Supreme Court of India (Division Bench (DB)- Two Judge)

Appeal (Civil), 1431 of 2008, Judgment Date: Mar 29, 2017


ITEM NO.105                 COURT NO.12               SECTION XIV

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).  1431/2008

M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MED.INS.&RSH&ORS.                    Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.                                   Respondent(s)


(with appln. (s) for impleadment and substitution and c/delay in filing
reply affidavit)


Date : 29/03/2017 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER

For Appellant(s)  Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv.
                        Mr. Ramesh Singh, Adv.
                        Mr. A.T. Patra, Adv.
                     Ms. Bina Gupta,Adv.


For Respondent(s)    Ms. Rachana Srivastava,Adv.
                        Mr. Nitya Madhusoodhnan, Adv.

                        Mr. Vishnu B. Saharya, Adv.
                        Mr. Viresh B. Saharya, Adv.
                     M/s Saharya & Co.,Adv.

                     Mr. Mukesh Kumar Sharma,Adv.



          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R

            The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.


|   (NEELAM GULATI)                |        (TAPAN KR. CHAKRABORTY)    |
|COURT MASTER                      |COURT MASTER                       |


                 (Signed Reportable order is placed on the file)

                                                  REPORTABLE

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1431 OF 2008


M/S. MEENA DEVI JINDAL MEDICAL INSTITUTE
& RESEARCH CENTRE                                              Appellant(s)


                          VERSUS


LT.GOVERNOR, DELHI & ORS.                                     Respondent(s)



