Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 8438 of 2016, Judgment Date: Aug 31, 2016

                                                              REPORTABLE

                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
                            CIVIL APPELLATE
                                JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.8438 OF 2016
              (Arising out of SLP (C) No.8463 of 2008)


KEDAR NATH YADAV                                    ………APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.                        ……RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8440 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 10731/2008)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8441 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11783/2008)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8444 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11830/2008)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8446 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12360/2008)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8447 OF 2016
                   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12724/2008)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8453 OF 2016
                    Arising out of SLP(C)NO.25580 OF 2016
                 (Arising out of SLP(C) ….CC No. 13645/2008

                                     And
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.8449 OF 2016
     (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 22491/2008)

                               J U D G M E N T


V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.



      Delay condoned in SLP (C) CC No. 13645 of 2008.

 Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
  The present appeals arise out of the impugned final  common  judgment  and
order dated  18.01.2008  in  W.P.  No.  23836  (W)  of  2006  and  connected
petitions, passed by the High Court of Calcutta, wherein the Writ  Petitions
filed challenging the proceedings of the acquisition of land  to  an  extent
of about 1000 acres within the  mouzas  Gopalnagar,  Singherberi,  Beraberi,
Khaserberi and Bajemelia, P.S. Singur, District Hooghly were dismissed.


 The relevant facts which are required for us to appreciate the rival  legal
contentions advanced on behalf  of  the  parties  are  stated  in  brief  as
hereunder:

The State of West  Bengal  formulated  an  industrial  policy  to  establish
automobile industries in the State to cater to the needs of the  people  and
to solve the problem of unemployment in  the  State.  In  pursuance  of  the
same, the respondent, Tata Motors Ltd. (hereinafter referred to  as  “TML”),
entered into discussions with the State Government of West Bengal  regarding
the infrastructural needs of the  project.  In  a  letter  dated  19.01.2006
addressed to  then  Principal  Secretary  of  the  Commerce  and  Industries
Department of the Government of West Bengal, TML  stated  that  a  team  had
visited the State  and  met  representatives  of  the  Government.  It  also
thanked the Government for the openness  with  which  the  discussions  were
held and the assurance of its full support on the  project,  and  summarized
its requirements for the same. The  relevant  portion  of  the  proposal  is
extracted hereunder:
“
|Sl.No|Aspect/       |Requirement  |Remarks                                  |
|.    |Parameter     |             |                                         |
|1    |Land          |1000 acres   |75% for Tata Motors land 25% for Vendor  |
|     |(including    |             |Park                                     |
|     |vendor park)  |             |Unconditional flexibility for allotment  |
|     |              |             |to vendors                               |
|     |              |             |Land title on out-right sale basis, or   |
|     |              |             |long lease of 99 years transfer of title |
|     |              |             |after the lease period, without          |
|     |              |             |condition.                               |
|     |              |             |Land to be stabilised/graded and given,  |
|     |              |             |or the cost to be reduced from the land  |
|     |              |             |cost.                                    |
|2    |Land for      |             |Schooling land to be allotted free of    |
|     |schooling and |             |cost or Government to promote            |
|     |township      |             |establishment of prominent schools in    |
|     |              |             |proximity.                               |
|     |              |             |                                         |
|     |              |             |Land for township to be  given at 50% of |
|     |              |             |rate applied for factory land.           |
|3    |Power         |100 MVA      |Quality of power (50 Hz +/- 3%),         |
|     |(including    |             |availability from 2 sources, regulatory  |
|     |vendor park)  |             |voltage +/- 5%                           |
|4    |Water         |15000 cu.m   |Potable water as per Indian Standards    |
|     |(including    |             |(IS-10500)                               |
|     |vendor park)  |             |                                         |
|5    |6 lane road   |             |Approach road to be available within 3   |
|     |around the    |             |months from the date of land allotment.  |
|     |boundary of   |             |                                         |
|     |the plant, and|             |                                         |
|     |4- lane       |             |                                         |
|     |approach road |             |                                         |
|     |to the site   |             |                                         |
|     |              |             |                                         |
|     |              |             |                                         |
|B    |Commercial    |             |                                         |
|1    |Land Cost     |             |Rs. 2 lakh per acre. Land cost to be paid|
|     |              |             |after 5 years at the rate of 0.1%        |
|     |              |             |interest p.a.                            |

   ”

The then Principal Secretary to the Government of West  Bengal,  Commerce  &
Industries Department,  sent  the  letter  dated  24.01.2006,  annexing  the
proposal which TML had sent, to the then Principal Secretary Land  and  Land
Reforms Department, Shri  Sukumar  Das  to  communicate  his  views  to  the
Commerce and Industries Department. A letter was also sent on the  same  day
to the then Principal Secretary, Finance Department seeking his view on  the
matter. Further, the ‘Record Note of Discussion held between TML and a  team
 from the Government of West Bengal and West Bengal  Industrial  Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the  “WBIDC”)  produced  on  record,
shows that a team from TML met representatives of  the  Government  of  West
Bengal and WBIDC on 08.03.2006 in Kolkata and on 17.03.2006 in  Mumbai.  The
relevant portion of the record note reads as under:

“TML has shown interest in setting up a “Special Category Project”  in  West
Bengal for manufacture of its new car for a volume of 2, 50,000 per year  on
maturity. The West Bengal Government is also  keen  to  attract  a  “Special
Category Project” in line with their Industrial Policy Document.”

The record note also states  that  the  project  was  looking  at  a  direct
investment worth Rs.650 crores  in  the  plant  and  machinery  and  the  IT
infrastructure by TML,  a  direct  investment  by  the  company  in  factory
building including utilities such as roads, water line, sewage  line,  power
lines drainage and effluent treatment plants etc. to the  tune  of  Rs.  176
crores, a direct investment by TML  in  a  township  of  approximately  2000
dwelling units of an average area of 1000/- sq. ft. per dwelling  unit  with
complete municipal  facilities  such  as  roads,  power  line,  water  line,
drainage, parks and other municipal  facilities  at  Rs.  150  crores.   The
record note further mentions  an  indirect  investment  by  vendors  in  the
vendor park in plant and machinery valued at Rs. 200 crores  and  a  further
indirect investment by vendors  in  factory  building  including  facilities
such as roads, power line, water line, drainage, sewage and other  municipal
facilities amounting to Rs. 90 crores.  The  employment  potential  of  this
project was assessed at 1,800 employees in direct employment by  TML  and  a
further 4,700 employees through vendors and service providers.
The estimated project requirement of land, is extracted as under:
“Land
TML factory – 400 acres
Vendor park – 200 acres
Township – 100 acres”

At this stage, it is  also  important  to  consider  the  incentive  package
offered by the State Government to TML. The relevant  portion  is  extracted
as under:

“ The West Bengal government has offered to TML an incentive  package  equal
to some of the best being offered in some States.
The two  teams  have  worked  out  the  following  package  which  may  vary
downwards or upwards based on the volumes of sales in West Bengal:
The State Government will develop the land  admeasuring  approx.  600  acres
and lease it to TML for its own factories as well as for sub-leasing to  the
vendors for vendor park needed for the project.   The entire  land  will  be
leased to TML for 30 years at an annual lease rental of Rs. 10 lakhs.   This
lease can be renewed for further blocks of 30 years at  a  negotiated  lease
rental at the option of TML.   On each renewal, the lease rental  would  not
be increased by more than 5 times of the lease rental existing on  the  date
of renewal.


The State Government would  develop  the  land  and  construct  the  factory
building including the facilities such as roads,  power  line,  water  line,
drainage,  sewage,  effluent  treatment  plant,  other  utilities  e.g.  Air
compressors, standby generators and LPG storage yard, etc. and lease  it  to
the TML at an annual lease rental of Rs. 90 lakhs per  annum  for  30  years
renewable at the option of TML for further  blocks  of  30  years.  At  each
renewal the lease rental will  be  negotiated.   However,  the  increase  in
rental will not be more than 500% at any  renewal  compared  to  the  rental
existing on the date of renewal.


The State Government will construct an integrated township of  approximately
2000 dwelling units of an average area of 1000 sq. ft.  per  dwelling  unit,
including the facilities such as roads, power line,  water  line,  drainage,
sewage, effluent treatment  plants,  parks,  schools,  training  institutes,
shopping complex, etc. and lease it to TML on lease for 30 years  on  annual
lease rental of Rs. 25 lakhs.  This lease can be renewed in  future  at  the
option of TML for further blocks of 30  years  and  the  increase  in  lease
rental at each renewal would not be more  than  5  times  the  lease  rental
existing on the date of renewal.


The township is estimated to cost Rs. 150 crores.”

The  Principal  Secretary,  Commerce  and  Industries  Department   of   the
Government of West Bengal sent a  letter  dated  23.03.2006  to  the  Deputy
General  Manager,  Government  Affairs  and  Collaborations  of   TML   with
reference to the letter  dated  19.01.2006  and  the  record  notes  of  the
subsequent discussions between the Government of West Bengal and TML on  the
subject signed on 17.03.2006, approving the proposal as under:

“….from TML to set up a plant  on  600  acres  of  land  near  Kharagpur  to
manufacture a new car addressing the lower end of the  market,  with  annual
capacity of 2,50,000 units on maturity……the targeted  date  of  commencement
of commercial production being the year 2008.”

By way of letter dated 29.03.2006, the then Chief Minister  of  West  Bengal
wrote to the then Chairman of TML regarding  the  project.  There  was  some
discussion regarding the location of the  plant,  the  relevant  portion  of
which is extracted from the file as under:
“During our discussion today, you had  mentioned  the  allocation  close  to
Kolkata may be  considered.  As  you  are  undoubtedly  aware,  land  around
Kolkata is difficult to come by and the cost  of  such  land  is  also  very
high. Also, land has to be suitable for  industry.  We  had  to  keep  these
aspects in view while selecting a location for the TML plant.
We had at first proposed location of this project  at  Guptamoni,  which  is
about 25km west of Kharagpur  towards  Jamshedpur  on  National  Highway  6.
Thereafter, based on the suggestion given  by  Shri  Ravi  Kant  during  his
meeting with Shri Nirupam Sen, we have now selected a  site  right  next  to
Kharagpur town,  on  National  Highway  6……The  distance  to  Kharagur  from
Kolkata can now be covered in approximately 90 minutes. Haldia Port is at  a
distance of 100 kms from this location, while Jamshedpur is  about  2  hours
away.
……
We now await a visit from Shri Ravi Kant for his approval  of  the  proposed
location. I can assure you that this is one of the best  locations  in  West
Bengal for locating your plant. I look forward to the  final  approval  from
the Board of Directors of TML so that we can immediately  start  taking  all
the necessary steps.”
                  (emphasis laid by this Court)

TML subsequently informed the representatives of  the  State  Government  of
West Bengal that they would like to be shown the site at  Singur  again  for
their  technical  team  to  reconfirm   the   suitability   of   the   site.
Consequently the said site was again shown to the representatives of TML  on
05.05.2006. They confirmed that this is the  site  which  would  be  ideally
suited for the proposed small car project.   The total land  area  was  1053
acres for the small car project and 200 acres in  Telipukur  mouza  for  the
township. The Draft Note for Cabinet Memo mentions the mouzas for which  the
WBIDC had proposed for acquisition of land as well.

The Principal Secretary, Commerce  and  Industries  Department  drafted  the
Cabinet Memo No. 2995/PrS/C&I dated 30.05.2006 titled as under:
“Proposal for acquisition  of  land  measuring  1053  acres  for  small  car
project of Tata Motors at Singur, Hooghly and  200  acres  in  Telipukur  in
Singur  P.S.  District-Hoogly  for  Housing  and  related  amenities  to  be
developed by Tata Housing Development Co. Ltd.”

The Cabinet Memo mentions the investment in the project  and  the  shift  in
the proposed site as well. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“….The Tata Motors Co. Ltd. (TML) have decided to set  up  their  Small  Car
Project in West Bengal.  For this purpose for the last several months,  they
have scouted for various sites around Kolkata  and  have  finally  chosen  a
site  in  Singur  P.S.  in  the  Hooghly  district  due  to  its  locational
advantage.  The site chosen will  also  cater  to  the  requirement  of  the
vendors of the Company who will be located in the Vendors’ Park  within  the
Tata Motors Factory site.  The total investment including  that  by  vendors
is expected  to  be  about  Rs.  1000  crores.    The  plant  will  generate
substantial direct and indirect employment, and will also  create  a  number
of ancillary units, which also generate local employment.
The State Government had  initially  proposed  location  of  this  plant  in
Kharagpur.  TML have informed that this will be flagship project,  providing
very high visibility to West Bengal  as  an  investment  destination.   They
also need very good connectivity  and  proximity  to  airport,  as  well  as
quality urban and physical infrastructure.

Taking all these factors into account, TML, after seeing a number  of  sites
in Howrah, Hooghly, Paschim Medinipur and Purba Medinipur, finally  selected
a site in Singur Block.


West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (WBIDC) now proposes  to
acquired 1053 acres of land for the said Small Car Project  of  Tata  Motors
Co. Ltd. in following mouzas under Singur P.S. in Hooghly district:




The Tata Housing Company Ltd. has proposed to set  up  housing  and  related
infrastructure  at  Telipukur  under  Singur  P.S.   in   Hooghly   district
comprising of 200 acres to cater to the Housing  and  Social  infrastructure
requirements of the proposed Small Car Project of the Tata Motors  Co.  Ltd.
at Singur, which is not far away from the  proposed  project  site.   WBIDC,
therefore, proposes to acquire 200 acres of land at Telipukur,  Singur  P.S.
in Hooghly district for the purpose.


The identification of lands involved in this acquisition proposal  has  been
made in such a manner that existing settlements/  habitations  are  avoided.
Where isolated homesteads are involved, suitable rehabilitation in the  form
of providing land/house will be taken up.

Detailed land survey and plot  identification  will  be  carried  out  after
Cabinet accords approval to the proposal.  Efforts  will  also  be  made  to
avoid/minimize intensively cropped lands.

This has the approval of the Chief Minister.

Cabinet may kindly approve  the  proposed  acquisition  of  1253  (1053+200)
acres of land as proposed at para 3 and 4 above.”
                      (emphasis laid by this Court)


Pursuant to the approval of the said decision of the Cabinet  by  the  Chief
Minister dated 05.06.2006, the  notification under  Section  4  (1)  of  the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “L.A.  Act”)  was
published in  the  Calcutta  Gazette  Extraordinary  dated  21.07.2006,  the
relevant portion of which reads as under:

“Whereas, it appears to the Governor that  land  as  mentioned  in  schedule
below  is  likely  to  be  needed  to  be  taken  by   Government/Government
Undertaking/Development Authorities, at the  public  expense  for  a  public
purpose, viz., employment generation and socio economic development  of  the
area  by  setting  up  TATA  Small  Car  Project  in  the  Mouza   Beraberi,
jurisdiction list No.  5,  P.S.  Singur,  District  Hooghly;  it  is  hereby
notified that for the above purpose an area of land comprising  RS/LR  plots
as detailed below and measuring more or  less,  72.03  acres,  as  specified
below within the aforesaid Mouza……”
                (emphasis laid by this Court)

       A perusal of the said notification makes it clear that  it  does  not
specifically mention that the land in question is being acquired  in  favour
of WBIDC. It merely states that the land in question  might  be  needed  for
Government  /  Government  Undertaking/Development   Authorities.   Proposal
numbers 3 and 4 of Cabinet Memo, referred to supra, approved  by  the  Chief
Minister make it clear that acquisition of land comprising of 1053 acres  is
needed for the Small Car Project of TML and 200 acres of land is  needed  to
cater to the housing and social infrastructure needs of the project.


Section 4 of the L.A. Act reads as under:

“ (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate  Government  the  land  in  any
locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose  or  for
a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the  Official
Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality  of  which
at least one shall be in the regional language],  and  the  Collector  shall
cause public notice of the substance of such notification  to  be  given  at
convenient places in the said  locality  the  last  of  the  dates  of  such
publication  and  the  giving  of  such  public  notice,  being  hereinafter
referred to as the date of the publication of the notification.”

 The Act, under the provision of Section 5-A  further  provides  that  after
the notification, the objections, if any, may be  submitted  in  writing  to
the Collector. The Collector, after the receipt of  such  objections,  needs
to give an opportunity of being  heard  to  the  person  so  objecting.  The
Collector is then required to conduct an inquiry  and  submit  a  report  in
that respect to the State Government for its consideration. In  the  instant
case,   five   objection   petitions   were   received   from    the    land
owners/cultivators within 30 days after publication  of  notification  under
Section 4 of the L.A. Act. One objector applied for exemption  of  his  land
from acquisition as he intended to set up a petrol  pump  from  it.  Another
applied for exemption of the land from acquisition on the ground  that  they
are running a number of agro-based industries  like  cold  storage,  factory
and fisheries covering a large  area  of  land  providing  employment  to  a
considerable number of persons. The  Land  Acquisition  Collector  submitted
the report dated 31.08.2006 to the State  Government.  In  the  report,  the
Land Acquisition Collector concluded that WBIDC intends to acquire the  land
for generating employment and for socio-economic development of the area  by
setting up a factory for the ‘Small Car Project’ of  TML  at  Singur.  Being
such  a  large  scale  project,  it  was  bound  to   create   immense   job
opportunities for the local youth, both directly and  indirectly.  The  Land
Acquisition Collector, thus, concluded that the acquisition of the  land  in
question was indeed for public purpose. As far as  certain  other  objectors
were concerned, the Land Acquisition Collector observed that  the  objectors
did not appear before him  to  justify  their  objections  to  the  proposed
acquisition of  lands,  despite  the  factum  of  hearing  before  the  Land
Acquisition  Collector  being  widely  advertised,  including  by   way   of
announcement in two local daily newspapers. The Land  Acquisition  Collector
concluded that it appears that the  objectors  are  no  more  interested  to
proceed further in the proceedings  with  their  objections.  Therefore,  he
concluded that those objections may be ignored in the  greater  interest  of
the public and the State and submitted his reports to the  State  Government
dated 29.08.2006. Pursuant to the report of the Land Acquisition  Collector,
the State Government issued notification under Section 6  of  the  L.A.  Act
published in the official gazette dated 30.08.2006, the relevant portion  of
which reads as under:

“Whereas the appropriate Government  is  satisfied,  after  considering  the
report sent by the  Collector  u/s  5-A  (2),  the  land  mentioned  in  the
schedule  given  below  is  needed  by  the  State  Government/   Government
Undertaking/ Development Authorities, at the public  expense  for  a  public
purpose, viz., employment generation and socio economic development  of  the
area by setting up of TATA Small Car Project………”


 The Land Acquisition Collector subsequently made award of  compensation  on
25.09.2006. WBIDC then took possession of the land in question,  the  extent
of which was 997 acres. By its letter dated 20.12.2006, WBIDC asked  TML  to
take “permissive possession of 950 acres of  land  pending  finalization  of
the lease deed and lease terms and conditions.” The formal  lease  deed  was
executed on  15.03.2007.  Subsequently,  the  acquisition  proceedings  were
challenged before the High Court of Calcutta by way of  Writ  Petitions.  By
common judgment  and  order  dated  18.01.2008,  a  Division  Bench  of  the
Calcutta  High  Court,  dismissed  the  Writ  Petitions,  and   upheld   the
acquisition of land, holding the same to be in the interest  of  the  public
and for public purpose. The same was challenged  by  way  of  Special  Leave
Petition before this Court being SLP (Civil) No.  8463  of  2008  and  other
connected SLPs as clearly mentioned in the cause title of this judgment.


 Even as the above said cases were pending  before  this  Court,  the  State
Government of West Bengal and TML went ahead with  the  development  of  the
land and setting up of the factory for the  ‘Small  Car  Project’.  It  was,
however, at around that time that the local  population  started  protesting
against the acquisition of the land and setting up of the factory.  Numerous
incidents of blockade, protests and violence were reported in the print  and
electronic media. By letter  dated  10.11.2008  addressed  to  the  Director
General  of  Police,  West  Bengal,  TML  informed  that  it  is  suspending
operations as the circumstances were no longer conducive for  them  to  work
in a peaceful manner. TML started  removing  the  equipments,  machines  and
other materials from the site from 10.11.2008 onwards. The  said  plant  was
then relocated to the State of Gujarat. The new Government  of  West  Bengal
enacted a legislation on 20.06.2011 titled the ‘Singur  Land  Rehabilitation
and Development Act, 2011’ (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  “Singur  Act,
2011”) for taking over the land covered by the lease granted  in  favour  of
TML. TML challenged the constitutional validity of the said Act  by  way  of
Writ Petition before a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. By  judgment
and order dated 28.09.2011 the learned single Judge upheld the  validity  of
the said Act. The correctness of the said decision was challenged by way  of
appeals before a Division Bench of the High Court. By  its  common  judgment
and order dated 22.06.2012, the  Division  Bench  allowed  the  appeals  and
struck down  Sections  2,  4(3),  5  and  6  of  the  Singur  Act,  2011  as
unconstitutional  as they were in direct conflict  with  the  provisions  of
the L.A. Act and hence,  repugnant to the said  Act.  It  was  further  held
that the entire Singur Act, 2011 itself is void and unconstitutional as  the
same had not received  assent  from  the  President  of  India.  Hence,  the
present appeals.

 By way of order dated 11.05.2016, this  Court  has  de-tagged  the  appeals
arising out of SLP (C) No. 23843 of 2012, SLP (C) No. 24269 of 2012 and  SLP
(C) No. 1881-1911 of 2013, as they deal with the constitutional validity  of
the Singur Act, 2011. The scope of the present appeals  is  only  restricted
to deciding the validity of the acquisition of  land  and  the  compensation
awarded thereafter in favour of the land losers.


  Mr. Colin Gonsalves, the learned senior counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of
the appellant in the appeal arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  No.  12724  of  2008
submits that admittedly,  TML  approached  WBIDC  to  develop  a  small  car
manufacturing unit within the State  of  West  Bengal.  The  learned  senior
counsel further contends that a perusal of the documents  on  record,  being
the Cabinet Memo as well as the letters exchanged between TML and  the  West
Bengal State Government would clearly show that the site of the project  was
chosen jointly by the State Government and TML as  the  best  possible  site
for the project which was to be implemented by establishing the  factory  in
consultation with each other. The land in question was acquired by WBIDC  at
the behest of  TML.  The  learned  senior  counsel  contends  that  such  an
acquisition would be hit by the provisions of Part VII of the L.A. Act,  the
heading of which is “Acquisition of land for  companies”.  It  is  submitted
that the provisions of the said part were not followed in the instant  case,
though the same are mandatory in nature. The learned  senior  counsel  draws
our attention to Section 39 of the L.A. Act which reads as under:

“39.Previous consent of appropriate Government and  execution  of  agreement
necessary:- The provisions of section 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not  be
put in force in order to acquire land  for  any  Company,  unless  with  the
previous consent of the  appropriate  Government,  nor  unless  the  Company
shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned”

It is contended that the Agreement in terms of Section 39 of  the  L.A.  Act
has not been published in the official gazette.
The learned senior counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court  in
the case of Devender Pal Singh v. State of  Punjab[1],  wherein  this  Court
has held as under:

“16. When a request is made by  any  wing  of  the  State  or  a  Government
company for acquisition of land for a public purpose,  different  procedures
are adopted. Where, however, an application  is  filed  for  acquisition  of
land at the instance of a "company", the procedures to be adopted  therefore
are laid down in Part VII of the Act. Although it may not  be  decisive  but
the conduct of the State  as  to  how  it  intended  to  deal  with  such  a
requisition, is a relevant factor. The action of the State provides  for  an
important condition to consider as  to  whether  the  purpose  where  for  a
company requests it for acquisition of  land  is  a  public  purpose  and/or
which could be made at public  expenses  either  as  a  whole  or  in  part,
evidently provisions laid down in Part II  shall  be  resorted  to.  On  the
other hand, if the State forms an opinion that the acquisition  of  land  at
the instance of the company may not be for public purpose or, therefore  the
expenses to be incurred therefore either in whole or in part  shall  not  be
borne by the State, the procedures laid down in Part VII thereof have to  be
resorted to. The procedures  laid  down  under  Part  VII  of  the  Act  are
exhaustive. Rules have been framed prescribing the mode and manner in  which
the State vis-à-vis the company should proceed.  It  provides  for  previous
consent of the Appropriate Government, execution of the agreement,  previous
inquiry  before  a  consent  is  accorded,  publication  of  the  agreement,
restriction on transfer, etc. It  also  provides  for  statutory  injunction
that no land shall be acquired except for the purpose  contained  in  Clause
(a) of Sub-section (1) Section 40 of the Act for a private company which  is
not a Government company. For the purpose of Section  44B  of  the  Act,  no
distinction  is  made  between  a  private  company  and  a  public  limited
company.”

The learned senior counsel contends that the abovementioned  case  makes  it
clear that land can be acquired either  for  a  company,  or  for  a  public
purpose, but not for both.
The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the decision  of  this
Court in the case of Amarnath Ashram v. Governor of U.P. & Ors.[2],  wherein
this Court held as under:

“Admittedly, in the present case the entire cost of  acquisition  is  to  be
borne by the appellant society and, therefore, it is an  acquisition  for  a
company and not for a  public  purpose.  That  is  also  borne  out  by  the
notification issued Under Section 6 of the Act which states "that  the  land
mentioned in the schedule below is needed  for  the  construction  of  play-
ground for students of Amar Nath Vidya Ashram (public  school).  Mathura  in
district Mathura by the Amar Nath Ashram Trust, Mathura". Therefore,  simply
because in the notification issued Under Section 4 of the Act it was  stated
that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for  a  play-  ground
for students of Amar Nath Vidya Ashram (public school), Mathura,  it  cannot
be said that the acquisition is for a public purpose and not  under  Chapter
VII  for  the  appellant-society  in  view  of  subsequent  events  and  the
declaration made Under Section 6. The learned counsel  for  the  State  also
relied upon the decision  of  this  Court  in  Srinivasa  Cooperative  House
Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry, , wherein this  Court  has
held that though there is "no provision in the Act to say that when  a  land
is required for a company, it may also be for  a  public  purpose.  However,
even the acquisition for a  company,  unless  utilisation  of  the  land  so
acquired is integrally connected with public use, resort to  the  compulsory
acquisition under Chapter VII cannot be had". It was submitted on the  basis
of this observation that even in case of an acquisition  for  a  company  an
element of public purpose has to be there and if  for  that  reason  it  was
believed by the Government that it was necessary for it to make  substantial
contribution from public revenue so as to avoid  the  charge  of  colourable
exercise of powers, the decision of the  Government  to  withdraw  from  the
acquisition cannot be  said  to  be  arbitrary  or  illegal.  The  aforesaid
observation was made by this Court in the context of requirement of  Section
40 of the Act and they cannot be construed to mean that no  land  cannot  be
acquired by the State Government  without  making  substantial  contribution
towards the cost of acquisition. We cannot read something more in  the  said
observation than what they were intended to convey. The provisions  of  part
VII and particularly the provisions regarding payment of  the  entire  costs
of the acquisition would otherwise become redundant.”

Further reliance has been placed by  him  on  the  case  of  R.L.  Arora[3],
wherein this Court held as under:
“Therefore, though the words "public purpose" in Sections 4 and 6  have  the
same meaning, they have to be read in the  restricted  sense  in  accordance
with s. 40 when the acquisition is for a company under s. 6.  In  one  case,
the notification under s. 6 will say that the acquisition is  for  a  public
purpose, in the other case the notification  will  say  that  it  is  for  a
company. The proviso to s. 6(1) shows that where the acquisition  is  for  a
public purpose, the compensation has to be paid  wholly  or  partly  out  of
public revenues or some fund controlled or managed  by  a  local  authority.
Where however the acquisition is either  for  a  company,  the  compensation
would be paid wholly by the company. Though therefore  this  distinction  is
there where the acquisition  is  either  for  a  public  purpose  or  for  a
company, there is not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the  two
purposes  and  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  where  the  acquisition  is
primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action under Part  VII
and compensation must always be paid wholly by the company.  A  third  class
of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily  for  a  company
but it may also be at the same time for a public purpose and  the  whole  or
part of compensation may be  paid  out  of  public  revenues  or  some  fund
controlled or managed by a local  authority.  In  such  a  case  though  the
acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be  covered
by that part of s. 6 which lays down that acquisition  may  be  made  for  a
public purpose if the whole or part of the compensation is to  be  paid  out
of the public revenues or  some  fund  controlled  or  managed  by  a  local
authority.”

The learned senior counsel contends that the mere mention of public  purpose
in the notifications, does not in  fact  make  the  acquisition  one  for  a
public purpose, when the acquisition of lands was made in favour of TML.  To
make the acquisition one for public purpose, it must be directly  useful  to
the public, and the benefit must not be merely  incidental  in  nature.  The
learned senior counsel places reliance  on  the  Statement  of  Objects  and
Reasons of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 to the L.A. Act, which states thus:

“ With the enormous expansion  of  the  State's  role  in  promoting  public
welfare and economic development since  independence,  acquisition  of  land
for public purposes, industrialisation, building of institutions, etc.,  has
become far more  numerous  than  ever  before.  While  this  is  inevitable,
promotion of public purpose has to  be  balanced  with  the  rights  of  the
individual whose land is acquired, thereby often depriving him of his  means
of livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private enterprises ought  not
to be placed on the same footing as acquisition for  the  State  or  for  an
enterprise under it. The individual and institutions who are unavoidably  to
be deprived  of  their  property  rights  in  land  need  to  be  adequately
compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice  they  have  to  make
for the larger interest  of  the  community.  The  pendency  of  acquisition
proceedings for long periods often causes hardship to the  affected  parties
and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them.
2.    It is necessary, therefore, to restructure the  legislative  framework
for acquisition of land so that it  is  more  adequately  informed  by  this
objective of serving the interests of community in harmony with  the  rights
of the individual. Keeping the above objects in  view  and  considering  the
recommendations  of  the  Law  Commission,  the  Land   Acquisition   Review
Committee as well as the State Governments,  institutions  and  individuals,
proposals for amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,  were  formulated
and a Bill for this purpose was introduced in the  Lok  Sabha  on  the  30th
April, 1982. The same has not been passed by  either  House  of  Parliament.
Since the introduction of the Bill, various other  proposals  for  amendment
of the Act have  been  received  and  they  have  also  been  considered  in
consultation with State Governments and other agencies. It is  now  proposed
to include all these  proposals  in  a  fresh  Bill  after  withdrawing  the
pending Bill. The main proposals for amendment are as follows:-
   The definition of public purpose as contained in the Act is  proposed  to
be amended so as to include a longer illustrative  list  retaining,  at  the
same time, the inclusive character of the definition.

(ii) Acquisition of land for non- Government companies under  the  Act  will
hence forth be made in pursuance of Part VII of the Act in all cases.”
                 (emphasis laid by this Court)

 Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the
some of the appellants, who are cultivators, in the appeal  arising  out  of
SLP (C) No. 11830 of 2008 and SLP (C) No. 11783 of 2008  contends  that  the
acquisition of lands in the instant case was not for a public  purpose,  but
for a company, (TML) under the guise  of  public  purpose.  The  lands  were
acquired by WBIDC at the specific instance of TML, as becomes clear  from  a
perusal of the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A.  Act,
the relevant portions of which have been extracted supra.


 The learned senior counsel further draws our attention to Section 6 of  the
L.A. Act, which reads as under:

“6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.  -  (1)  Subject
to the provision of Part  VII  of  this  Act,  [appropriate  Government]  is
satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-
section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a  public  purpose,  or
for a Company, a  declaration  shall  be  made  to  that  effect  under  the
signature of a  Secretary  to  such  Government  or  of  some  officer  duly
authorized to certify its orders [and different  declarations  may  be  made
from time to time in respect of different parcels of  any  land  covered  by
the same notification under  section  4,  sub-section  (I)  irrespective  of
whether one report or different reports has  or  have  been  made  (wherever
required) under section 5A, sub-section (2)];

……………

Provided  further  that  no  such  declaration  shall  be  made  unless  the
compensation to be awarded for such property is to be  paid  by  a  Company,
wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled  or  managed
by a local authority.

Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded for such  property  is
to be paid out of the funds of a corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to  be  compensation  paid  out  of
public revenues.”


