M/S MAGNUM PROMOTERS P.LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)
Appeal (Civil), 4284 of 2011, Judgment Date: Nov 27, 2014
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
I.A.3 of 2014
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4284 OF 2011
M/S MAGNUM PROMOTERS P. LTD. .........APPELLANT
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .........RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
This I.A. No.3 of 2014 in Civil Appeal No. 4284 of 2011 is filed by the
appellant seeking for direction and appropriate orders for disposal of this
appeal in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(in short 'the Act of 2013'). The appellant-land owner has come to this
Court questioning the correctness of the judgment and order dated
16.05.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No. 3695 of 1999,
inter alia, urging various facts and legal contentions.
Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder:
The appellant is the lawful owner of the land comprised in Khasra Nos. 750
Min (1-2 ) and 751 Min (0-18) situated in the revenue estate of Village
Malikpur, Kohi alias Rangpuri, Tehsil Mehrauli in the National Capital
Territory of Delhi (for short 'NCT, Delhi'). The Municipal Corporation of
Delhi (MCD) vide its sanction bearing No. S.N.406/B/HQ/17/148/AE (B) HQ III
dated 12.07.1990 gave sanction for constructing the farmhouse from common
land. On 17.12.1993, the Completion Certificate with regard to the farm
house on the land in question was issued to the appellant by the MCD. On
27.06.1996, the Government of National Capital Territory issued
Notification No.F.9 (12)/95 /L&B/LA/8474 dated 01.06.1995 under Section 4
of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short 'the repealed L.A. Act') for the
acquisition of the different parcels of land including an area measuring
369 bighas and 1 biswa situated in the revenue estate of village Malikpur
Kohi alias Rangpuri in the NCT, Delhi. The above said notification issued
for acquisition of the land covered the land and building owned by the
appellant bearing Khasra No. 750 for 3 bighas and Khasra No.751 for 3.12
bighas. The public purpose mentioned in the said acquisition notification
was for development of Vasant Kunj Phase IV.
On 24th June, 1997, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the repealed L.A.
Act was issued by the NCT, Delhi in respect of the land sought to be
acquired including the land owned by the appellant. On 9th June, 1999,
notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the repealed L.A. Act with regard to the
land in question were issued by the Land Acquisition Collector to the
appellant. On 15th June, 1999, the appellant filed a writ petition (c) No.
3695 of 1999 before the High Court of Delhi, questioning the legality of
the aforesaid acquisition notifications published under Sections 4 and 6 of
the repealed L.A. Act urging various grounds. Other similarly placed land
holders also challenged the said two notifications before the High Court.
The writ petitions were heard together by the High Court and passed its
judgment and order dated 16.05.2008 by dismissing the writ petitions
holding that the acquisition of land by the NCT, Delhi is legal and valid
and did not suffer from any legal infirmities. Hence, this appeal.
It is the case of the appellant that throughout the proceedings before the
High Court as well as this Court, the appellant has been in continuous
physical possession of the land involved in this appeal as it has been
protected by various orders of "status quo" by the High Court as well as
this Court with respect to the possession of the land in question.
Mr. Chandra Uday Singh, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant placed strong reliance upon Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
to substantiate the plea that actual physical possession of land has not
been taken by the Land Acquisition Collector even after 5 years being
elapsed after the award was passed as on the date of the Act of 2013 which
came into force with effect from 01.01.2014. The aforesaid provision is
extracted hereunder:-
"24(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, where an Award
under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not
been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate government, if it so chooses,
shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Provided that whether an award has been made and compensation in
respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries specified in the notifications for acquisition
under Section 4 of the said land acquisition and shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
6. Having regard to the facts narrated above that neither physical
possession of the land nor compensation awarded was paid to the appellant,
it is contended that the acquisition proceedings of the land of the
appellant are lapsed. In support of the aforesaid submission he has placed
reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Pune Municipal
Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors.[1], Union of
India & others v. Shiv Raj & others[2], Bimla Devi & Others v. State of
Haryana & Others[3], Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana & Another[4] and Sree
Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu & others[5].
Therefore, the learned senior counsel has requested for grant of relief as
prayed for in this application.
7. The above said provision of the Act of 2013 quoted above has been
interpreted by the three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra), the relevant paras 20 and 21 from the case
are extracted hereunder:-
"20.......it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has
been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years
prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position
that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the
landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of
compensation amount in the Government treasury is of no avail and cannot be
held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons
interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject
land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
21. The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject land
acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under the 1894
Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2) of the
2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected. Section 114(1)
of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 114,
however, makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with
regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the
2013 Act. Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has
been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and
possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The
legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as
conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit
in the contention of the Corporation."