                                     O R D E R


            The appeal has been preferred by  the  M/s.  Meena  Devi  Jindal
Medical Institute and Research Centre questioning  the  judgment  and  order
passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on March  03,  2005  in  W.P.
(C) No. 1479 of  1982  repelling  the  challenge  to  the  land  acquisition
proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (in
short 'the Act') as per the Notification issued on 19.3.1981. Enquiry  under
Section 5A of the Act was held. The objections preferred  by  the  appellant
were duly considered and rejected.  Thereafter declaration under  Section  6
of the Act was issued on 21st September, 1981.   Appellant/Petitioner  filed
writ  petition  before  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  questioning  the   land
acquisition proceedings in the year 1982.
            The facts unfold that one Smt. Kanso Devi (since  deceased)  was
owner of the property.  She had entered into an agreement  dated  21.04.1979
with Rank Television Pvt. Ltd. for construction of  group  housing  society.
Appellant No.1 herein claims to be registered society  under  the  Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and it was formed with the object  to  establish  and
maintain hospitals for philanthropic purpose and it  entered  into  a  lease
agreement with owner Kanso Devi on 3.1.1981.  The lease agreement  has  been
concurred by Rank Television Pvt. Ltd., as confirming  party.  It  was  tri-
partite agreement. Later on 17.2.1981  the  appellant  No.1  herein  entered
into an agreement to sell with respect to said  property  with  Kanso  Devi.
It was confirmed by M/s Rank Television Pvt.  Ltd.  Power  of  Attorney  has
been obtained by the appellant No.1 from Kanso Devi and  the  appellant  had
been placed in possession of the property.
      Kanso Devi purportedly executed a will  in  favour  of  the  appellant
No.1 on 4.4.1982.  She ultimately died on 27.11.1989 during the pendency  of
the writ petition.  It is submitted that property had been  mutated  in  the
name of the appellant No.1- charitable institution .   The  acquisition  had
been questioned in the High Court on the ground  that  in  the  Notification
issued under Section  4  of  the  Act,  purpose  was  shown  to  be  planned
development of Delhi.  Only 10,000 Sq. Yard land  comprised  in  Khasra  No.
394 (plot no.20), Alipur Road, Delhi was proposed to be  acquired.   It  was
not specified in the Notification  for  what  specific  purpose  of  planned
development of Delhi, Notification had  been  issued.   Thus  the  objection
raised by the Appellant No.1 herein, in the course of  enquiry,  held  under
Section 5A of the Act, had been illegally  rejected.   The  acquisition  for
the purpose of School was not mentioned in  the  Notification  issued  under
Section 4 of the Act as such  the  Notification  was  vague  and  no  useful
purpose would  be served by acquisition of a small plot of land.
             It was not  disputed  that  in  the  zonal  plan  prepared  for
development of Delhi, the area in question had been shown  as  reserved  for
the institutional purposes.
            The writ application was resisted on behalf of  the  respondents
on the ground that acquisition had been made in accordance with law for  the
planned development of Delhi.  Ultimately it was  for  the  purpose  of  the
school the acquisition had been made and it would be open after  acquisition
to change the purpose  related to the planned development of Delhi  as  such
there was no illegality in the acquisition of the land and no  malafide  has
been attributed.
            The High Court by the impugned  order  has  dismissed  the  writ
application on various grounds; firstly that acquisition is permissible  for
planned development of the city.  Apart from that, it has  been  found  that
in that zonal development plan of Delhi the area in question had been  shown
for the institutional purposes thus, it was open  to  acquire  the  area  in
accordance therewith for the purpose of planned development of  Delhi.   The
petitioner No.1, at the relevant point of time, was  having  only  agreement
to sell in its favour.  The enquiry was properly held under  Section  5A  of
the Act.  Thus the writ petition has been ultimately dismissed holding  that
running of educational institution by the  Government  for  the  benefit  of
public at  large  can  hardly  be  equated  to  running  of  the  charitable
hospital.  Thus  acquisition  cannot  be  said  to  be  suffering  with  any
illegality.  Thus the same has been upheld.  Aggrieved  thereby  the  appeal
has been preferred.
            It was submitted by the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of the appellants that  there  was  no  public   purpose  behind  the
acquisition. The mention that it was for planned development  of  Delhi  was
absolutely vague, mention of public  purpose,  if  any.  The  enquiry  under
Section 5A of the Act was not properly conducted.  The objection  raised  by
the appellant had been illegally rejected.  Reliance has been placed on  the
decisions with respect to the vagueness on  Munshi Singh &  Ors.  vs.  Union
of India [(1973)2 SCC 337] and with respect to the  entitlement  of  tenants
to question the acquisition, reliance has been placed  on  the  decision  of
this court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Krishan Lal Arneja &  Ors.  [(2004)8
SCC 453] in which  reliance  was  placed  upon  the  decision  in  Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay  vs.  Industrial  Development  Investment  Co.
(P.) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] in which it has been held that  it  cannot  be
said that in no case of the land acquisition under  the  provisions  of  the
Act tenant cannot challenge the  proceedings.
            On the other hand learned counsel on behalf of  the  respondents
has submitted that land as has been acquired in accordance with  zonal  plan
for “planned development of Delhi” for institutional purposes land could  be
acquired by specifying that it is being acquired for planned development  of
Delhi.       Learned  counsel  has  relied  upon   the   decision   of   the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon &  Ors.  vs.  Lt.  Governor  of
Delhi & Ors. [(1975) 4 SCC 285].  She has also referred to the  decision  of
this Court in Bhagat Singh vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1999) (2) SCC 384]  to
submit that once the land has been  acquired  for  planned  development  its
purpose can be changed at any point of time for  appropriately  for  planned
development of the city.
            Section 3(f)  of  the  Act  defines  public  purpose  for  which
acquisition can be made under the Act.  The definition of public purpose  is
inclusive of Section 3f(iii) contains the provisions  regarding  acquisition
for planned development of land from public fund in pursuance of any  scheme
or policy would  be  for  public  purpose.   Section  3(f)  of  the  Act  is
extracted hereunder:

“3(f) The expression “public purpose”  includes -
(i) the provision of village-sites, or the  extension,  planned  development
or improvement of existing village-sites;
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;
(iii) the provision of land for planned  development  of  land  from  public
funds in pursuance of any scheme or  policy  of  Government  and  subsequent
disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or  outright  sale
with the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the
State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor  or  landless
or to persons residing in  areas  affected  by  natural  calamities,  or  to
persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any  scheme
undertaken by Government, any local authority  or  a  corporation  owned  or
controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of  land  for  carrying  out  any  educational,  housing,
health  or  slum  clearance  scheme  sponsored  by  Government,  or  by  any
authority established by Government for carrying out any  such  scheme,  or,
with  the  prior  approval  of  the  appropriate  Government,  by  a   local
authority, or a society registered under  the  Societies  Registration  Act,
1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law  for  the  time  being  in
force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning  of  any  law
relating to co-operative societies for  the  time  being  in  force  in  any
State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme  of  development  sponsored
by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government,  by
a local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises  or  building  for  locating  a  public
office,

      but does not include acquisition of land for companies.”