The learned senior counsel contends that as per Section 6 of the  L.A.  Act,
the deposit of money is the deposit of public revenue is to be  examined  in
the light of Explanation-2. Explanation-2  to  Section  6,  which  has  been
added by way of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act  68  of  1984  provides
that no declaration under Section 6 shall be made  unless  the  compensation
to be awarded for the lands in question is paid  by  a  Company,  wholly  or
partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a  local
authority. The learned senior counsel further contends that WBIDC cannot  be
said to be ‘local authority’. A local  authority  must  have  representative
character. This means that it must comprise of elected members and  must  be
under the control of the Government with the control  and  management  of  a
municipal or local fund. This aspect of the matter has  been  considered  by
this Court in a number of  cases  wherein  it  was  held  that  a  statutory
corporation or a company formed by a State Government or Central  Government
cannot be construed as a local authority. The learned senior counsel  places
reliance on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court  in  the  case  of
Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji v. State of  Bombay  &  Ors[4],  wherein  on  the
question of whether or not the State Road Transport Corporation was a  local
authority for the purpose of the L.A. Act, it was held as under:
“The expression "local authority" is not defined  in  the  Land  Acquisition
Act but is defined in  s.  3(31)  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897,  as
follows:
"'local authority' shall mean a municipal committee,  district  board,  body
of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to,  or  entrusted
by the Government with, the control or management of a  municipal  or  local
fund :"
The definitions given in the General Clauses Act, 1897, govern  all  Central
Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act. No doubt,  this
Act was enacted later in point of time than the Land  Acquisition  Act;  but
this Act was a  consolidating  and  amending  Act  and  a  definition  given
therein of the expression "local authority" is the same  as  that  contained
in the earlier Acts of 1868 and 1887.  The  definition  given  in  s.  3(31)
will, therefore, hold good for construing the expression  "local  authority"
occurring  in  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  We  have  already  quoted   the
definition. It will be clear from the definition that  unless  it  is  shown
that the State Transport  Corporation  is  an  'authority'  and  is  legally
entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management  of  a
local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. No material has  been
placed before us from which it could  be  deduced  that  the  funds  of  the
Corporation can be regarded as local funds.”

The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the decision  of  this
Court  in  the  case  of  Calcutta  State  Road  Transport  Corporation   v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal[5], wherein it was held as under:
“The expression "local authority" is not defined in the Income Tax Act.  Its
definition is, however, contained in the General Clauses Act in Clause  (31)
of Section 3. It reads :
'Local authority' shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body  of
port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or  entrusted  by
the Government with, the control or  management  of  a  municipal  or  local
fund.
The contention of Sri Ray is that inasmuch as the assessee is  entrusted  by
the Government with the control or management of a "local  fund",  it  is  a
local authority within the meaning of the said definition.  Sri  Ray  placed
strong reliance upon the judgement of this Court in Union of India and  Ors.
v. Shri R.C. Jain and Ors. The question in the  said  decision  was  whether
the  Delhi  Development  Authority  (D.D.A.)  constituted  under  the  Delhi
Development Act, 1957 is a "local authority". The question had arisen  under
the provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act. Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.,  speaking
for the Bench, laid down  the  following  test  for  determining  whether  a
particular body is a "local authority" within the meaning of  Section  3(31)
of the  General  Clauses  Act:  "An  authority,  in  order  to  be  a  local
authority, must be of like nature and character as  a  Municipal  Committee,
District Board or Body of Port Commissioners, possessing,  therefore,  many,
if  not  all,  of  the  distinctive  attributes  and  characteristics  of  a
Municipal Committee, District Board  or  Body  of  Port  Commissioners,  but
possessing one essential feature, viz., that it is legally  entitled  to  or
entrusted by the government with, the control and management of a  municipal
or local fund." The learned Judge elaborated the said test  saying  that  to
be characterised as a "local authority", the authority  must  have  separate
legal existence as a corporate body,  it  must  not  be  a  mere  government
agency but must be  legally  independent  entity,  it  must  function  in  a
defined area and must ordinarily, wholly or partly, directly or  indirectly,
be elected by the inhabitants of the area. It  must  also  enjoy  a  certain
degree of autonomy either complete or partial, must be entrusted by  statute
with such government functions  and  duties  as  are  usually  entrusted  to
Municipal Bodies such as those connected with  providing  amenities  to  the
inhabitants of the locality like health and education, water  and  sewerage,
town  planning  and  development,  roads,  markets,  transportation,  social
welfare services etc. Finally it was observed-such body must have the  power
to raise funds for furtherance of its  activities  and  fulfillment  of  its
objects by levying taxes, rates, charges or fees.”
                         (emphasis laid by this Court)

The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the decision  of  this
Court in the case of S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. R. Pattabiraman &  Ors.[6]
to contend that explanation cannot extend the scope of the proviso.  It  was
held by this Court as under:

“42. In Hiralal Rattanlal etc. v. State of U.P. and  Anr.  etc.  this  Court
made the following observations:
Ordinarily, a proviso to a section is intended to take out  a  part  of  the
main section for special treatment. It is not expected to enlarge the  scope
of the main section. But cases have arisen in  which  this  Court  has  held
that despite the fact that a provision is called proviso,  it  is  really  a
separate provision and the so-called proviso has substantially  altered  the
main section.
43. We need  not  multiply  authorities  after  authorities  on  this  point
because  the  legal  position  seems  to  be  clearly  and  manifestly  well
established. To sum up, a proviso may serve four different purposes:
1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment;
2) it may entirely  change  the  very  concept  of  the  intendment  of  the
enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to  be  fulfilled  in
order to make the enactment workable;
3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part  of
the enactment and thus acquire the  tenor  and  colour  of  the  substantive
enactment itself; and
4) it may be used merely to act as an  optional  addenda  to  the  enactment
with the sole object of explaining the  real  intendment  of  the  statutory
provision.
44. These seem to be by and large the  main  purport  and  parameters  of  a
proviso.”

The learned senior counsel contends that explanation is  only  relatable  to
the main provision and not the proviso. The  learned  senior  counsel  thus,
reiterates that even where the acquisition of land  is  for  a  corporation,
provisions of Part VII of the L.A. Act must be complied with.


 Mr. Prashant Bhushan, the  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the
appellant - Association of Democratic Rights in the appeal  arising  out  of
SLP (c) No. CC 13645 of 2008 submits that acquisition for a  public  purpose
is made under Part II of the L.A. Act, whereas acquisition for a company  is
made under Part VII of the L.A. Act. The procedure under  Part  VII  of  the
L.A. Act is mandatory and strict compliance of the same is required for  the
state to exercise its power of  eminent  domain  to  acquire  the  lands  in
favour of a Company. It is submitted that in the  instant  case,  the  lands
were acquired for a particular company, TML, at the  instance  of  the  said
company and the exact location and site of the land was also  identified  by
the said company. Even the notifications issued under Sections 4  and  6  of
the L.A. Act clearly state that the land was being  acquired  for  the  Tata
Motor’s ‘Small Car Project’.


 The learned counsel draws our attention to Rule 4 of the  Land  Acquisition
(Companies) Rules, 1963 framed under Section 55 of the  L.A.  Act  of  which
reads as under:

“Appropriate Government to be  satisfied  with  regard  to  certain  matters
before initiating acquisition proceedings-  (1) Whenever a company makes  in
application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land,  that
Government shall direct the Collector to  submit  a  report  to  it  on  the
following matters namely :-
that the company has made its best  endeavour  to  find  out  lands  in  the
locality suitable for the purpose of acquisition.

(ii) that the company has made all reasonable efforts to get such  lands  by
negotiation with the person interested  therein  on  payment  of  reasonable
price and such efforts have failed,
(iii) that the land proposed to be   acquired is suitable for the purpose ;
(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive ;
(v) that the company is in a position to utilize the  land  expeditiously  ;
and
(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural  land  that
no alternative suitable site can be found so  as  to  avoid  acquisition  of
that land… ………………”

It is submitted that Rule 4 is mandatory  in  nature  and  that  unless  the
directions enjoined by Rule 4 are  complied  with,  the  notification  under
Section 6 of the L.A. Act will be invalid. The learned counsel submits  that
the aforesaid Rule came up for the consideration before this  Court  in  the
case of Devender Singh (supra), wherein it was held as under:
“44. Another question which arises for our consideration is  as  to  whether
Rule 4 of the Companies Rules is mandatory or directory in nature. The  High
Court held it to be directory.
45. Rule 4 of the Rules employs the word "shall" not once place  but  twice.
Ordinarily, it is imperative in character. No reason has been  shown  before
us as to why it should be held to be directory provision  particularly  when
the Land Acquisition Act is an expropriatory legislation.
46. In State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Patel  Chaturbhai  Narsibhai  and  Ors.,
this Court held:

15.  The  contention  of  the  State  that  the  enquiry  under  Rule  4  is
administrative and that the owner of the land is not entitled  to  be  given
an opportunity to be heard at the  enquiry  cannot  be  accepted  for  these
reasons. The enquiry under Rule 4 shows that the Collector is  to  submit  a
report among other matters that the Company has made all reasonable  efforts
to get such lands by negotiation with  the  persons  interested  therein  on
payment of reasonable price  and  such  efforts  have  failed.  The  persons
interested therein are the owners of  the  land  which  is  proposed  to  be
acquired. The Company at such an enquiry has to show that the  company  made
negotiations with the owners of the  land.  The  owners  of  the  land  are,
therefore, entitled to be heard at  such  an  enquiry  for  the  purpose  of
proving or disproving the reasonable efforts of  the  company  to  get  such
land by negotiation. The contention on behalf of the State that  the  owners
of the land will get an opportunity when an enquiry is  made  under  Section
5A of the Act is equally unsound. Section 17 of the Act  provides  that  the
appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of  Section  5A  shall
not apply, and if it does so direct a declaration may be made under  Section
6 at any time after the publication of the notification under Section  4  of
the Act. Therefore, the enquiry under Section 5A may not be held.
47. In General Government Servants Cooperative Housing  Society  Ltd.,  Agra
etc. v. Sh. Wahab Uddin and Ors. etc., this Court held:
13. Sub-rule (1) requires the Government to direct the Collector  to  submit
a report to it on the matters enumerated in Clauses (i) to (vi) of the  Sub-
rule (1) which is for the benefit of the Company. The purpose  is  to  avoid
acquisition of land not suitable for a Company. Clause (ii) of Sub-rule  (1)
requires that the Company has to make all reasonable  efforts  to  get  such
lands by negotiation with  the  person  interested  therein  on  payment  of
reasonable prices and that such efforts have failed. The purpose  of  Clause
(ii) seems to be to  avoid  unnecessary  land  acquisition  proceedings  and
payment of exorbitant prices. The purpose of Clauses (iii), (iv) and (v)  is
obvious. The purpose  of  Clause  (vi)  is  to  avoid  acquisition  of  good
agricultural  land,  when  other  alternative  land  is  available  for  the
purpose. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 4 requires  the  Collector  to  give  reasonable
opportunity to the Company so that the Collector may hold  an  inquiry  into
the matters referred in Sub-rule (1).  The  Collector  has  to  comply  with
Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-rule 2 during the course of  the  inquiry
under Sub- rule (1). The Collector under Sub-rule 3 then has to send a  copy
of his report of the inquiry to the appropriate Government  and  a  copy  of
the report has to be forwarded by the Government  to  the  Land  Acquisition
Committee  constituted  under  Rule  3  for  the  purpose  of  advising  the
Government in relation to acquisition of land under Part  VII  of  the  Act,
the duty of the Committee being to advise  the  Government  on  all  matters
relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the  Act
(Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3). No declaration shall be made  by  the  appropriate
Government under Section  6  of  the  Act  unless  the  Committee  has  been
consulted by the Government and has considered the report submitted  by  the
Collector under Section 5A of the Act. In addition,  under  Clause  (ii)  of
Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4, the  Company  has  to  execute  an  agreement  under
Section 41 of the  Act.  The  above  consideration  shows  that  Rule  4  is
mandatory; its compliance  is  no  idle  formality,  unless  the  directions
enjoined by Rule 4 are complied with, the notification under Section 6  will
be invalid. A consideration  of  Rule  4  also  shows  that  its  compliance
precedes the notification under Section 4 as well as compliance  of  Section
6 of the Act.”


 The learned counsel further places reliance on the decision of  this  Court
in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd.  v.  G.  Jayaram  Reddy  &  Ors.[7],
wherein it was held that if the land is to be acquired for a  company,  then
the  State  Government  and  the  company  are  bound  to  comply  with  the
provisions contained in Part VII of the L.A. Act.


 The learned counsel further submits that the argument  advanced  on  behalf
of TML that the cost of acquisition has been borne by the public  exchequer,
if accepted, would in fact make this an even  more  egregious  violation  of
the L.A. Act. It  is  submitted  that  this  would  not  only  mean  that  a
colourable device has been used to circumvent the provisions of Part VII  of
the L.A. Act, but that there has also been a clear violation of  Section  41
of the L.A. Act, which provides that the cost of acquisition must  be  borne
by the company and not by the State.


 The  learned  counsel  thus,  submits  that  the  entire  land  acquisition
proceedings being a colourable exercise of power carried  out  in  violation
of the L.A. Act and the relevant Rules be set aside.


Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the
State of West Bengal in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13645 of  2008
submits that the acquisition of land in Singur for TML  is  illegal  as  the
same has been done in complete violation of the  provisions  of  Sections  4
and 6 of the L.A. Act, as well as the non-compliance with Part  VII  of  the
L.A. Act and Rules applicable  for  acquisition  of  land  in  favour  of  a
Company.


The  learned  senior  counsel  takes  us  through  the  cabinet  notes  with
reference to the requisition letter of  TML,  extracted  supra  and  submits
that it becomes very clear from a perusal of the documents  on  record  that
the scouting and selection of land was done completely by TML,  much  before
the issuance of the notification under  Section  4  of  the  L.A.  Act.  The
learned senior counsel further submits that initially, TML had  submitted  a
proposal of requirement  of  600  acres  of  land,  which  was  subsequently
increased to 1000 acres without any  justification  for  seeking  such  vast
extent of lands in favour of TML. This action of the  State  Government  and
its officers shows a complete non application of mind on  the  part  of  the
cabinet while assessing how much land is  needed  for  the  project,  before
acquiring lands at the behest of TML.


The learned senior counsel further submits that post the  amendment  to  the
L.A. Act in the year 1984, it becomes  clear  that  the  acquisition  for  a
company must comply with the requirements of Part VII of the L.A.  Act,  and
must only be done in accordance with the same.  The  same  cannot  be  fused
with acquisition of land for a public purpose. The  learned  senior  counsel
places reliance on the Statement of Objects and  Reasons  of  the  Amendment
Act 68 of 1984, the relevant part of which has been extracted supra.


The learned  senior  counsel  further  submits  that  Parliamentary  Debates
relating to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 also indicate that acquisition  for
company could be done only under Part VII of the L.A. Act.


The learned senior counsel places reliance on the  decision  of  the  Madhya
Pradesh High  Court  in  the  case  of  Chaitram  Verma  and  Ors.  v.  Land
Acquisition Officer, Raipur and Ors.[8] and the Allahabad High Court in  the
case of Pooran and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.[9], wherein  it  has  been
held  that  after  the   amendment  to  the  L.A.  Act  in  the  year  1984,
acquisition of land for a company can happen only in  accordance  with  Part
VII of the L.A. Act.


The learned senior counsel further contends that the  doctrine  of  infusion
of public revenue by the government or by corporations  covered  by  Section
3(cc) of the L.A. would not be available after the amendments  made  in  the
year 1984. In the pre-1984 legal position, there was lack of clarity in  the
inclusive definition of public purpose in Section  3(f)  to  the  L.A.  Act.
Therefore, the Supreme Court in a number of cases  resorted  to  the  second
proviso to Section 6 for holding that infusion of public revenue would  make
the acquisition for a company an acquisition for public purpose.  After  the
exclusion of companies from the purview of Section 3(f)  of  the  L.A.  Act,
infusion  of  public  revenue  cannot  be  resorted  to  for  holding   that
acquisition of land  in favour of a company is one for public  purpose.  The
learned senior counsel  thus,  submits  that  the  reliance  placed  by  the
learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  TML  on  the   pre-1984
decisions, including Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of  Punjab[10]  ,  Somawanti
v. State of Punjab[11], Jage Ram v. State of  Haryana[12]  and  Aflatoon  v.
Lt. Governor of Delhi[13] is misplaced as the same have  no  application  to
the facts  of  the  instant  case  as  the  same  pertain  to  the  pre-1984
situation. It is  further  submitted  that  the  reliance  placed  upon  the
decisions of this Court in the cases of Pratibha Nema (supra)  and  Amarnath
Ashram (supra) has no bearing on the facts of the instant case as  the  same
have not correctly appreciated the  scope  of  the  1984  amendment  to  the
provision Section 3 (f) of the L.A. Act.


The learned senior counsel further contends that  the  objections  filed  by
the landowners/ cultivators before  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  after
publication of the notification under Section 4 of the L.A.  Act  were  also
rejected under Section 5-A(2)  of  the  L.A.  Act  in  a  mechanical  manner
without any application of mind. The learned senior  counsel  contends  that
the State Government of West Bengal also  recorded  its  satisfaction  under
Section 6 of the  L.A.  Act  by  recording  its  satisfaction  mechanically,
without considering the need of the lands.  It is further submitted  by  the
learned senior counsel that with  regard  to  conducting  an  inquiry  under
Section 5-A(2) of the  L.A.  Act,  this  Court  has  held  in  a  catena  of
decisions that it is a valuable right  available  to  the  land  owners  and
cultivators, and therefore, it casts a statutory obligation on the  part  of
the Collector and the State Government to consider the objections  and  take
a decision in accordance with law. The application of mind by the  concerned
Land Acquisition Collector including the  State  Government  before  issuing
the notification under Section 6 of the Act, for acquisition of lands  is  a
sine qua non. The learned senior counsel places reliance on the decision  of
this Court in the case of Raghubir Singh Sherawat v. State  of  Haryana  and
Ors.[14], wherein it has been held as under:

“In this context, it is necessary to remember  that  the  rules  of  natural
justice have been ingrained in the scheme of  Section  5A  with  a  view  to
ensure that before any person is deprived of his land by way  of  compulsory
acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the  State
Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire  the  particular
parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort to  convince
the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  to  make   recommendation   against   the
acquisition of his land. He can also point out  that  land  proposed  to  be
acquired is not suitable for  the  purpose  specified  in  the  notification
issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce  evidence  to  show
that another piece of land is available and the same  can  be  utilized  for
execution of the  particular  project  or  scheme.  Though,  it  is  neither
possible nor desirable to make a list of the grounds on which the  landowner
can persuade the Collector to  make  recommendations  against  the  proposed
acquisition of land, but what is important  is  that  the  Collector  should
give a fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and objectively  consider
his plea against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter,  he  should  make
recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why  the  particular  piece
of land should or should not be acquired and whether or  not  the  plea  put
forward  by  the  objector  merits   acceptance.   In   other   words,   the
recommendations made by the Collector must reflect objective application  of
mind to  the  objections  filed  by  the  landowners  and  other  interested
persons.”



The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the observations  made
by this Court in the case  of  Surinder  Singh  Brar  &  Ors.  v.  Union  of
India[15] to submit that the Collector did not apply his mind at  all  while
considering the objections under Section 5-A (2) of the L.A.  Act.  In  that
case, this Court observed as under:

“The reason why the LAO did not apply his mind to the  objections  filed  by
the Appellants and other landowners is obvious.  He  was  a  minion  in  the
hierarchy of the administration of the Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  and
could not have even thought of making recommendations contrary to  what  was
contained in the letter sent by the Administrator to  Surinder  Singh  Brar.
If he had shown the courage of acting independently and made  recommendation
against the acquisition of land, he would  have  surely  been  shifted  from
that post and his career would have  been  jeopardized.  In  the  system  of
governance which we  have  today,  junior  officers  in  the  administration
cannot even think of, what to say of, acting against the wishes/dictates  of
their superiors. One who violates this unwritten code of conduct does so  at
his own peril and is described  as  a  foolhardy.  Even  those  constituting
higher strata of services follow the path of least resistance  and  find  it
most convenient to tow the line  of  their  superiors.  Therefore,  the  LAO
cannot be blamed  for  having  acted  as  an  obedient  subordinate  of  the
superior authorities, including the Administrator. However, that  cannot  be
a legitimate ground to approve the reports prepared by him  without  even  a
semblance of consideration of the objections filed  by  the  Appellants  and
other landowners and we have no hesitation to hold that the  LAO  failed  to
discharge the statutory duty  cast  upon  him  to  prepare  a  report  after
objectively  considering  the  objections  filed  under  Section  5A(1)  and
submissions made by the objectors during the course of personal hearing.”


The learned senior counsel thus, contends that the acquisition of  the  vast
tracts  of  lands  of  the  owners/cultivators,  depriving  them  of   their
constitutional rights for non-compliance with  the  mandatory  procedure  as
provided under Section 5-A (2) and Part VII of the L.A. Act.  Therefore  the
acquisition proceedings are void ab initio in law.


Mr. K. Parasaran, the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  WBIDC
adopts the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel Mr.  Rakesh  Dwivedi
on behalf of the West Bengal State Government.


On the other hand, Mr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi,  the  learned  senior  counsel
appearing on behalf of TML contends that the government is free  to  acquire
certain lands keeping in mind a certain entity, and the mere fact  that  the
acquisition of lands has been done keeping that  entity  in  mind  will  not
render the acquisition invalid. It is  submitted  that  the  State  of  West
Bengal as  a  matter  of  Industrial  Policy  decided  to  make  efforts  to
establish more manufacturing industries with a view to attract more  private
sector investment in  the  manufacturing  industry.  The  tremendous  growth
potential of automobile industry in the State  of  West  Bengal  would  have
boosted economy, created job opportunities, direct and  indirect,  and  have
had an  impact  on  the  secondary  employment  in  the  associated  service
sectors. The learned senior counsel further places strong  reliance  on  the
constitution bench decision of this Court in the case of  Aflatoon  (supra),
wherein this Court has held that the acquisition of land  for  the  “planned
development of Delhi” was a valid public purpose. It was held that the  fact
that after the acquisition, the land was handed  over  to  the  co-operative
housing societies would not attract Part VII of the  L.A.  Act,  1894.  This
Court has held as under:

“24. It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the  acquisition  was  really  for
the cooperative housing societies which are companies within the  definition
of the word 'company' in Section  3(e)  of  the  Act,  and,  therefore,  the
provisions of Part VII of the Act should have been complied with.  Both  the
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court  were  of  the
view that the acquisition was not for 'company. We see no reason  to  differ
from their view. The mere fact that after  the  acquisition  the  Government
proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of  the  property
acquired for development to the  cooperative  housing  societies  would  not
make the acquisition one for 'company'. Nor are we satisfied that  there  is
any  merit  in  the  contention  that  compensation  to  be  paid  for   the
acquisition came from the consideration paid by the  cooperative  societies.
In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit  filed  in  the  writ
petitions here, it is difficult to  hold  that  it  was  cooperatives  which
provided the  fund  for  the  acquisition.  Merely  because  the  Government
allotted a part of the property to cooperative  societies  for  development,
it would not follow that the acquisition was for cooperative societies,  and
therefore, Part VII of the Act was attracted.”


The learned senior counsel further placed reliance on the decision  of  this
Court in the case of Mandir Shree Sita Ramji v. Land  Acquisition  Collector
& Ors.[16], wherein it was held as under:

“12. We have considered the submissions of both  the  sides.  In  our  view,
there is no merit in the  challenge  to  the  proposed  acquisition  on  the
ground that the acquisition was for the purposes of the society  covered  by
Agreement dated 9th May, 1972.  The  subsequent  Notification  is  merely  a
follow up of  the  earlier  Notification.  The  entire  acquisition  is  for
"planned development of Delhi". To be remembered that  Appellants'  land  is
in the midst of the 35000 acres which have been  acquired  pursuant  to  the
Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959. The Agreement dated  19th  May,
1972 does not specify that it  is  the  Appellants'  land  which  is  to  be
allotted to that Society. The Society is to be allotted some land  and  even
if Appellants' land is allotted to this Society, after acquisition, it  will
not  mean  that  the  acquisition  was  for  this  Society.  Therefore,  the
provisions of Part VII of the  Land  Acquisition  Act  need  not  have  been
complied with.”


The learned senior counsel submits that in the instant case, the  mere  fact
that TML looked at and inspected some sites before the  lands  were  finally
acquired does not take away from the fact that  the  lands  were,  in  fact,
acquired in favour of WBIDC for a public purpose. It  is  further  submitted
that the fact that the compensation amount of Rs. 138 crores  was  deposited
by WBIDC and not by TML also keeps the  acquisition  of  the  lands  in  the
instant case out of the purview  of  Part  VII  of  the  L.A.  Act  and  the
relevant Rules. It is submitted that the essential test to determine  as  to
whether the acquisition of the lands in question is for public  purpose,  is
whether the funds for acquisition are coming from public funds. The  learned
senior counsel places reliance on the Constitution Bench  decision  of  this
Court in the case of Pandit Jhandu Lal  (supra),  wherein  it  was  held  as
under:

“Section 6 is, in terms, made subject to the provisions of Part VII  of  the
Act. The provisions of Part VII, read with section 6 of  the  Act,  lead  to
this result that the declaration for the acquisition  for  a  Company  shall
not be made unless the compensation to be awarded for the property is to  be
paid by a  company.  The  declaration  for  the  acquisition  for  a  public
purpose, similarly, cannot  be  made  unless  the  compensation,  wholly  or
partly, is to be paid out of public funds. Therefore,  in  the  case  of  an
acquisition for a  Company  simpliciter,  the  declaration  cannot  be  made
without satisfying  the  requirements  of  Part  VII.  But,  that  does  not
necessarily mean that an acquisition of  a  Company  for  a  public  purpose
cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the  cost
or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public  funds.
In other words,  the  essential  condition  for  acquisition  for  a  public
purpose is that the cost of the acquisition is should be  borne,  wholly  or
in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a Company  may  also
be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if  a  part  or
the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by  public  funds.  If,  on  the
other hand, the acquisition for  a  Company  is  to  be  made  at  the  cost
entirely of  the  Company  itself,  such  an  acquisition  comes  under  the
provisions of Part VII. As in the present instance, it appears that part  at
any rate of the compensation to be awarded for the acquisition  is  to  come
eventually  from  out  of  public  revenues,  it  must  be  held  that   the
acquisition is not  for  a  Company  simpliciter.  It  was  not,  therefore,
necessary  to  go  through  the  procedure  prescribed  by  Part  VII.   We,
therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not  for  the
same reasons.”


The learned senior counsel further submits that the above  position  of  law
was reiterated by this Court more recently in the case of Pratibha  Nema  v.
State of M.P.[17], wherein it was held as under:
“Thus the distinction  between  public  purpose  acquisition  and  Part  VII
acquisition has got blurred under the impact of judicial  interpretation  of
relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the deceive  distinction  lies  in
the fact whether cost of acquisition comes out of  public  funds  wholly  or
partly. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by  the  Government
was held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso  to  Section  6
as held in a catena of decisions. The net result  is  that  by  contributing
even a trifling sum, the character  and  pattern  of  acquisition  could  be
changed by the Government. In ultimate analysis, what is  considered  to  be
an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of  an  industry  in  private
sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition  if
only the Government comes forward to sanction the payment of a  nominal  sum
towards compensation. In the present state of law,  that  seems  to  be  the
real position.”

The learned senior counsel further contends that this  Court  has  in  fact,
also held that it is enough if only a part of the amount comes  from  public
funds to make the acquisition as one for public purpose. Reliance  has  been
placed on the Constitution Bench decision of  this  Court  in  the  case  of
Somawanti (supra), wherein it was held as under:

“We would like to add that the view taken in  Senja  Naicken's  case  I.L.R.
(1926) Mad. 308 has been followed by the various High Courts  of  India.  On
the basis of the correctness of that view the State  Governments  have  been
acquiring private properties all  over  the  country  by  contributing  only
token  amounts  towards  the  cost  of  acquisition.  Titles  to  many  such
properties would be unsettled if we were now to take the view  that  'partly
at public expense' means substantially at public expense. therefore, on  the
principle of stare decisis the view taken in  Senja  Naicken's  case  I.L.R.
(1926) Mad. 308 should not be disturbed. We would, however, guard  ourselves
against being understood to say that  a  token  contribution  by  the  State
towards the cost of acquisition will be sufficient compliance with  the  law
in each and every case. Whether such contribution meets the requirements  of
the law would depend upon the facts of every case. Indeed the fact that  the
State's  contribution  is  nominal  may   well   indicate,   in   particular
circumstances that the action of the State  was  a  colourable  exercise  of
power. In our opinion 'part' does not necessarily mean  a  substantial  part
and that it will be open to the Court in every case which  comes  up  before
it to examine whether the contribution  made  by  the  state  satisfies  the
requirement of the law.”


 It is further submitted that the  said  position  was  reiterated  by  this
Court in the  case  of  Jage  Ram  (supra),  wherein  it  was  held  that  a
contribution of Rs.100/- by the State Government was sufficient to take  the
acquisition of land outside the purview of Part VII of the L.A. Act.


  The learned senior counsel further contends that the cabinet  meeting  and
cabinet memo do not substitute the notification under Section 4 of the  L.A.
Act, as well as the  inquiry  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.  It  is
submitted that even after  the  cabinet  approval,  it  was  upon  the  Land
Acquisition Collector to survey and decide whether  the  lands  in  question
can be acquired for that particular purpose or not. The  discretion  of  the
Land  Acquisition  Collector  was  unfettered  and  uncompromised.   It   is
submitted that the inquiry of the Land Acquisition Collector  was  submitted
in the instant case, and all the requirements as provided for under Part  II
of the L.A. Act were complied with while acquiring the lands in question  in
the instant case.


  We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of all the  parties.
Before we examine the contentions in  detail  and  consider  the  matter  on
merits, it is important to address an issue  raised  by  Mr.  Abhishek  Manu
Singhvi and Mr. Gopal Jain, the learned senior counsel appearing  on  behalf
of TML, that the State of West Bengal cannot be allowed to resile  from  the
position  taken  by  them  in  their  pleadings,  without  even  filing   an
affidavit. It is contended by  them  that  the  State  of  West  Bengal  had
specifically contended before the High Court that Part VII of the  L.A.  Act
has no application in the instant case and the acquisition of land  was  one
which was done in the public interest. The  learned  senior  counsel  submit
that even before the Supreme Court, the State of West Bengal has  stated  in
its counter affidavit  that  establishing  a  new  industry  is  the  public
purpose as envisaged under Section 3(f) of the L.A.  Act  and  that  in  the
instant case, it was the state government which had acquired  the  lands  in
favour of WBIDC for the purpose of fulfilling its  industrialization  policy
in the State of West Bengal.


Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel very  vehemently  contends
that the State Government of West Bengal and  WBIDC  cannot  be  allowed  to
change their stand before this Court in these proceedings  at  the  time  of
arguments merely because of change  of  Government  in  the  State  of  West
Bengal after the completion of  the  land  acquisition  proceedings.  It  is
further contended that the change of stand by the State government  at  this
stage without filing an affidavit amounts to violation of the principles  of
natural justice. Strong reliance is placed by him on the  decision  of  this
Court in the case of Jal Mahal Resort (P) Ltd. v. K.P.  Sharma[18]  in  this
regard.


Further reliance is placed by him on the decision of this Court in the  case
of Andhra Pradesh  Dairy  Development  Corpn.  Federation  v.  B.  Narasimha
Reddy[19], wherein it was held as under:

“40. In the matter of Government of a State, the  succeeding  Government  is
duty bound to continue and carry on  the  unfinished  job  of  the  previous
Government, for the reason that the action is that of  the  "State",  within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, which  continues  to  subsist
and therefore, it  is  not  required  that  the  new  Government  can  plead
contrary from the State action taken by the previous Government  in  respect
of a particular subject. The State, being a continuing body can  be  stopped
from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry  it
came to the conclusion that action was  not  in  conformity  with  law,  the
doctrine of estoppel would not apply. Thus,  unless  the  act  done  by  the
previous Government is found to be contrary  to  the  statutory  provisions,
unreasonable or against policy,  the  State  should  not  change  its  stand
merely because the other political party has  come  into  power.  "Political
agenda of an individual or a political party should  not  be  subversive  of
rule of law". The Government has to rise above the nexus of vested  interest
and nepotism etc. as the principles of governance have to be tested  on  the
touchstone of justice, equity and fair play. The decision must be  taken  in
good faith and must be legitimate.”


Reliance is also placed by him on the decision of this Court in the case  of
M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu  &  Ors.[20],  wherein  it  was
held as under:

“……No doubt Mahapalika is a continuing body and it  will  be  estopped  from
changing its stand in the given case. But when  Mahapalika  finds  that  its
action was contrary to the provisions of law by  which  it  was  constituted
there could certainly be no impediment in  its  way  to  change  its  stand.
There cannot be any estoppel operating against the Mahapalika.”

It is further contended that State  government  should  not  be  allowed  to
change its stand merely because some other political  party  has  come  into
power after the acquisition proceedings and the  legal  proceedings  of  the
land owners were concluded in the High Court by passing the impugned  common
judgment and order.


 Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the
State of West Bengal on the other hand rebuts the above submission  made  by
the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of TML. It is submitted  that
there  is  absolutely  no  law  which  mandates  that  upon  the  change  of
government, the stance taken earlier cannot be changed, more  so,  when  the
earlier stance is clearly  opposed  to  both  law  and  public  policy.  The
learned senior counsel submits that even in the case of A.P.  Dairy  (supra)
on which reliance has  been  placed  upon  by  the  learned  senior  counsel
appearing on behalf of TML, this Court has held that the  state  can  change
its stand if it is found that the act done by  the  previous  government  is
contrary to provisions of law or is against public policy.


 The learned senior counsel  further  submits  that  in  the  instant  case,
having regard to the nature of acquisition of lands  made  by  the  previous
Government, the lands were acquired by the State Government in  exercise  of
its  eminent  domain  power  without  following  the  statutory   provisions
contained in Sections 3(f), 4 and 6 of the L.A. Act as well as Part  VII  of
the L.A. Act. It is submitted that the previous government of the state  has
violated statutory provisions of the L.A. Act in acquiring the  vast  extent
of  lands  having  immense  agricultural  potential,  thus   depriving   the
agricultural occupation of a  large  number  of  land  owners/  cultivators,
thereby depriving  them  of  their  constitutional  and  fundamental  rights
guaranteed under the  Constitution  of  India.  It  is  submitted  that  the
acquisition of the lands in the instant case has been made at  the  instance
of  TML.  Therefore,  the  previous  Government  has  violated  the  law  in
acquiring the  lands.  It  is  submitted  that  the  stand  of  the  present
government becomes clear from the fact  that  it  enacted  the  Singur  Act,
2011, the constitutional validity of which has been  challenged  by  TML  by
way of filing petitions, which were  allowed  by  the  High  Court,  against
which judgment, the State Government filed SLPs which are currently  pending
before this Court. Therefore, the State Government has changed its stand  in
not justifying the acquisition proceedings.


We are unable to agree with the contentions advanced by the  learned  senior
counsel appearing on behalf of TML. While  it  is  true  that  rule  of  law
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of furthering  political  agendas,  it  is
also a well established position of law that a  stand  taken  by  the  state
government can be changed subsequently if there is  material  on  record  to
show that the earlier action of  the  acquisition  of  lands  by  the  State
Government was  illegal  or  suffers  from  legal  malafides  or  colourable
exercise of power.


Further, in any case, it is also well settled  position  of  law  that  this
Court is not bound  by  affidavits  and  counter  affidavits  filed  by  the
parties. In exercise of its power under Article 136 of the  Constitution  of
India, this Court can examine the material on record in order  to  determine
whether the action of the previous state government in acquiring  the  lands
in the instant case was in accordance with  law  or  not.  In  the  case  of
P.S.R. Sadanatham v. Arunachalam[21], a Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court
held as under:

“7. ………In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on  a
party as such but it confers a  wide  discretionary  power  on  the  Supreme
Court to  interfere  in  suitable  cases.  The  discretionary  dimension  is
considerable but that relates to the power of the  court.  The  question  is
whether it spells by  implication,  a  fair  procedure  as  contemplated  by
Article 21. In our view, it does. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction.  It
is residuary power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude,  its  limit,  when
it chases injustice, in the sky  itself.  This  Court  functionally  fulfils
itself by reaching out to  injustice  wherever  it  is  and  this  power  is
largely derived in the common run of cases from Art 136…………”

               (emphasis laid by this Court)

In the instant case, the cabinet  records,  communication  between  TML  and
representative of the State Government, the  notifications  published  under
Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A. Act are all on record.  We  shall  examine  the
same to assess the validity  of  the  acquisition  of  the  lands  in  these
proceedings.
The above said preliminary objection, as has  been  raised  by  the  learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of TML is  thus,  not  accepted.  We  now
proceed to decide the matter on merits.


On the basis of the factual and rival legal contentions advanced  on  behalf
of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties  as  well  as  the
material produced on record and from perusal  of  the  original  files,  the
following points would arise for consideration of this Court:


Whether the lands involved in these proceedings have  been  acquired  for  a
public purpose or for a Company (TML)?


If the lands have  been  acquired  for  a  Company,  whether  the  procedure
provided for under Part VII of the L.A. Act has been complied  with  by  the
state government?


Whether the inquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A(2)  of  the  L.A.  Act
has been duly conducted by the Land Acquisition Collector?


 Whether the Land Acquisition Collector has assigned reasons in  his  report
for rejecting the objections  raised  by  the  landowners/cultivators  after
application of mind?


 Whether the report of the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  is  based  on  the
decision of the State Government taken prior to issuing  notification  under
Section 6 of the L.A. Act?


 Whether the awards  have  been  passed  after  holding  due  inquiry  under
Section 9 of the L.A. Act and also in  compliance  with  the  principles  of
natural justice?


Whether the compensation awarded in favour of  the  land  owners/cultivators
is based on a proper appreciation of the market value of the land?


 What is the legal effect on the acquisition proceedings of  not  conducting
an inquiry under Section 5-A (2) and passing composite awards under  Section
11 of the L.A. Act?


What order can be passed in these proceedings at this stage?


Answer to Point Nos. 1  and 2
 Issue Nos. 1 and 2 are inter-related, hence, they are answered together  as
under:

Section 3(f) of the Act defines acquisition of land for 'public purpose'  by
the State Government, which reads thus:
“3(f) the expression “public purpose' includes—
…………
(iii) the provision of land for planned  development  of  land  from  public
funds in pursuance of any scheme or  policy  of  Government  and  subsequent
disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or  outright  sale
with the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the
State;
…………
(vi) the provision of  land  for  carrying  out  any  educational,  housing,
health  or  slum  clearance  scheme  sponsored  by  Government,  or  by  any
authority established by Government for carrying out any  such  scheme,  or,
with  the  prior  approval  of  the  appropriate  Government,  by  a   local
authority, or a society registered under  the  Societies  Registration  Act,
1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law  for  the  time  being  in
force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning  of  any  law
relating to co-operative societies for  the  time  being  in  force  in  any
State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme  of  development  sponsored
by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government,  by
a local authority;
………

but does not include acquisition of lands for Companies”
                         (emphasis laid by this Court)
The definition of the term 'Company'  was  inserted  in  the  definition  of
Section 3(e) of the L.A. Act by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from  24.09.1984.
Section 3(e) of the L.A. Act defines a company as:
“(i) a company as defined in Section 3 of the  Companies  Act,  1956  (1  of
19560 other than a Government Company referred to in cl. (cc)
 …………”

 Section 3(f) of the L.A. Act, which defines what public purpose is for  the
purpose of acquisition of land, clearly indicates that  the  acquisition  of
land for companies is not covered within the public purpose. It is in  light
of this statutory scheme under the  provisions  of  the  L.A.  Act  that  it
becomes crucial to examine whether the lands in question were  acquired  for
a public purpose or was it acquired by the State Government  for  a  company
(TML) in the instant case.


  A perusal of the notification issued under Section 4(1) of  the  L.A.  Act
extracted supra clearly shows that the proposed lands  in  the  notification
are needed for the setting up  of  the  Tata  Small  Car  project  in  mouza
Berabery, P.S. Singur, District Hooghly.


 The Cabinet Memo  dated  30.05.2006,  extracted  supra,  at  Serial  No.  3
mentioned acquisition of  lands  measuring  1053  acres  by  WBIDC  for  the
purpose of setting up of the Tata Motor’s ‘Small Car Project’ in  the  State
of West Bengal. The said Cabinet Memo received the  approval  of  the  Chief
Minister on 05.06.2006 after which the notification under Section 4  of  the
L.A. Act was published in the official gazette.


  As far as the proposal  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  on  record  to
indicate that WBIDC made such requisition to  the  State  Government  giving
its proposal  for  acquisition  of  the  proposed  lands  mentioned  in  the
notification issued under Section 4 of the L.A. Act, which are required  for
‘public purpose’ as defined under Section 3(f) (iii) of the L.A. Act,  which
enables the WBIDC to give requisition for acquiring the lands in its  favour
for the planned development of land out of the public funds in pursuance  of
any scheme or policy of Government. As is  evident  from  the  Notifications
issued under the L.A. Act and from the cabinet memo,  there  is  no  mention
about  such  requisition  being  made  by  the  Corporation  to  the   State
Government regarding the proposed lands being required  for  acquisition  in
favour of WBIDC for planned development of land in pursuance of  any  scheme
or policy of the Government.  Even  from  a  perusal  of  the  letter  dated
29.08.2006,  written  by  the  Joint  Secretary,  Land  and   Land   Reforms
Department, Government of West Bengal,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  state
government did not apply its mind while considering the  need  of  the  land
and merely followed the document on  which  the  Collector  had  signed.  It
reads as under:

“It is clear from the report and records relating to the proceedings u/s  5A
of the L.A. Act, 1894 received from the L.A.  Collector  after  disposal  of
objections from the persons having  rights  and  interest  in  land  in  the
Berabari and Khaserbari mouzas of Singur PS where 6 LA cases comprising  for
setting up Tata Small Car Project have been initiated,  that  the  Collector
did not find any objection having merits for  change/  modification  of  the
area within the conceived area of acquisition and  he  has  recommended  the
land covered u/s  4  notification  in  the  aforesaid  mouzas  are  fit  for
acquisition for the public purpose on behalf of WBIDC, the RB.

On  perusal  of  the  reports  and  records  we  may  agree  to  the   above
recommendation of the Collector and issue declaration u/s/ 6  as  prescribed
in the aforesaid Act.”


       The letter of the Joint  Secretary  mentions  the  WBIDC  to  be  the
requisitioning body. However, the same finds no mention in the  notification
issued under Section 6 of the L.A. Act, the relevant portion  of  which  has
been extracted supra.

Even if the argument advanced on behalf of TML were to be accepted, that  it
was the policy of the state government to generate employment  and  increase
socio economic development in the State, the relevant policy  documents  are
not forthcoming in the original acquisition files which were made  available
for this Court. Thus, by no stretch of imagination can  the  acquisition  of
lands in the instant case be said to be at the instance  of  WBIDC,  or  for
the fulfilment of some scheme of the Corporation or  the  State  Government.
Thus, it cannot be said to attract Section 3(f)(iii), (iv) or  (vi)  either.
On the contrary, what is on record is the minutes of  meetings  between  the
representatives of the West Bengal  Government  and  TML  dated  17.03.2006,
which state that TML is  interested  in  setting  up  a   ‘special  category
project’ in the State to manufacture  2,50,000  units  for  its  ‘Small  Car
Project’. As per the project requirement mentioned in the letter written  by
Deputy  General  Manager  TML  to  the  Principal  Secretary,   Commerce   &
Industries Department, Government  of  West  Bengal  dated  19.01.2006,  400
acres of land were required for setting up of the  factory,  200  acres  for
vendor park and 100 acres for township. The said  letter  was  forwarded  by
the Commerce and Industries Department to the Principal Secretary, Land  and
Land Reforms Department on 24.01.2006 and the Finance  Secretary  for  their
consideration and seeking their views in this regard. It is undisputed  fact
that the State Government has not deposited the  public  money  towards  the
cost of acquisition of land to initiate the acquisition proceedings to  show
that the acquisition of lands is for public purpose which  is  an  essential
requirement under the provision of Section 6 of the  L.A.  Act.  As  can  be
seen, the notification issued  under  Section  6  of  the  L.A.  Act  merely
provides that the land is needed for the setting up of the  Tata  Small  Car
project, which is a public purpose under the L.A. Act. In the case  of  Usha
Stud and Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. v. State  of  Haryana  &  Ors.[22],  a
three judge bench of this Court, after adverting to a catena of case law  on
the subject held as under:

“The ratio  of  the  aforesaid  judgments  is  that  Section  5-A(2),  which
represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi  alteram  partem,  gives
an opportunity to  the  objector  to  make  an  endeavour  to  convince  the
Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified  in
the notification issued under Section 4(1) or that  there  are  other  valid
reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also  makes  it  obligatory
for  the  Collector  to  submit  report(s)  to  the  appropriate  Government
containing his recommendations on the objections, together with  the  record
of the proceedings held by him so that the Government may  take  appropriate
decision on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that  if  the  appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made  by  the
Collector  under  Section  5-A  that  particular  land  is  needed  for  the
specified  public  purpose  then  a  declaration  should   be   made.   This
necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply  mind  to
the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections  filed
by the landowners and other  interested  persons.  Then  and  then  only,  a
declaration can be made under Section 6(1).”
                      (emphasis laid by this Court)

Thus, there seems to be no application  of  mind  either  at  the  stage  of
issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act, or the  report
of Collector under Section 5-A (2) of the L.A. Act or the  issuance  of  the
final notification under Section 6 of the L.A. Act. Such an acquisition,  if
allowed to sustain, would lead to the  attempt  to  justify  any  and  every
acquisition of land of the most vulnerable sections of the  society  in  the
name of ‘public purpose’ to promote socio-economic development.


 On the other hand, it is the Corporation  which  has  raised  the  cost  of
acquisition by way of taking loan from nationalized banks and  the  same  is
said to have been deposited with the State Government. As has  rightly  been
contended  by  Mr.  Kalyan  Banerjee,  learned  senior  counsel  by  placing
reliance on various decisions of this Court, which  have  been  adverted  to
supra, WBIDC cannot even be said to be a local authority for the purpose  of
the L.A. Act and therefore the deposit of  money  towards  acquisition  cost
does not satisfy the statutory requirement  under  Section  6  of  the  Act.
Thus, the contention advanced by the learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of TML that the acquisition in the instant case  is  one  for  public
purpose as the funds for same have come from public revenue, also cannot  be
accepted. Thus, neither there is a scheme of the Government, nor  the  funds
have been derived from the public revenue and that is  why  the  acquisition
in the instant case cannot be said to be one for ‘public purpose’.


  The contention advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf
of TML that this Court has consistently taken the view that  acquisition  in
favour  of  a  statutory  corporation  or  development  authority  for  land
development including  industrial  development,  makes  the  acquisition  of
lands one for ‘public purpose’, as defined under Section 3(f) (iv) or  (vii)
of the  L.A.  Act  and  there  is  no  need  to  follow  the  procedure  for
acquisition as laid down in Part VII of the L.A. Act, cannot be accepted  by
me.  After  the  passing  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Amendment  Act,  1984,
acquisition of land for  a  company  is  no  longer  covered  under  ‘public
purpose’ in view of Section 3(f)(viii) of  the  L.A.  Act.  Apart  from  the
above statutory provisions inserted by way of an amendment the  Objects  and
Reasons for such amendment referred to supra upon which strong reliance  has
been placed by Mr. Colin Gonsalves and Mr. Rakesh  Dwivedi,  learned  senior
counsel on behalf of the owners and State would  make  it  abundantly  clear
that the mandatory procedure as laid down under Part VII  of  the  L.A.  Act
read with the rules framed  there  under  was  not  followed  by  the  State
Government before the  notifications were published.


From a perusal of both the statutory provisions of the L.A. Act as  well  as
the case law on the subject referred to supra  upon  which  strong  reliance
has been rightly placed by the learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the
owners/cultivators and State Government, it becomes  clear  that  the  state
government can acquire land under the public purpose clauses (iv) and  (vii)
of  the  Act  for  industrial  estates,  housing   colonies   and   economic
parks/zones even where the type of industry has  been  identified.   So,  an
acquisition made for an industrial estate of a particular type  of  industry
like small cars is permissible under the ‘public purpose’  for  the  purpose
of the L.A. Act under the above  clauses  of  Section  3  (f)  of  the  Act.
Before land could be acquired, the procedure consistent with  the  statutory
provisions of law must be followed mandatorily.  There  is  nothing  in  law
which would support the acquisition of land for a particular  Company  under
the guise of  ‘public  purpose’,  rendering  the  exception  provided  under
Section 3(f)(viii) of the L.A. Act useless and nugatory.


 In the case of Devender Pal Singh (supra), this Court has  held  that  when
the acquisition of land is for a public purpose, it is Part II of  the  L.A.
Act which would apply and where the acquisition of land is at  the  instance
of a Company, the procedure to be adopted is laid down in Part  VII  of  the
L.A. Act. It was held as under:

“40. Distinction between acquisition under Part II and Part  VII  are  self-
evident. The State was not only obligated to issue  a  notification  clearly
stating as to whether the acquisition is for a public  purpose  or  for  the
company. Section 6 categorically states so, as would appear from the  second
proviso appended thereto.
41. A declaration is to be made  either  for  a  public  purpose  or  for  a
company. It cannot be for both.
42. It is furthermore trite that Land Acquisition Act  is  an  expropriatory
legislation. (See Hindustan Petroleum  Corporation  Ltd.  v.  Darius  Shapur
Chenai and Ors.; and Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v.  Pure  Industrial
Cock & Chem. Ltd. and Ors.)
43.  Expropriatory  legislation,  as  is  well-known,   must   be   strictly
construed. When the properties of a citizen is being  compulsorily  acquired
by a State in exercise  of  its  power  of  Eminent  Domain,  the  essential
ingredients thereof, namely, existence of a public purpose  and  payment  of
compensation are principal requisites therefore. In the case of  acquisition
of land for a private company, existence of a public  purpose  being  not  a
requisite  criteria,  other   statutory   requirements   call   for   strict
compliance, being imperative in character.”
             (emphasis laid by this Court)

 The decisions of this Court in the cases  of  Pandit  Jhandu  Lal  (supra),
Somawanti (supra), Jage Ram (supra) and Aflatoon (supra) upon  which  strong
reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel appearing  on  behalf
of TML, have no bearing on the facts of  the  instant  case,  as  they  were
decided prior to the enactment of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,
1984, except the decision of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Pratibha  Nema
(supra).


In the case of Pratibha Nema, this Court did not consider the  statement  of
objects and reasons of the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,  1984,  the
relevant portion of which  has  been  extracted  supra.  Further,  the  fact
situation in that case was also very different as  this  Court  was  dealing
with acquisition of land for the purpose of  setting  up  a  ‘diamond  park’
pursuant to the policy decision by the state government of Madhya Pradesh.


In  this  day  and  age  of  fast  paced  development,  it   is   completely
understandable for the state government to want to acquire lands to  set  up
industrial units. What, however, cannot be lost sight of is  the  fact  that
when the brunt of this ‘development’ is borne by  the  weakest  sections  of
the society, more so,  poor  agricultural  workers  who  have  no  means  of
raising a voice against the action of the mighty  state  government,  as  is
the case in the instant fact situation, it is the onerous duty of the  state
Government to ensure that the mandatory procedure laid down under  the  L.A.
Act and the Rules framed there under  are  followed  scrupulously  otherwise
the acquisition  proceedings  will  be  rendered  void  ab  initio  in  law.
Compliance with the provisions of the L.A.  Act  cannot  be  treated  as  an
empty formality by the State Government, as that would be  akin  to  handing
over the eminent domain power of State to the  executive,  which  cannot  be
permitted in a democratic country which is required to be  governed  by  the
rule of law.  This  Court  in  the  case  of  State  of  Punjab  v.  Gurdial
Singh[23],  has held with regard to the legal mala fides as under:

“9. The question, then, is what  is  mala  fides  in  the  jurisprudence  of
power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps  it  separate
from the popular concept of personal vice.  Pithily  put,  bad  faith  which
invalidates the exercise of power-sometimes called  colourable  exercise  or
fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and  satisfactions-
is the attainment of  ends  beyond  the  sanctioned  purposes  of  power  by
simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If  the  use  of  the
power is for the  fulfillment  of  a  legitimate  object  the  actuation  or
catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad  where  the  true
object is to reach an end different from the one  for  which  the  power  is
entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but  irrelevant
to the entrustment. When  the  custodian  of  power  is  influenced  in  its
exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of  which  the  power
is vested the court calls it a colourable  exercise  and  is  undeceived  by
illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the  mark
even in Law when he stated: "I repeat...that all power is  a  trust-that  we
are accountable for its exercise-that, from the people, and for the  people,
all springs, and all must exist". Fraud on power voids the order  if  it  is
not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context  is  not
equal to moral  turpitude  and  embraces  all  cases  in  which  the  action
impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent  of
the power, whether this be malice- laden or even benign. If the  purpose  is
corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign  to  the  scope
of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict  or  impel  the
action, mala fides or fraud on power,  vitiates  the  acquisition  or  other
official act.”
           (emphasis laid by this  Court)

In the case of S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab[24], a constitution  bench
of this Court has held that:
“In legal parlance it would be a case of a  fraud  on  a  power,  though  no
corrupt motive or bargain is imputed. In this sense, if it  could  be  shown
that an authority exercising a power has taken into account -  it  may  even
be bona fide  and  with  the  best  of  intention,-  as  a  relevant  factor
something which it  could  not  properly  take  into  account,  in  deciding
whether or not to exercise the power or the manner or  extent  to  which  it
should be exercised, the exercise of  the  power  would  be  bad.  Sometimes
Courts are confronted with cases where the purposes sought  to  be  achieved
are mixed, - some relevant and some alien to the purpose. The  courts  have,
on occasions, resolved the difficulty by finding out  the  dominant  purpose
which impelled the action, and where the power itself is  conditioned  by  a
purpose, have proceeded to invalidate the exercise of  the  power  when  any
irrelevant purpose is proved to have entered the mind of the authority  (See
Sadler v. Sheffield Corporation [1924] 1 CH  483.  as  also  Lord  Denning's
observation Earl fitzwilliam etc. v. Minister of T. & C. Planning  [1951]  2
K.B. 284,. This is on  the  principle  that  if  in  such  a  situation  the
dominant purpose is unlawful then the act itself is unlawful and it  is  not
cured by saying that they had another purpose which was lawful.”
               (emphasis laid by this  Court)

It is also a well settled principle of law that  if the manner  of  doing  a
particular act is prescribed under any statute the act must be done in  that
manner or not at all. In the case of Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council  Of
Kerala & Ors.[25], this Court has held as under:
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that  if  the  manner  of
doing a particular act is prescribed under any  Statute,  the  act  must  be
done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is  traceable  to
the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche  in  Nazir
Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under :


“Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain  way,  the  thing
must be done in that way or not at all.”


32. This rule has since been approved by this  Court  in  Rao  Shiv  Bahadur
Singh and Anr. v. State of Vindhya Pradesh and again in Deep Chand v.  State
of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a  Three-Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh  and  Ors.  and  the  rule
laid down in Nazir Ahmad's case (supra) was  again  upheld.  This  rule  has
since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts  and  has  also
been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law.”

                         (emphasis laid by this Court)



 In the instant case, what makes the  acquisition  proceedings  perverse  is
not the fact that the lands were needed for  setting  up  of  an  automobile
industry, which would help to generate employment as well as  promote  socio
economic  development  in  the  State,  but  what  makes   the   acquisition
proceedings perverse is that the proper procedure as laid  down  under  Part
VII of the  L.A.  Act  read  with  Rules  was  not  followed  by  the  State
Government. The acquisition of land for and at the instance of  the  company
was sought to be disguised as acquisition of land for  ‘public  purpose’  in
order to circumvent compliance with the mandatory provisions of Part VII  of
the L.A. Act. This action of the State Government is  grossly  perverse  and
illegal and void ab initio in law and such  an  exercise  of  power  by  the
state government for acquisition  of  lands  cannot  be  allowed  under  any
circumstance. If such acquisitions of lands are permitted, it  would  render
entire Part VII  of  the  L.A.  Act  as  nugatory  and  redundant,  as  then
virtually every acquisition  of  land  in  favour  of  a  company  could  be
justified as one for a ‘public purpose’ on the ground that  the  setting  up
of  industry  would  generate  employment   and   promote   socio   economic
development in the State. Surely, that could not have been the intention  of
the legislature in providing the provisions of Part VII read with 3  (f)  of
the L.A. Act. From a perusal of the materials on record  from  the  original
files, the relevant extracts  from the  letters  addressed  by  TML  to  the
State Government of West Bengal and Cabinet notes which have been  extracted
and discussed supra, it becomes clear that in the instant  case,  the  lands
in question were acquired by the State Government for a  particular  Company
(TML), at the instance of that Company.  Further,  the  exact  location  and
site of the land was also identified by TML. Even the  notifications  issued
under Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A.  Act  clearly  state  that  the  land  in
question was being acquired for the ‘Small Car Project’ of TML. In  view  of
the foregoing reasons, by no stretch of imagination can such an  acquisition
of lands be held  to be one for ‘public purpose’ and not for a  company.  If
the acquisition of lands in the instant case does not amount to one for  the
company, I do not know what would.


 In view of the aforesaid categorical findings recorded by me based  on  the
materials on record, including cabinet memo,  minutes  of  meetings  between
representatives  of  the  state  government  and  TML   as   well   as   the
notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A.  Act,  1984,  it  is
clear that the acquisition of lands in the instant case is for  the  Company
(TML). Admittedly, the  procedure  for  acquisition  as  contemplated  under
Sections 39, 40 and 41 of Part VII of the L.A. Act read with Rules 3, 4  and
5 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 has not been followed,  as
the acquisition was sought to be guised as one for  ‘public  purpose’  under
Sections 3(f) (iii), (iv) and (vii) of the  L.A.  Act.  The  acquisition  of
land in the instant case in favour of the Company is thus, improper for  not
following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Part VII of the L.A.  Act
and Rules and  therefore  the  acquisition  proceedings  are  liable  to  be
quashed.


 Further, even after the lands were acquired in its favour,  TML  could  not
start operations in accordance with the terms of the lease  deed.  The  same
becomes clear from a perusal of the letter dated 28.09.2010 written  by  the
Managing Director, India Operations of  TML  to  the  Managing  Director  of
WBIDC, which reads as under:

“We had proposed an integrated Automobile Plant consisting of  manufacturing
operations by Tata Motors  as  well  as  co-locating  vendors  in  the  same
complex.You were kind enough to lease 645  acres  to  Tata  Motors  and  290
acres to vendors as recommended by Tata Motors……
We, therefore, concluded that a peaceful environment could  not  be  created
for normal working of the  plant  and  we  had  to  take  the  most  painful
decision to close the operations on 3rd October, 2008.  Meanwhile,  we  also
took permission from you to remove our equioment  and  machinery,  which  we
have now done. We, invested Rs. 440 crores and of course continue  to  incur
Rs. 1 crore per month towards  maintenance.  This  is  an  addition  to  the
investment of about Rs. 171 crores (inclusive of  Rs.  40  crores  for  land
premium charges) done by our vendors.
…………
We have also had discussions with the Hon’ble Industry Minister as  well  as
with the Industry Secretary for finding various alternative  uses  for  this
plant. In this respect, we would like to submit that we could also  consider
the option of moving out from the premises provided we and our  vendors  are
compensated for the cost  of  the  buildings,  sheds  on  the  premises  and
expenses incurred in developing the  infrastructure  which  remains  on  the
premises.
……………”

Thus, it is an undisputed fact that even once the cost  of  acquisition  was
borne by WBIDC by way  of  raising  loan  from  banks,  TML  did  not  start
operations and held on to the possession of the land. It did not  engage  in
any other manufacturing activity either. Subsequently, TML also removed  the
machinery from the concerned plant and shifted the  same  to  the  state  of
Gujarat and the lands in question have since been resumed by WBIDC.


 In view of the foregoing reasons, Point  Nos.  1  and  2  are  answered  in
favour of the land owners/cultivators.

Answer to Point Nos. 3, 4 and 5
  From a perusal of the materials on record and original acquisition  files,
it is evident that a large number of  objections  were  filed  by  the  land
owners before the notification was issued under Section 4 of the  L.A.  Act.
The same were not considered properly under Section  5-A  (2)  of  the  L.A.
Act. Notices were issued to the objectors individually but  the  same  could
not be served upon the  owners/cultivators  of  the  proposed  lands  to  be
acquired.  It is further mentioned in  the  record  that  the  announcements
were made through loudspeakers and by  publications in the  newspapers.   It
has been submitted by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior  counsel  appearing
on behalf of the State of West Bengal that once  a  decision  was  taken  to
serve the land owners/cultivators individually  then  it  should  have  been
ensured by the Land Acquisition Collector that the notices were  so  served.
However, the fact that the same was not done is evident from  a  perusal  of
the acquisition files maintained by the State Government.

     Even though the land owners/cultivators did not appear before the  Land
Acquisition Collector, the objections filed  by  them  ought  to  have  been
considered objectively by him as required under Section 5-A (2) of the  L.A.
Act. Additionally, seven objections were filed under Section 5-A itself  and
some of the  objections  pertained  to  persons  who  were  already  running
industrial units.  The names of the objectors are as follows:
“

1.    Kuldip Maity of Beraberi, P.S. Singur;

2.    Subir Kumar Pal, Director of M/s Shree Bhumi  Steel  Pvt.  Ltd.,  P.S.
Singur;

3.    M/s. Shanti Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., P.S. Singur;

4.    Prashanta Kumar Jana, Vill-Habaspota, Singur;

5.    M/s. Ajit Services Station on behalf of Tapan Kumar Bera, Advocate;

6.    M/s. Shree  Padma  Sagar  Exports  Pvt.  Ltd.  of  Singherbheri,  P.S.
Singur”



Some of these objectors were not  given  the  opportunity  to  be  heard  as
required under Section 5-A (2) of the L.A. Act. The same ought to have  been
given to them as required both under the statutory provisions  of  the  L.A.
Act as well as the principles of natural  justice,  as  the  acquisition  of
lands of the objectors would entail a  serious  civil  consequence.  In  the
case of Mandir Shri Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi[26], a  Constitution
Bench of this Court has held that it is the mandatory  duty  cast  upon  the
Collector to follow the provision of Section 5-A (2)  of  the  L.A.  Act  as
under:


“5. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition  on  the  basis  that
the appellant had no opportunity of  being  heard  by  the  Collector  under
Section 5-A. The  duty  to  afford  such  an  opportunity  is  mandatory.  A
decision by the Government on the objection, when the Collector afforded  no
opportunity of being heard to the objector, would not be proper.  The  power
to hear the objection under Section 5-A is that of the Collector and not  of
the appropriate Government. It is no doubt true that the  recommendation  of
the Land Acquisition  Collector  is  not  binding  on  the  Government.  The
Government may choose either to accept the recommendation or to  reject  it;
but the requirement of the section is  that  when  a  person’s  property  is
proposed to be acquired, he must be  given  an  opportunity  to  show  cause
against it. Merely because the Government  may  not  choose  to  accept  the
recommendation of the Land Acquisition Collector, even when  he  makes  one,
it cannot be said that he need not make the recommendation at all but  leave
it to the Government to decide the matter. In other  words,  the  fact  that
the Collector is  not  the  authority  to  decide  the  objection  does  not
exonerate him from his duty to hear the objector on the objection  and  make
the recommendation.”
                      (emphasis laid by this Court)

In the case of Babu Ram v. State of  Haryana[27],  this  Court  observed  as
under:

“30. As indicated hereinabove in the  various  cases  cited  by  Mr.  Pradip
Ghosh and, in particular, the decision  in  Krishnan  Lal  Arneja  case,  in
which reference has been made to the observations made by this Court  in  Om
Prakash case, it has been emphasized that a right under Section 5-A  is  not
merely statutory but also  has  the  flavour  of  fundamental  rights  under
Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Such observations had been  made  in
reference to an observation made in the earlier decision  in  Gurdial  Singh
case and keeping in mind the fact that right to property  was  no  longer  a
fundamental right, an observation  was  made  that  even  if  the  right  to
property was no longer a fundamental right,  the  observations  relating  to
Article 14 would continue to apply in full force with regard to Section  5-A
of the L.A. Act.”
                   (emphasis laid by this Court)

From a perusal of the proceedings  before  the  Collector,  which  are  made
available to this Court, it becomes clear that the same have  been  rejected
without assigning any clear reasons or application of mind.
 Thus, the report of the Collector is not a valid  report  in  the  eyes  of
law.  The State  Government  has  mechanically  accepted  the  same  without
application of mind independently before issuing notification under  Section
6 of the L.A. Act declaring that the lands are  required  for  establishment
of automobile industry by TML. Therefore, the point nos.  3,  4  and  5  are
answered  against  the  State  Government  and  in  favour   of   the   land
owners/cultivators.

 Answer to Point Nos. 6, 7 and 8
 After issuing the notifications under Section 6 of the L.A.  Act  declaring
that  the  lands  have  been  acquired  for  the   purpose   of   industrial
development, a statutory duty is cast upon the Collector to issue notice  to
the land owners/cultivators, as required under Section 9 of  the  L.A.  Act,
to determine the market value of the acquired land  and  award  compensation
as required under Section 11 of the L.A. Act which is mandatory  for  taking
possession of the land by the State Government.