8. Further, reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in
Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra), wherein it was opined
that Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any period during
which the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed on
account of stay or injunction or "status quo" order regarding possession of
the land granted by any court. It was conclusively held that the
Legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years
indicated in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, even if the proceedings had
been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a
court of law or for any reason.
9. It was further contended that the phrase used under Section 24(2) is
'physical possession' which means actual taking over possession from the
appellant-land owner by the Land Acquisition Collector. In support of this
contention he has also placed reliance upon two judgments of this Court in
Prahlad Singh & Ors. v. U.O.I & Ors[6] case and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v.
State of Haryana and Ors.[7].
10. On the other hand, Ms. Rachna Srivastava, the learned counsel on
behalf of respondent Nos. 2 & 3 contended that the Act of 2013 is
prospective in operation by virtue of Section 24 read with Section 114 of
the Act of 2013. As provided under Section 24, the effect of Section 6 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897 the action taken by respondent Nos. 2-4 has
been saved. She submits that by reading the above two Sections of the Act,
it is clear that Legislature wanted to protect and save the acquisition
proceedings initiated under the repealed L.A. Act, particularly where
possession of the acquired land has been taken. It is submitted that the
intention of the Legislature in providing Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 was
never to destroy the entire acquisition proceedings in acquiring the land
for the public purpose under the repealed L.A. Act, 1894.
11. It is further contended that it is a well settled position of law that
the proceedings initiated and culminated under the repealed Act of 1894 are
not to be disturbed by interpreting the provisions of Section 24(2) of the
Act of 2013 to declare the acquisition proceeding of land as lapsed on
account of not taking physical possession of the land after 5 year period
or not paying compensation from the date of passing of the award. Under
the provisions of the repealed L.A. Act of 1894, by operation of Section 16
or 17 (1) of the Act as the case may be, once the possession of the
acquired land is taken, the land will be vested with the State Government
and is absolutely free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, it is not even
open for the State Government to restore the land to the land owner in
exercise of its power under Section 48 of the repealed L.A. Act as, it is
not permissible in law. The above said legal position is laid down by this
Court in the cases of Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of UP[8]. and
Sanjeevanagar Medical and Health Emloyees' Co-operative Housing Society v.
Mohd. Abdul Wahab and Ors.[9]. In the aforesaid cases, this Court has held
that Section 11(A) of the repealed L.A. Act, is not applicable (which is
analogous to Section 24 of the Act of 2013) and that in such circumstances,
the only consequence provided under the repealed L.A. Act is payment of
interest under Section 34 in respect of the acquired land. Therefore, the
acquisition of land cannot be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013, in view of the law laid down in the above cases referred
to supra. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the
respondents that the above said judgments were not brought to the notice of
this Court and could not be considered at the time of rendering the
decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and other cases of this
Court referred to supra. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the said cases
by the appellant's senior counsel do not render any assistance in support
of its case for grant of relief as prayed in the application.
12. It is further contended by the learned counsel that if either of the
two negative conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013
remains unfulfilled, the acquisition proceedings of the land involved in
this appeal cannot be held to have lapsed as it would defeat the purpose of
acquisition and intendment of the L.A. Act. In other words, the two
negative conditions contained in Section 24(2) has to be read conjunctively
and as such both the conditions are required to be fulfilled for the
purpose of holding the acquisition proceedings as lapsed. This aspect of
the matter has been dealt with by this Court in the case of The Punjab
Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT, West Bengal, Calcutta[10]. It is
contended that this case was also not brought to the notice of this Court
in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and other cases referred
to supra and therefore the said decisions require re-consideration by the
larger Bench of this Court.
13. Further, it is urged that the appellant has violated the provisions of
Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972. It
is contended that during the pendency of the present appeal the appellant
has sold the land admeasuring area 12 Bigha, falling in Khasra Nos. 745(1-
18), 746 (2-14), 747 (4-8) 750 (1-16), 751 (1-4) situated in the Revenue
Estate of Village Malikpur Kohi at Rangpuri, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi
along with all necessary rights to M/s. DCBC Properties Pvt. Ltd. vide
registered sale deed No. 6539 dated 1st June, 2012 out of which 1 Bigha
2.5 Biswas in Khasra No. 750 and 18 Biswas in Khasra No. 751 have been
acquired under acquisition notification. Sections 3 and 4 read along with
Section 9 of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act of 1972 are
extracted hereunder for the purpose of answering the legal contention urged
in this regard:-
"3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central Government -
No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or
otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi
which has been acquired by the Central Government under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing for acquisition of
land for a public purpose.
