharma  and  her
husband Sushil Sharma an order was passed by a District Court in Texas,  USA
regarding the care and custody of their children  (both  American  citizens)
and their  respective  visiting  rights.   A  subsequent  order  placed  the
children in the care of Sushil Sharma and only visiting  rights  were  given
to Sarita  Sharma.  Without  informing  the  foreign  court,  Sarita  Sharma
brought the children to India on or about 7th May, 1997.
24. Subsequently on 12th June, 1997 Sushil Sharma obtained a divorce  decree
from the foreign court and also an  order  that  the  sole  custody  of  the
children shall be with him. Armed with this, he moved the Delhi  High  Court
on 9th September, 1997 for a writ of habeas corpus seeking  custody  of  the
children.  The High Court allowed the writ petition  and  ordered  that  the
passports of the children be  handed  over  to  Sushil  Sharma  and  it  was
declared that he could take the  children  to  USA  without  any  hindrance.
Feeling aggrieved, Sarita Sharma preferred an appeal in this court.
25. This court noted that Sushil  Sharma  was  an  alcoholic  and  had  used
violence against Sarita Sharma. It also noted that Sarita  Sharma's  conduct
was not "very satisfactory" but that before she came to India,  she  was  in
lawful custody of the children but "she had committed a breach of the  order
of the American Court directing her not to  remove  the  children  from  the
jurisdiction of that Court without its permission."
26. This court noted the  following  principles  regarding  custody  of  the
minor children of the couple:
 The modern theory of the conflict of laws recognizes or  at  least  prefers
the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact  with  the
issues arising in the case.[8]
 Even though Section 6 of the Hindu  Minority  and  Guardianship  Act,  1956
constitutes the father  as  the  natural  guardian  of  a  minor  son,  that
provision cannot  supersede  the  paramount  consideration  as  to  what  is
conducive to the welfare of the minor.[9]
 The domestic court will consider the welfare of the child as  of  paramount
importance and the order of a foreign court is only a  factor  to  be  taken
into consideration.[10]
    On the merits of the case, this Court observed:
"Considering all the aspects relating to the welfare  of  the  children,  we
are of the opinion that in spite of the order passed by the Court in  U.S.A.
it was not [pic]proper for the High Court to have allowed the habeas  corpus
writ petition and directed  the  appellant  to  hand  over  custody  of  the
children to the respondent and permit him to take them away to  U.S.A.  What
would be in the interest of  the  children  requires  a  full  and  thorough
inquiry and, therefore, the High Court should have directed  the  respondent
to initiate appropriate proceedings in which such an inquiry can be held."

27. Notwithstanding this, neither was the matter remanded to the High  Court
for issuing such a direction to Sushil Sharma to  approach  the  appropriate
court for conducting a "full and thorough" inquiry nor was such a  direction
issued by this court. The order of the  Delhi  High  Court  was  simply  set
aside and the writ petition filed by Sushil Sharma was dismissed.
28. We may note that significantly, this court did not  make  any  reference
at all to the principle of comity of courts nor give any  importance  (apart
from its mention) to the passage quoted from Surinder  Kaur  Sandhu  to  the
effect that:
"The modern theory of  Conflict  of  Laws  recognizes  and,  in  any  event,
prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the  most  intimate  contact
with the issues arising in the case. Jurisdiction is not  attracted  by  the
operation or creation of fortuitous circumstances such as  the  circumstance
as to where the child, whose custody is in issue,  is  brought  or  for  the
time being lodged. To allow the assumption of jurisdiction by another  State
in such  circumstances  will  only  result  in  encouraging  forum-shopping.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon functional lines. That is to  say,
for example, that in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the  law  of
that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being  of
the spouses and the welfare of the offsprings of marriage."
(2) Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal & Anr.
29. Shilpa  Aggarwal  and  her  husband  Aviral  Mittal  were  both  British
citizens of Indian origin. They had a minor child (also a foreign  national)
from their marriage. They had  matrimonial  differences  and  as  a  result,
Shilpa Aggarwal came to India from the U.K. with  their  minor  child.   She
was expected to return to the U.K. but cancelled their  return  tickets  and
chose to stay on in India. Aviral  Mittal  thereupon  initiated  proceedings
before the High  Court  of  Justice,  Family  Division,  U.K.  and  on  26th
November, 2008 the foreign court directed Shilpa Aggarwal,  inter  alia,  to
return  the  minor  child  to  the  jurisdiction  of  that  foreign   court.
Incidentally, the order passed by the foreign court  is  strikingly  similar
to the order passed by the foreign  court  subject  matter  of  the  present
appeal.
30. Soon thereafter, Shilpa Aggarwal's father filed a writ petition  in  the
Delhi High Court seeking protection of the child and for  a  direction  that
the custody of the child be handed over to him. The High  Court  effectively
dismissed the writ petition and granted time to Shilpa Aggarwal to take  the
child on her own to the U.K. and  participate  in  the  proceedings  in  the
foreign court failing which the child be handed over to Aviral Mittal to  be
taken to the U.K. as a measure  of  interim  custody,  leaving  it  for  the
foreign court to determine which parent would be best  suited  to  have  the
custody of the child.