   As can be seen from  material  on  record,  no  individual  notices  were
served upon the land owners/cultivators. A joint  inquiry  appears  to  have
been conducted by the Land Acquisition  Collector  without  giving  them  an
adequate  opportunity  to  establish  their  claim  for   determination   of
reasonable compensation for acquisition of  lands  by  presenting  true  and
correct market value of the lands. The  determination  of  market  value  of
lands by clubbing a number of cases together and passing a  composite  award
is no award in the eyes of law. The inquiry, as contemplated  under  Section
11 of the L.A. Act, is a quasi judicial exercise of power  on  the  part  of
the  Collector  in  awarding  just  and  reasonable  compensation   to   the
landowners/cultivators.  That  has  not  been  done  in  the  instant  case.
Further, the proviso to Section 11(1) of  the  L.A.  Act  provides  that  no
award shall be made by  the  collector  without  the  previous  approval  of
either the appropriate government or such officer authorised by it  for  the
above purpose.  It was also  brought  to  the  notice  of  this  Court  that
supplementary awards were also passed which is not  legally  permissible  in
law. For non-compliance of  the  above  provisions  of  the  L.A.  Act,  the
composite awards are vitiated in  law  and  therefore,  the  same  are  also
liable to be quashed.


  Accordingly, the point nos. 6, 7 and 8 are answered in favour of the  land
owners.



                                 ……………………………………………………J.
                                  [V. GOPALA GOWDA]




                       O R D E R
      The points formulated above have been answered by  separate  opinions.
However we concur on the  question  of  quashing  the  impugned  acquisition
proceedings and reliefs to be granted to the  land  owners/cultivators.  The
appeals are allowed, the common judgment and order dated  18.01.2008  passed
in W.P. No. 23836 (W) of 2006 and  connected  writ  petitions  by  the  High
Court  of  Calcutta  is  set  aside.  The  acquisition  of   land   of   the
landowners/cultivators in the instant case is declared as illegal and  void.
 Since the nature of the acquired lands has been  changed  in  view  of  the
acquisition, we  direct  the  Survey  Settlement  Department  of  the  State
Government of West Bengal to conduct a survey and  identify  the  mouzas  of
lands acquired with reference to lay out  plans,  other  connected  records,
village maps and survey settlement records of the lands in  question  within
10 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this  order,  in  order  to
identify the respective portions of land which needs to be returned  to  the
respective landowners/cultivators. Let possession of the lands  be  restored
to the landowners/cultivators within 12 weeks from the date  of  receipt  of
the copy of this judgment and order.  The  compensation  which  has  already
been paid to the land owners/cultivators  shall  not  be  recovered  by  the
state government as they have been deprived of the occupation and  enjoyment
of their lands for the last ten years. The landowners/cultivators  who  have
not withdrawn the compensation are permitted to withdraw the same  which  is
in deposit either with the Land Acquisition Collector or the Court.

                                 ……………………………………………………J.
                                  [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

                                 ……………………………………………………J.
                                  [ARUN MISHRA]
New Delhi,
August 31, 2016

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8438 OF 2016
                    [Arising out of SLP (C) No.8463/2008]

Kedar Nath Yadav etc. etc.                        … Appellants

Vs.

State of West Bengal & Ors.                       … Respondents

With

[C.A. No.8440/2016 (@ SLP [C] No.10731 of 2008;
 C.A. No.8441/2016 (@  SLP [C] No.11783 of 2008;
 C.A. No.8444/2016 (@  SLP [C] No.11830 of  2008;
 C.A. No.8446/2016 (@  SLP [C] No.12360 of 2008;
 C.A. No…8447/2016 (@ SLP [C] No.12724 of 2008;
 C.A. No.8453/2016 (@ SLP(C) No.25580/2016 - CC No.13645 of 2008; and
 C.A. No.8449/2016 @ SLP(C) No.22491 of 2008.]


                               J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    I have gone through the draft judgment, however I find  myself  unable
to agree with the same except on points for determination  nos. 3, 4  and  5
framed  by  esteemed  brother  for  the   reasons   mentioned   hereinafter.
Since  esteemed  Brother  has  taken  pains  to  elaborate  the  facts   and
submissions in detail they need not be restated.
IN RE. QUESTION NOS. 1 AND 2
3.    Question Nos.1 and 2 are  inter-related  and  the  main  question  for
consideration is whether the acquisition of land is for a company and if  so
procedure provided  under  Part  VII  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) is required to be  complied  with  by
the State Government.
4.    “Public purpose”  has  been  defined  in  section  3(f)  of  the  Land
Acquisition Act. The definition is inclusive and  the  Amendment  Act,  1984
excludes  the  acquisition  for  company  from  the  definition  of  “public
purpose”. Acquisition of land for company has been  dealt  with  under  Part
VII of the Act.  Under  section  39  previous  consent  of  the  appropriate
Government and execution of agreement is necessary for acquiring land for  a
company. Both sections 6 to 16 and sections 18 to 37 shall not  be  used  to
acquire land for any company under Part VII unless the previous  consent  of
the appropriate Government has been obtained and company  has  executed  the
agreement as provided in section 41 of the Act. Section 41 further  provides
that in the case of acquisition for a company the payment  of  the  cost  of
acquisition has to be borne by the company and other  matters  as  specified
in section 41 are also to be provided in the agreement.  Such  an  agreement
is required to be published in the Official Gazette and  a  statutory  force
is given to its terms on which the public  shall  be  entitled  to  use  the
work.
5.    Section 3(f) though excludes the acquisition for a  company.  However,
at the same time it is inclusive definition and it is  provided  in  section
3(f) that it includes the provision for  development  of  land  from  public
funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of the Government and  subsequent
disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or  outright  sale
with the object of securing further development as planned.  Public  purpose
in section 3(iv) also includes the  provision  of  land  for  a  corporation
owned or controlled by the State. The west Bengal Industrial Corporation  is
established by the State.
6.    Public purpose has to be adjudged in the background of  the  facts  of
the instant case and the State of West Bengal  decided  to  make  effort  to
establish manufacturing industries with  a  view  to  attract  more  private
sector investment and foreign direct  investment  for  industrialization  at
par with the model adopted by other progressive States.  It  has  considered
the offer of TML –  manufacturer  of  Nano  car  -  as  an  opportunity  for
establishing manufacturing industry so  as  to  further  grab  attention  of
automobile industry in the State of West Bengal to  boost  its  economy  for
creating  job  opportunities,  direct  and  indirect  impact  on   secondary
employment in the associated services. The proceedings were initiated  under
the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  the  West  Bengal  Industrial  Development
Corporation (WBIDC) was the acquiring body which bore  the  entire  cost  of
acquisition.
Section 6 of the Act is extracted hereunder :
“6.  Declaration that land is required for a  public  purpose.—  (1) Subject
to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when  the appropriate  Government
is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made  under  section  5A,
sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for  a  public  purpose,
or for a Company, a declaration shall be  made  to  that  effect  under  the
signature of a  Secretary  to  such  Government  or  of  some  officer  duly
authorised to certify its orders, and different  declarations  may  be  made
from time to time in respect of different parcels of  any  land  covered  by
the same notification under section  4,  sub-section  (1),  irrespective  of
whether one report or different reports has  or  have  been  made  (wherever
required) under section 5A, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by  a
notification under section 4, sub-section (1),—
published after the commencement of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment  and
Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but before the commencement  of  the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 68 of 1984) shall be made  after  the
expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the  notification;
or
published after the commencement of the Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,
1984, shall be made after the expiry of  one  year  from  the  date  of  the
publication of the notification:]
 [Provided further that] no  such  declaration  shall  be  made  unless  the
compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company,  or
wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled  or  managed
by a local authority.  
[Explanation 1.—In computing any of the periods referred  to  in  the  first
proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding  to  be  taken  in
pursuance of the notification issued under section 4,  sub-section  (1),  is
stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
       [Explanation  2.—Where  the  compensation  to  be  awarded  for  such
property is to  be  paid  out  of  the  funds  of  a  corporation  owned  or
controlled  by  the  State,  such  compensation  shall  be  deemed   to   be
compensation paid out of public revenues].

(2) [Every declaration] shall be published in  the  Official  Gazette,  [and
in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in  which  the  land  is
situate of which at least one shall be in the  regional  language,  and  the
Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration  to
be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the date  of
such publication and the giving of such  public  notice,  being  hereinafter
referred to as the  date  of  publication  of  the  declaration),  and  such
declaration shall state] the  district  or  other  territorial  division  in
which the land  is  situate,  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  needed,  its
approximate area, and where a plan shall have been made  of  the  land,  the
place where such plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be  conclusive  evidence  that  the  land  is
needed for a public purpose or for a Company,  as  the  case  may  be;  and,
after making such declaration the [appropriate Government] may  acquire  the
land in a manner hereinafter appearing.”

It is apparent from the provisions contained in second proviso to section  6
that declaration under section 6 shall not be made unless  the  compensation
to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company either wholly  or
partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a  local
authority. The Explanation second to section 6(1) of the Act makes it  clear
that where the compensation awarded for the property is to be  paid  out  of
funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State,  such  compensation
shall be deemed  to  be  compensation  paid  out  of  public  revenue.  Thus
Explanation second makes it clear that when corporation pays the  funds  for
acquisition of the property that such compensation shall  be  deemed  to  be
paid out of public revenue. As already mentioned above the  acquisition  for
a corporation is indeed within the public  purpose  as  defined  in  section
3(f)(iv). Thus the concept of funds in section 6 as amended  in  1984  comes
into play in the case of acquisition of a land for a corporation and  it  is
not necessary that the State Government  itself  should  bear  the  cost  of
acquisition so as  to  make  it  expenditure  out  of  public  revenue  even
expenditure by  the  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the  State  for
acquisition shall be deemed to be made out of public revenues and  when  the
land had been acquired for a corporation the land is to  be  vested  in  the
Corporation though lease of the land has been granted to the company –  Tata
Motors Ltd., for short TML – for its aforesaid project.  In  my  opinion  it
would remain acquisition for a public purpose as provided  in  section  3(f)
of the Act;  as  also  opined  in  the  various  decisions  to  be  adverted
hereinafter of this Court.
7.     Acquisition  of  land  for  establishing  such  an   industry   would
ultimately benefit the people and the  very  purpose  of  industrialization,
generating job opportunities hence it would be open to the State  Government
to invoke the provisions of Part II of the Act.  When  Government  wants  to
attract  the  investment,  create  job  opportunities  and   aims   at   the
development of the State and secondary development, job opportunities,  such
acquisition is permissible for public purpose.
8.    In Somawanti v. State of Punjab  AIR  1963  SC  151,  the  concept  of
“public purpose” has been considered by this Court as under :
“53. “Public Purpose” as explained by this  Court  in  Babu  Barkaya  Thakur
case (1961) 1 SCR  128  :  AIR  1960  SC  1203  means  a  purpose  which  is
beneficial to the community. But whether a particular purpose is  beneficial
or is likely to be beneficial to the community or not is a matter  primarily
for the satisfaction of the State  Government.  In  the  notification  under
Section 6(1) it has been stated that  the  land  is  being  acquired  for  a
public purpose, namely, for setting up a factory for  manufacturing  various
ranges  of  refrigeration  compressors  and  ancillary  equipment.  It   was
vehemently argued before us  that  manufacture  of  refrigeration  equipment
cannot be regarded as beneficial to the community in the real sense  of  the
word and that such equipment will at the most enable articles of  luxury  to
be  produced.  But  the  State  Government  has  taken  the  view  that  the
manufacture of these articles is  for  the  benefit  of  the  community.  No
materials have been placed before us from which  we  could  infer  that  the
view of  the  Government  is  perverse  or  that  its  action  based  on  it
constitutes a fraud on  its  power  to  acquire  land  or  is  a  colourable
exercise by it of such power.
54. Further, the notification itself sets out  the  purpose  for  which  the
land is being acquired. That purpose, if we may  recall,  is  to  set  up  a
factory for the  manufacture  of  refrigeration  compressors  and  ancillary
equipment. The importance of this undertaking to a State such as the  Punjab
which has a surplus of fruit, dairy products etc. the general effect of  the
establishment of this factory  on  foreign  exchange  resources,  spread  of
education, relieving the pressure on unemployment etc. have been set out  in
the affidavit of the respondent and their substance appears in  the  earlier
part of this judgment. The affidavits have  not  been  controverted  and  we
have, therefore, no hesitation in acting upon them.”

9.    In Jage Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1971) 1 SCC  671,  this
Court held that setting up of a factory for purpose of manufacture of China-
ware and Porcelain-ware including wall Glazed Tiles was  a  public  purpose.
This Court has held thus :
“8. There is no denying the fact that starting  of  a  new  industry  is  in
public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the  State
Government that the new State of  Haryana  was  lacking  in  industries  and
consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of  unemployment.
There is also no denying the fact that the industrialisation of an  area  is
in public interest. That apart, the question  whether  the  starting  of  an
industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has  to
be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This  Court
is not in a position to go  into  that  question.  So  long  as  it  is  not
established that the acquisition is sought to be made  for  some  collateral
purpose, the declaration of the Government that it  is  made  for  a  public
purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6(3) says that the declaration  of
the Government that the acquisition made is  for  public  purpose  shall  be
conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless  it
is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is  not  open  to
this Court to  go  behind  that  declaration  and  find  out  whether  in  a
particular case the purpose for which the  land  was  needed  was  a  public
purpose or not: see Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab AIR 1963  SC  151  and
Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081. On  the  facts  of
this case there can be hardly any doubt that the purpose for which the  land
was acquired is a public purpose.”

10.   In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra  (1977)  1  SCC  133,
this Court held that development and  utilization  of  land  as  residential
industrial area qualified as “public purpose”. This Court held that :
“6. In writ petitions before the High Court, the submission that  no  public
purpose existed was not pressed in view of the decision  of  this  Court  in
Somavanti Smt v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC  151.  In  Ramtanu  Cooperative
Housing Society Ltd.  Shri  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  (1970)  3  SCC  323,
acquisition of land for development  of  industrial  areas  and  residential
tenements for persons to live on industrial estates was held to  be  legally
valid for a genuinely public  purpose.  This  ground,  therefore,  need  not
detain us, although  the  appellants,  who  are  owners  of  the  properties
acquired, have formally raised it also by means of the six appeals filed  by
them (Civil Appeals 1616-1621 of 1969). In agreement with  the  High  Court,
we hold that notifications under Section 4(1) of the Act were valid  in  all
these cases.”

11.   In Arnold Rodricks v. State  of  Maharashtra  (1966)  3  SCR  885  the
acquisition of land  for  development  and  utilization  as  industrial  and
residential area met the test of “public  purpose”.  This  Court  laid  down
thus :
“We may further take up the question of the validity of Section 3(f)(2).  In
our view it is not necessary to decide this point because we  have  come  to
the conclusion  that  the  notifications  issued  under  Sections  4  and  6
specified a public purpose;  the  purpose  specified  was  “development  and
utilization of the said lands as industrial and residential areas”.  In  our
opinion this purpose is a public purpose within the Land Acquisition Act  as
it stood before the amendment made by the Bombay Legislature and it  is  not
necessary for the respondents to  rely  on  the  amendment  to  sustain  the
notification. ..
It was urged before us  that  the  State  Government  was  not  entitled  to
acquire property from A and give  it  to  B.  Reliance  was  placed  on  the
decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (204  Mass.  607)  .
But as pointed out by this Court, public purpose varies with the  times  and
the prevailing conditions in localities, and in some towns like  Bombay  the
conditions are such that it is imperative that the State should  so  all  it
can to increase the availability of residential and industrial sites. It  is
true  that  these  residential  and  industrial  sites  will  be  ultimately
allotted to members of the public and they  would  get  individual  benefit,
but it is in the interest of the general community  that  these  members  of
the public should be able to have sites to put  up  residential  houses  and
sites  to  put  up  factories.  The  main  idea  in  issuing  the   impugned
notifications was not to think of the private comfort or  advantage  of  the
members of the public but the general public good. At any rate,  as  pointed
out in Babu Barkva Thakur v. State of Bombay [(1961) 1 SCR 128 at p  137]  a
very large section of the community  is  concerned  and  its  welfare  is  a
matter of public concern. In our view the welfare of a large  proportion  of
persons  living  in  Bombay  is  a  matter  of  public   concern   and   the
notifications  served  to  enhance  the  welfare  of  this  section  of  the
community and this is  public  purpose.  In  conclusion  we  hold  that  the
notifications are valid and cannot be impugned on the ground that they  were
not issued for any public purpose.” [Emphasis supplied]

12.   In Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Ors. v.  District  Collector,  Ranga  Reddy
District & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC  552  this  Court  has  considered  concept  of
“eminent domain” and has referred to SusetteKelo v. City of New  London  162
L.Ed 439 = 545 US 469 wherein it  had  been  observed  that  “using  eminent
domain for economic development impermissibly  blurs  the  boundary  between
the public and private takings”. Government’s pursuit of  a  public  purpose
might benefit individual purpose. Samuel Berman v. Andrew  Parker,  99  L.Ed
27, has also been referred to wherein  it  has  been  observed  that  public
ownership cannot be said to be the  sole  method  of  promoting  the  public
purposes of community redevelopment projects. Other decisions as  to  public
domain have also been referred to. “Eminent domain” has been discussed  thus
:
“43. “Eminent domain” may be defined as the right or power  of  a  sovereign
State to take private property for public use without  the  owner’s  consent
upon the payment of just compensation. It means nothing more  or  less  than
an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and  interest  of
appropriating the property of individual members of  the  community  to  the
great necessities and common good of the  whole  society.  It  embraces  all
cases where, by the authority of the State and  for  the  public  good,  the
property of an individual is taken without his  consent  to  be  devoted  to
some particular use, by the  State  itself,  by  a  corporation,  public  or
private, or by a private citizen for the welfare  of  the  public  (American
Jurisprudence, 2d, Vol. 26, pp. 638-39, Para 1; Corpus Juris Secundum,  Vol.
29, p. 776, Para 1; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 14, pp.  468-
70).
44. “Eminent domain” is thus inherent power  of  a  governmental  entity  to
take privately owned property, especially land  and  convert  it  to  public
use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking  (vide  P.  Ramanatha
Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, Vol. 2, p. 1575).
45. The term “eminent domain” is said to have originated by  Grotius,  legal
scholar of the seventeenth century. He believed  that  the  State  possessed
the power to take or destroy property for the benefit of  the  social  unit,
but he  believed  that  when  the  State  so  acted,  it  was  obligated  to
compensate the injured property owner for  his  losses.  In  his  well-known
work De Jure, Belli etPacis, the learned author proclaimed:
“The property of subject is under the eminent domain of the State,  so  that
the State or he who acts for it may use,  alienate  and  even  destroy  such
property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which  even  private
persons have a right over the property of the other, but  for  the  ends  of
public utility, to which ends  those  who  founded  civil  society  must  be
supposed to have intended the private ends should give way.”
46. Blackstone too believed that the State had  no  general  power  to  take
private property of landowners,  except  on  the  payment  of  a  reasonable
price. The right of the State or the sovereign to its or  his  own  property
is absolute while that of the subject or citizen to  his  property  is  only
paramount. The citizen holds his property subject always  to  the  right  of
the sovereign to take it for a public purpose. The power of  eminent  domain
is merely a means to an end viz. larger public interest.
47. The power of eminent domain does not  depend  for  its  existence  on  a
specific grant. It is inherent and exists in every sovereign  State  without
any recognition thereof in  the  Constitution  or  in  any  statute.  It  is
founded on the law of necessity. The power is  inalienable.  No  legislature
can bind itself or its successors not to exercise  this  power  when  public
necessity demands it. Nor can it be abridged or restricted by  agreement  or
contract.
48. Nichols in his classic book Eminent Domain defines it  (eminent  domain)
as “the power of sovereign to take  property  for  public  use  without  the
owner’s consent”.
49.  Another  constitutional  expert  (Cooley)  in  his  treatise   on   the
Constitutional Limitations, states:
“More accurately, it is the rightful authority  which  must  rest  in  every
sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of a  public  nature  which
pertain to its citizens in common and to appropriate and control  individual
property for the public  benefit,  as  the  public  safety,  convenience  or
necessity may demand.”
50.  Willis  in  his  well-known  work  Constitutional  Law  discusses   two
viewpoints as to  exercise  of  power  of  eminent  domain.  The  older  and
stricter view was that unless the property was dedicated  for  user  by  the
public at large or a considerable section  thereof,  it  would  not  be  for
public use or  for  public  purpose.  The  modern  and  more  liberal  view,
however, is that it is not an essential condition of  public  use  that  the
property should be transferred to public ownership or for  public  user  and
it is sufficient that the public derives advantage from the scheme.
51. In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley 41 L Ed 369  :  164  US  112
(1896) an Act of California provided for the acquisition of  lands  whenever
fifty landowners or a majority of them in a particular locality required  it
for construction of a watercourse, the object of the  legislation  being  to
enable dry lands to be brought under wet cultivation. The  validity  of  the
Act was challenged on the ground that the  acquisition  would  only  benefit
particular landowners who could take water from the channel and  the  public
as such had no direct interest in the matter and consequently there  was  no
public user. The contention was right if narrow view was to be accepted  but
was not well founded if liberal  view  was  to  be  adopted.  Rejecting  the
contention, the Court observed: (L Ed pp. 389-90)
“To irrigate and thus to bring into possible cultivation these large  masses
of otherwise worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a  matter
of public interest, not confined to the  landowners,  or  even  to  any  one
section of the State. The fact that the use of the water is limited  to  the
landowners is not, therefore, a fatal objection to this legislation.  It  is
not essential that the entire community, or even  any  considerable  portion
thereof, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order  to
constitute a public use. … It is  not  necessary,  in  order  that  the  use
should be public, that every resident in the district should have the  right
to the use of the water.”                               (emphasis supplied)
The above statement of law was reiterated in subsequent cases.
52. In Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles 67 L Ed 1186 : 262 US 700  (1922)
the Court observed that: (L Ed p. 1192)
“… It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any  considerable
portion, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order  to
constitute a public use”.
53. In New York City Housing Authority v. Muller 270 NYP 333 : 105  ALR  905
certain lands were acquired in  pursuance  of  a  governmental  project  for
clearing slums and providing  housing  accommodation  to  persons  with  low
income. The validity of the acquisition was questioned on  the  ground  that
the use was private  and  not  public.  The  Court,  however,  rejected  the
contention and stated:
“Over many years and  in  a  multitude  of  cases  the  courts  have  vainly
attempted to define comprehensively the concept of  a  public  use;  and  to
formulate a universal test  even  though  it  were  possible,  would  in  an
inevitably changing world be unwise if not futile.”
… and holding that those purposes were for the benefit  of  the  public  the
Court went on to observe:
“It is also said that since the  taking  is  to  provide  apartments  to  be
rented to a class designated as persons of low income or  to  be  leased  or
sold to limited dividend corporations the use is  private  and  not  public.
This objection disregards the primary purpose of the legislation. Use  of  a
proposed structure, facility or service by everybody and anybody is  one  of
the abandoned, universal tests of a public use.”(emphasis supplied)
54. In Murray v. LaGuardia 291 NY 320 a  town  corporation  was  formed  for
acquiring certain lands. It was financed by Metropolitan  Insurance  Company
which held all the stocks of  the  corporation.  The  owners  of  the  lands
contended that the scheme was  to  benefit  only  few  individuals  and  the
Insurance Company which was a private corporation and there  was  no  public
use in the project. The Court, however, rejected the argument. Dealing  with
the contention that there was no public  use  in  the  project  because  the
Insurance Company was benefited, the Court observed:
“Nor do we find merit  in  the  related  argument  that  unconstitutionality
results from the fact that in the present case the statute permits the  city
to exercise the power of ‘eminent  domain’  to  accomplish  a  project  from
which ‘Metropolitan’, a private corporation may ultimately  reap  a  profit.
If upon completion of the project the public good is enhanced  it  does  not
matter that private interests may be benefited.” (emphasis supplied)
55. In Samuel Berman v. Andrew Parker 99  L  Ed  27  :  348  US  26,  owners
instituted an action of condemnation of their property  under  the  District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act, 1945. Plans were approved  and  the  Planning
Commission certified them to the agency for execution. The agency  undertook
the exercise  of  redevelopment  of  the  area.  It  was  contended  by  the
landowners that the project was not public project and their property  could
not be acquired. Rejecting the contention, the Court observed that  it  does
not sit to determine whether a particular  housing  project  is  or  is  not
desirable.
56. The concept of public welfare is broad  and  inclusive.  The  values  it
represents  are  spiritual  as  well  as  physical,  aesthetic  as  well  as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to  determine  that  the
community should be beautiful as also healthy, spacious as also clean,  well
balanced as also carefully patrolled. According to the Court,  the  Congress
and its authorised agencies have made determinations that take into  account
a wide variety of values and it was not for the Court to reappraise them:
“… If those who govern the District of Columbia  decide  that  the  nation’s
capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there  is  nothing  in  the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.” (Samuel Berman case 99 L Ed  27,  L
Ed p.38 : 348 US 26)
57. Dealing with the contention that  the  project  was  undertaken  by  one
businessman for the benefit of  another  businessman,  the  Court  observed:
(Samuel Berman case[supra])
“The public end may be as  well  or  better  served  through  an  agency  of
private enterprise  than  through  a  department  of  government—or  so  the
Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public  ownership  is  the  sole
method  of  promoting  the  public  purposes  of   community   redevelopment
projects. What we have said also disposes of any contention  concerning  the
fact  that  certain  property  owners  in  the  area  may  be  permitted  to
repurchase their properties for redevelopment in harmony  with  the  overall
plan. That, too, is a legitimate means which Congress and its  agencies  may
adopt, if they choose.” (emphasis supplied)
58. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 81 L
Ed 2d 186 : 467 US 229 (1984) the Court held that, no doubt there is a  role
for  courts  to  play  in  reviewing  a  legislature’s  judgment   of   what
constitutes a public use, even when the  eminent  domain  power  is  equated
with the police power. But the Court in Berman (supra) made  clear  that  it
is “extremely narrow”. The Court emphasised that  any  departure  from  this
judicial restraint would result in courts deciding on what is  and  what  is
not a governmental function and in their  invalidating  legislation  on  the
basis of their view on that question. And the  court  would  not  substitute
its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what  constitutes  a  public
use “unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation”.
59. Recently, in SusetteKelo v. City of New London 162 L Ed  439  :  545  US
469 the landowners challenged the city’s exercise of  eminent  domain  power
on the ground that it was not for public use. The project in question was  a
community project for economic revitalisation of the city of New London  for
which the land was acquired. It was submitted by  the  learned  counsel  for
the respondents that the facts in Kelo (supra) were similar to the facts  of
the  present  case.  For  that  the  counsel  relied  upon  the   integrated
development project. Dealing with the project, the Court stated: [Kelo  case
(supra)]
“The Fort Trumbull area is situated on a peninsula  that  juts  into  Thames
River. The area comprises approximately 115 privately owned  properties,  as
well as the 32 acres  of  land  formerly  occupied  by  the  naval  facility
(Trumbull State Park now occupies  18  of  those  32  acres).  Parcel  1  is
designated for a waterfront conference hotel  at  the  center  of  a  ‘small
urban village’ that will include restaurants and shopping. This parcel  will
also have marinas for both recreational and commercial  uses.  A  pedestrian
‘riverwalk’ will originate here and continue down the coast, connecting  the
waterfront  areas  of  the  development.  Parcel  2  will  be  the  site  of
approximately 80 new residences organised into an  urban  neighbourhood  and
linked by public walkway to the remainder of the development, including  the
State park. This parcel also includes space reserved  for  a  new  US  Coast
Guard Museum. Parcel 3, which is located immediately  north  of  the  Pfizer
facility, will contain at least 90,000  sqft  of  research  and  development
office space. Parcel 4A is a 2.4 acre site  that  will  be  used  either  to
support the adjacent State park, by providing  parking  or  retail  services
for visitors, or to support the nearby marina.  Parcel  4B  will  include  a
renovated marina, as well as the final stretch of the riverwalk. Parcels  5,
6 and 7 will provide land for office and retail space, parking,  and  water-
dependent commercial uses.”
The Court also stated:
“Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand,  it  has  long
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the  property  of  A  for  the
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B,  even  though  A
is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is  equally  clear  that  a
State may transfer property from one private  party  to  another  if  future
‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation  of  land
for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.”
The Court noted the  contention  of  the  petitioners  that  “using  eminent
domain for economic development impermissibly  blurs  the  boundary  between
public and private  takings”.  It  also  conceded  that  quite  simply,  the
Government’s pursuit of a public purpose might  benefit  individual  private
parties, but rejected the argument by stating:
“When the  legislature’s  purpose  is  legitimate  and  its  means  are  not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the  wisdom  of
other kinds of socio-economic legislation are not to be carried out  in  the
Federal Courts.”
60. The Court reiterated: (Samuel Berman case (supra)
“The public end may be as  well  or  better  served  through  an  agency  of
private enterprise  than  through  a  department  of  government—or  so  the
Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public  ownership  is  the  sole
method  of  promoting  the  public  purposes  of   community   redevelopment
projects.”
61. The above principles have been  accepted  and  applied  in  India  also.
Immediately after the Constitution  came  into  force,  this  Court  had  an
occasion to consider the power of eminent domain  in  the  leading  case  of
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of  India AIR 1951 SC 41 :  1950  SCR  869.
Referring to the doctrine of eminent domain in the  American  legal  system,
Mukherjea, J. (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  stated:  (Charanjit  Lal  case
(supra)
“48. It is a right inherent in  every  sovereign  to  take  and  appropriate
private property belonging to  individual  citizens  for  public  use.  This
right, which is described as eminent domain in American  law,  is  like  the
power of taxation, and offspring of political necessity, and it is  supposed
to be based upon an implied reservation by Government that private  property
acquired by its citizens under its  protection  may  be  taken  or  its  use
controlled for public benefit irrespective of the wishes of the owner.”
62. In Commr. & Collector v. Durganath Sarma AIR 1968 SC 394 : (1968) 1  SCR
561 drawing distinction between police power and power  of  eminent  domain,
this Court observed: (SCC p. 399, para 9)
“9. … In the exercise of its eminent domain power the  State  may  take  any
property from the owner and may appropriate  it  for  public  purposes.  The
police and eminent domain powers are essentially distinct. Under the  police
power many restrictions  may  be  imposed  and  the  property  may  even  be
destroyed without compensation being  given,  whereas  under  the  power  of
eminent domain, the property may be appropriated to public  use  on  payment
of compensation only.”
63. In  Coffee  Board  v.  CCT  (1988)  3  SCC  263  referring  to  American
authorities, Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated:  (SCC  p.  282,
para 29)
“29. … It is trite knowledge that eminent domain is an  essential  attribute
of sovereignty of every State and authorities are universal  in  support  of
the definition of eminent domain as the  power  of  the  sovereign  to  take
property for public  use  without  the  owner’s  consent  upon  making  just
compensation.”
64. In Scindia Employees’ Union v. State of Maharashtra (1996)  10  SCC  150
this Court observed: (SCC p. 152, para 4)
“4. … The very object of compulsory acquisition is in exercise of the  power
of eminent domain by the State against the  wishes  or  willingness  of  the
owner or person interested in the land. Therefore, so  long  as  the  public
purpose subsists the exercise of the  power  of  eminent  domain  cannot  be
questioned.  Publication  of  declaration  under  Section  6  is  conclusive
evidence of public purpose. In view of the finding that it is a question  of
expansion of dockyard for defence purpose, it is a public purpose.”
65. In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2003) 3 SCC 128 this Court said:  (SCC
p. 144, para 27)
“27 … The power to acquire by the State  the  land  owned  by  its  subjects
hails from the right of  eminent  domain  vesting  in  the  State  which  is
essentially an attribute of sovereign power of the State.  So  long  as  the
public purpose subsists, the exercise of the power by the State  to  acquire
the land of its subjects without regard to the wishes or willingness of  the
owner or person interested in the land cannot be questioned.”