4. Regulation on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition
proceedings have been initiated.
No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the
competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage,
gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union
territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the
Scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land
or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the
Central Government under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under section 48
of that Act.
......
1 9. Penalty -
If any person contravenes the provisions of section 3 or section 4, he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years or with fine or with both."
14. Further the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 4 sought to
distinguish the two decisions in the case of Prahlad Singh (supra) and
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra) and further if this Court had to differ
from the decision as per Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant
Governor, Government Of NCT, Delhi And Others[11] the said cases should
have been referred to the larger Bench, that has not been done. Therefore,
reliance placed upon the aforesaid decisions on behalf of the appellant are
of no avail in support of the plea taken that physical possession of the
land is not taken by respondent nos.2, 3 and 4. Therefore, she has
requested this Court for the dismissal of the application filed under
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it has no application in the case on
hand.
15. We have carefully gone through the legal submissions made by the
learned counsel on behalf of the parties in respect of the application
filed by the appellant under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 with
reference to the averments made therein and the objection statement filed
by respondent Nos. 2-4 and response affidavit of the Land Acquisition
Collector. The official original record produced before us for our perusal
as per our direction, discloses that the "Kabza Karyavahi" or possession
taking proceedings of the acquired land was started on 27.12.2013. As per
the record, on 27.12.2013, the taking over of possession was done only to
the extent of the vacant portion of the appellant's land whereas the
building structure situated on the land could not be taken on that day as
the demolition squad was not available for respondent No.4. Thus, it is
clear from the said document available on record that the possession of the
building structure situated on the appellant's land was not taken by him on
27.12.2013. As per the possession memo available in the record, it is
recorded in the said proceeding that the further action for taking over
possession in respect of the land were to be continued by the Land
Acquisition Collector on 28.12.2013 and there is no record to show as to
whether the action continued on 28.12.2013 in this regard. The alleged
taking over of possession of the land involved in this appeal was done on
31.12.2013, as per the document annexure R-1 memo of possession taking
possession of the acquired land in Award no.07/98-99 is signed by the
officers of the Land and Building Department of the third respondent; the
same was alleged to have immediately been delivered to the DDA officials
i.e. respondent no.5 on the same day. According to respondent Nos. 3 and 4,
the possession of the land involved in this appeal has been allegedly taken
by them without any objections being raised by the appellant-owner. The
above said plea taken by them cannot be accepted by us as the same is
wholly contrary to the factual position regarding possession of the land.
The question of raising objection to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 for taking
possession of the land by the appellant did not arise at all for the reason
that notice in this regard was not issued to it calling upon it to handover
possession of the land to the Land Acquisition Collector. The reasons
stated at paragraphs 8 and 9 in the response affidavit filed by one Mr.
Vivek Kumar Tripathi, who is the Land Acquisition Collector-respondent No.
4 in these proceedings with regard to limits of the then existing sub-
divisions Tehsils in Delhi being modified, consequently the revenue estate
of the boundaries of village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri which previously formed
part of District South, due to the said reorganisation, sub-division, Delhi
Cantonment and sub-division, Vasant Vihar which were earlier part of
District of South West have become part of District New Delhi. Resultantly,
village Rangapuri which was part of sub-division Vasant Vihar under the
jurisdiction of Land Acquisition Collector, South-West fell under the
jurisdiction of District New Delhi. The notification dated 11.09.2012 was
issued by the first respondent creating 11 districts by altering sub-
divisions Tehsils in Delhi. Land Acquisition of the land involved in these
proceedings was transferred from District South-West to the office
of respondent no.4 on 21.12.2012 and remaining records on
14.01.2014. The above said make believe story narrated by the Land
Acquisition Collector in his affidavit is a deliberate intention to
misrepresent facts to justify the alleged taking over possession of the
land on 31.12.2013. The aforesaid explanation furnished by the Land
Acquisition Collector in his affidavit for the alleged taking over
possession of acquired land is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant.