31. Feeling aggrieved, Shilpa  Aggarwal  preferred  an  appeal  before  this
court  which  noted  and  observed  that  the  following   principles   were
applicable for deciding a case of this nature:
 There are two contrasting principles of law, namely, comity of  courts  and
welfare of the child.
 In  matters  of  custody  of  minor  children,  the  sole  and  predominant
criterion is the interest and  welfare  of  the  minor  child.[11]  Domestic
courts cannot be guided entirely  by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  parents
violated an order passed by a foreign court.[12]
32. On these facts and applying the principles mentioned above,  this  court
agreed with the view of the High Court that the order dated  26th  November,
2008 passed by the foreign court did not intend to separate the  child  from
Shilpa Aggarwal until a final decision was taken with regard to the  custody
of the child. The child was a foreign national; both parents had worked  for
gain in the U.K. and both had acquired  permanent  resident  status  in  the
U.K.  Since the foreign court had the most  intimate  contact[13]  with  the
child and the parents, the principle of "comity  of  courts"  required  that
the foreign court would be  the  most  appropriate  court  to  decide  which
parent would be best suited to have custody of the child.
(3) V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India
33. The mother (Vijayasree Voora) had removed her  minor  child  (a  foreign
national) from the U.S.A. in violation of a custody order dated  18th  June,
2007 passed by the Family Court of the State of New York. The custody  order
was passed with her consent and with  the  consent  of  the  child's  father
(Ravi Chandran, also a foreign national).
34. On 8th August, 2007, Ravi  Chandran  applied  for  modification  of  the
custody order and was granted,  the  same  day,  temporary  sole  legal  and
physical custody of the minor child and Vijayasree  Voora  was  directed  to
immediately turn over the minor child and his passport to Ravi Chandran  and
further, her custodial time with the child was suspended. The foreign  court
also ordered that the issue of custody of the child shall be  heard  by  the
jurisdictional Family Court in the USA.
35. On these broad facts, Ravi Chandran moved  a  petition  for  a  writ  of
habeas corpus in this court for the production of  the  child  and  for  his
custody. The  child  was  produced  in  this  court  and  the  question  for
consideration was: "What should be the order in the facts and  circumstances
keeping in mind the interest of the child and the orders of  the  courts  of
the country of which the child is a national."
36. This court referred to a large number  of  decisions  and  accepted  the
following observations, conclusions and principles:
 The comity of nations does not require a court to blindly follow  an  order
made by a foreign court.[14]
 Due weight should be given to the views formed by the courts of  a  foreign
country of which the child is a national. The comity of courts  demands  not
the  enforcement  of  an  order  of  a   foreign   court   but   its   grave
consideration.[15] The weight and persuasive effect of  a  foreign  judgment
must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.[16]
 The welfare of the child is  the  first  and  paramount  consideration,[17]
whatever orders may have been passed by the foreign court.[18]
 The domestic court is bound to consider what is in the  best  interests  of
the child. Although the order of a foreign court will be attended to as  one
of the circumstances to be taken into account, it  is  not  conclusive,  one
way or the other.[19]
 One of the considerations that a domestic court must keep in mind  is  that
there is no danger  to  the  moral  or  physical  health  of  the  child  in
repatriating him or her to the jurisdiction of the foreign country.[20]
 While considering whether a child should be removed to the jurisdiction  of
the foreign court or not, the domestic court may either  conduct  a  summary
inquiry or an elaborate inquiry in this regard.  In the event  the  domestic
court conducts a summary inquiry, it would return the custody of  the  child
to the country from which the child was removed unless such return could  be
shown to be harmful to the child. In the event the domestic  court  conducts
an elaborate inquiry, the court could go into the merits  as  to  where  the
permanent welfare of the child lay and  ignore  the  order  of  the  foreign
court or treat the fact of removal of the  child  from  another  country  as
only one of the  circumstances.[21]  An  order  that  the  child  should  be
returned forthwith to the country from which he or she has been  removed  in
the  expectation  that  any  dispute  about  his  or  her  custody  will  be
satisfactorily resolved in the courts of that country may well  be  regarded
as being in the best interests of the child.[22]
 The modern theory of  conflict  of  laws  recognizes  and,  in  any  event,
prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the  most  intimate  contact
with the issues arising in the case. Jurisdiction is not  attracted  by  the
operation or creation of fortuitous circumstances such as  the  circumstance
as to where the child, whose custody is in issue,  is  brought  or  for  the
time being lodged.[23]
37. On the facts of the case, it was held that an elaborate inquiry was  not
required to be conducted. It was also observed that  there  was  nothing  on
record which could remotely suggest that it would be harmful for  the  child
to return to his native  country.  Consequently,  this  court  directed  the
repatriation of the child to the jurisdiction of the foreign  court  subject
to certain directions given in the judgment.