13.   The definition of  “Public  purpose”  as  amended  in  1984  has  been
considered in Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) thus :
“67. The expression “public purpose”  is  of  very  wide  amplitude.  It  is
merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The inclusive  definition  does  not
restrict its ambit  and  scope.  Really,  the  expression  is  incapable  of
precise and comprehensive  definition.  And  it  is  neither  desirable  nor
advisable to attempt to define  it.  It  is  used  in  a  generic  sense  of
including any purpose wherein even  a  fraction  of  the  community  may  be
interested or by which it may be benefited.
68. We may also refer to few decisions wherein the expression  came  up  for
consideration of courts.
69. Before about a century, in Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secy. of  State  for
India in Council AIR 1914 PC 20 certain lands were  sought  to  be  acquired
for erecting buildings for the use of government officials. The  action  was
challenged in the High Court of Judicature at  Bombay  contending  that  the
purpose of acquisition could not be said to be “public purpose”.  Negativing
the  arguments  and  upholding  the  acquisition,  Batchelor,  J.  observed:
(Hamabai case).
“… ‘General definitions are,  I  think,  rather  to  be  avoided  where  the
avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the  extent
of the phrase “public purposes” in the lease; it is enough to say  that,  in
my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include  a  purpose,
that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of  the  community,
as opposed to the  particular  interest  of  individuals,  is  directly  and
vitally concerned.’ ”(emphasis supplied)
The aggrieved  appellant  approached  the  Privy  Council.  The  Council  in
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secy. of State for India in Council AIR 1914 PC  20
approved the above observations of Batchelor, J. Speaking for  the  Judicial
Committee, Lord Dunedin stated: (IA p. 47)
“… all that remains is to determine whether the purpose here  is  a  purpose
in which the general interest of the community  is  concerned.  Prima  facie
the Government are good judges of that. They are not absolute  judges.  They
cannot say: ‘Sic volo sic jubeo’, but at least  a  court  would  not  easily
hold them to be wrong. But here, so far from holding them to be  wrong,  the
whole of  the  learned  Judges,  who  are  thoroughly  conversant  with  the
conditions of Indian life, say that they are satisfied that  the  scheme  is
one which will redound to  public  benefit  by  helping  the  Government  to
maintain the efficiency of  its  servants.  From  such  a  conclusion  Their
Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own  statement  it  commends
itself to their judgment.” (emphasis supplied)

70. In Veeraraghavachariar v. Secy. of State for  India  AIR  1925  Mad  837
certain vacant sites were acquired for enabling panchamas to  build  houses.
It was argued that this was not a public purpose  as  the  benefits  of  the
acquisition were to go only to few individuals. The contention was  rejected
by the Court observing that it is not  possible  to  define  what  a  public
purpose is. There can be no doubt that provision of  house  sites  for  poor
people is a public purpose for it benefits a large class of people  and  not
one or two individuals.
71. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh AIR  1952  SC  252  a  Constitution
Bench of this Court was examining vires of certain provisions of  the  Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1950 and other State laws in the context of Article 31  of
the  Constitution  (as  then  stood).  The   constitutional   validity   was
challenged on the ground that the Act failed  to  provide  for  compensation
and there was lack of public purpose.  The  Court,  however,  negatived  the
contention. As to “public purpose”, Mahajan, J. (as His Lordship then  was),
observed: (Kameshwar Singh case [supra])
“208. … The  expression  ‘public  purpose’  is  not  capable  of  a  precise
definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a  process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition  of  the
expression is elastic and takes its colour from  the  statute  in  which  it
occurs, the concept varying with the time  and  state  of  society  and  its
needs. The point to be determined in each case is  whether  the  acquisition
is in the general interest  of  the  community  as  distinguished  from  the
private interest of an individual.” (emphasis supplied)
In the concurring judgment, S.R. Das, J. (as His Lordship then was)  stated:
(Kameshwar Singh case (supra), AIR p. 290, para 106)
“106. From what I have stated so far, it follows that whatever furthers  the
general interests of the community as opposed to the particular interest  of
the individual must be regarded as a public purpose. With the  onward  march
of civilisation our notions as to the scope of the general interest  of  the
community are fast changing and widening with the result that  our  old  and
narrower notions  as  to  the  sanctity  of  the  private  interest  of  the
individual can no longer stem the forward flowing  tide  of  time  and  must
necessarily give way to the broader notions of the general interest  of  the
community. The emphasis is unmistakably shifting from the individual to  the
community. This modern trend in the social and political philosophy is  well
reflected and given expression to in our Constitution.” (emphasis supplied)
72. In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan AIR 1955 SC 810 a  Constitution  Bench
of this Court considered vires of the  Bombay  Land  Requisition  Act,  1948
(Act 23 of 1948). Interpreting provisions of the Constitution  and  Schedule
VII thereof, the Court held that requisition of property by  the  Government
of Bombay for accommodation  of  foreign  consulate  could  be  said  to  be
“public purpose”. It was held that every State purpose or Union  purpose  is
a public purpose but there  may  be  acquisition  or  requisition  which  is
neither for the State nor for the Union and yet it  may  be  for  a  “public
purpose”;  for  instance,  acquisition  for  construction  of  hospital   or
educational institution by a private individual or institution.
73. In State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji AIR 1956 SC 294 land was  requisitioned
for accommodating employees of Road Transport Corporation. It was  contended
that there was no  “public  purpose”  and  hence  the  action  was  illegal.
Referring to Hamabai(supra), Ali Gulshan  AIR  1955  SC  810  and  State  of
Bombay v. Bhanji Munji AIR 1955 SC 41, the Constitution  Bench  stated  that
the expression “public purpose” must  be  decided  in  each  case  examining
closely all the facts and circumstances of the case. On  the  facts  of  the
case, it was held that a breakdown in the organisation of  the  Corporation,
leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create  a  chaotic
condition to the detriment of  the  interest  of  the  community.  Providing
living accommodation for its  employees  is  a  statutory  activity  of  the
Corporation and  it  is  essential  for  the  Corporation  to  provide  such
accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road  transport
system and it must, therefore, be held to be “public purpose”.
74. In the leading case of Somawanti v. State of  Punjab  AIR  1963  SC  151
certain lands were acquired by the Government for public  purpose  viz.  for
setting up a factory  for  manufacturing  various  ranges  of  refrigeration
compressors and ancillary equipments. It was contended that acquisition  was
not for “public purpose” and hence it was unlawful.
75. Interpreting inclusive  definition  of  “public  purpose”  in  the  Act,
Mudholkar, J. stated: (Somawanti case, AIR p. 161, para 24)
“24. … This is an inclusive  definition  and  not  a  compendious  one  and,
therefore, does not assist us very much in ascertaining  the  ambit  of  the
expression  ‘public  purpose’.  Broadly  speaking  the  expression   ‘public
purpose’ would, however, include a purpose in which the general interest  of
the community, as opposed to the  particular  interest  of  individuals,  is
directly and vitally concerned.”
It was also observed that “public purpose” is bound to vary with  the  times
and the prevailing conditions in a given locality and, therefore,  it  would
not be a practical proposition even to attempt  a  comprehensive  definition
of it. It is because of this  that  the  legislature  has  left  it  to  the
Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the  need  of
a given land for a public purpose.
76. In Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1966 SC 1788  this  Court
held that the phrase “public purpose” has no static  connotation,  which  is
fixed for all times. It is also not possible to lay  down  a  definition  of
what public purpose is, as the concept of public  purpose  may  change  from
time to time. It, however, involves in it an element of general interest  of
the community which should be regarded as a public purpose.
77. In Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166 this Court held  that
the concept of public purpose implies that  acquisition  or  requisition  of
property is in the interest of general public  and  the  purpose  for  which
such acquisition or requisition  is  made  directly  and  vitally  subserves
public interest.
78. Recently, in Daulat Singh Surana v. Collector (L.A.) (2007)  1  SCC  641
land was sought to be acquired for construction  of  office  of  the  Deputy
Commissioner of Police (Security Control). It was contended that  there  was
no  element  of  public  purpose  and  hence  the  acquisition  was  not  in
accordance  with  law.  Negativing  the   contention   and   upholding   the
acquisition, the Court held that the expression “public purpose” includes  a
public purpose in which greatest interest of the community as opposed  to  a
particular interest of an individual is directly concerned. The  concept  is
not static but changes with the passage of time.  Power  of  eminent  domain
can, therefore, be exercised by the State in public interest.
79. A “public purpose” is thus wider than a “public necessity”.  Purpose  is
more pervasive than urgency. That which one sets before him  to  accomplish,
an end, intention, aim, object, plan or  project,  is  purpose.  A  need  or
necessity, on the other hand, is urgent,  unavoidable,  compulsive.  “Public
purpose   should   be   liberally   construed,   not   whittled   down    by
logomachy.”(emphasis supplied)
80. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha  Reddy  (1977)  4  SCC  471  Krishna
Iyer, J. stated: (SCC p. 502, para 57)
“57. … There may be many processes of satisfying a public  purpose.  A  wide
range of choices may exist. The State may walk into the open market and  buy
the items, movable and immovable, to fulfil the public purpose;  or  it  may
compulsorily acquire from some private  person’s  possession  and  ownership
the articles needed to meet the public purpose; it may requisition,  instead
of resorting to acquisition; it may take  on  loan  or  on  hire  or  itself
manufacture or produce. All these steps are  various  alternative  means  to
meet the public purpose. The State may need chalk or cheese, pins,  pens  or
planes, boats, buses or buildings, carts, cars,  or  eating  houses  or  any
other of the innumerable items to run a welfare-oriented  administration  or
a public corporation or answer a community requirement. If  the  purpose  is
for servicing the public, as  governmental  purposes  ordinarily  are,  then
everything desiderated for subserving such public purpose  falls  under  the
broad and expanding rubric. The nexus between the  taking  of  property  and
the public purpose springs necessarily  into  existence  if  the  former  is
capable of answering the latter. On the other hand,  if  the  purpose  is  a
private or non-public one, the mere fact that  the  hand  that  acquires  or
requires is Government or a public corporation, does not  make  the  purpose
automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate. If a  fleet  of  cars  is
desired for conveyance of public officers, the purpose is a public  one.  If
the same fleet of cars is sought for  fulfilling  the  tourist  appetite  of
friends and relations of the same public officers, it is a private  purpose.
If bread is ‘seized’ for feeding a starving section of the community, it  is
a public purpose that is met but, if the  same  bread  is  desired  for  the
private dinner of a political maharajah  who  may  pro  tem  fill  a  public
office, it is a private purpose. Of course, the thing taken must be  capable
of serving the object of the taking. If you want to run  bus  transport  you
cannot take buffaloes.”
81. As observed by Bhagwati, J. (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  in  National
Textile Workers’ Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan (1983) 1 SCC 228  the  law  must
adapt itself with the changing socio-economic context.  His  Lordship  said:
(SCC p. 255, para 9)
“9. … We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of  the
living present. Law cannot stand still; it must  change  with  the  changing
social concepts and values. If the bark that  protects  the  tree  fails  to
grow and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if  it
is a living tree, it will shed that bark and grow  a  new  living  bark  for
itself. Similarly, if the law fails to respond  to  the  needs  of  changing
society, then either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke  its
progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will  cast  away  the  law
which stands in the way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly  be  on
the move adapting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind.”
(emphasis supplied)
82. Finally, we may refer to the Tenth  Report  of  the  Law  Commission  of
India on “The Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning  of  Land”  wherein  the
Law Commission considering the meaning of “public purpose”  under  the  Act,
stated:
“37. (a) Public purpose.—Public purpose is not defined in the Act. There  is
only an inclusive definition which relates to village  sites  in  districts.
In other respects, there is no  indication  in  the  Act  of  any  test  for
determining whether a purpose is a public purpose or not. A large number  of
suggestions have been received by us  urging  that  we  should  clearly  and
exhaustively define the term ‘public purpose’. In  an  ever-changing  world,
the connotation of the expression ‘public purpose’ must necessarily  change.
If a precise definition is enacted, it would become rigid and leave no  room
for alteration in the light of changing circumstances.  It  would  leave  no
room for the courts to adjust the meaning of  the  expression  according  to
the needs of the times.”
(emphasis supplied)
Referring to leading authorities on eminent  domain  and  “public  purpose”,
the Commission observed:
“38. … It is, in our view, neither possible  nor  expedient  to  attempt  an
exhaustive definition of public purposes. The  only  guiding  rule  for  the
determination  of  its  meaning  is  that  the   proposed   acquisition   or
requisition should tend to promote the welfare of the community as  distinct
from the benefit conferred upon  an  individual.  The  mere  fact  that  the
immediate use is to benefit a particular individual would  not  prevent  the
purpose being a public one, if in the result it is conducive to the  welfare
of the community. The question is exhaustively  discussed  in  P.  Thambiran
Padayachi v. State of Madras AIR 1952 Mad 756 by Venkatarama Aiyar,  J.  All
that can, therefore, be attempted in  a  legislation  of  this  kind  is  to
provide  an  inclusive  definition,  so  as  to  endow  it  with  sufficient
elasticity to enable the courts to interpret the meaning of  the  expression
‘public purpose’ according to the needs of the situation, and this  is  what
we have attempted.”

      This Court has observed in Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra)  that  public
purpose is of very wide amplitude. It has referred to  State  of  Bombay  v.
Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC 810 where considering the  public  purpose  it  was
held that there may be acquisition or requisition which is neither  for  the
State nor for the Union yet it may  be  for  public  purpose.  Daulat  Singh
Surana & Ors. v. First Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. (2007)  1  SCC  641
has also been referred to in  which  it  has  been  laid  down  that  public
purpose includes a purpose in which the greatest interest  is  of  community
as opposed to particular interest of an individual  is  directly  concerned.
The concept is not static but changes with the passage  of  time.  Power  of
eminent domain can therefore be  exercised  by  the  State  only  in  public
interest. The project in  hand  would  have  definitely  served  the  public
purpose and public purpose should be liberally construed, not whittled  down
by logomachy. It has been observed in National  Textile  Workers’  Union  v.
P.R.Ramakrishnan & Ors.  (1983) 1 SCC 228 that  law  must  change  with  the
changing social concepts and values. If the law fails to  respond  to  needs
of changing society, then either it will stifle the growth  of  the  society
and choke its progress or if the society is vigorous enough,  it  will  cast
away the law which stands in the way of its growth. Law must  constantly  be
on the move adapting  itself  to  the  fast-changing  society  and  not  lag
behind, that is, to adjust to the meaning of  the  expression  according  to
the needs of the times in the matter of public purpose. That is the  purpose
behind the inclusive definition of public purpose in section 3(f) also.
14.   This Court has again considered the public  purpose  in  Nand  Kishore
Gupta v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  Ors.  (2010)  10  SCC  282.  On  a
consideration of various judgments in  Sooraram  Pratap  Reddy  v.  District
Collector (2008) 9 SCC 552, JhanduLal v.  State of Punjab (AIR 1961 SC  343)
and various other decisions, this Court has laid down thus :

“56. During the debate, our attention was invited to  Section  3(f)  of  the
Act, which contains a definition for “public purpose”. It  was  pointed  out
that where the acquisition is for the Company, it cannot amount to a  public
purpose. There can be no dispute  about  this  proposition  that  where  the
acquisition of land is for the companies,  it  cannot  amount  to  a  public
purpose. It was, therefore, our endeavour to find out whether this land  was
for the Company and we are quite satisfied with a finding  recorded  by  the
High Court that this acquisition was not for the Company  but  was  for  the
public purpose.
57. The Expressway is a work of immense public importance. The  State  gains
advantages from the construction of an expressway and so  does  the  general
public. Creation of  a  corridor  for  fast-moving  traffic  resulting  into
curtailing the travelling time, as also the transport of  the  goods,  would
be some factors which speak in favour of the Project being  for  the  public
purpose. Much was stated about the 25 million sq m of  land  being  acquired
for the five parcels of land. In fact, in our opinion, as has  rightly  been
commented upon by the High  Court,  the  creation  of  the  five  zones  for
industry, residence, amusement, etc. would be complementary to the  creation
of the Expressway.
58. It cannot be forgotten that the creation  of  land  parcels  would  give
impetus to the industrial development of the State creating  more  jobs  and
helping the economy and thereby helping the general public. There can be  no
doubt that the implementation of the Project would  result  in  coming  into
existence of five developed parcels/centres in the State for the use of  the
citizens. There shall, thus, be the planned development  of  this  otherwise
industrially  backward  area.  The  creation  of  these  five  parcels  will
certainly help the maximum utilisation of the Expressway and  the  existence
of an Expressway for the  fast-moving  traffic  would  help  the  industrial
culture created in the five parcels. Thus, both  will  be  complimentary  to
each other and can be viewed as parts of an integral scheme.  Therefore,  it
cannot be said that it is not a public purpose.
59. We must, at this stage, take into account the argument  that  the  whole
compensation is coming wholly from the Company and not from  the  Government
or from YEIDA. The appellants invited our attention to Clause 4.1(d) of  the
Concession Agreement. On that basis, it was  argued  that  the  Company  has
paid the compensation  cost  and,  therefore,  the  acquisition  is  clearly
covered under Part VII of the Act, and there may be  no  public  purpose  if
the acquisition is made for the Company and it is the  Company  who  has  to
shell out the whole compensation. Now, this argument is clearly incorrect.
60. Even if we accept for the sake of argument that  all  this  compensation
is coming from the Company, we  must  firstly  bear  it  in  mind  that  the
Company gets no proprietary or ownership rights  over  the  Project  assets.
Now, if it is presumed that the compensation is  coming  from  the  Company,
then it will have to be held that the whole assets would go to the  Company.
At least that is envisaged in Part VII of the Act. Here,  that  is  not  the
case. The assets are to revert back to the acquiring body or,  as  the  case
may  be,  the  Government.  Even  the  lands  which  are  utilised  for  the
construction of the Expressway are to  go  back  to  the  Government  barely
after 36 years i.e. after the Company has utilised  its  rights  to  recover
the toll on the Expressway. Secondly, it must be  borne  in  mind  that  the
Concession Agreement  has  been  executed  in  February  2003,  whereas  the
acquisition process started somewhere in the month of September 2007.
61. When the Concession Agreement was executed,  the  cost  factor  was  not
known. The acquiring body was  only  to  make  available  the  land  to  the
concessionaire to  implement  the  Project.  There  would  be  a  number  of
difficulties arising, as for example, it would be clearly  not  contemplated
that the land would be made available without any value or that there  would
be no scheme for the State Government for recovering the  expenses  that  it
would incur in obtaining the land. The learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
State as also for the Company and YEIDA argued that  in  order  to  overcome
and iron out such difficulties, the Agreement provides that the  land  would
be leased on a premium equivalent to the  acquisition  cost.  This  argument
proceeds on the basis of Clause 4.3(C) of the Concession  Agreement.  It  is
to be noted then that the premium of the land was not going to be  just  the
acquisition  cost,  but  also  the  lease  rent  of  Rs.  100  per  hectare.
Therefore, the State Government was to earn Rs.  100  per  hectare  for  the
total acquired land, which was about 25 million sq  m  over  and  above  the
compensation to be decided.  The  mention  of  the  compensation  amount  in
addition to the lease money of Rs. 100 per  hectare  would  clearly  provide
that the whole compensation was not going to be paid by the  Company  alone.
This is apart from the fact that through this Agreement, only the extent  of
the compensation payable by the Company to YEIDA was decided. However,  once
all the amounts went to the coffers of YEIDA, it would lose its  independent
character as a premium. When it goes into the coffers of YEIDA, it is  YEIDA
which would make the payments of the estimated compensation and  thereby  it
would be as if the compensation is paid not by the Company, but by YEIDA.
62. The respondents have relied on the law laid down in Pratibha  Nema  case
(2003) 10  SCC  626,  more  particularly,  paras  24  and  25  therein.  The
respondents also argued relying upon the decision  in  Naihati  Municipality
v. Chinmoyee Mukherjee (1996) 10 SCC 632. The respondents  argued  that  the
law laid down in Pratibha Nema case (supra) emanates from  the  judgment  in
Naihati Municipality v. Chinmoyee Mukherjee (supra).
63.  Two  judgments  in  State  of  Karnataka  v.  All  India  Manufacturers
Organisation (2006) 4 SCC 683 and Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector  (2008)
9 SCC 552 were pressed in service by the respondents.
64. The first judgment in State of  Karnataka  v.  All  India  Manufacturers
Organisation (supra) pertain  to  Bangalore-Mysore  Infrastructure  Corridor
Project. While considering what the public purpose was, this Court in  paras
76, 77, 78 and 79 took stock of the contention,  whereby  it  was  suggested
that land far away from the actual alignment of the road and  periphery  had
been acquired and, therefore, even if  the  implementation  of  the  Highway
Project was assumed to be for the public purpose,  the  acquisition  of  the
land far away therefrom would not amount to a public purpose  nor  would  it
be covered by the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial  Areas  Development
Act, 1966 (the KIAD Act).
65. In the present case also, it was argued that the lands which  are  being
acquired for the interchange would not at all be necessary. Further, it  was
argued that the five parcels of  land  which  are  being  acquired  for  the
development of five industrial townships, could not be said to  be  for  the
public purpose nor could it be said to be a part of the  present  integrated
scheme. This Court had refuted this argument holding that even  in  case  of
Bangalore-Mysore Highway Project, the lands even  a  little  away  from  the
main alignment of the road, had to  be  a  part  of  this  Project  and  the
Project was an integrated infrastructure development project and not  merely
a highway project. It  was  conceived  originally  as  the  Bangalore-Mysore
Infrastructure Corridor Project,  which  conceived  of  the  development  of
roads  between  Bangalore  and  Mysore,  for  which   there   were   several
interchanges in and around the periphery of the city of Bangalore,  together
with  numerous  developmental  infrastructure  activities  along  with   the
highway at several points. The situation is  no  different  in  the  present
case. Therefore, the contention that this acquisition  was  not  for  public
purpose, is rejected.
66. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector (supra) the same question  cropped
up which has  been  mentioned  in  paras  9,  10  and  11  of  the  judgment
suggesting that there  was  no  public  purpose  and  in  fact,  it  was  an
acquisition for a private company under Part VII of the Act and,  therefore,
the power of eminent domain would have no  application  to  such  case.  The
contentions raised in that judgment in  paras  16,  17  and  18  are  almost
similar to the contentions raised herein. The Court  has  extensively  dealt
with the question of public purpose in  para  66  and  has  taken  stock  of
practically all the cases till para 109 therein. It will  not  be  necessary
for us to repeat all the case law and the questions  raised  and  considered
in these paragraphs, such as industrial policy  of  the  State,  acquisition
for Company, etc.
67. In fact, while  considering  the  contention  regarding  the  industrial
policy of the State, the Court has taken into consideration the  oft  quoted
case of Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal (2007)  8  SCC
418 where this Court has come to the  conclusion  that  in  the  absence  of
illegality or violation of law, a court of law will  not  interfere  in  the
policy matters. Similar is the case  here,  where  the  development  of  the
industrial infrastructure along the Expressway for  the  overall  betterment
of the region  and  further  for  the  industrialisation  of  the  otherwise
backward region of Uttar Pradesh,  was  considered  as  a  policy.  In  this
judgment again, the Court has extensively  considered  the  question  as  to
whether and under what circumstances, the acquisition could be  said  to  be
the acquisition for the Company. In that, the Court has also considered  the
decision in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 1203.
68. The Court quoted the observations  in  the  aforementioned  decision  in
Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (supra) to the following effect:  (AIR
1960 SC p. 1207, para 10)
“10. … These requirements indicate that the acquisition for a  company  also
is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch  as  it  cannot  be  seriously
contended that constructing dwelling houses,  and  providing  amenities  for
the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some  work  of
public utility do not serve a public purpose.”
69. We have already considered this  question  that  in  the  present  case,
there is nothing to indicate that the acquisition is for  the  Company  i.e.
for Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. It is only, therefore, that we are  at  pains
to  point  out  that  the  Government  was  only  using  the   Company   for
implementing its policy.
70. In the aforementioned judgment of Sooraram  Pratap  Reddy  v.  Collector
(supra), Hon’ble Thakker, J. has also referred to  the  decision  in  Jhandu
Lal v. State of  Punjab AIR 1961  SC  343  where  the  acquisition  was  for
construction of houses by members of Thapar Industries  Cooperative  Housing
Society Ltd., Yamuna Nagar. The challenge was that there was  non-compliance
with the provisions of Part VII of the Act, though the acquisition  was  for
the Company under Part VII of the Act. The High Court, in  that  case,  held
that the acquisition was for a public purpose  and  there  was  no  need  to
comply with the provisions of Part VII of the Act.
71. In fact, practically all the decisions on  the  subject  of  acquisition
for the Company and public purpose have been considered in this judgment  of
Sooraram Pratap  Reddy  v.  Collector  (supra),  which  itself  is  a  locus
classicus.  Ultimately,  this  Court  came  to  the  conclusion   that   the
acquisition made by the State of Andhra Pradesh could not be faulted, as  it
was in  pursuance  of  policy  decision  for  development  of  the  city  of
Hyderabad and in pursuance of that policy, an integrated project  was  taken
up for development of the city  of  Hyderabad  into  a  business-cum-leisure
tourism infrastructure centre. The Court also came to  the  conclusion  that
Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure and  Investment  Corporation  (APIIC)  in  the
reported decision was a nodal agency like YEIDA in the  present  case  which
was to generate the revenue and help the development of  infrastructure  for
industrialisation  of  the  area.  The  Court  also  recognised  that   such
instrumentality of the State would have the power of  eminent  domain.  Like
the present case, the Court  held  the  Project  to  be  an  integrated  and
indivisible project. We have no doubt that in the  present  case  also,  the
Expressway as well as the five parcels which are to be  developed  are  part
of an integrated and indivisible project.
72. In Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector (supra) it  has  also  been  found
that the entire amount of the compensation was  to  be  paid  by  the  State
agency APIIC, just like in the present case, where the entire amount  is  to
be paid by YEIDA, which  agency  is  working  as  a  nodal  agency  for  the
execution of the Project. The Court has also found that where the  power  of
eminent domain is exercised mala fide or for collateral purposes and  dehors
the Act or in an irrational or unreasonable manner or when  the  purpose  is
“no public purpose” and the fraud on statute is apparent, a writ  court  can
undoubtedly interfere. It has been found very  specifically  here  that  the
present matter is not suffering from the above defects.
73. In this judgment, the subject of eminent domain has been  discussed  and
considered with thoroughness and all the ramifications of the  principle  of
eminent  domain  have  been  discussed.  We  have  already  culled  out  the
principles emanating  from  this  decision  in  the  earlier  part  of  this
judgment and even at the cost of repetition, we may say that  this  judgment
is practically, the law-setter on the subject of eminent domain, as also  on
the other allied subjects of acquisition. The judgment  has  also  explained
the concept of “public purpose”, which  has  been  held  to  be  wider  than
“public necessity”. The judgment proceeds on a  basis  that  merely  because
the benefit goes to a particular section of  the  society,  the  acquisition
does not cease to be for the public purpose. It has been  specifically  held
that where the State is satisfied about the existence of a  public  purpose,
the acquisition would be governed by Part II of the Act, as has happened  in
the present matter.
74. The judgment in  Sooraram  Pratap  Reddy  v.  Collector  (supra)  is  an
authoritative  pronouncement  on  the  mode  of  payment,  as  also  on  the
construction of Sections 40 and 41 of the Act. In fact, this judgment  is  a
complete answer to the argument of the appellants that this  acquisition  is
not for public purpose.”

15.   A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in  sections  3(f),  6,
other provisions of Part II and the provisions contained in Part VII of  the
Act makes it clear that there can be an acquisition for public  purpose  and
ultimately land may go on lease or other mode of transfer to a  company  and
in case the compensation is paid out of  public  revenue,  it  would  be  an
acquisition for a public purpose under Part II and in case  compensation  is
borne as  per  the  agreement  provided  in  section  41,  it  would  be  an
acquisition under Part  VII  of  the  Act.  Though  acquisition  for  public
purpose can also be for the purpose of industrialization or  for  a  company
in case setting up of  the  company  has  a  public  purpose  behind  it  as
provided in section 3(f) and payment  of  compensation  for  acquisition  of
land is made out of public revenue as per the provisions  of  section  6  as
amended in 1984.
16.   This Court in the decisions before the amendment of sections  3,  3(f)
and 6 in 1984 in the pre-amended period in the cases of Babu  Barkya  Thakur
v. State of Bombay, AIR (1960) SC  1203,  Pandit  Jhandu  Lal  v.  State  of
Punjab, AIR (1961) SC 343, R.L. Arora  v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  (1962)
Supp. 2 SCR 149, Somawanti v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 774, Jage  Ram  &
Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 671,  Indrajeet  C.  Parekh  v.
State of Gujarat (1975) 1 SCC 824, Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi  (1975)
4 SCC 285, Bai Malimabu v. State  of  Gujarat  &  Ors.  (1978)  2  SCC  373;
Manubhai Jethalal Patel v. State of Gujarat  (1983)  4  SCC  553,  Srinivasa
Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy  Sastry  &  Ors.
(1994) 4 SCC 675 in  which  notification  was  published  on  8.2.1979;  and
Mandir Sita Ramji v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 745  in
which notifications  under  section  4  were  published  on  13.11.1959  and
13.3.1975 has taken the view that an acquisition for a  company  could  also
be for public purpose where the  Government  provides  compensation  out  of
public revenue. The contribution of the Government could even be small  that
is Rs.100/- or so. Though the contribution so made would have to  be  judged
in the facts of the case by the doctrine of colorable exercise of power.
17.   Even after the amendments made in definition of  “public  purpose”  in
section 3(f) and other provisions of Part II and Part VII of the Act in  the
year 1984, where the acquisition was initiated after the amendment has  been
made, the amended provisions has  been  taken  into  consideration  by  this
Court in various decisions referred to hereinafter.
18.   In Amarnath Ashram Trust Society & Anr. v. Governor  of  U.P.  &  Ors.
(1998) 1 SCC 591 which is a decision rendered  post-amendment  wherein  this
Court has observed thus :

“4. The appellant wants  land  adjacent  to  its  school  building  for  the
purpose of a playground for its students. The land belongs to Respondent  5.
So it tried to obtain it from Respondent 5 by offering a price  higher  than
its market value but  did  not  succeed.  It,  therefore,  moved  the  State
Government to acquire that land for it. The  Government  agreed  and  issued
notification under Section  4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  on  1-8-1986
notifying its intention to acquire that land for  a  public  purpose  namely
“playground of students of Amar NathVidya Ashram (Public School),  Mathura”.
Thereafter, inquiries under Section  5-A  and  under  Rule  4  of  the  Land
Acquisition (Company) Rules, 1963 were made.  The  Government  also  entered
into an agreement with the appellant as required by  Section  40(1)  of  the
Act on 11-8-1987. It then issued a declaration under Section 6  on  4-9-1987
mentioning the fact that the report made under sub-rule (4)  of  Rule  4  of
the Land Acquisition (Company) Rules, 1963 was considered by the  Government
that the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule  3  of  the  said
Rules was consulted, that the agreement entered between  the  appellant  and
the Governor was duly published that the Governor  was  satisfied  that  the
land mentioned in the schedule is needed for construction  of  a  playground
for students of Amar NathVidya Ashram (Public School), Mathura by  the  Amar
Nath Ashram Trust, Mathura. This acquisition of land was challenged  by  the
owner by a writ petition filed in  the  Allahabad  High  Court.  An  interim
order was passed directing  the  parties  to  maintain  status  [pic]quo  as
regards possession. During the pendency of the said petition,  on  1-5-1992,
the Government denotified the land  from  acquisition  in  exercise  of  its
power  under  Section  48  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.  The   appellant
challenged that notification by filing a writ petition in  the  High  Court.
The petition filed by the appellant and the one  filed  by  the  owner  were
heard  together.  The  petition  filed  by  the  owner  was   dismissed   as
infructuous and the petition filed by the appellant  was  dismissed  on  the
ground that the decision of  the  State  Government  to  withdraw  from  the
acquisition for the reason that the acquisition having  been  proclaimed  as
one for a public purpose a part of cost of acquisition was  required  to  be
borne by the State and as no such provision was made, it was not  likely  to
be sustained if challenged, cannot be said to be contrary or illegal.
6. It is now well established that if  the  cost  of  acquisition  is  borne
either wholly or partly by the Government, the acquisition can  be  said  to
be for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. But if  the  cost  is
entirely borne by the company then it is an acquisition for a company  under
Part VII of the Act. It was so held by this Court in Jhandu Lal v. State  of
Punjab AIR 1961 SC 343.  This  decision  was  relied  upon  by  the  learned
counsel for the State to support his contentions  but  it  is  difficult  to
appreciate how it supports him. It is held in  that  case  that  it  is  not
correct to say that no acquisition for a company for a  public  purpose  can
be made except under Part VII of the Act. In that case a part  of  the  cost
was to be borne by the Government and, therefore, it was held  that  it  was
not necessary to comply  with  the  provisions  of  Part  VII  of  the  Act.
Admittedly, in the present case the entire cost  of  acquisition  is  to  be
borne by the appellant-Society and, therefore, it is an  acquisition  for  a
company and not for a  public  purpose.  That  is  also  borne  out  by  the
notification issued under Section 6 of the Act which states “that  the  land
mentioned  in  the  schedule  below  is  needed  for  the  construction   of
playground for students of Amar NathVidya Ashram  (Public  School),  Mathura
in District Mathura by the Amar  Nath  Ashram  Trust,  Mathura”.  Therefore,
simply because in the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act it  was
stated that the land  was  needed  for  a  public  purpose,  namely,  for  a
playground for students of Amar Nath Vidya Ashram (Public School),  Mathura,
it cannot be said that the acquisition is  for  a  public  purpose  and  not
under Chapter VII for the appellant-Society in  view  of  subsequent  events
and the declaration made under Section 6. The learned counsel for the  State
also relied upon the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Srinivasa  Coop.  House
Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry (1994) 4  SCC  675  wherein
this Court has held (at p. 676, SCC Headnote) that though there is
“no provision in the Act to say that when a land is required for a  company,
it may also be for a public purpose. However, even  the  acquisition  for  a
company, unless utilisation of the land so acquired is integrally  connected
with public use, resort to the  compulsory  acquisition  under  Chapter  VII
cannot be had”.
It was submitted on the basis of this observation that even in  case  of  an
acquisition for a company an element of public purpose has to be  there  and
if for that reason it was believed by the Government that it  was  necessary
for it to make substantial contribution from public revenue so as  to  avoid
the charge of colourable exercise of powers, the decision of the  Government
to withdraw from the acquisition cannot be said to be arbitrary or  illegal.
The aforesaid  observation  was  made  by  this  Court  in  the  context  of
requirement of Section 40 of the Act and they cannot be  construed  to  mean
that no land cannot (sic can) be acquired by the  State  Government  without
making substantial contribution towards the cost of acquisition.  We  cannot
read something more in the said observation than what they were intended  to
convey.  The  provisions  of  Part  VII  and  particularly  the   provisions
regarding payment of the entire costs of  the  acquisition  would  otherwise
become redundant.
9. In an acquisition under Part VII of the Act, position of the  company  or
the body for which the land is acquired is quite different from that of  the
owner of the land. As a result of withdrawal from  the  acquisition  whereas
the owner of land is ordinarily  not  likely  to  suffer  any  prejudice  or
irreparable loss,  the  company  for  whose  benefit  the  land  was  to  be
acquired, may suffer substantial loss.
10. However, it is not necessary to go into this larger question whether  in
such a case the State Government can withdraw from acquisition  without  the
consent of the company as the  justification  given  by  the  Government  is
otherwise not sustainable.  As  stated  earlier  the  reason  given  by  the
Government for withdrawing from the acquisition is that as no  part  of  the
cost of acquisition was to be borne by the Government the acquisition  could
not have been sustained as for a public purpose.  We  have  already  pointed
out that in this case the acquisition was not for a public  purpose  but  it
was an acquisition for a company under Chapter VII of the  Act.  In  respect
of an acquisition for a company under Chapter VII of the Act  law  does  not
require that the State should also bear some cost of acquisition to make  it
an acquisition for public use.  Thus  the  decision  of  the  Government  to
withdraw from acquisition was based upon  a  misconception  of  the  correct
legal position. Such a decision has to be  regarded  as  arbitrary  and  not
bona fide. Particularly in a case where as a result of a decision  taken  by
the Government the other party is likely to be prejudicially  affected,  the
Government has to exercise its power bona fide  and  not  arbitrarily.  Even
though Section 48 of the Act confers upon the State wide discretion it  does
not permit it to act in an arbitrary manner.  Though  the  State  cannot  be
compelled to acquire  land  compulsorily  for  a  company  its  decision  to
withdraw from acquisition can be challenged on the  ground  that  power  has
been exercised mala fide or in an arbitrary  manner.  Therefore,  we  cannot
accept the submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  State  that  the
discretion of the State Government  in  this  behalf  is  absolute  and  not
justiciable at all.” (emphasis supplied)