Therefore, the said explanation by him cannot be accepted by us. The
averments made at para 10 of the response affidavit of Land Acquisition
Collector are contrary to the "Kabza Karyavahi (possession taking over
proceedings) dated 27.12.2013 and the reason stated in the said memo is
that the Land Acquisition Collector could not take possession of the
building structure situated on the acquired appellant's land, as the
demolition squad was not available on that day. The possession of the land
taking over document Annexure R-1 to the response affidavit dated
31.12.2013 produced by the Land Acquisition Collector in which it is stated
that the possession of the land of the appellant has been taken on
31.12.2013 the said averment in the affidavit is contradictory to the
"kabza karyavahi" document dated 27.12.2013 available in the original
record. The contradictory statements made by the Land Acquisition Collector
in his response affidavit at para 10 cannot be accepted by us. The plea
sworn by the Land Acquisition Collector in the affidavit is a false
statement of fact for the reason that the physical possession of the land
is in fact not taken and could not have been taken by the Land Acquisition
Collector from the appellant when the interim order of "status quo" with
regard to the possession of land of the appellant was passed by this Court
on 04.08.2008. The said order being well within the knowledge of the
respondent Nos. 2-5 is evident from the record of proceedings of this Court
dated 24.09.2010 as the names of learned counsel on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 1-5 is shown in this Court's record of proceedings. The
further plea taken by him at para 10 of the said affidavit that the second
respondent enquired about the litigation status in respect of the order
passed in relation to this case and other cases of village Rangpuri from
the 5th respondent-DDA and did not receive any response from it is once
again a false statement of fact. Therefore, the office of the 3rd
respondent being unaware of any interim order of "status quo" is once again
a false statement and the same has been deliberately made by him to justify
his action as stated in the respondent affidavit. Hence, the statement of
facts sworn to at paras 8-10 are liable to be rejected and accordingly
rejected. Therefore, the plea of the Additional District Collector/Land
Acquisition Collector and its officers to have allegedly taken over
possession of the land as stated at paragraph 10 of the response affidavit
is false and it amounts to contempt of this Court committed by them, as
they have wilfully disobeyed the interim order of this Court dated
04.08.2008. Therefore, the plea of taking over possession of land of the
appellant either on 27.12.2013 as per the original record or on 31.12.2013
as per document Annexure R1 cannot be accepted by us. The respondents have
misrepresented certain relevant facts to this Court by filing the above
referred response affidavit with an oblique motive to deny the valuable
statutory right accrued in favour of the appellant under Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013. Hence, the conduct of respondent No. 4 and officials of
respondent No.3 in misrepresenting facts is deprecated by us.
16. The document of Annexure R-1 to the response affidavit has been
falsely created by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 with a malafide intention not
only to defeat the statutory right of the appellant-land owner accrued in
its favour under the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, but it
is a clear case of misrepresentation of facts to this Court with an oblique
motive to deprive the valuable constitutional right of the appellant to the
land involved in these proceedings. This conduct of the ADM/Land
Acquisition Collector is highly objectionable and reprehensible as his
action in creating false official documents to deny the legitimate right
accrued in favour of the appellant, which conduct of him amounts to breach
of trust reposed with him by the public to discharge his public functions
in the larger interest of public. The public officers are required to
maintain the public record honestly, truly and correctly, the Additional
District Magistrate cadre indulging in such unlawful acts will discredit
the credibility of the public office from maintaining trust and confidence
in the public office which is most important and necessary for the good
administration of the second respondent. This has not been done in the case
on hand by the Land Acquisition Collector which cannot be appreciated by
this Court.
17. Further, the reliance is placed upon the judgment by the learned
senior counsel on behalf of the appellant on Prahlad Singh's case (supra)
to show that the alleged taking over of the possession of the land is not
legally correct. The relevant paragraph reads thus:-
"13. We have given our serious thought to the entire matter and carefully
examined the records. Section 16 lays down that once the Collector has made
an award under Section 11, he can take possession of the acquired land.
Simultaneously, the section declares that upon taking possession by the
Collector, the acquired land shall vest absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances. In terms of the plain language of this section,
vesting of the acquired land in the Government takes place as soon as
possession is taken by the Collector after passing an award under Section
11. To put it differently, the vesting of land under Section 16 of the Act
presupposes actual taking of possession and till that is done, legal
presumption of vesting enshrined in Section 16 cannot be raised in favour
of the acquiring authority. Since the Act does not prescribe the mode and
manner of taking possession of the acquired land by the Collector, it will
be useful to notice some of the judgments in which this issue has been
considered."
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
At para 19 of the above case, it has been further clearly held that the
memo of taking over possession of the acquired land must be in the presence
of independent witnesses, undisputedly the same has not been done by
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the case on hand. Therefore, in view of the
principles laid down in the above case, the plea of the respondents that as
per memo of possession dated 31.12.2013 the possession of the said land of
the appellant was taken and handed over to the DDA-respondent no.4 on the
same day is not accepted by us as it is not done in fact and could not have
been done in view of the interim order referred to supra and also the same
has not been done in the presence of independent witnesses as required in
law.