38. This court also quoted a passage from Sarita Sharma to the  effect  that
a decree passed by a foreign court  cannot  override  the  consideration  of
welfare of a child.
(4) Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo
39. Ruchi Majoo (wife) had come  to  India  with  her  child  consequent  to
matrimonial differences between her and her  husband  (Sanjeev  Majoo).  All
three that is Ruchi Majoo,  Sanjeev  Majoo  and  their  child  were  foreign
nationals.
40. Soon after Ruchi Majoo came  to  India,  Sanjeev  Majoo  approached  the
Superior Court of California,  County  of  Ventura  in  the  USA  seeking  a
divorce from Ruchi Majoo and obtained a protective custody warrant order  on
9th September, 2008 which required Ruchi Majoo to appear before the  foreign
court. She did not obey the order of the foreign court perhaps  because  she
had initiated proceedings  before  the  Guardian  Court  at  Delhi  on  28th
August, 2008. In any  event,  the  Guardian  Court  passed  an  ex-parte  ad
interim order on 16th September, 2008 (after the protective custody  warrant
order passed by the foreign court) to the effect that  Sanjeev  Majoo  shall
not interfere with the custody of her minor child  till  the  next  date  of
hearing.
41. Aggrieved by this order, Rajiv Majoo challenged it  through  a  petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution filed in the  Delhi  High  Court.  The
order of 16th September, 2008 was set aside by the High Court on the  ground
that the Guardian Court had no jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  proceedings
since the child was not ordinarily resident in Delhi. It was also held  that
the issue of the child's custody ought to be decided by  the  foreign  court
for the reason that it had already passed  the  protective  custody  warrant
order and also because the child and his parents were American citizens.
42.  On  these  broad  facts,  this  court  framed   three   questions   for
determination.  These questions are as follows:-
(i) Whether the High Court was justified  in  dismissing  the  petition  for
custody of the  child  on  the  ground  that  the  court  at  Delhi  had  no
jurisdiction to entertain it; (ii) Whether  the  High  Court  was  right  in
declining exercise of jurisdiction on the principle  of  comity  of  courts;
and (iii) Whether the order granting interim custody of the child  to  Ruchi
Majoo calls for any modification in terms of grant of visitation  rights  to
the father pending disposal of the petition by the trial court.
43. We are not concerned with the first and the third question.  As  far  as
the second question is concerned, this court was  of  the  view  that  there
were four reasons for answering the question in the negative. Be that as  it
may, the following principles were accepted and adopted by this court:
 The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. Simply  because  a
foreign court has taken a particular  view  on  any  aspect  concerning  the
welfare of a child is not enough for the courts in this country to shut  out
an independent consideration of the  matter.  The  principle  of  comity  of
courts simply demands consideration of an order passed by  a  foreign  court
and not necessarily its enforcement.[24]
 One of the factors to be considered whether a domestic court should hold  a
summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry for repatriating the  child  to  the
jurisdiction of the foreign court is the time gap  in  moving  the  domestic
court for repatriation. The longer the time gap, the lesser the  inclination
of the domestic courts to go in for a summary inquiry.[25]
 An order of a foreign court is one of the factors to be considered for  the
repatriation of a child to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.  But  that
will not override the consideration of  welfare  of  the  child.  Therefore,
even where the removal of a child  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  foreign
court goes against the orders of that foreign court, giving custody  of  the
child to the parent who approached the foreign court would not be  warranted
if it were not in the welfare of the child.[26]
 Where a child has been removed from the jurisdiction of a foreign court  in
contravention of an order passed by that foreign  court  where  the  parties
had set up their matrimonial home, the domestic court must consider  whether
to conduct an elaborate or summary inquiry on the  question  of  custody  of
the child. If an elaborate inquiry is to be held,  the  domestic  court  may
give due weight to the order of the foreign court depending upon  the  facts
and circumstances in which such an order has been passed.[27]
 A constitutional court exercising summary  jurisdiction  for  the  issuance
of a writ of habeas  corpus  may  conduct  an  elaborate  inquiry  into  the
welfare of the child whose custody is claimed and a Guardian  Court  (if  it
has jurisdiction) may conduct a summary inquiry  into  the  welfare  of  the
child, depending upon the facts of the case.[28]
 Since the interest and welfare of the child is paramount, a domestic  court
"is entitled and indeed duty-bound  to  examine  the  matter  independently,
taking the foreign judgment,  if  any,  only  as  an  input  for  its  final
adjudication."
44. On the facts of the case, this court  held  that  "repatriation  of  the
minor to the United States, on the principle of "comity of courts" does  not
appear to us to be an acceptable option worthy of being  exercised  at  that
stage." Accordingly, it was held that the "Interest of the  minor  shall  be
better served if he continued to be in the  custody  of  his  mother  [Ruchi
Majoo]."