19.   This Court has laid down that in case cost  of  acquisition  is  borne
either wholly or partly by the Government, the acquisition can  be  said  to
be for a public purpose. If the cost is entirely borne by the  company  then
the acquisition is for a company under Part VII of the Act.
20.   In Pratibha Nema & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Ors.  (2003)  10  SCC  626,
considering the amended provisions it was observed :
“6. In order to appreciate  the  contentions  set  out  above  in  a  proper
perspective, it would be appropriate to advert to certain  basic  provisions
of the Act and recapitulate the well-settled principles relating  to  public
purpose and acquisition of land under Part II  and  Part  VII  of  the  Act.
Section 4(1) which occurs in Part II of the Act contemplates a  notification
to be published in the Official Gazette etc.  whenever  it  appears  to  the
appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed  for  any  public
purpose or for a  company.  Thereupon,  various  steps  enumerated  in  sub-
section (2) could be undertaken by  the  authorized  officer.  There  is  an
inclusive definition of “public purpose” in clause (f) of  Section  3.  This
clause was inserted by Central Act 68 of  1984.  Many  instances  of  public
purpose specified therein would have perhaps been embraced within  the  fold
of public purpose  as  generally  understood.  Maybe,  by  way  of  abundant
caution or to give quietus to legal controversies, the inclusive  definition
has been added. One thing which deserves particular notice is the  rider  at
the end of clause (f) by which the acquisition  of  land  for  companies  is
excluded from the purview  of  the  expression  “public  purpose”.  However,
notwithstanding this dichotomy, speaking from the point of  view  of  public
purpose, the provisions of Part II and Part VII are not  mutually  exclusive
as elaborated later.
7. The concept of public purpose (sans inclusive definition) was  succinctly
set out by Batchelor, J. in a vintage decision of the Bombay High Court.  In
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secy. of State for India AIR 1914 PC 20  the  Privy
Council quoted with approval the following  passage  from  the  judgment  of
Batchelor, J.: (AIR p. 21)
“General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the  avoidance
is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely  the  extent  of  the
phrase ‘public purposes’ in the lease; it is  enough  to  say  that,  in  my
opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may  mean,  must  include  a  purpose,
that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of  the  community,
as opposed to the  particular  interest  of  individuals,  is  directly  and
vitally concerned.”
8. The Privy  Council  then  proceeded  to  observe  that  prima  facie  the
Government are good judges to determine  the  purpose  of  acquisition  i.e.
whether the purpose is such that the general interest of  the  community  is
served. At the same time, it was aptly  said  that  they  are  not  absolute
judges. This decision of the Privy Council and the words  of  Batchelor,  J.
were referred to with approval by  a  Constitution  Bench  in  Somawanti  v.
State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 and various other decisions of this Court.
9. We may now advert to Section 6. It provides for a declaration to be  made
by the Government or its duly authorized officer that a particular  land  is
needed for a public  purpose  or  for  a  company  when  the  Government  is
satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under  Section  5-A(2).
It is explicitly made clear that such declaration shall be  subject  to  the
provisions  of  Part  VII  of  the  Act  which  bears  the  chapter  heading
“Acquisition  of  Land  for  Companies”.  Thus,  Section  6  reiterates  the
apparent  distinction  between  acquisition  for  a   public   purpose   and
acquisition for a company. There is an  important  and  crucial  proviso  to
Section 6 which has a bearing on the question  whether  the  acquisition  is
for a public purpose or for a company. The second proviso lays down that
“no such declaration shall be made unless the  compensation  to  be  awarded
for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly  or  partly  out  of
public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority”.
Explanation 2 then makes it clear that where the compensation to be  awarded
is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled  by  the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to  be  compensation  paid  out  of
public revenues. Thus, a provision for payment of  compensation,  wholly  or
partly, out of public revenues or some  fund  controlled  or  managed  by  a
local authority is sine qua non for making a declaration to the effect  that
a particular land is needed for a public purpose. Even if a  public  purpose
is behind the acquisition for a company, it shall not be  deemed  to  be  an
acquisition for a public purpose unless at least part  of  the  compensation
is payable out of public  revenues  which  includes  the  fund  of  a  local
authority or the funds of a corporation owned or controlled  by  the  State.
However, it was laid down in Somawanti case (supra)  that  the  notification
under Section 6(1) need not explicitly set out the fact that the  Government
had decided to pay a part of the expenses of  the  acquisition  or  even  to
state that the Government is prepared to make a part of contribution to  the
cost of acquisition.  It  was  further  clarified  that  the  absence  of  a
provision in the budget in respect of the  cost  of  acquisition,  whole  or
part, cannot affect the validity of the declaration. The majority Judges  of
the Constitution Bench also clarified that a contribution to be made by  the
State need not be substantial and  even  the  token  contribution  of  Rs100
which was made in that case satisfied the requirements  of  the  proviso  to
Section 6(1). The contribution of a small fraction  of  the  total  probable
cost of the acquisition does not necessarily vitiate the declaration on  the
ground of colourable exercise of power, according to the ruling in the  said
case. Following Somawanti (supra), the same approach  was  adopted  in  Jage
Ram v. State of  Haryana  (1971)  1  SCC  671.  The  question,  whether  the
contribution of a nominal amount from the public exchequer  would  meet  the
requirements  of  the  proviso  to  Section  6,  had  again  come   up   for
consideration in Manubhai Jehtalal Patel v. State of Gujarat  (1983)  4  SCC
553. D.A. Desai, J. after referring to Somawanti (supra), speaking  for  the
three-Judge Bench observed thus: (SCC p. 555, para 4)

“It is not correct to determine the validity of acquisition keeping in  view
the amount of contribution but the motivation for  making  the  contribution
would help  in  determining  the  bona  fides  of  acquisition.  Further  in
Malimabu case (1978) 2 SCC 373 contribution of Re 1 from the  State  revenue
was held adequate to hold that  acquisition  was  for  public  purpose  with
State fund. Therefore, the  contribution  of  Re  1  from  public  exchequer
cannot be dubbed as illusory so as to invalidate the acquisition.”
10. In Somawanti case (supra) the following note  of  caution  was  sounded:
(AIR p. 169, para 52)
“We would, however, guard ourselves against being understood to say  that  a
token contribution by the State towards the  cost  of  acquisition  will  be
sufficient compliance with the law in each  and  every  case.  Whether  such
contribution meets the requirements of the law would depend upon  the  facts
of every case. Indeed the fact that the State’s contribution is nominal  may
well indicate, in particular circumstances, that the  action  of  the  State
was a  colourable  exercise  of  power.  In  our  opinion  ‘part’  does  not
necessarily mean a substantial part and that it will be open  to  the  Court
in every case which comes up before it to examine whether  the  contribution
made by the State satisfies the requirement of the law. In this case we  are
satisfied that it satisfies the requirement of law.”
11. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Indrajit  C.  Parekh  v.  State  of
Gujarat (1975)  1  SCC  824  without  much  of  elaboration,  relegated  the
observations in the above passage to very narrow confines by  stating  thus:
(SCC p. 827, para 3)
“In view of the decision in this case that a  nominal  contribution  out  of
public revenues would satisfy the requirement  of  the  proviso  to  Section
6(1) the observation ‘whether such contribution  meets  the  requirement  of
the law would depend upon the facts  of  every  case’  must  necessarily  be
taken to refer to the requirement of some law  other  than  the  proviso  to
Section 6(1). No such law was pointed out to us; and  it  is  not  necessary
for the purposes of this appeal to enter on a discussion  as  to  what  such
other law could be.”
12. Another important provision  is  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  6  which
enjoins that the declaration (required  to  be  published  in  the  Official
Gazette etc.) shall be conclusive evidence that the land  is  needed  for  a
public purpose or for a company  and  on  publication  of  declaration,  the
appropriate Government is enabled to acquire the  land  in  accordance  with
the  other  provisions  of  the  Act.   This   sub-section   came   up   for
interpretation  of  this  Court  in  Somawanti  case  (supra).   The   Court
emphasised that the conclusiveness contemplated by sub-section  (3)  is  not
merely regarding the satisfaction of the Government on the question of  need
but also with regard to the question that the land is needed  for  a  public
purpose or for a company, as the case may be. However,  the  learned  Judges
highlighted an important exception to the finality or conclusiveness of  the
declaration under Section 6(1). It was observed thus: (AIR p. 164, para 36)
“That exception is that if there is  a  colourable  exercise  of  power  the
declaration will be open to challenge  at  the  instance  of  the  aggrieved
party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a  limited  power
in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public  purpose,
leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a  company.  If  it  appears  that
what the Government is satisfied  about  is  not  a  public  purpose  but  a
private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the Government  would  be
colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the  Act
and its declaration will be  a  nullity.  Subject  to  this  exception,  the
declaration of the Government will be final.”
13. The main contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,  as
already noticed, rests on the plea of colourable exercise of power.
14. Colourable exercise of power or mala fides in the province  of  exercise
of power came up for discussion in State of Punjab v. Gurdial  Singh  (1980)
2 SCC 471. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J.: (SCC p. 475, para 9)
“Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power —  sometimes
called colourable  exercise  or  fraud  on  power  and  oftentimes  overlaps
motives, passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends  beyond  the
sanctioned purposes of power  by  simulation  or  pretension  of  gaining  a
legitimate goal. …  When  the  custodian  of  power  is  influenced  in  its
exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of  which  the  power
is vested the court calls it a colourable  exercise  and  is  undeceived  by
illusion. … Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona  fide
for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral  turpitude
and embraces all cases in which  the  action  impugned  is  to  effect  some
object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this  be
malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act  is
bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or  extraneous  to
the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or  fraud  on
power vitiates the acquisition or other official act.”
15. The above exposition of law unfolds the right direction or the  line  of
enquiry which the court has to pursue to test the  validity  of  declaration
made under Section 6(1) exalted by  the  legal  protection  accorded  to  it
under sub-section (3).
16. In order to proceed on these lines, the ambit  and  contours  of  public
purpose as understood by this Court in  certain  decided  cases  has  to  be
taken note of. We have already noticed the broad and general meaning of  the
expression “public purpose” as stated by  Batchelor,  J.  nearly  a  century
back. In  the  particular  context  of  setting  up  industries  by  private
enterprise, this Court’s perspective of public purpose is  discernible  from
certain decided cases to which we shall make reference.
17.  In  Jage  Ram  case  (supra)  the  public  purpose  mentioned  in   the
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 was “the setting up of  a  factory  for
the manufacture of Chinaware and porcelain ware”. The State  Government  had
contributed a sum of Rs 100 as was done in the  case  of  Somawanti  (supra)
towards the cost of the land. The question arose whether  it  was  necessary
for the Government to proceed with the acquisition under  Part  VII  of  the
Act. Holding that acquisition under Part VII need  not  have  been  resorted
to, this Court proceeded to discuss the  question  whether  the  acquisition
was intended for a public purpose. K.S. Hegde, J.  speaking  for  the  Court
observed thus: (SCC p. 674, para 8)
“8. There is no denying the fact that starting  of  a  new  industry  is  in
public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the  State
Government that the new State of  Haryana  was  lacking  in  industries  and
consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of  unemployment.
There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an  area  is
in public interest. That apart, the question  whether  the  starting  of  an
industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has  to
be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This  Court
is not in a position to go  into  that  question.  So  long  as  it  is  not
established that the acquisition is sought to be made  for  some  collateral
purpose, the declaration of the Government that it  is  made  for  a  public
purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6(3) says that the declaration  of
the Government that the acquisition made is  for  public  purpose  shall  be
conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless  it
is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is  not  open  to
this Court to  go  behind  that  declaration  and  find  out  whether  in  a
particular case the purpose for which the  land  was  needed  was  a  public
purpose or not: see Somawanti v. State of  Punjab  (supra)  and  Raja  Anand
Brahma Shah v. State of U.P., AIR 1967 SC 1081. On the facts  of  this  case
there can be hardly any doubt that  the  purpose  for  which  the  land  was
acquired is a public purpose.”
18. In Somawanti case (supra) setting up a factory for  the  manufacture  of
refrigeration compressors and ancillary  equipment,  was  held  to  subserve
public purpose. The importance of such industry to a State  such  as  Punjab
which had surplus food  and  dairy  products,  the  possible  generation  of
foreign exchange resources and employment opportunities were all taken  into
account to hold  that  public  purpose  was  involved  in  establishing  the
industry. It was observed: (AIR p. 169, para 55)
“55. On the face of it, therefore, bringing  into  existence  a  factory  of
this kind would be a purpose beneficial to the public even though that is  a
private venture.”
The decision in Jage Ram case (supra) was cited with approval by this  Court
in Bajirao T. Kote v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 2 SCC 442. In  R.L.  Arora
v. State of U.P. AIR 1964  SC  1230  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court
observed that there was a definite public purpose behind the acquisition  of
land for taking up works in connection with the setting up of a factory  for
production of textile machinery parts. However, that was in the  context  of
a case of acquisition under Part VII.
19. These decisions establish that a  public  purpose  is  involved  in  the
acquisition of land for setting up an industry in the private sector  as  it
would ultimately benefit the people. However, we would like to add that  any
and every industry need not necessarily promote  public  purpose  and  there
could be exceptions which negate the public purpose. But, it must  be  borne
in mind that the satisfaction of the  Government  as  to  the  existence  of
public purpose cannot be lightly faulted and it  must  remain  uppermost  in
the mind of the court.
20.  Having  noted  the  salient  provisions  and  the  settled   principles
governing the acquisition for a public purpose, it is time to turn  to  Part
VII dealing with acquisition of land  for  companies.  The  important  point
which we would like to highlight at  the  outset  is  that  the  acquisition
under Part VII is not divorced from  the  element  of  public  purpose.  The
concept of public purpose runs through the gamut of Part VII as well.
21. “Company” is defined to mean by Section 3(e) as: (i)  a  company  within
the meaning of Section 3 of  the  Companies  Act  other  than  a  government
company, (ii) a society registered  under  the  Societies  Registration  Act
other than a cooperative society referred to in clause  (cc),  and  (iii)  a
cooperative  society  governed  by  the  law  relating  to  the  cooperative
societies in force in any State other than a  cooperative  society  referred
to in clause (cc).  An  industrial  concern  employing  not  less  than  100
workmen and conforming to the other requirements specified in  Section  38-A
is also deemed to be a company for the purposes of Part  VII.  In  order  to
acquire land for a company as defined above, the  previous  consent  of  the
appropriate Government is the first requirement and secondly, the  execution
of agreement by the company conforming to the requirements of Section 41  is
another essential formality. Section 40 enjoins that consent should  not  be
given by the appropriate Government unless it is  satisfied  that:  (1)  the
purpose of the acquisition is  to  obtain  land  for  erection  of  dwelling
houses for workmen or for the provision of  amenities  connected  therewith;
(2) that the acquisition is needed for  construction  of  some  building  or
work for a company which is  engaged  or  about  to  engage  itself  in  any
industry or work which is for a public purpose; and (3)  that  the  proposed
acquisition is for the construction of  some  work  that  is  likely  to  be
useful to the public. The agreement contemplated by Section 41 is  meant  to
ensure the compliance with these essentialities. It is also meant to  ensure
that the entire cost of acquisition is borne by and paid to  the  Government
by the company  concerned.  Thus,  it  is  seen  that  even  in  a  case  of
acquisition for a company, public  purpose  is  not  eschewed.  It  follows,
therefore, that the existence or non-existence of a public purpose is not  a
primary distinguishing factor between the  acquisition  under  Part  II  and
acquisition under Part VII. The real point of distinction seems  to  be  the
source of funds to cover the  cost  of  acquisition.  In  other  words,  the
second proviso to Section 6(1) is the  main  dividing  ground  for  the  two
types of acquisition.  This  point  has  been  stressed  by  this  Court  in
Srinivasa Coop. House Building  Society  Ltd.  v.  Madam  Gurumurthy  Sastry
(1994) 4 SCC 675 at para 12: (SCC p. 684)
“In the case of an acquisition for a company  simpliciter,  the  declaration
cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of  Part  VII.  But  that
does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a  company  for  a  public
purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part  VII,  if
the cost or a portion of the cost of the  acquisition  is  to  come  out  of
public funds. In other words, the essential  condition  for  acquisition  is
for a public purpose and that the  cost  of  acquisition  should  be  borne,
wholly or in part, out of public funds.”
The legal position has been neatly and  succinctly  stated  by  Wanchoo,  J.
speaking for the Constitution Bench in R.L. Arora  v.  State  of  U.P.,  AIR
1962 SC 764. This is what has been said: (AIR pp. 767-68, para 5)
“Therefore, though the words ‘public purpose’ in Sections 4 and 6  have  the
same meaning, they have to be read in the  restricted  sense  in  accordance
with Section 40 when the acquisition is for a company under  Section  6.  In
one case, the notification under Section 6 will say that the acquisition  is
for a public purpose, in the other case the notification will  say  that  it
is for a  company.  The  proviso  to  Section  6(1)  shows  that  where  the
acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation has to be paid  wholly
or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled  or  managed  by  a
local authority. Where  however  the  acquisition  is  for  a  company,  the
compensation would be paid wholly by  the  company.  Though  therefore  this
distinction is there where the acquisition is either for  a  public  purpose
or for a company, there is not a  complete  dichotomy  between  acquisitions
for the two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where the  acquisition
is primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action  under  Part
VII and compensation must always be paid wholly  by  the  company.  A  third
class of cases is possible where the acquisition  may  be  primarily  for  a
company but it may also be at the same time for a  public  purpose  and  the
whole or part of compensation may be paid out of  public  revenues  or  some
fund controlled or managed by a local authority. In such a case  though  the
acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be  covered
by that part of Section 6 which lays down that acquisition may be  made  for
a public purpose if the whole part of the compensation is to be paid out  of
the  public  revenues  or  some  fund  controlled  or  managed  by  a  local
authority. Such was the case in Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State  of  Punjab,  AIR
1961 SC 343.… It is only where the acquisition is  for  a  company  and  its
cost is to be met entirely by the company  itself  that  the  provisions  of
Part VII apply.”
22. Thus the distinction between public purpose  acquisition  and  Part  VII
acquisition has got blurred under the impact of judicial  interpretation  of
relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the decisive distinction  lies  in
the fact whether the cost of acquisition comes out of  public  funds  wholly
or partly.  Here  again,  even  a  token  or  nominal  contribution  by  the
Government was held to be sufficient compliance with the second  proviso  to
Section 6 as held in a catena of  decisions.  The  net  result  is  that  by
contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern  of  acquisition
could  be  changed  by  the  Government.  In  ultimate  analysis,  what   is
considered to be an acquisition  for  facilitating  the  setting  up  of  an
industry in the private sector  could  get  imbued  with  the  character  of
public purpose acquisition if only the Government comes forward to  sanction
the payment of a nominal sum towards compensation. In the present  state  of
law, that seems to be the real position.” (emphasis supplied).

      In Pratibha Nema (supra) on due consideration of  amended  provisions,
this Court has clearly laid down that the existence or  non-existence  of  a
public  purpose  is  not  a  primary  distinguishing  factor   between   the
acquisition under Part II and acquisition under Part VII. The real point  of
distinction  seems  to  be  the  source  of  funds  to  cover  the  cost  of
acquisition. The second proviso to section 6(1) is the main  driving  ground
for the two types of acquisitions. The amendment made in 1984 in  section  6
does not deal with the concept of token consideration for  such  acquisition
paid out of the public revenues. The second provision to section 6(1)  makes
it clear that where the compensation to be awarded for such property  is  to
be  paid  out  of  the  funds  of  the  corporation,  it  is  deemed  to  be
compensation paid out of public revenue.  Section  6  requires  compensation
determined to be paid out of the funds of the corporation then it  would  be
deemed to be expenditure out of public revenue to make it acquisition  under
Part II. In the instant case corporation has paid  entire  compensation.  It
is not a case of token amount paid out of public revenue.
21.   In Devinder Singh & Ors.v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2008)  1  SCC  728,
this Court has considered concept of public purpose and observed  that  when
an application is filed by a company for acquisition  but  the  decision  of
the State has to be seen how it intended to deal with such a  prayer,  is  a
relevant factor. In case of public purpose the acquisition could be made  at
public expense. Therefore, evidently the provisions made in  Part  II  shall
be resorted to. On the other  hand  if  the  State  forms  an  opinion  that
acquisition may not be for public purpose then the State would not bear  the
expenses and then the procedure laid down in Part VII shall be resorted  to.
This Court has laid down thus :
      “16. When a request is made by any wing of the State or  a  government
company for acquisition of land for a public purpose,  different  procedures
are adopted. Where, however, an application  is  filed  for  acquisition  of
land at the instance of a “company”, the procedures to be  adopted  therefor
are laid down in Part VII of the Act. Although it may not  be  decisive  but
the conduct of the State  as  to  how  it  intended  to  deal  with  such  a
requisition, is a relevant factor. The action of the State provides  for  an
important condition to  consider  as  to  whether  the  purpose  wherefor  a
company requests it for acquisition of  land  is  a  public  purpose  and/or
which could be made at public  expenses  either  as  a  whole  or  in  part,
wherefor evidently provisions laid down in Part II shall be resorted to.  On
the other hand, if the State forms an opinion that the acquisition  of  land
at the instance of the company may not be for public purpose  or,  therefore
the expenses to be incurred therefor either in whole or in  part  shall  not
be borne by the State, the procedures laid down in Part VII thereof have  to
be resorted to. The procedures laid down under  Part  VII  of  the  Act  are
exhaustive. The Rules have been framed prescribing the mode  and  manner  in
which the State vis-à-vis  the  company  should  proceed.  It  provides  for
previous consent of the appropriate Government, execution of the  agreement,
previous  inquiry  before  a  consent  is  accorded,  publication   of   the
agreement, restriction on transfer, etc.  It  also  provides  for  statutory
injunction that no land shall be acquired except for the  purpose  contained
in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 of  the  Act  for  a  private
company which is not a government company. For the purpose of  Section  44-B
of the Act, no distinction is made between a private company  and  a  public
limited company.

37. In this case we may notice that purported  contribution  had  been  made
only after the writ petitions were filed. Ordinarily, this Court  would  not
have gone into the said question but the agreement provides for  payment  of
entire compensation by the Company. We do not know as to at what  stage  the
State thought it fit to meet a part  of  the  expenses  for  acquisition  of
land. Such an opinion on  the  part  of  the  State  having  regard  to  the
statutory scheme  should  have  been  formed  prior  to  entering  into  the
agreement itself. The agreement does not mention  about  any  payment  of  a
part of compensation by the State. We, in the absence of any other  material
on record, must hold that the State had  not  formed  any  opinion  in  that
behalf at  least  when  the  agreement  was  executed.  The  wisdom  in  all
probabilities dawned on the officers of the State at a later stage.
38. Satisfaction on the part of the State required to  be  arrived  at  upon
formation of opinion on the basis of materials brought  on  record  for  the
purpose of Part II of the Act are different from that of Part VII. Once  the
appropriate Government arrives at a decision that  the  land  sought  to  be
acquired is needed for a public purpose, the court would not go  behind  it,
as the same may furnish a valid argument for upholding an acquisition  under
Part II. But when an acquisition is made under Part VII, the conditions  and
precedents therefor as contained in the Companies Rules must  be  satisfied.
On the face of record, if it can be shown that the  Government  had  ignored
the mandatory provisions of the  Act,  the  acquisition  would  have  to  be
struck down.
39. In Shyam Behari v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 427 it was held:  (AIR  p.
429, para 3)
“3. … In the second place, the declaration under Section 6 may be made  that
land is needed for a company in which case the entire  compensation  has  to
be paid by the  company.  It  is  clear  therefore  that  where  the  entire
compensation is to be paid by a company, the notification  under  Section  6
must contain a declaration that  the  land  is  needed  for  a  company.  No
notification under Section 6 can be made where the  entire  compensation  is
to be paid by a company declaring that  the  acquisition  is  for  a  public
purpose, for such a declaration requires that  either  wholly  or  in  part,
compensation must come out of public revenues or  some  fund  controlled  or
managed by a local authority.”
40. Distinction between acquisition under Part II  and  Part  VII  is  self-
evident. The State was not only obligated to issue  a  notification  clearly
stating as to whether the acquisition is for a public  purpose  or  for  the
Company. Section 6 categorically states so, as would appear from the  second
proviso appended thereto.
41. A declaration is to be made  either  for  a  public  purpose  or  for  a
company. It cannot be for both.

       54.  In  Srinivasa  Coop.  House  Building  Society  Ltd.  v.   Madam
Gurumurthy Sastry (1994) 4 SCC 675, noticing Somawanti  (supra)  wherein  it
was held that the manufacturing of the articles was for the benefit  of  the
community and to  save  substantive  part  of  foreign  exchange  and  staff
quarters to workmen, it was held: (SCC p. 684, para 12)
“12. … On the other hand, in the case of an acquisition for a  company,  the
compensation has to be paid by the company. In such a case there can  be  an
agreement under Section  41  for  transfer  of  the  land  acquired  by  the
Government to the company on payment of the cost  of  acquisition,  as  also
other matters. The agreement contemplated by Section 41  is  to  be  entered
into between the company and  the  appropriate  Government  only  after  the
latter is satisfied about the  purpose  of  the  proposed  acquisition,  and
subject to  the  condition  precedent  that  the  previous  consent  of  the
appropriate Government has been given to the acquisition. Section  6  is  in
terms, made  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Part  VII  of  the  Act.  The
declaration for acquisition for a company  shall  not  be  made  unless  the
compensation to be awarded for the property is to be paid by a  company.  In
the case of an  acquisition  for  a  company  simpliciter,  the  declaration
cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of  Part  VII.  But  that
does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a  company  for  a  public
purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part  VII,  if
the cost or a portion of the cost of the  acquisition  is  to  come  out  of
public funds. In other words, the essential  condition  for  acquisition  is
for a public purpose and that the  cost  of  acquisition  should  be  borne,
wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence an acquisition for  a  company
may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act,  if  a
part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If,  on
the other hand, the acquisition, for a company is to be  made  at  the  cost
entirely of  the  company  itself,  such  an  acquisition  comes  under  the
provisions of Part VII.”
55. The approach of the High Court  in  this  behalf,  in  our  opinion,  is
totally  erroneous.  A  provision  of  a  statute  is  either  mandatory  or
directory.  Even  if  a  provision  is  directory,  the   same   should   be
substantially complied with. It cannot  be  ignored  in  its  entirety  only
because the provision is held to be directory and not an imperative one.
56. In this case admittedly there has been no compliance  with  Rule  4.  If
Rule 4 has not been complied with, the exercise of jurisdiction  under  Part
VII must be held to have been erroneous.” (emphasis supplied)

      In the case of Devinder (supra) the acquisition  was  under  Part  VII
and the State contribution of Rs.100/-  towards  cost  of  acquisition  came
during the pendency of the writ petition.  This  Court  has  held  that  the
acquisition which was for a company could not  be  termed  into  acquisition
for a public purpose by making a nominal contribution  during  the  pendency
of the writ petition. However, this Court has laid down that the  source  of
funds  to  cover  the  cost  of  acquisition   is   determinative   of   the
applicability of the procedure in Part II or Part VII of the  Act.  In  case
fund is  coming  from  the  company  then  Part  VII  would  apply  and  not
otherwise.
22.   In Sooraram Pratap Reddy’s case (supra), this  Court  has  also  dealt
with the submission where the acquisition is for a private  company  whether
it would be governed by the provisions of Part VII of the  Act  whereas  the
submission of the respondent was that pursuant to the Government  policy  it
was to be acquired by APIIC and the entire compensation was to  be  paid  by
APIIC. As such the acquisition would fall under Part II  of  the  Act.  This
Court has discussed the matter thus:
“96. Whereas  the  contention  of  the  appellants  is  that  the  so-called
acquisition is for a private company and hence it would be governed by  Part
VII of the Act, the stand of the respondents is that it was in pursuance  of
industrial policy of the State that land was to be  acquired  by  APIIC  and
the entire amount of compensation was to be paid by APIIC and  as  such  the
acquisition is covered by Part II of the Act.
97. Our attention has been invited by  the  learned  counsel  for  both  the
parties to some of the decisions on this issue.
98. Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960  SC  1203  was  probably
the first leading decision of this Court on  the  point.  In  that  case,  a
notification was issued by the erstwhile State of Bombay on  3-4-1959  under
Section 4 of the Act wherein it was stated that the lands specified  in  the
Schedule attached to the notification were  likely  to  be  needed  for  the
purpose of M/s Mukund Iron & Steel Works Ltd., a  company  registered  under
the Companies Act, 1913. The petitioner lodged  objections  challenging  the
notification on the ground that the lands  were  not  required  for  “public
purpose” and the proceedings were vexatious and malicious. In  the  counter-
affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, it was denied  that
the acquisition of  the  land  was  not  for  the  public  purpose  and  the
proceedings were, therefore, vitiated. The Court,  after  referring  to  the
Preamble and the relevant provisions of the Act, held that  acquisition  for
company under the Act was for a “public purpose”  inasmuch  as  constructing
dwelling houses and providing amenities for the benefit of workmen  employed
by the company would serve public purpose.  The  Court  observed:  (AIR  pp.
1206-07, para 10)
“10. … Further, though it may appear on the words of the  Act  contained  in
Part II, which contains the operative portions of  the  proceedings  leading
up to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for  a  company  may  or
may not be for a public purpose, the provisions of Part VII  make  it  clear
that the appropriate Government cannot permit the  bringing  into  operation
the effective machinery of the Act unless  it  is  satisfied  as  aforesaid,
namely, that the purpose of acquisition is to enable the  company  to  erect
dwelling houses  for  workmen  employed  by  it  or  for  the  provision  of
amenities directly connected with the company or that  the  land  is  needed
for  construction  of  some  work  of  public  utility.  These  requirements
indicate that the acquisition for a company  also  is  in  substance  for  a
public  purpose  inasmuch  as  it  cannot  be   seriously   contended   that
constructing dwelling houses, and providing amenities  for  the  benefit  of
the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of  public  utility
do not serve a public purpose.” (emphasis supplied)
99. In Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC  343  the  land  of
the appellant was sought to  be  acquired  for  construction  of  houses  by
members of  Thapar  Industries  Cooperative  Housing  Society  Ltd.,  Yamuna
Nagar. Proceedings were, therefore, initiated for acquisition of land  under
Part II of the Act. The action was challenged, inter  alia,  on  the  ground
that there was non-compliance with the provisions of Part  VII  of  the  Act
and the proceedings were liable to be quashed as the said procedure had  not
been followed. The High Court held that the land was acquired for  a  public
purpose and there was no need to comply with the  provisions  of  Part  VII,
even though the company was to pay the entire amount of compensation  (which
according to this Court was not factually correct). The aggrieved  landowner
approached this Court.
100. According to this Court (in Pandit Jhandu Lal case  (supra),  the  main
point for determination was whether or not the acquisition  proceedings  had
been vitiated by reason of the admitted fact that there was no attempt  made
by the Government to comply with the requirement of Part  VII  of  the  Act.
Referring to Babu  Barkya  (supra)  this  Court  held  that  the  conclusion
arrived at by the High Court was “entirely correct”, though the  process  of
reasoning by which it had reached the conclusion was erroneous.
101. The Court (in Pandit Jhandu Lal case  (supra)  observed  that  the  Act
contemplates acquisition for (i) a public purpose, and (ii) for  a  company;
thus, conveying the idea that acquisition  for  a  company,  is  not  for  a
public purpose. It was also observed that the purposes  of  public  utility,
referred to in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act were akin  to  public  purpose.
Hence, acquisition for a public purpose as also acquisition  for  a  company
are governed by considerations of public utility. But the procedure for  the
two kinds of acquisitions is different and if it  is  for  a  company,  then
acquisition has to be effected in accordance with the  procedure  laid  down
in Part VII. Considering the ambit and scope of Sections 6 and 39 to 41  and
referring to Babu Barkya (supra), the Court  observed:  (Pandit  Jhandu  Lal
case (supra), AIR pp. 346-47, para 8)