18. Further, this Court held at para 26 in Raghuvir Singh Sehravat's case
(supra) as under:-
"26. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta, J., who constituted the
majority did not agree with Untwalia, J. and observed as under: (Balwant
Narayan Bhagde case, SCC pp. 711-12, para 28)
"28. ... We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds
to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests
in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of
taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial
decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on
paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a [pic]necessary condition of
vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of
the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of
the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land
admits of.........."
(emphasis laid by this Court)
Thus, in view of the above decisions, this Court has clearly laid down the
legal principle as to how taken over physical possession of the acquired
land means the actual taking of possession of it of it from the land
owners/interested persons.
19. The learned counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 2,3 and 4 sought to
distinguish the said judgments by placing reliance upon the judgment in the
case of Sita Ram Bhandar Society (supra) wherein this Court opined thus:-
"28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that
while taking possession, symbolic and notional possession is perhaps not
envisaged under the Act but the manner in which possession is taken must of
necessity depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle
in mind, this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam after considering
the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case, observed that while taking possession
of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic
approach had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under which
the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case had been rendered and held as under:
(Viswam case, SCC p. 262, para 9)
9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the
accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a
memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by
him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it
would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is
common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be
cooperative in taking possession of the land.
29. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab
yet again the question was as to the taking over of the possession of
agricultural land and it was observed thus: (SCC p. 215, para 4)
4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood
completed by 17-4-1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken.
No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their
possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to
take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The
normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence
of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries
is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto,
the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful
possession."
20. Further, on the plea taken by the learned counsel on behalf of the
respondent nos. 2 and 3 regarding contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Act of 1972 for transfer of the land in question by the appellant during
the pendency of the proceedings as it was acquired by the NCT on behalf of
the Central Government by placing reliance on Article 239AA of the
Constitution, with respect to the contention of 1972 Act is concerned, the
same has no application to the fact situation. In view of the said
provision, it has been contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the
respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4 that the land and home subject-matters that are
in Delhi are still with the Central Government and therefore, acquisition
of land by NCT is the acquisition made by it on behalf of the Central
Government. This is far-fetched argument of the learned counsel and
therefore, the same cannot be accepted by us for the reason that the
acquisition notification available in the original record would clearly
show that the land is acquired by the NCT, Delhi and not on behalf of the
Central Government. Hence, the said contention is liable to be rejected and
accordingly rejected.
21. Apart from the said reason, even assuming for the sake of argument
that the Act of 1972 is applicable, it has been specifically stated by the
learned senior counsel that the competent authority has given permission to
the appellants to transfer the land in favour of subsidiary company of the
appellant. The same can be seen in para 5 of the sale deed produced before
this Court which reads thus:-
"5. The vendor have obtained NOC under provisions of the Delhi Land
(Restriction on transfer) Act, 1972 from the concerned
department/Tehsildar Notification Delhi and shall obtain all such necessary
clearance/permission as may be required for effectively transferring and
conferring the title on the Vendee."
Therefore, the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 9 have no application to
the fact situation on hand and there is no substance in this plea of the
respondent and the same is rejected.
22. In view of the aforesaid findings and reasons recorded by us, the
prayer made in this application is allowed. The acquisition proceedings in
respect of the appellant's land have lapsed. Consequently the appeal is
also allowed quashing the acquisition proceeding notifications in respect
of the appellant's land. No costs.
..................................................................J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
..................................................................J.
[C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
November 27 ,2014
ITEM NO.1C-For Judgment COURT NO.9 SECTION XIV
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No(s). 4284/2011
M/S MAGNUM PROMOTERS P.LTD. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 27/11/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan,Adv.
For Respondent(s) M/s Saharya & Co.
Ms. Sushma Suri,Adv.
Mrs. Anil Katiyar,Adv.
Ms. Sushma Suri,Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.
I.A. No. 3/2014 is allowed.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(VINOD KUMAR) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT
MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
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[1] (2014) 3 SCC 183
[2] (2014) 6 SCC 564
[3] (2014) 6 SCC 583
[4] (2014) 6 SCC 586
[5] 2014 (10) SCALE 388
[6] (2011) 5 SCC 386
[7] (2012) 1 SCC 792
[8] (1993) 4 SCC 369
[9] (1996) 3 SCC 600
[10] (1971) 2 SCC 540
[11] (2009) 10 SCC 501
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| REPORTABLE |
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