(5) Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao
45. The facts in this case are a little complicated and it is not  necessary
to advert to them in any detail.  The sum  and  substance  was  that  Arathi
Bandi and her husband Bandi Rao were ordinarily residents of  USA  and  they
had a minor child.  There were  some  matrimonial  differences  between  the
couple and proceedings in that regard were pending in a  court  in  Seattle,
USA.
46. In violation of an order passed  by  the  foreign  court,  Arathi  Bandi
brought the child to India on 17th July, 2008.  Since  she  did  not  return
with the child to the jurisdiction of the foreign  court  bailable  warrants
were issued for her arrest by the foreign court.
47. On or about 20th November, 2009 Bandi Rao initiated proceedings  in  the
Andhra Pradesh High Court for a writ of  habeas  corpus  seeking  production
and custody of the child to enable him  to  take  the  child  to  USA.   The
Andhra Pradesh High Court passed quite a few material  orders  in  the  case
but Arathi Bandi did not abide by some of them resulting in the  High  Court
issuing non-bailable warrants on 25th January, 2011 for  her  arrest.   This
order and two earlier orders passed by the High Court were  then  challenged
by her in this court.
48. This court observed that Arathi Bandi had come to India in  defiance  of
the orders passed by the foreign court and that she also ignored the  orders
passed by the High Court. Consequently, this court  was  of  the  view  that
given her conduct, no relief could be granted to Arathi Bandi.
49. This court took into consideration various  principles  laid  down  from
time to time in different decisions rendered by this court  with  regard  to
the custody of a minor child.  It was held that:
 It is the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing  wrong
by removing a child out of the country does not gain any  advantage  of  his
or her wrong doing.[29]
 In a given case relating to the custody of a child, it may be necessary  to
have an elaborate inquiry with regard to the  welfare  of  the  child  or  a
summary inquiry without investigating the merits of the dispute relating  to
the care of the child on the ground that  such  an  order  is  in  the  best
interests of the child.[30]
 Merely because a child has been brought to India  from  a  foreign  country
does not necessarily mean that the domestic court should decide the  custody
issue. It would be in accord with the  principle  of  comity  of  courts  to
return the child to the jurisdiction of the foreign court from which  he  or
she has been removed.[31]
Discussion of the law
50. The principle of the comity of courts  is  essentially  a  principle  of
self-restraint, applicable when a foreign court is seized of  the  issue  of
the custody of a  child  prior  to  the  domestic  court.  There  may  be  a
situation where the foreign court though seized of the issue does  not  pass
any effective or substantial order or  direction.  In  that  event,  if  the
domestic court were to pass an effective or substantial order  or  direction
prior in point of time then  the  foreign  court  ought  to  exercise  self-
restraint and respect the direction or order of the domestic court (or  vice
versa), unless there are very good reasons not to do so.
51. From a review of the above decisions, it is quite clear  that  there  is
complete unanimity that the best interests and welfare of the child  are  of
paramount importance. However, it should be clearly understood that this  is
the final goal or the final objective  to  be  achieved  -  it  is  not  the
beginning of the exercise but the end.
52. Therefore, we are concerned with two principles in a case  such  as  the
present. They are (i) The  principle  of  comity  of  courts  and  (ii)  The
principle of the best  interests  and  the  welfare  of  the  child.   These
principles have been referred to "contrasting  principles  of  law"[32]  but
they are not 'contrasting' in the sense of one being  the  opposite  of  the
other but they are contrasting in the sense of  being  different  principles
that need to be applied in the facts of a given case.
53. What then are some of the key circumstances and  factors  to  take  into
consideration for reaching this final goal or  final  objective?  First,  it
must be appreciated that  the  "most  intimate  contact"  doctrine  and  the
"closest concern" doctrine of Surinder Kaur Sandhu are very much  alive  and
cannot be ignored only because their application might be  uncomfortable  in
certain situations. It is not appropriate that a domestic court having  much
less intimate contact with a child and having much less close  concern  with
a child and his or her parents (as against a foreign court in a given  case)
should take upon itself the onerous task of determining the  best  interests
and welfare of the child. A foreign court having the most  intimate  contact
and the closest concern with the child would be better equipped and  perhaps
best suited to appreciate the social and cultural milieu in which the  child
has been brought up rather than a domestic court.  This  is  a  factor  that
must be kept in mind.