“8. … There is no doubt that, as pointed out in the recent decision of  this
Court, the Act contemplates for a public purpose and  for  a  company,  thus
conveying the idea that acquisition for  a  company  is  not  for  a  public
purpose. It has been  held  by  this  Court,  in  that  decision,  that  the
purposes of public utility, referred to in Sections 40-41 of  the  Act,  are
akin to public purpose. Hence, acquisition for  a  public  purpose  as  also
acquisitions  for  a  company  are  governed  by  considerations  of  public
utility. But the procedure for the two kinds of acquisitions  is  different,
insofar as Part VII has made  substantive  provisions  for  acquisitions  of
land for companies. Where acquisition is made  for  a  public  purpose,  the
cost of acquisition for payment of compensation has to  be  paid  wholly  or
partly out of Public Revenues, or some  fund  controlled  or  managed  by  a
local authority. On the other hand, in the case  of  an  acquisition  for  a
company, the compensation has to be paid by the  company.  But,  in  such  a
case, there has to be an agreement, under Section 41, for  the  transfer  of
the land acquired by the Government to the company on payment  of  the  cost
of acquisition, as also other matters not material to our  present  purpose.
The agreement contemplated by Section 41 is to be entered into  between  the
company and the appropriate Government only after the  latter  is  satisfied
about the purpose of the proposed acquisition, and subject to the  condition
precedent that the previous consent of the appropriate Government  has  been
given to the acquisition. The ‘previous consent’ itself of  the  appropriate
Government is made to depend upon the satisfaction of that  Government  that
the purpose of the acquisition was as laid down in Section 40. It is,  thus,
clear that the provisions of Sections 39-41 lay  down  conditions  precedent
to the application of the machinery of the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  if  the
acquisition is meant for a company.” (emphasis supplied)
102. The Court then dealt with the extent and applicability of Section 6  of
the Act and stated: (Pandit Jhandu Lal case (supra), AIR p. 347, para 8)
“8. … Section 6 is in terms made subject to the provisions of  Part  VII  of
the Act. The provisions of Part VII, read with Section 6 of  the  Act,  lead
to this result that the declaration for the acquisition for a company  shall
not be made unless the compensation to be awarded for the property is to  be
paid by a  company.  The  declaration  for  the  acquisition  for  a  public
purpose, similarly, cannot  be  made  unless  the  compensation,  wholly  or
partly, is to be paid out of public funds. Therefore,  in  the  case  of  an
acquisition for a  company  simpliciter,  the  declaration  cannot  be  made
without satisfying  the  requirements  of  Part  VII.  But,  that  does  not
necessarily mean that an acquisition for a  company  for  a  public  purpose
cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the  cost
or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public  funds.
In other words,  the  essential  condition  for  acquisition  for  a  public
purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne,  wholly  or  in
part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a company may  also  be
made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part  or  the
whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If,  on  the  other
hand, the acquisition for a company is to be made at the  cost  entirely  of
the company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions  of  Part
VII. As in the present instance, it appears that part at  any  rate  of  the
compensation to be awarded for the acquisition is to  come  eventually  from
out of public revenues, it must be held that the acquisition is  not  for  a
company simpliciter. It was not, therefore,  necessary  to  go  through  the
procedure prescribed by Part VII. We, therefore, agree with  the  conclusion
of the High Court, though not for the same reasons.” (emphasis supplied)
106. In R.L. Arora (II) v. State of U.P, AIR 1962 SC  764  this  Court  held
that in view of the amendment made in the Act, even if the  acquisition  did
not satisfy conditions laid down under clause (a) and  clause  (b)  of  sub-
section (1) of Section 40 of the Act, it would be  valid,  if  they  satisfy
conditions in clause (aa) introduced by the Amendment Act. It was also  held
that once the Government decided to acquire land for  public  purpose,  such
acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground that procedure laid  down  in
Part VII had not  been  followed.  The  Court,  keeping  in  view  the  Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1962 (Act 31 of 1962), held  that  clause  (aa)
of sub-section (1) of Section 40 as inserted by  Act  31  of  1962  did  not
contravene  Article  31(2)  or  Article  19(1)(f)   of   the   Constitution.
Accordingly, the acquisition was held legal and valid.
107. A special reference may be made to a decision of the Division Bench  of
the High Court of Gujarat in Motibhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State  of  Gujarat
AIR 1961 GUJ 93. In Motibhai (supra) land was sought to be  acquired  for  a
company, namely, Sarabhai Chemicals for  its  expansion.  It  was  contended
that acquisition was not for public purpose under Section 4 of the  Act  and
it was bad in law.
108. Considering the relevant provisions of the Act as  also  leading  cases
on the point, the Court (in Motibhai case (supra)  held  that  even  if  the
acquisition of land is for a private concern  whose  sole  aim  is  to  make
profit, the intended acquisition of land would  materially  help  in  saving
foreign exchange in which the  public  is  also  vitally  concerned  in  our
economic system. It can, therefore, be said  to  be  a  public  purpose  and
would not be bad. The Court stated: (Motibhai  case  (supra),  AIR  p.  104,
para 42)
“42. This is just as well. So diverse and  varied  can  be  the  activities,
engagements and operations which may redound to the general benefit  of  the
public and in which the general interest of the public can  be  said  to  be
really involved that it is impossible to expect a  definition  exclusive  or
inclusive which will  aptly  meet  every  particular  objective  within  the
matrix of public purpose and not fail in some circumstances. The  expression
is of convenient  vagueness  and  the  court  can  at  best  give  temporary
definiteness  but  not  definitiveness  to  the   undefined   and   shifting
boundaries of a field which now seems likely  to  raise  some  frequent  and
fighting issues and give rise to different problems for adjudication.”
It was also observed: (Motibhai case (supra), AIR p. 104, para 43)
      “43. Public purpose is not a constant.  The  scope  of  an  expression
which conjugates general interest of  the  public  must  necessarily  depend
inter alia on social and economic needs  and  broad  interpretation  of  the
democratic ideal. It must alter as social  and  economic  conditions  alter.
The  social  and  economic  theorist  may  contend  for  an  extremely  wide
application of this concept of public purpose and overemphasise the  element
of the general interest of the public. The reactionary  on  the  other  hand
may strive for stringent restraints on its shifting  boundaries  and  oppose
any shift in emphasis. The true  rule  of  the  matter  would  seem  to  lie
midway. The Court will not attach too much weight to the apparent  character
of the activity or  agency  but  would  prefer  to  lean  in  favour  of  an
application of the rule which has regard to the substance of the matter  and
embraces activities,  engagements  and  operations  which  would  serve  the
common good as being affected with public interest. The application  of  the
rule must rest on the modern economic system of a welfare State  having  its
own requirements and problems. The application of  the  rule  would  not  be
governed by right distinctions nor would the economic principle  be  allowed
to be blurred by the blending of forms and interests.” (emphasis supplied)
The Court proceeded to state: (Motibhai case (supra), AIR p. 104, para 44)
“44. In the field of economic  progress  and  interest  of  the  public  the
application of the rule would include operations  which  are  more  or  less
indispensable to the community. The  very  lack  of  definitiveness  of  the
expression public purpose, somewhat paradoxical though it may seem  requires
that the field of its coverage must extend to  concerns  which  are  fit  to
serve the common welfare. That coverage can include activities open  to  the
initiative of both private enterprise and public administration for  private
enterprise is certainly amenable to public control and can be  an  efficient
instrument of economic benefit.”
Upholding the acquisition, the Court concluded: (Motibhai case (supra),  AIR
p. 105, para 48)
“48. … It cannot be  ignored  that  Respondent  2  Company  is  a  scheduled
industry controlled by the provisions of  the  Industries  (Development  and
Regulation) Act, 1951. The  price  of  its  products  is  subject  to  these
controls. We are also satisfied that the public is vitally concerned in  the
saving of foreign exchange in our present economic situation and  that  this
is an aspect of the matter which has to be borne in mind. We  are  satisfied
that the respondents are correct  in  their  submission  that  the  intended
acquisition of lands in dispute would materially help in the saving of  such
exchange. We have to consider together all the aspects  of  the  case  which
redound to and result in the benefit of the public and on an  assessment  of
all the facts and circumstances of the case and  the  cumulative  effect  of
the same we are of the opinion that the land in  dispute  is  needed  for  a
public purpose as  contended  by  the  respondents.  We  may  add  that  the
notifications under Sections 4 and  6  are  not  defective  on  any  of  the
grounds urged before us on behalf of the petitioner as held by  us  and  the
declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land in  dispute
is needed for a public purpose.”
111. In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285 land  was  sought
to be acquired for “Planned Development of Delhi”. Neither the  master  plan
nor the zonal plan was ready. The question before  this  Court  was  whether
acquisition proceedings could have been initiated in the absence  of  master
plan or zonal  plan.  Considering  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Delhi
Development Act, 1957, the Court held  that  the  proceedings  did  not  get
vitiated in the absence of such plan. The Court  observed  that  acquisition
generally precedes development. If for proper development,  land  is  sought
to be acquired, such action could not be said to be illegal, unlawful or  in
colourable exercise of power. It was also  contended  that  the  acquisition
was for company inasmuch as after acquisition, the  Government  proposed  to
hand  over  the  property  or  a  portion  thereof  to  cooperative  housing
societies and since procedure in Part VII of the Act was not  followed,  the
acquisition was not valid. Even the said contention  was  negatived  by  the
Court observing that merely because the Government  allotted  a  portion  of
the property to cooperative societies, Part VII did not  get  attracted  and
the acquisition could not be held invalid. (See also Ajay  Krishan  Shinghal
v. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721.)
112. In S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka (1996) 7 SCC 302 land was  sought
to be acquired under the Act for public  purpose,  namely,  for  setting  up
Information  Technological  Park.  Challenging  the  acquisition,   it   was
contended by the petitioners that the  acquisition  was  mala  fide  and  in
colourable exercise of power since  primarily  the  acquisition  was  for  a
private limited company and not for the State.  The  relevant  part  of  the
notification read thus: (S.S. Darshan case (supra), SCC p. 304, para 5)
“The lands shown in the annexed index are required  for  a  public  purpose,
that is, to  establish  information  technological  park  through  Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Board.” (emphasis supplied)
Emphasising the fact that the acquisition was through the Board, this  Court
ruled that acquisition was for a public  purpose.  The  notification  stated
about public purpose of  establishment  of  information  technological  park
through  the  Board.  Considering  various  clauses  in  the  joint  venture
agreement, the Court held that the cumulative effect of  all  went  to  show
that acquisition was for the public  purpose  of  setting  up  technological
park by the Government of Karnataka through the Karnataka  Industrial  Areas
Development Board and was, therefore, valid.
113. In W.B. Housing Board v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta (1997) 6 SCC  207  land
was  acquired  for  providing  houses  to  poor  people.  The   action   was
challenged, inter alia, on the ground that the Housing  Board  was  to  earn
profit and hence it could not  have  been  said  to  be  a  public  purpose.
Refuting the contention and upholding the acquisition, the Court  took  note
of the fact that it was a matter of common knowledge  that  there  is  acute
shortage of housing accommodation both in  rural  and  urban  areas  of  the
country. The Court also stated that since late the  prices  of  real  estate
have sky-rocketed making it beyond  the  reach  of  low  income  and  middle
income groups of people, hence, the State has a  duty  to  give  shelter  to
homeless people, specially, to the people of the low income  group.  If  for
that purpose  it  sought  to  acquire  land,  it  could  not  be  said  that
acquisition was illegal or unlawful.
114. Regarding earning of profit, the Court stated: (Brijendra Prasad  Gupta
case (supra), SCC p. 225, para 26)
“26. Simply because there is an element of profit, it  could  not  make  the
whole scheme illegal. A private entrepreneur will  certainly  look  to  some
profit but to see that the profit motive does not lead to exploitation  even
of the rich and that the houses are available to  the  poor  people  and  to
middle class people at nominal or affordable prices, or even  on  no-profit-
no-loss basis, the Housing Board exercises  the  necessary  control.  It  is
certainly a public purpose to provide houses to the community especially  to
poor people for whom the prices  are  beyond  their  means  and  they  would
otherwise never be able to acquire a house.”
The Court concluded: (Brijendra Prasad Gupta case (supra), SCC p. 225,  para
28)
“28. The Court must shake off its myth that public purpose  is  served  only
if the State or the Housing Board or the joint sector company does not  earn
any profit. There cannot be any better  authority  than  the  State  or  the
statutory corporation to supervise or monitor the  functions  of  the  joint
venture company. Courts will certainly step in  if  the  public  purpose  is
sought to be frustrated.”(emphasis supplied)

116.  Reliance  was  also  placed  on  State  of  Karnataka  v.  All   India
Manufacturers Organisation (2006) 4 SCC 683. In that  case,  the  Government
of Karnataka undertook a mega  project  for  developing  its  transport  and
communication  system.  A  memorandum  of  understanding  was  entered  into
between the State  Government  and  a  company  for  implementation  of  the
project and lands were acquired. A  public  interest  litigation  (PIL)  was
filed in the High Court alleging that the land was  not  needed  for  public
purpose and yet excess land was acquired and had been given  to  a  company.
The action was, therefore, illegal, unlawful and mala fide.  Negativing  the
contention and upholding the action, this Court observed  that  the  project
was an integrated  infrastructure  development  project  and  not  merely  a
highway project. As an  integrated  project,  it  required  acquisition  and
transfer  of  lands  even  away  from  the  main  alignment  of  the   road.
Acquisition of land and giving it to the company was, therefore,  legal  and
lawful and did not suffer from mala fides.
127. We would have indeed considered the contention of the  learned  counsel
for the appellants closely in the light of earlier decisions of this  Court.
We are, however, of the view that on the facts and in the  circumstances  of
the present case, the  Government  was  right  in  forming  an  opinion  and
reaching  a  satisfaction  as  to  “public  purpose”   and   in   initiating
proceedings under Sections 4 and 6 and in invoking Part II of the  Act.  We,
therefore, refrain from undertaking  further  exercise.  In  our  considered
opinion, it is not necessary for us to enter into larger  question  in  view
of “fact situation” in the instant case.
Conclusions
128. Applying  the  aforesaid  principles  to  the  case  on  hand,  in  our
considered opinion, it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by  the
State for acquisition of land under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  are
illegal, unlawful, unwarranted, mala fide, fraud on  statute  or  have  been
taken in colourable exercise of power.

131. In our judgment, the respondents are right in submitting that  in  case
of integrated and indivisible project, the project has  to  be  taken  as  a
whole and must be judged whether it is in the  larger  public  interest.  It
cannot be split into different components and to consider whether  each  and
every component will serve public  good.  A  holistic  approach  has  to  be
adopted in such matters. If the project taken as a whole is  an  attempt  in
the  direction  of  bringing   foreign   exchange,   generating   employment
opportunities and securing economic benefits to the State and the public  at
large, it will serve public purpose.
132. It  is  clearly  established  in  this  case  that  the  infrastructure
development project conceived by the State and executed under  the  auspices
of its instrumentality (APIIC) is one covered by the Act. The joint  venture
mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project  and  achieving
lawful public purpose for realising the goal of  larger  public  good  would
neither destroy the object nor vitiate  the  exercise  of  power  of  public
purpose for development of infrastructure. The concept of joint  venture  to
tap  resources  of  private  sector  for  infrastructural  development   for
fulfilment of public purpose has been recognised  in  foreign  countries  as
also in India in several decisions of this Court.
133. The entire amount of  compensation  is  to  be  paid  by  State  agency
(APIIC) which also works as nodal agency for execution of  the  project.  It
is primarily for the State to decide whether there exists public purpose  or
not.  Undoubtedly,  the  decision  of  the  State  is  not  beyond  judicial
scrutiny. In appropriate cases, where such power is exercised mala  fide  or
for  collateral  purposes  or  the  purported  action  is  dehors  the  Act,
irrational or otherwise unreasonable or the so-called purpose is “no  public
purpose” at all  and  fraud  on  statute  is  apparent,  a  writ  court  can
undoubtedly interfere. But except in such  cases,  the  declaration  of  the
Government is not subject to judicial review. In other words, a writ  court,
while exercising powers under Articles 32, 226 or 136 of  the  Constitution,
cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Government as  to
what constitutes “public purpose”. (emphasis supplied)

      Thus this Court has laid down that when the entire compensation is  to
be paid by APIIC, it is for the State  to  decide  whether  there  exists  a
public purpose or not, though the  decision  of  the  State  is  not  beyond
judicial scrutiny. Whether it is exercised mala fide or collaterally  or  de
hors of the Act and no public purpose would be served, court can  interfere.
The expenditure out of the funds of the APIIC was held  to  be  from  public
revenue as provided in Explanation 2 of section 6(1) of the Act.
23.   In Urmila Roy & Ors. v. Bengal Peerless Housing Development  Co.  Ltd.
& Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 242, this Court has considered  the  amended  provisions
and Explanation 2 of section 6 and held that the  expenditure  is  the  test
for applicability of the procedure prescribed in Part II as it was borne  by
the State Government or the Housing Board that the acquisition was for  Part
II and not Part VII of the Act. This Court has held thus:
“38. A perusal of the second proviso and  Explanation  2  of  Section  6  in
particular reveals that if the compensation  awarded  for  the  property  is
paid substantially out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled  by
the State, such compensation will be deemed to be paid out of  public  funds
and as such would satisfy the test of acquisition for a public purpose.
39. We see from the record that  as  per  the  letter  issued  by  the  Land
Acquisition Collector on 13-11-2001 to the Housing  Ministry  of  the  State
Government, a request had been  made  that  a  sum  of  Rs  3  crores  which
represented  about  50%  of  the  compensation  of  the  acquired  land   be
deposited. This memo had been forwarded  by  the  State  Government  to  the
Housing  Board  and  on  23-11-2001  a  sum  of  Rs  1.70   crores   towards
compensation had been sent  by  Bengal  Peerless  to  the  Land  Acquisition
Collector through the Housing Board.
40. It appears that on 30-10-2003 the State  Government  had  requested  the
Housing Board to make arrangements for the balance payment  of  compensation
of about Rs 82,04,138 and by a memorandum of 31-10-2003  the  Government  of
West Bengal had directed the Housing Board to  pay  the  additional  balance
compensation which too was defrayed by an account payee cheque  dated  3-11-
2003 drawn on Bank  of  Maharashtra.  The  accounts  statement  of  Bank  of
Maharashtra was produced before us for perusal and this  statement  supports
the argument that the aforesaid amount  had,  indeed,  been  paid  from  the
funds of the Housing Board which is completely owned and controlled  by  the
State Government.
41. In their written submissions the appellants have  doubted  the  accuracy
of this accounts statement, by asserting that they  had  not  been  able  to
verify its contents as it had been produced  for  the  first  time  in  this
Court. We find that even if this objection is  accepted  and  the  statement
ruled out of consideration, the other evidence on record does indicate  that
a substantial part of the compensation had been  paid  from  the  government
funds.

43. In Indrajit Parekh v. State of Gujarat (1975)  1  SCC  824  in  which  a
somewhat  restricted  meaning  has  been  given  to  the   extremely   broad
parameters laid down in Pratibha Nema case (supra), but it  has  nonetheless
been observed that if a reasonable amount of  compensation  had  been  drawn
out of government funds, it  would  satisfy  the  requirement  of  a  public
purpose as per the Act.
44. In the present  case,  as  already  mentioned  above,  we  find  that  a
substantial part of the compensation has, indeed, been  paid  by  the  State
Government or by the Housing Board  which  clearly  satisfies  the  test  of
public purpose. In this background, we endorse the finding of  the  Division
Bench that the procedure envisaged in Part II and not in  Part  VII  of  the
Act would be applicable. This is precisely what has been done.”

24.   In Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. v. State of U.P. &  Ors.  (2010)  10  SCC
282, this Court has referred to the decisions in Devinder Singh (supra)  and
Pratibha Nema (supra) and has laid down that there was no  conflict  in  the
decisions. This Court has considered the matter thus :
“80. During the debate, the decision in Devinder Singh v.  State  of  Punjab
(2008) 1 SCC 728 was also referred  to.  It  was  urged  that  there  was  a
conflict in this decision and the decision in Pratibha Nema case (2003)  110
SCC 626. This was a case where the petitioners who were the  owners  of  the
agricultural  lands,  had  challenged  the  acquisition  of  lands  for  M/s
International Tractors Ltd. It was claimed that the land was being  acquired
for public purpose i.e. setting up  Ganesha  Project  of  M/s  International
Tractors Ltd. at various villages. The High Court had  held  that  the  land
acquisition was  for  public  purpose.  This  Court  explained  the  “public
purpose” as  defined  in  Section  3(f)  of  the  Act  and  noted  that  the
aforementioned Ganesha Project was not a project of the State, but  the  one
undertaken by the Company M/s International Tractors  Ltd.  The  Court  then
went on to consider Sections 40 and 41 of the Act along with Rule 4  of  the
Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 and came  to  the  conclusion  that
the same could not be a public purpose as the whole compensation was  coming
from the coffers of the Company. In that view, the  Court  further  came  to
the conclusion  that  the  State  not  having  followed  the  provisions  of
Sections 40 and 41 of the Act, the whole process had suffered illegality.
81. The Court also considered the decision in  Pratibha  Nema  case  (supra)
and distinguished the same by making a  comment  to  the  following  effect:
(Devinder Singh case (supra), SCC p. 738, para 22)
“22. … But we must hasten to add that the Bench did not  have  any  occasion
to consider the question as  to  whether  the  State  is  entitled  to  take
recourse to the provisions  of  both  Part  II  and  Part  VII  of  the  Act
simultaneously.”
The Court, however, refused to go  into  the  nicety  of  the  question  and
observed that in a case of acquisition for a public company, public  purpose
is not to be assumed and the point of  distinction  between  acquisition  of
lands under Part II and Part VII of the Act would be the source of funds  to
cover the cost of acquisition. The Court also  considered  the  judgment  of
this Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC  151,  Jage  Ram  v.
State of Haryana (1971) 1 SCC 671 and Shyam Behari  v.  State  of  M.P.  AIR
1965 SC 427 Ultimately, the Court came to the conclusion that the  necessary
provisions not having been found,  the  view  of  the  High  Court  was  not
correct, whereby it had upheld the land acquisition, holding it  to  be  for
the public purpose.
82. We have closely seen the judgment in  Devinder  Singh  (supra)  however,
the factual situation in the judgment is quite different.  In  our  opinion,
the judgment will not help the appellants to contend that the  present  land
acquisition is not for public purpose. We also do not think  that  there  is
any serious conflict between the decision in Pratibha Nema case (supra)  and
the decision in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra), so as to  require
a reference to the larger Bench. In our opinion, the  decision  in  Pratibha
Nema case (supra) applies to the fact situation in this case.
83. Therefore, considering the overall factual  situation,  we  are  of  the
opinion that the High Court was right in holding that  the  acquisition  was
made for the public purpose. We find from the order of the High  Court  that
the High Court has considered the question  of  public  purpose  keeping  in
mind the correct principles of law. We are, therefore, of the  opinion  that
the contention raised by the learned counsel for the  appellants  that  this
acquisition was not for the public purpose  for  various  reasons  which  we
have discussed, is not correct.”

25.   In my opinion for the purpose of acquiring land in  the  instant  case
it was not necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the  provisions  contained  in
Chapter VII of the Act. The proposal submitted to the Cabinet  on  30.5.2006
indicates that the West Bengal Industrial  Development  Corporation  (WBIDC)
was the acquiring body to acquire 1053 acres of land for Small  Car  Project
of TML at Singur which was comprised in Gopal Nagar, Singherberi,  Beraberi,
Khaserberi and Bajemelia. Thus the Cabinet has approved the  said  proposal.
WBIDC was associated with the project  right  from  the  beginning  and  was
instrumental in getting the land identified by the TML for  the  purpose  of
selection. The memo for the Standing Committee of the  Cabinet  on  Industry
dated 26.7.2006 contains the decision of  acquisition  of  land  for  public
purpose under Land Acquisition Act it was  made  considering  the  following
facts :
“(B) Declaration of Acquisition as Public Purpose under the LA Act
Keeping in  view  the  importance  of  this  Industrial  investment  in  the
automobile sector for the industrial development of the State,  and  keeping
in view the fact that  the  land  is  being  acquired  by  the  West  Bengal
Industrial Development Corporation as the Requiring Body, and WBIDC being  a
Corporation owned and controlled by the State  Government,  it  is  proposed
that this acquisition be  done  for  public  purpose  in  terms  of  Section
3(f)(iv) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The matter is accordingly  placed  before  the  Standing  Committee  of  the
Cabinet on Industries for decision on the following :
Approval of the revised package of incentives as described in item A above;

Approval for taking up land acquisition for public purpose as  described  in
item B above.”

      The Standing Committee has approved the  same  as  apparent  from  the
Minutes placed on record. Notification  under  section  4  of  the  Act  was
published in the Gazette on 21.7.2006 in which it  was  mentioned  that  the
land   is   likely   to   be    needed    by    the    Government/Government
undertaking/Development  Authorities  at  the  public  expense  for   public
purpose, viz., employment generation and socio-economic development  of  the
area by setting up  small  car  project.  Though  it  was  not  specifically
mentioned that the WBIDC is to be the acquiring  body  but  a  decision  had
already been taken in this regard and the  aforesaid  expression  Government
Undertaking/Development authorities would include acquisition  by  WBIDC  as
the Government has decided to treat it as a public  purpose  as  it  was  to
generate direct employment to 1800 persons and by direct employment  through
vendors and through other service providers to 4700 persons approx.  Similar
is the position with respect to declaration under section 6 of the  Act.  As
the Government has treated the acquisition for  a  public  purpose  and  the
entire money has been paid by WBIDC consequently by mere  mention  that  the
land was required for the small car project of TML  would  not  make  it  an
acquisition for a company under Part VII. Non-mention  of  WBIDC  cannot  be
taken to be an illegality impinging the validity of the  notification  under
section 4 of the Act. The  fact  that  the  application  was  filed  by  TML
indicating its willingness for setting up the industry would not  also  make
it an acquisition for a company but how the State has dealt with  the  same,
would be the decisive factor.  Since  WBIDC  was  involved  right  from  the
beginning by the State Government and a decision  was  taken  by  the  State
Government that WBIDC  would  be  the  acquiring  authority  and  WBIDC  was
involved in identification of the land and the reports were submitted by  it
to the Government, the acquisition was for WBIDC is  apparent  as  the  land
was to vest in the WBIDC and  it  has  paid  the  compensation.  Payment  of
premium amount as per the conditions of lease agreement  fastened  upon  the
TML would also not make it a compensation paid by TML as  already  discussed
hereinabove. In my opinion it was not necessary for the State Government  to
deposit the amount of compensation as compensation paid by  the  corporation
is also to be treated out of public revenue.
26.   The aims and objects of the amendment of section 3(f) when taken  into
consideration would not alter the aforesaid position of law. Acquisition  of
land for a company or for industrialization if  it  is  for  public  purpose
would be covered under section 3(f) as amended and when corporation  is  the
acquiring authority and amount of compensation is borne by  it  in  entirety
and land has been ultimately leased out to TML for its  project  by  it  the
acquisition would remain for a public purpose under section 3(f)  attracting
Part II of the Act. The procedure adopted under Part II cannot  be  said  to
be impermissible. It cannot be said to be acquisition under guise of  public
purpose so as to violate the intendment of exclusion  of  the  company  from
section 3(f) as amended.
27.   Considering the various decisions rendered  by  this  Court  in  post-
amendment period in Amarnath Ashram Trust Society & Anr.  v.  Government  of
U.P. & Ors., Pratibha Nema, Devinder Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab,  Sooraram
Pratap Reddy, Urmila Roy & Ors. v. Bengal Peerless Housing  Development  Co.
Ltd. & Ors., and Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P.  discussed  hereinabove
are binding on a Co-ordinate Bench and I find no reason to take a  different
view on merits .
28.   Even otherwise I feel bound by the principle of stare decisis in  view
of the aforesaid consistent decisions of this Court. In  WamanRao  v.  Union
of India (1981) 2 SCC 362, it has been laid down  that  the  rule  of  stare
decisis requires that it is unnecessary to enquire or determine as  to  what
was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as  stare
decisis. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754, it  has  been
laid down that the law declared by this Court should be certain,  clear  and
consistent. The doctrine of binding precedent has  the  merit  of  promoting
certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. In Krishena Kumar v.  Union
of India (1990) 4 SCC 207, law to the similar  effect  has  been  laid  down
when departure is rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious  principles
of law and remedy continued injustice. In  Mishri  Lal  v.  Dhirendra  Nath,
(1999) 4 SCC 11 it has been laid down that the doctrine is based on  ‘public
policy’ and should be adhered to subserve the ends of justice.
In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of  Maharashtra  (2005)
2 SCC 673, it  has  been  observed  that  the  doctrine  has  the  merit  of
promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions,  and  enables  an
organic  development  of  the  law,  besides  providing  assurance  to   the
individual as to the consequence of  transactions  forming  part  of   daily
affairs. In Shanker Raju v. Union of India (2011) 2  SCC  132  it  has  been
observed that a judgment, which has held the field for a long  time,  should
not be unsettled. The view which has held the field for a long  time  should
not be disturbed only because another view is possible. In Fida  Hussain  v.
Moradabad Development Authority &  Anr.  (2011)  12  SCC  615  it  has  been
observed that the decision of two Judges  is  binding  on  another  Division
Bench of two Judges. Following observations have been made by this Court  in
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 :
“28. We are of the opinion that a pronouncement of law by a  Division  Bench
of this Court is binding on a Division  Bench  of  the  same  or  a  smaller
number of Judges, and in order that such decision  be  binding,  it  is  not
necessary that it should be a decision rendered  by  the  Full  Court  or  a
Constitution Bench of the Court.”

In Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 453 it  has  been
observed that a Co-ordinate Bench should not  disturb  the  decision  on  an
identical question. The rationale of this rule is the need  for  continuity,
certainty and  predictability  in  the  administration  of  justice.  It  is
necessary to inculcate confidence in the administration of justice  as  laid
down in Joint Commissioner of  Income  Tax,  Surat  v.  Saheli  Leasing  and
Industries Ltd. (2010) 6 SCC 384. It cannot be referred to  a  larger  Bench
unless there is an error apparent on its face or that a  particular  earlier
decision was not noticed,  which  has  a  direct  bearing  or  has  taken  a
contrary view. In The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT,   AIR  1965  SC  1636  a
Constitution Bench  of  this  Court  has  observed  that  in  reviewing  and
revising its earlier decision, in the interests of the public  good  or  for
any other valid and compulsive reasons, it must be  the  constant  endeavour
and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of  certainty
and continuity in the interpretation of law.
29.   In my opinion, on merits  the  view  taken  by  this  Court  does  not
require reconsideration at all and otherwise also I find no ground  in  view
of the consistent decisions to take a different view.
30.   For the aforesaid reasons I respectfully disagree with the  conclusion
of esteemed brother on question numbers 1 and 2.
IN RE. QUESTION NOS. 3, 4 AND 5
31.   Coming to question nos. 3, 4 and 5 as they  are  inter  connected,  it
appears that even before issuance of notification under  section  4  of  the
Act  decision  has  been  taken  to  acquire  the  land  in  question.   The
notification under section 4 is an introductory measure. Section  4  of  the
Act is extracted hereunder :
“4.  Publication  of  preliminary  notification  and  powers   of   officers
thereupon.—(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government  that  land
in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any  public  purpose
or for a company a notification to that effect shall  be  published  in  the
Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating  in  that  locality
of which at least one shall be in the regional language  and  the  Collector
shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be  given
at convenient places in the said locality (the last of  the  dates  of  such
publication  and  the  giving  of  such  public  notice,  being  hereinafter
referred to as the date of publication of die notification).
(2) Thereupon it shall be  lawful  for  any  officer,  either  generally  or
specially authorized  by  such  Government  in  this  behalf,  and  for  his
servants and workmen,—
to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in  such  locality;  to
dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted  for
such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the  intended
line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries  and  line  by  placing  marks  and  cutting
trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and  the
boundaries and line marked to cut down  and  clear  away  any  part  of  any
standing crop, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon  any  enclosed
court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (unless  with  the  consent  of
the occupier thereof) without  previously  giving  such  occupier  at  least
seven days’ notice in writing of his intention to do so.”

32.   It is apparent from section 4(2) that after notification is issued  it
shall be lawful for any officer to enter upon and survey and to do  all  the
acts which are necessary to ascertain  whether  land  is  adapted  for  such
purpose. The notification is  of  exploratory  character  and  it  does  not
proprio motu result in acquisition. The  proposal  for  acquisition  in  any
particular locality ripens into definite  proceedings  where  Government  is
satisfied how land is needed for  public  purpose.  Section  4(1)  does  not
require land to be defined or identified but requires locality to be  stated
so as to file objection under section 5 of the Act. In the instant case  the
Cabinet has taken a decision to acquire the said land beforehand  for  which
a notification has ultimately been  issued  under  sections  4  followed  by
declaration under section 6 of the Act. The right under section  5A  of  the
Act is a valuable right has been laid down in  various  decisions  cited  at
bar referred hereinafter.
33.   In Raghubir Singh Sherawat v. State of Haryana &  Ors.  (2012)  1  SCC
792 it was observed thus :
“39. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules of  natural
justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section  5-A  with  a  view  to
ensure that before any person is deprived of his land by way  of  compulsory
acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the  State
Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire  the  particular
parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort to  convince
the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  to  make   recommendation   against   the
acquisition of his land. He can also point out that the land proposed to  be
acquired is not suitable for  the  purpose  specified  in  the  notification
issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce  evidence  to  show
that another piece of land is available and the same  can  be  utilised  for
execution of the particular project or scheme.”

In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2012) 2 SCC it was held  thus  :

“25. According to the appellant, the notification under Section 4 of the  LA
Act was not served on the owner companies. However, upon coming to  know  of
this notification, the appellant vide their letter dated 8-9-1997  submitted
objections running into four pages containing 8 paragraphs. We have  already
noted that the Second Land Acquisition Officer adjourned the hearing on  one
occasion as requested by the appellant. He, however, refused to adjourn  the
matter any further. The second request was rejected. We  feel  that  looking
to the nature of the issues involved, the Second  Land  Acquisition  Officer
could have adjourned the proceedings after putting the  appellant  to  terms
because hearing the representative of the owner companies was mandatory.  In
any event, if he did not want to  adjourn  the  proceedings  and  wanted  to
consider the objections  in  the  absence  of  the  counsel  for  the  owner
companies and assuming such a course is permissible in law, he  should  have
dealt with the objections carefully and not in such a  light-hearted  manner
because  a  heavy  responsibility  rested  on  his   shoulders.”   (emphasis
supplied)

34.   In Surinder Singh Brar & Ors.v. Union of India &  Ors.  (2013)  1  SCC
403 it was observed thus :
“69. In the context of the statement contained in  the  first  line  of  the
paragraph  titled  “Observations”,  we  repeatedly  asked   ShriSudhirWalia,
learned counsel assisting Dr Rajiv Dhavan to show as to  when  the  LAO  had
summoned the revenue records and when he had conducted spot  inspection  but
the learned counsel could not  produce  any  document  to  substantiate  the
statement contained in the  two  reports  of  the  LAO.  This  leads  to  an
inference that, in both the reports, the  LAO  had  made  a  misleading  and
false statement about his having seen  the  revenue  records  and  conducted
spot inspection. That  apart,  the  reports  do  not  contain  any  iota  of
consideration of the objections filed by the landowners.  Mere  reproduction
of the  substance  of  the  objections  cannot  be  equated  with  objective
consideration thereof in the light of the submission made by  the  objectors
during the course of hearing. Thus, the violation of the mandate of  Section
5-A(2) is writ large on the  face  of  the  reports  prepared  by  the  LAO.
(emphasis supplied)
70. The reason why the LAO did not apply his mind to  the  objections  filed
by the appellants and other landowners is obvious. He was a  minion  in  the
hierarchy of the administration of the Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  and
could not have even thought of making recommendations contrary to  what  was
contained in the letter sent by the Administrator to  Surinder  Singh  Brar.
If he had shown the courage of acting independently and made  recommendation
against the acquisition of land, he would  have  surely  been  shifted  from
that post and his career would have  been  jeopardised.  In  the  system  of
governance which we  have  today,  junior  officers  in  the  administration
cannot even think of, what to say of, acting against the wishes/dictates  of
their superiors. One who violates this unwritten code of conduct does so  at
his own peril and is described as foolhardy. Even those constituting  higher
strata of services follow the path of least  resistance  and  find  it  most
convenient to tow the line of their superiors. Therefore, the LAO cannot  be
blamed  for  having  acted  as  an  obedient  subordinate  of  the  superior
authorities,  including  the  Administrator.  However,  that  cannot  be   a
legitimate ground to approve the reports prepared  by  him  without  even  a
semblance of consideration of the objections filed  by  the  appellants  and
other landowners and we have no hesitation to hold that the  LAO  failed  to
discharge the statutory duty  cast  upon  him  to  prepare  a  report  after
objectively considering  the  objections  filed  under  Section  5-A(1)  and
submissions made by the objectors during the  course  of  personal  hearing.
(emphasis supplied).

76. Section 5-A, which embodies the most important dimension  of  the  rules
of natural justice, lays  down  that  any  person  interested  in  any  land
notified under Section 4(1) may,  within  30  days  of  publication  of  the
notification, submit objection in writing against the  proposed  acquisition
of land or of any land in the locality to the Collector.  The  Collector  is
required to give the objector  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  either  in
person or by any person authorised by him or by pleader. After  hearing  the
objector(s) and making such further inquiry, as he may think necessary,  the
Collector has to make a report in respect of  land  notified  under  Section
4(1) with his recommendations on the objections and forward the same to  the
Government along with the  record  of  the  proceedings  held  by  him.  The
Collector can make different reports in  respect  of  different  parcels  of
land proposed to be acquired.
84. What needs to be emphasised is that hearing required to be  given  under
Section 5-A(2) to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land and  who
has filed objections under Section 5-A(1)  must  be  effective  and  not  an
empty formality. The Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing  the
objectors has the  freedom  of  making  further  enquiry  as  he  may  think
necessary. In either eventuality, he has to make report in  respect  of  the
land notified under Section 4(1) or make different  reports  in  respect  of
different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing  his
recommendations on the objections and submit the  same  to  the  appropriate
Government along with  the  record  of  proceedings  held  by  him  for  the
latter’s decision. The appropriate Government is  obliged  to  consider  the
report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and then record  its  satisfaction
that the particular land is needed  for  a  public  purpose.  This  exercise
culminates into making a declaration that the land is needed  for  a  public
purpose and  the  declaration  is  to  be  signed  by  a  Secretary  to  the
Government or some other officer duly authorised to certify its orders.  The
formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public  purpose  and
suitability thereof is sine  qua  non  for  issue  of  a  declaration  under
Section 6(1). Any violation of  the  substantive  right  of  the  landowners
and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of  opportunity
of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made  by
the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government  on  such
recommendations. The recommendations made  by  the  Collector  without  duly
considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and  submissions  made
at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2)  or  failure  of  the  appropriate
Government to take objective decision on such objections  in  the  light  of
the recommendations made by the Collector will denude the  decision  of  the
appropriate Government of statutory finality. To  put  it  differently,  the
satisfaction recorded by the  appropriate  Government  that  the  particular
land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration made  under  Section
6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if  statutorily  engrafted  procedural
safeguards are not adhered to by  the  authorities  concerned  or  there  is
violation of the principles of natural justice.  The  cases  before  us  are
illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate  of  Sections  5-A(2)  and
6(1). Therefore,  the  second  question  is  answered  in  the  affirmative.
(emphasis supplied)

87. The proposition laid down in the aforementioned two judgments  does  not
support the stance of the Chandigarh Administration that even  though  there
is breach of the mandate of Section 5-A read with Section  6(1),  the  Court
cannot, after the issue of  declaration  under  Section  6(1),  nullify  the
acquisition proceedings. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  ratio  of  both  the
judgments is that satisfaction of the appropriate  Government  envisaged  in
Section 6(1) must be preceded by consideration of  the  report  prepared  by
the Collector after considering the objections filed under Section  5-A  and
hearing the objectors. This necessarily implies  that  the  Government  must
objectively  apply  its  mind  to  the  report  of  the  Collector  and  the
objections filed by the landowners and then take a decision whether  or  not
the  land  is  needed  for  the  specified  public  purpose.  A   mechanical
endorsement of the report of the Collector cannot be a  substitute  for  the
requirement of application of mind by the Government which must  be  clearly
reflected in the record.
88. In addition to what we have observed on the issue of flagrant  violation
of the two sections, it will be apposite to  recapitulate  the  language  of
the declarations issued under Section 6(1), which were  published  on  28-2-
2007. A reading of the  declarations  makes  it  clear  that  the  authority
issuing the same was totally unmindful of the requirement  of  the  statute.
This could be the only reason why instead of recording satisfaction  of  the
appropriate Government that the land is needed for  a  public  purpose,  the
notification  uses  the  expressions  “appears  to  the  Administrator”  and
“likely to be needed”. This only adds  to  the  casualness  with  which  the
entire issue of acquisition has been dealt with by the higher  functionaries
of the Chandigarh Administration.
89. Adverting to the impugned order [Surinder Singh Brar v. Union of  India,
W.P. (C) No. 5065 of 2007, decided on 18-3-2011 (P&H)],  we  find  that  the
High Court has not examined the substantive grounds on which the  appellants
had challenged the acquisition of their land with the  required  seriousness
and failed to notice  that  the  LAO  had  not  at  all  considered  several
objections including those relating to adverse  impact  on  the  environment
and  ecology  of  the  area  raised  by  the  landowners  and   mechanically
recommended the acquisition of land notified under Section  4(1),  that  the
reports of the LAO were not placed before the competent authority  and  that
even the Adviser had not objectively considered the reports of  the  LAO  in
the light of the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and  simply  appended
his signatures on  the  note  prepared  by  the  Secretary  (Finance).  This
omission on the High Court’s part has resulted in miscarriage of justice.”

35.   In Gojer Brothers Private Ltd. & Anr. v. State of West Bengal  &  Ors.
(2013) 16 SCC 660 this Court observed :
“18. In Surinder Singh Brar v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 403,  this  Court
extensively considered the report prepared by the Land  Acquisition  Officer
and the decision taken by the  administration  of  the  Union  Territory  of
Chandigarh and observed: (SCC pp. 450-51, 455-58, paras 68-70, 76-79 & 84)
“68. A cursory reading of the reports of the  LAO  may  give  an  impression
that he had applied his mind to the objections filed  under  Section  5-A(1)
and assigned reasons for not entertaining the same, but a  careful  analysis
thereof leaves no doubt that the officer concerned had not  at  all  applied
his mind to the objections of the landowners and merely created a facade  of
doing so. In the opening paragraph under  the  heading  ‘Observations’,  the
LAO recorded that he  had  seen  the  revenue  records  and  conducted  spot
inspection.  He  then  reproduced  the  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons
contained in the Bill which led to the enactment of the Punjab  New  Capital
(Periphery) Control Act, 1952 and proceed to extract some portion  of  reply
dated 31-7-2006 sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar.

19. In Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana  (2013)
4 SCC 210, the Court reiterated the propositions laid down in Raghbir  Singh
Sehrawat case (2012) 1 SCC 792 and Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State  of  W.B.
(2012) 2 SCC 25 and observed: (Usha Stud case (supra), SCC p. 227, para 30)
“30. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments  is  that  Section  5-A(2),  which
represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi  alteram  partem,  gives
an opportunity to  the  objector  to  make  an  endeavour  to  convince  the
Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified  in
the notification issued under Section 4(1) or that  there  are  other  valid
reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also  makes  it  obligatory
for  the  Collector  to  submit  report(s)  to  the  appropriate  Government
containing his recommendations on the objections, together with  the  record
of the proceedings held by him so that the Government may  take  appropriate
decision on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that  if  the  appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made  by  the
Collector under Section 5-A(2)  that  particular  land  is  needed  for  the
specified  public  purpose  then  a  declaration  should   be   made.   This
necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply  mind  to
the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections  filed
by the landowners and other  interested  persons.  Then  and  then  only,  a
declaration can be made under Section 6(1).”

21. In our view, non-consideration of the objections filed under Section  5-
A(1) has resulted in denial of  effective  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the
appellant. The manner  in  which  the  Joint  Secretary  to  the  Government
approved  the  recommendation  made  by  the  Land   Acquisition   Collector
favouring  acquisition  of  the  property  is  reflective  of   total   non-
application of mind by the competent authority to  the  recommendation  made
by the Land Acquisition Collector and the report prepared by him.”

36.   In Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana  (2013)
4 SCC 210 this Court observed :
“30. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments  is  that  Section  5-A(2),  which
represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audialterampartem,  gives  an
opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince  the  Collector
that his land is not required  for  the  public  purpose  specified  in  the
Notification issued under  Section  4(1)  or  that  there  are  other  valid
reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also  makes  it  obligatory
for  the  Collector  to  submit  report(s)  to  the  appropriate  Government
containing his recommendations on the objections, together with  the  record
of the proceedings held by him so that the Government may  take  appropriate
decision on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that  if  the  appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made  by  the
Collector under Section 5-A(2)  that  particular  land  is  needed  for  the
specified  public  purpose  then  a  declaration  should   be   made.   This
necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply  mind  to
the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections  filed
by the landowners and other  interested  persons.  Then  and  then  only,  a
declaration can be made under Section 6(1).”

37.   In Sharma Agro Industries v. State of Haryana  &  Ors.  (2015)  3  SCC
341, it was observed :
“14. The Land Acquisition Collector in the present case has  recommended  to
the State Government that the land covered in these civil appeals  need  not
be acquired. On our direction, Mr.  Manjit  Singh,  the  learned  Additional
Advocate General representing the State of Haryana has  made  available  the
record pertaining to acquisition of the lands  involved  in  these  appeals.
The following is the relevant  translated  extract  of  the  recommendations
made by the Land Acquisition Collector:
“On 16-1-2003 I visited the spot concerned for the  purpose  of  inspection;
with the Kanoongo and Patwari belonging to the Revenue Department. A  seller
has been established since 1981 in Khasra Nos. 3959, 3960,  3961/1,  3961/2,
3963, 3964, 3965, 3966/1, 3967, 3968 with a  total  area  of  29  bighas  11
biswas. The Government of Haryana, Department of Industry, had  also  issued
a licence to the seller for this industry, and the same  is  operative  till
date. An old factory is established in Khasra Nos. 3966/2,  3971/2,  with  a
total area of 1 bigha 11 biswas. Small-scale industry  licences  established
in Khasra Nos. 4000, 4001/2, 4001/1/1, 4001/1/2,  4001/1/3,  4002/1,  4002/2
where old factories along with lantered houses have been  constructed.  When
the land was acquired  in  1986  in  Sector  3,  the  abovementioned  khasra
numbers  were   excluded   from   the   acquisition   process.   Hence   the
abovementioned land may be released, measuring total of  37  bighas  and  13
biswas. The above numbers are leftover for acquirement.
                                                                        sd/-
                                         Land Acquisition Collector, Karnal”

The State Government has neither accepted the recommendations  of  the  Land
Acquisition Collector nor assigned any reasons  before  issuing  declaration
notification under Section 6 of the Act. The same is sought to be  justified
by the learned  Additional  Advocate  General  contending  that  it  is  the
prerogative  of  the   Government   to   either   accept   or   reject   the
recommendations of the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  with  respect  to  the
proposed land to be  acquired  by  issuing  declaration  notification  under
Section 6 of the Act. This contention of  the  learned  Additional  Advocate
General is wholly untenable in law in view  of  the  decisions  referred  to
above. However, after adverting to the decisions of this Court in the  above
case and in the cases referred  to  supra,  the  said  report  of  the  Land
Acquisition Collector was neither accepted by the  Government  nor  did  the
Government assign any reasons before issuing  the  declaration  notification
by holding that the land is required for public purpose, we are of the  view
that the acquisition proceedings are vitiated in law.
15. The learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants  has  rightly  placed
reliance upon the decision of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. State of  Haryana
(2014) 3 SCC 203, wherein this Court referred to the  legal  principle  laid
down in Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana (2013)  8  SCC  99,  and
has held as under: (SCC p. 119, para 35)
“35. What is most surprising is that the High Court did not even  deal  with
the issue relating to application of mind by the Government  to  the  report
submitted by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5-A(2) along  with
his recommendations. The documents produced before the High Court  and  this
Court do not show that the State Government had objectively applied mind  to
the  recommendations  made  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  and  felt
satisfied that the land in question deserves to be acquired for the  purpose
specified in the notification issued under Section  4(1).  The  record  also
does not contain any indication as to  why  the  State  Government  did  not
consider it proper to accept the recommendations  of  the  Land  Acquisition
Collector. Therefore, there is  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the
impugned acquisition is ultra vires the provisions contained  in  Section  6
of the Act.””

38.   In Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014)  3  SCC  203  it  was
observed thus:
“10. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. (2012) 2 SCC 25 it has  been
held as under: (SCC pp. 29-30, paras 14-16)
“14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings  under  the  LA  Act  are
based on the principle of  eminent  domain  and  Section  5-A  is  the  only
protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be  acquired.  It
is a minimal safeguard afforded to  him  by  law  to  protect  himself  from
arbitrary acquisition by pointing out  to  the  authority  concerned,  inter
alia, that the important ingredient, namely, ‘public purpose’ is  absent  in
the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA  Act  being
an expropriatory legislation,  its  provisions  will  have  to  be  strictly
construed.
15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is  necessary  to  enable  the
Collector to  deal  effectively  with  the  objections  raised  against  the
proposed acquisition  and  make  a  report.  The  report  of  the  Collector
referred to in this provision is  not  an  empty  formality  because  it  is
required to be placed before the appropriate Government  together  with  the
Collector's recommendations and the record of the  case.  It  is  only  upon
receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision  on
the objections. It is pertinent to note that  declaration  under  Section  6
has to be made only after the appropriate Government  is  satisfied  on  the
consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section  5-
A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan  Petroleum  Corpn.  Ltd  v.  Darius
Shapur Chenai (2005) 7  SCC  627the  appropriate  Government  while  issuing
declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind  not
only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but  also
to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making  such  further
inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary and also the recommendations made  by
him in that behalf.
16. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the LA Act  makes  a  declaration  under
Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public  purpose.
Formation of opinion by the appropriate Government  as  regards  the  public
purpose must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration  of
relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. It  is,  therefore,  that
the hearing contemplated under Section 5-A and the report made by  the  Land
Acquisition  Officer  and  his  recommendations  assume  importance.  It  is
implicit in this provision that before making declaration  under  Section  6
of the LA Act, the State Government  must  have  the  benefit  of  a  report
containing recommendations of the Collector submitted under  Section  5-A(2)
of the LA Act. The recommendations must indicate  objective  application  of
mind.” (emphasis supplied)

11. In Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana  (2013)
4 SCC 210 it was held as under: (SCC p. 227, para 30)
“30.  …  Section  6(1)  provides  that  if  the  appropriate  Government  is
satisfied, after considering the report,  if  any,  made  by  the  Collector
under Section 5-A(2) that  particular  land  is  needed  for  the  specified
public purpose then a declaration should be made. This  necessarily  implies
that the State Government is required to apply mind to  the  report  of  the
Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the  landowners
and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be  made
under Section 6(1).” (emphasis supplied)
12. Further, in Women's Education Trust v. State of  Haryana  (2013)  8  SCC
99, this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 119, para 35)
“35. What is most surprising is that the High Court did not even  deal  with
the issue relating to application of mind by the Government  to  the  report
submitted by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5-A(2) along  with
his recommendations. The documents produced before the High Court  and  this
Court do not show that the State Government had objectively applied mind  to
the  recommendations  made  by  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  and  felt
satisfied that the land in question deserves to be acquired for the  purpose
specified in the notification issued under Section  4(1).  The  record  also
does not contain any indication as to  why  the  State  Government  did  not
consider it proper to accept the recommendations  of  the  Land  Acquisition
Collector. Therefore, there is  no  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the
impugned acquisition is ultra vires the provisions contained  in  Section  6
of the Act.” (emphasis supplied)

14. In the light of the foregoing cases, it is evident that  the  Government
has to consider the report of the Land Acquisition  Collector  while  making
declaration of acquisition of land under Section 6 of the Act.  Further,  if
the Government is coming to a conclusion which is contrary  to  the  report,
then the Government has to provide appropriate reasons for the same.”

39.   In Gurbinder Kaur Brar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2013)  11  SCC
228 it was observed :
“9. We also agree with the learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  that  the
report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  was  vitiated  due  to  total  non-
application  of  mind  by  the  officer  concerned  to  a  large  number  of
substantive objections raised by the appellants  under  Section  5-A(1).  He
mechanically rejected the objections and senior officers of  the  Chandigarh
Administration accepted the report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  despite
the fact that the same had been prepared in violation of Section 5-A(2).”

40.   In the instant case it is apparent from the report that  there  is  no
objective consideration of objections at any stage.  The  inquiry  held  and
the report sent under section 5A of the Act was clearly  influenced  by  the
decision of the Cabinet taken before issuance of notification under  section
4 of the Act to acquire land in certain J L numbers  in  particular  mouza’s
as per the choice of location by TML which has   prevailed  whereas  in  the
matter of acquisition of such vast  area  comparative  fertility  aspect  of
chunk of land to be selected ought to have been considered  and  land  which
is more or less barren ought to have been preferred which exercise  has  not
been resorted to. Though the State  Government  could  have  taken  decision
before issuance of notification under section 4 for setting  up  of  project
however it could not have taken  decision  to  acquire  particular  land  in
various mouza’s before survey is undertaken as authorized by the  provisions
contained in section 4 of the Act, the action of the State  has  the  effect
of frustrating very  purpose  of  holding  inquiry  under  section  5A.  The
inquiry held under section  5A  is  a  farce  and  an  eyewash  neither  the
Collector nor State Government considered the  matter  with  objectivity  as
mandated. Inquiry has not been done with open mind with  requisite  fairness
they were clearly influenced by  decision  of  cabinet.  Entire  acquisition
stands vitiated in the facts and circumstances of the case.  The  case  need
not be relegated to  the  stage  of  inquiry  as  project  itself  has  been
abandoned.
41.   However, for enquiry under  section  5A  individual  notices  are  not
provided. It is not provided in the Act that individual  notices  should  be
issued. The publications as envisaged under section 4  are  enough  and  are
the only requirement of the law  to  be  mandatorily  observed  pursuant  to
which  objections  under  section  5A  are  required  to   be   filed.   The
notification under section 4 is required to be  published  in  the  Official
Gazette and two daily newspapers; out of that one newspaper shall be in  the
regional language, and public notice of such substance has to  be  given  at
the convenient places in the locality. Within  thirty  days  the  objections
are to be filed under section 5A. Thus non-service of individual notices  on
farmers would not vitiate the enquiry.
42.   For the aforesaid reasons, I agree with  the  ultimate  conclusion  of
esteemed brother as to question nos.3, 4 and 5.
IN RE. QUESTION NUMBERS 6 TO 9
43.   It appears that the award has been passed without issuance of  notices
to holders on the pretext that it was not possible  to  serve  them  due  to
prevailing situation.  For determination of compensation individual  notices
are required to be issued. Section 9(1) requires the  Collector  to  publish
public notice for taking possession and for claims  to  compensation  to  be
made. Section 9(3) requires the Collector shall serve  notice  to  the  same
effect on the occupier if any, of the land and on all such persons known  or
seem to be interested therein etc. In case  the  person  interested  resides
elsewhere notice has to be sent by post to the last known address  or  place
of business which has not been followed in the instant case. In  my  opinion
the service of personal notice is mandatory as required under  section  9(3)
of the Act. Non-compliance of the provision would render the  award  invalid
requiring determination of compensation afresh at the  same  time  it  would
not have the effect on the validity of the notification under section 4  and
declaration made under section 6 of the Act. The award cannot be  questioned
in the writ  jurisdiction  and  non-issuance  of  individual  notices  under
section 9 would not vitiate the notification issued  under  sections  4  and
declaration made under section 6 of the Act. However, the fact remains  that
proper procedure has not been followed in the instant matter.  The  question
of adequacy of the compensation determined cannot vitiate  the  acquisition.
It was also not disputed before us  that  after  the  award  was  passed  on
merits, further consent awards were passed in favour of certain persons  for
which no authority or provision of law could be shown. Be that  as  it  may.
It would have no impact on validity  of  notification  under  section  4  or
declaration made under section 6 of the Act.
44.   In my  opinion  question  number  7  as  to  determination  of  proper
compensation cannot  be  considered  in  writ  jurisdiction  as  any  person
aggrieved by inadequacy of compensation has the remedy to seek reference  as
provided in section 18 of the Act.
Accordingly I answer the question numbers 6, 7 and 8.
RELIEF
45.   After acquisition of the land by WBDIC it granted  lease  to  TML  and
handed over possession. Ultimately, the TML could not  start  operations  as
is apparent  from  its  letter  dated  28.9.2010.  They  had  removed  their
equipment  and  machinery  also.  Though  the  project   would   have   been
beneficial, however in the circumstances it has  moved  out  as  environment
could not be created for normal working of the plant as mentioned in  letter
of TML. The State Government has taken possession of the land from  TML  and
TML has abandoned its project in the State of West Bengal  and  has  shifted
it to the State of Gujarat.
46.   Possession has been taken ten years before from the landowners.  In  a
case where there are no  sale-deeds  evidence  forthcoming  compensation  is
awarded to land-owners on annualized yield of  10  years  as  held  by  this
Court in Special Land  Acquisition  Officer  v.  Virupax  Shankar  Nadagouda
(1996) 6 SCC 124 and Collector, Land Acquisition v. Gana Ram Dhoba (1996)  1
SCJ 15. In the facts of this case it would be  appropriate  to  direct  that
land is given back to all land owners since they have been deprived  of  the
usufruct of the land for a decade as such  the  compensation  paid  to  them
shall not be recovered. They are permitted to retain it or claim it in  full
and final settlement of claim towards damages  for  deprivation  of  use  of
their land etc.
47.   In view of determination on question numbers 3, 4 and  5  and  due  to
violation of the provisions contained in section  5A  of  the  Act,  in  the
facts of the case to do complete justice between the parties in exercise  of
power under Article 142 of Constitution the  entire  proceedings  pertaining
to land acquisition are quashed and case is not  relegated  in  the  instant
case to the stage of inquiry under section  5A  of  the  Act  as  ordinarily
resorted to, as the very purpose of acquisition has failed and directing  an
inquiry afresh would be an exercise in futility. The  land  shall  be  given
back to the land owners and compensation if any paid to them  shall  not  be
recovered from them those who have not collected it are free to collect  the
same in lieu of damages for deprivation of possession for ten years.


48.   The impugned orders are set aside, the appeals are  allowed  with  the
aforesaid directions. Parties to bear their own costs.


New Delhi;                                                 ………………………..J.
August 31, 2016.                                        (Arun Mishra)




ITEM NO.1A-For JUDGMENT        COURT NO.8           SECTION XVI

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No.8438/2016 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).
8463/2008

KEDAR NATH YADAV                                   Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.                        Respondent(s)

WITH

C.A. No.8440/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 10731/2008

C.A. No.8441/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 11783/2008

C.A. No.8444/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 11830/2008

C.A. No.8446/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 12360/2008

C.A. No.8447/2016 @ SLP(C) No. 12724/2008

C.A. No.8453/2016 @ S.L.P.(C) No.25580/2016 @ SLP (C)...CC No. 13645/2008

C.A. No.8449/2016 @ SLP(C) No.22491/2008

Date : 31/08/2016 These matters were called on for pronouncement of
JUDGMENTS and ORDER today.

For Petitioner(s)       Mr. B.P. Yadav, Adv.
                        Mr. Anindo Mukherjee, Adv.
                     Mrs Sarla Chandra,Adv.

                        Dr. M.P. Raju, Adv.
                     Mr. Ashwani Bhardwaj,Adv.
                        Mr. Joydeep Mukherjea, Adv.

                     Mr. Anip Sachthey,Adv.

                     Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta,Adv.

                     Mr. Prashant Bhushan,Adv.

                     Mr. Dharam Bir Raj Vohra,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma,Adv.

                     Mr. Parijat Sinha,Adv.

                     Mr. Parijat Sinha,Adv.

                        Mr. Gopal Jain, Sr. Adv.
                        Mrs. Nandini Gore, Adv.
                        Mr. Abhishek Roy, Adv.
                        Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Adv.
                        Mr. Sidharth Sharma, Adv.
                        Mr. Arjun Sharma, Adv.
                        Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Adv.
                        Ms. Devina Sehgal, Adv.
                     For M/s. Karanjawala & Co.

                     Mrs Manik Karanjawala,Adv.

                     Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee,Adv.

      Hon'ble Mr. Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  and  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Arun
Mishra pronounced separate judgments of the Bench  comprising   Hon'ble  Mr.
Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra.
      Delay condoned in SLP(C)....CC No.13645 of 2008.
      Leave granted.
      The appeals are allowed in terms of  the  separate  signed  Reportable
Judgments and order.

      Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

                    (VINOD KUMAR JHA)               (SUMAN JAIN)
                        AR-CUM-PS                    COURT MASTER
|                                       | |                                      |

      (Two Signed Reportable judgments along with Order are  placed  on  the
file)

|                                       | |                                      |

-----------------------
[1]   [2] (2008) 1 SCC 728
[3]   [4] (1998) 1 SCC 591
[5]   [6] AIR 1962 SC 764
[7]   [8] AIR 1963 SC 1890
[9]   [10] (1996) 8 SCC 758
[11]  [12] ( 1985) 1 SCC 591
[13]  [14] (2011) 10 SCC 608
[15]  [16] A.I.R. 1994 MP 74
[17]  [18] 2010 Supp All. L.J. 1
[19]  [20] (1961) 2 SCR 459
[21]  [22] (1963) 2 SCR 774
[23]  [24] (1971) 1 SCC 671
[25]  [26] (1975) 4 SCC 285
[27]  [28] (2012) 1 SCC 792
[29]  [30] (2013) 1 SCC 403
[31]  [32] (2005) 6 SCC 745
[33]  [34] (2003) 10 SCC 626
[35]  [36] (2014) 8 SCC 804
[37]  [38] (2011) 9 SCC 286
[39]  [40] (1999) 6 SCC 464
[41]  [42] (1980) 3 SCC 141
[43]  [44] (2013) 4 SCC 210
[45]  [46] AIR 1980 SC 318
[47]  [48] AIR 1964 SC 72
[49]  [50](1999) 3 SCC 422
[51]  [52] (1975) 4 SCC 298
[53]  [54] (2009) 10 SCC 115

-----------------------
|Mouza                           | J.L. No           |
|Gopal Nagar                     |13                 |
|Singherberi                     |10                 |
|Beraberi                        |05                 |
|Khaserberi                      |11                 |
|Bajemelia                       |12                 |

 

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