54. Second, there is no reason why  the  principle  of  "comity  of  courts"
should be jettisoned, except for special and  compelling  reasons.  This  is
more so in a case where only an interim or an interlocutory order  has  been
passed by a foreign court (as in the present case). In McKee which has  been
referred to in several decisions of this court, the  Judicial  Committee  of
the Privy Council was not dealing with an interim or an interlocutory  order
but a final adjudication. The applicable principles are  entirely  different
in  such  cases.  In  this  appeal,  we  are  not  concerned  with  a  final
adjudication by a foreign court - the principles for dealing with a  foreign
judgment are laid down in Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[33]  In
passing an interim or an interlocutory order, a foreign court is as  capable
of making a prima facie fair adjudication as any domestic  court  and  there
is no reason to undermine its competence or capability. If the principle  of
comity of courts is accepted, and it has been so accepted by this court,  we
must give due respect even to such orders passed by  a  foreign  court.  The
High Court misdirected itself by looking at the issue as a matter  of  legal
rights of the parties. Actually, the issue is of the  legal  obligations  of
the parties, in the context of the order passed by the foreign court.
55. If an interim or an interlocutory order passed by a  foreign  court  has
to be disregarded, there must be some special reason for doing so. No  doubt
we expect foreign courts to respect the orders passed  by  courts  in  India
and so there is  no  justifiable  reason  why  domestic  courts  should  not
reciprocate and respect orders passed by foreign courts. This issue  may  be
looked at from another perspective. If the reluctance to  grant  respect  to
an interim or an interlocutory  order  is  extrapolated  into  the  domestic
sphere, there may well be situations where  a  Family  Court  in  one  State
declines to respect an interim or an interlocutory order of a  Family  Court
in another State on the ground of best interests and welfare of  the  child.
This may well happen in a case where a person  ordinarily  resident  in  one
State gets married to another person ordinarily resident  in  another  State
and they reside with their child in a third State. In such a situation,  the
Family Court having the most intimate contact and the closest  concern  with
the child (the court in the third State)  may  find  its  orders  not  being
given due respect by a Family Court in the first or the second  State.  This
would clearly be destructive of the equivalent of the  principle  of  comity
of courts even within the country and, what is  worse,  destructive  of  the
rule of law.
56. What are the situations in which an interim or  an  interlocutory  order
of a foreign court may be ignored? There are very few  such  situations.  It
is of primary importance to determine, prima facie, that the  foreign  court
has jurisdiction over the child whose custody is in dispute,  based  on  the
fact of the child being ordinarily resident in the territory over which  the
foreign court  exercises  jurisdiction.  If  the  foreign  court  does  have
jurisdiction, the interim  or  interlocutory  order  of  the  foreign  court
should be given due weight and respect. If the jurisdiction of  the  foreign
court is not in doubt, the "first strike"  principle  would  be  applicable.
That is to say that due respect and weight must be given  to  a  substantive
order prior in point of time to a substantive order passed by another  court
(foreign or domestic).
57. There may be a case, as has happened in the present  appeal,  where  one
parent invokes  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  but  does  not  obtain  any
substantive order in his or her favour and  the  other  parent  invokes  the
jurisdiction of another court and obtains a substantive order in his or  her
favour before the first court. In such an  event,  due  respect  and  weight
ought to be given to the substantive order passed by the second court  since
that interim or interlocutory order was passed prior in point  of  time.  As
mentioned above, this situation has arisen in the present  appeal  -  Mayura
had initiated divorce proceedings in India before  the  custody  proceedings
were initiated by  Surya  in  the  U.K.  but  the  foreign  court  passed  a
substantive order on the custody  issue  before  the  domestic  court.  This
situation also arose in Ruchi  Majoo  where  Ruchi  Majoo  had  invoked  the
jurisdiction of the domestic court before Rajiv  Majoo  but  in  fact  Rajiv
Majoo obtained a  substantive  order  from  the  foreign  court  before  the
domestic court. While the substantive order of the foreign  court  in  Ruchi
Majoo was accorded due respect and weight but for  reasons  not  related  to
the principle of comity of courts and on merits, custody of  the  child  was
handed over to Ruchi Majoo, notwithstanding the first strike principle.
58. As has been held in Arathi  Bandi  a  violation  of  an  interim  or  an
interlocutory order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction ought to  be
viewed strictly if the rule of law is to be maintained. No litigant  can  be
permitted to defy or decline adherence to an  interim  or  an  interlocutory
order of a court merely because he or she is of the opinion that that  order
is incorrect - that has to be judged by  a  superior  court  or  by  another
court having jurisdiction  to  do  so.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the
observations of this court in Sarita Sharma  and  Ruchi  Majoo  have  to  be
appreciated. If as a general principle, the violation of an  interim  or  an
interlocutory order  is  not  viewed  seriously,  it  will  have  widespread
deleterious effects on the authority of courts to  implement  their  interim
or interlocutory orders or compel their  adherence.  Extrapolating  this  to
the courts in  our  country,  it  is  common  knowledge  that  in  cases  of
matrimonial differences in our country, quite often  more  than  one  Family
Court has  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  in  issue.  In  such  a
situation, can a litigant say that he  or  she  will  obey  the  interim  or
interlocutory order of a particular Family Court and not  that  of  another?
Similarly, can one Family Court hold that an  interim  or  an  interlocutory
order of another Family Court on the same subject matter may be  ignored  in
the best interests and welfare of the child? We think not. An interim or  an
interlocutory is precisely what it is - interim or interlocutory  -  and  is
always subject to modification or vacation by the  court  that  passes  that
interim or interlocutory order. There is no finality attached to an  interim
or an interlocutory order. We may add  a  word  of  caution  here  -  merely
because a parent has violated an order of a  foreign  court  does  not  mean
that that parent should be penalized for it. The conduct of the  parent  may
certainly be taken into account for passing a final order,  but  that  ought
not to have a penalizing result.
59. Finally, this court has accepted the view[34] that in a given  case,  it
might be appropriate to have an elaborate inquiry to decide whether a  child
should be repatriated to the foreign country and to the jurisdiction of  the
foreign court or in a given case to have a  summary  inquiry  without  going
into the merits of the dispute relating to the best  interests  and  welfare
of the child and repatriating the child to the foreign country  and  to  the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
60. However, if there  is  a  pre-existing  order  of  a  foreign  court  of
competent  jurisdiction  and  the  domestic  court  decides  to  conduct  an
elaborate inquiry (as against a  summary  inquiry),  it  must  have  special
reasons to do so.  An elaborate inquiry should not be ordered  as  a  matter
of course.  While deciding whether a summary or an elaborate inquiry  should
be conducted, the domestic court must take into consideration:
(a) The nature and effect of the interim or interlocutory  order  passed  by
the foreign court.
(b) The existence of special reasons for repatriating  or  not  repatriating
the child to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
(c) The repatriation of the child does not cause any moral  or  physical  or
social or cultural or psychological harm to the child, nor should  it  cause
any legal harm to the parent with whom the child  is  in  India.  There  are
instances where the order of the foreign court may result in the  arrest  of
the parent on his or her return to the foreign country.[35]  In such  cases,
the domestic court is also obliged to ensure  the  physical  safety  of  the
parent.
(d) The alacrity with which the parent moves the concerned foreign court  or
the concerned domestic court is also relevant. If the time gap is  unusually
large and is not reasonably explainable and the  child  has  developed  firm
roots in India, the domestic  court  may  be  well  advised  to  conduct  an
elaborate inquiry.
Discussion on facts
61. The facts in this appeal reveal that Surya and Mayura  are  citizens  of
the U.K. and their children  are  also  citizens  of  the  U.K.;  they  (the
parents) have been residents of the U.K. for several years  and  worked  for
gain over there; they also own immovable property  (jointly)  in  the  U.K.;
their children were born and  brought  up  in  the  U.K.  in  a  social  and
cultural milieu different from that of India and they have grown up in  that
different milieu; their elder daughter was studying in a school in the  U.K.
until she was brought to India and the younger daughter had  also  joined  a
school in the U.K. meaning thereby that  their  exposure  to  the  education
system was different from the education system in India.[36]  The mere  fact
that the children were admitted to a school in India, with  the  consent  of
Surya is not conclusive of  his  consent  to  the  permanent  or  long  term
residence of the children in India. It is  possible,  as  explained  by  his
learned counsel, that he did not want any disruption  in  the  education  of
his children and that is why he consented to the admission of  the  children
in a school in India. This is a possible explanation and cannot be  rejected
outright.
62. Mayura has not taken any steps to give up her  foreign  citizenship  and
to acquire Indian citizenship.  She  has  taken  no  such  steps  even  with
respect to her children.  Clearly, she is desirous of retaining her  foreign
citizenship at the cost of her Indian citizenship and would  also  like  her
children to continue  with  their  foreign  citizenship,  rather  than  take
Indian citizenship. That being the position, there  is  no  reason  why  the
courts in India should not encourage her and the children to submit  to  the
jurisdiction of the foreign court which has the most intimate  contact  with
them and closest concern apart from being located in the  country  of  their
citizenship. The  fact  that  Mayura  is  of  Indian  origin  cannot  be  an
overwhelming factor.
63. Though Mayura filed proceedings for divorce in India way back in  August
2012, she made no serious effort to obtain any interim order in  her  favour
regarding the custody of the children, nor did she persuade the trial  court
for more than two years to pass an interim order  for  the  custody  of  the
children.  On the other hand,  the  foreign  court  acted  promptly  on  the
asking of Surya and passed an interim order regarding  the  custody  of  the
children, thereby making the first strike principle applicable.
64.  It would have been another matter altogether if the  Family  Court  had
passed an  effective  or  substantial  order  or  direction  prior  to  13th
November, 2012 then, in our view,  the  foreign  court  would  have  had  to
consider exercising self-restraint  and  abstaining  from  disregarding  the
direction or order of the Family Court by applying the principle  of  comity
of courts. However, since the first effective order or direction was  passed
by the foreign court, in our opinion, principle of comity  of  courts  would
tilt the balance in favour of that court rather than the Family  Court.   We
are assuming that the Family Court was a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction
although we must mention that according to Surya, the Family  Court  has  no
jurisdiction over the matter of the custody  of  the  two  children  of  the
couple since they are both British citizens and are ordinarily residents  of
the U.K.  However, it is not necessary for us  to  go  into  this  issue  to
decide this because even on first principles, we are of the  view  that  the
orders or directions passed by the foreign court must have  primacy  on  the
facts of the case, over the Family  Court  in  Coimbatore.  No  specific  or
meaningful reason has been given to us to ignore or bypass the direction  or
order of the foreign court.
65. We have gone through the orders and directions  passed  by  the  foreign
court and find that there is no final determination on the issue of  custody
and what the foreign court has required is for  Mayura  to  present  herself
before it along with the two children who are wards  of  the  foreign  court
and to make her submissions.  The foreign court  has  not  taken  any  final
decision on the custody of the children.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the
foreign court may come to a conclusion, after hearing both parties that  the
custody of the children should be with Mayura and that they should  be  with
her in India. The foreign court may also come to  the  conclusion  that  the
best interests and welfare of the children requires that they may remain  in
the U.K. either under the custody of Surya or Mayura or their joint  custody
or as wards of the court during their minority. In other  words,  there  are
several options before the foreign court and we  cannot  jump  the  gun  and
conclude that the foreign court will  not  come  to  a  just  and  equitable
decision which would be in  the  best  interests  and  welfare  of  the  two
children of the couple.
66.  The  orders  passed  by  the  foreign  court  are  only   interim   and
interlocutory and no finality is attached to them.  Nothing prevents  Mayura
from contesting the correctness of the interim and interlocutory orders  and
to have them vacated or modified or even set aside.  She has taken  no  such
steps in this regard for over two years. Even the later order passed by  the
foreign court is not final and there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the
foreign court will not take all  relevant  factors  and  circumstances  into
consideration before taking a final view in the matter  of  the  custody  of
the children. The foreign court may  well  be  inclined,  if  the  facts  so
warrant, to pass an order that the custody of the children  should  be  with
Mayura in India.
67. There is also nothing on the record to indicate that any prejudice  will
be caused to the children of Mayura and Surya if they are taken to the  U.K.
and subjected to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.   There  is  nothing
to suggest that they will be prejudiced in  any  manner  either  morally  or
physically or socially or culturally or psychologically if they continue  as
wards of the court until a final order  is  passed  by  the  foreign  court.
There is nothing to suggest that the foreign court is either incompetent  or
incapable of taking a  reasonable,  just  and  fair  decision  in  the  best
interests of the children and entirely for their welfare.
68. There is no doubt that the foreign court has the most  intimate  contact
with Mayura and her children and also the  closest  concern  with  the  well
being of Mayura, Surya and their children.  That  being  the  position  even
though Mayura did not violate any  order  of  the  foreign  court  when  she
brought her children to  India,  her  continued  refusal  to  abide  by  the
interim and interlocutory order of the foreign court is  not  justified  and
it would be certainly in the best interests and welfare of the  children  if
the foreign court, in view of the above,  takes  a  final  decision  on  the
custody of the children at the earliest. The foreign court  undoubtedly  has
the capacity to do so.
69. We have considered the fact that the children have  been  in  Coimbatore
since August 2012 for over two years.  The question that arose in our  minds
was whether the children had adjusted to life in India and  had  taken  root
in India and whether, under the circumstances, it would  be  appropriate  to
direct their repatriation to the U.K. instead  of  conducting  an  elaborate
inquiry in India. It is always difficult  to  say  whether  any  person  has
taken any root in a country other than that of his or  her  nationality  and
in a country other than where he or she was born and brought  up.  From  the
material on record, it cannot be said that life has changed so much for  the
children that it would be better for them to remain  in  India  than  to  be
repatriated to the U.K. The facts in this case do not suggest  that  because
of their stay in India over the last two years the children are not  capable
of continuing with their life in the  U.K.  should  that  become  necessary.
However, this can more appropriately be decided
by the foreign court after taking all factors into consideration.
70. It must be noted at this stage that efforts were made by this  court  to
have the matter of custody settled in an amicable manner, including  through
mediation, as recorded in a couple of orders that have been passed  by  this
court.  Surya had also agreed to and did temporarily shift his residence  to
Coimbatore and apparently met  the  children.   However,  in  spite  of  all
efforts, it was not possible to amicably settle the issue and the  mediation
centre attached to this court gave  a  report  that  mediation  between  the
parties had failed.  This left us with no option but to hear the  appeal  on
merits.
71. Given these facts and the efforts made so far, in our opinion, there  is
no reason to hold any elaborate inquiry as postulated in L. (Minors) -  this
elaborate inquiry is best left to be conducted by the  foreign  court  which
has the most intimate contact and the closest concern with the children.  We
have also noted that Surya did not waste any  time  in  moving  the  foreign
court for the custody of the children. He moved the foreign  court  as  soon
as he became aware (prior to  the  efforts  made  by  this  court)  that  no
amicable solution was
possible with regard to the custody of the children.
72.   We are conscious that it will not be financially easy  for  Mayura  to
contest the claim of her husband Surya for  the  custody  of  the  children.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that some directions need to  be  given  in
favour of Mayura to enable her to  present  an  effective  case  before  the
foreign court.
73. Accordingly, we direct as follows:-
 Since the children Sneha Lakshmi Vadanan and  Kamini  Lakshmi  Vadanan  are
presently studying in a school in  Coimbatore  and  their  summer  vacations
commence (we are told) in May, 2015 Mayura Vadanan will  take  the  children
to the U.K. during the summer vacations of the children and comply with  the
order dated 29th November, 2012 and participate (if she so  wishes)  in  the
proceedings pending in the High Court of Justice. Surya  Vadanan  will  bear
the cost of litigation expenses of Mayura Vadanan.

 Surya Vadanan will pay the air fare or purchase the tickets for the  travel
of Mayura Vadanan and the children to the U.K. and later, if necessary,  for
their return to India.  He  shall  also  make  all  arrangements  for  their
comfortable stay in their matrimonial home, subject  to  further  orders  of
the High Court of Justice.

 Surya Vadanan will pay maintenance to Mayura Vadanan and the children at  a
reasonable figure to be decided by the High Court of Justice  or  any  other
court having jurisdiction to take a decision in the matter. Until then,  and
to meet immediate out of pocket expenses, Surya Vadanan will give to  Mayura
Vadanan prior to her departure from India  an  amount  equivalent  to  1000
(Pounds one thousand only).

 Surya Vadanan shall ensure that all coercive processes that may  result  in
penal consequences against Mayura Vadanan are dropped or are not pursued  by
him.

 In the event Mayura Vadanan does not comply with the  directions  given  by
us, Surya Vadanan will be entitled to take the  children  with  him  to  the
U.K. for further proceedings in the High Court of Justice. To  enable  this,
Mayura Vadanan will deliver to Surya Vadanan the passports of  the  children
Sneha Lakshmi Vadanan and Kamini Lakshmi Vadanan.

74.  The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.

                                           ................................J
                                           (Madan B. Lokur)

                                         ................................J
                                          (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi;
February 27, 2015

-----------------------
[1]  13. Divorce.-(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the
husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that
the other party-
    (i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual
intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or
    (i-a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the
petitioner with cruelty; or
    (i-b) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less
than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or
    [rest of the provision is not relevant]
[2] . There is no paragraph 2(c) in the text of the order supplied  to  this
court.
[3]  (2000) 3 SCC 14
[4]  (2010) 1 SCC 591
[5]  (2010) 1 SCC 174
[6]  (2011) 6 SCC 479
[7]  (2013) 15 SCC 790
[8]  Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, (1984) 3 SCC 698
[9]  Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu
[10]    Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, (1998)  1  SCC  112  which  in  turn
referred to McKee v. McKee,   1951 AC 352: (1951) 1 All ER 942 (PC)
[11]    Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand  M.  Dinshaw,  (1987)  1  SCC  42.  Even
though this court used the word "sole", it is clear that it did  not  reject
or intend to reject the principle of comity of courts.
[12]    Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma
[13]    Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu
[14]    B's Settlement, In re. B. v. B.,1940 Ch 54: (1951) 1 All ER 949  and
McKee v. McKee
[15]    McKee v. McKee
[16]    McKee v. McKee
[17]    McKee v. McKee
[18]    B's Settlement, In re
[19]    Kernot v. Kernot, 1965 Ch 217: (1964) 3 WLR 1210: (1964)  3  All  ER
339
[20]    H. (Infants) , In re, (1966) 1 WLR 381 (Ch & CA) : (1966) 1  All  ER
886 (CA)
[21]    L. (Minors), In re, (1974) 1 WLR 250 : (1974) 1 All ER 913 (CA)
[22]    L. (Minors), In re,
[23]    Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu
[24]    Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde
[25]    Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde
[26]    Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma
[27]    V. Ravi Chandran and Aviral Mittal
[28]    Dhanwanti Joshi referring to Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw
[29]    Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw
[30]    V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India
[31]    V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India
[32]    Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal
[33]    13. When foreign judgment not conclusive.-A foreign judgment shall
be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between
the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim
litigating under the same title except-
    (a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent
jurisdiction;
    (b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case;
    (c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an
incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise the law of
India in cases in which such law is applicable;
    (d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are
opposed to natural justice;
    (e) where it has been obtained by fraud;
    (f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force
in India.
[34]    L. (Minors), In re,
[35]    Arathi Bandi
[36]    In our order dated 9th July, 2014 we have noted  that  according  to
Mayura the children are attending some extra classes.  This  is  perhaps  to
enable them to adjust to the education system and curriculum in India.