             The  scheme  contained  in  the  zonal  plan   for  Delhi  city
indicated the planned development of Delhi and the  area  was  reserved  for
institutional  purposes.   The  word  “Institution”   includes   educational
institute as defined in Oxford Dictionary is to the following effect:
      “a large organization founded for a  particular  purpose,  such  as  a
college, bank, etc.- an organization providing residential care  for  people
with special needs. – an official organization with an important role  in  a
country. 2. an established law or custom. -a well established  and  familiar
person or thing;  he  became  a  national  institution.  3.  the  action  of
instituting.”


            It is apparent   that  there  can  be  acquisition  for  planned
development as per zonal plan prepared under  Delhi  Development  Act,  1957
(in short 'the Act')  for  institutional  area,  it  was  not  necessary  to
mention particular purpose, once  planned  development  of  Delhi  has  been
specified that to be read with the zonal plan  applicable  in  the  area  in
question.  Thus, it  Could not be said that the Notification  suffered  with
any legal vice.  The constitution  Bench  of  this  court  in  the  case  of
Aflatoon (supra) has considered the  question  where  the  Notification  was
issued under section 4 of the act with respect  to  planned  development  of
Delhi though no doubt it was with respect to larger area,   but  area  would
not  make   a  difference,  ultimately  this  court   has   upheld   similar
Notification under Section 4, while discussing the matter, this  Court  held
as under:

      “23.The planned development of Delhi had  been  decided  upon  by  the
Government before 1959, viz., even before the  Delhi  Development  Act  came
into force. It is true that there could be no planned development  of  Delhi
except in accordance with the provisions  of  Delhi  Development  Act  after
that Act came into force but there was no inhibition in acquiring  land  for
planned development of Delhi under  the  Act  before  the  Master  Plan  was
ready. [see the decision in Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi).
      In other words, the fact that actual development is permissible in  an
area other than a development area with the  approval  or  sanction  of  the
local authority did not preclude the Central Government from  acquiring  the
land for planned development under the  Acts. Section 12 is  concerned  only
with the planned development. It has  nothing  to  do  with  acquisition  of
property;  acquisition   generally   precedes   development.   For   planned
development in an area other than a  development area, it is only  necessary
to obtain the sanction or approval of the local  authority  as  provided  in
section 12(3). The Central Government could acquire any property  under  the
Act and develop it after obtaining the approval of the local  authority.  We
do not think it necessary to go into  the  question  whether  the  power  to
acquire the land under Section 15 was delegated by  the  Central  Government
to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. We have already held the appellants  and
the writ petitioners cannot be allowed to  challenge  the  validity  of  the
notification under section 4 on the ground of laches and  acquiescence.  The
plea that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had no authority to  initiate  the
proceeding for acquisition by issuing the notification under  section  4  of
the Act as section 15 of the Delhi Development Act gives that power only  to
the  Central  Government  relates  primarily  to   the   validity   of   the
notification. Even assuming that the Chief Commissioner  of  Delhi  was  not
authorized by  the  central  Government  to  issue  the  notification  under
Section 4 of the land acquisition Act, since the  appellants  and  the  writ
petitioners are precluded by their laches and acquiescence from  questioning
the notification, the contention must, in any event, be negatived and we  do
so.”


            The reliance has been placed by  learned  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of the appellant on  Munshi Singh's  case  (supra)   which  reads  as
follows:

“8. As already noticed, in the notifications under section 4  all  that  was
stated  was  that the land was  required   for   "planned  development    of
the  area". There  was   no  indication whatsoever whether  the  development
was  to  be  of  residential  and  building  cites  or  of   commercial  and
industrial plots nor was it possible    for any one interested in  the  land
sought to be acquired to find out  what  kind  of  planned  development  was
under contemplation  i.e.  whether  the  land  would  be  acquired  and  the
development made  by the government or whether  the  owners  of   properties
would  be  required  to      develop  a  particular  area  in   a  specified
way.  If  the  master  plan which came  to  be sanctioned  on  September  4,
1962 had    been  available  for inspection by  the  persons  interested  in
filing objections or even  if the knowledge of its  existence  on  the  part
of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position may have  been
different. In that situation the appellants could not claim that  they  were
unable to file objections owing  to  the  lack  of  any  indication  in  the
notification under section 4 of  the  nature  of development for  which  the
area  was  being requisitioned.    On  behalf  of  the  state  it  has  been
pointed out  that the appellants had themselves filed a copy of  the  master
plan which was sanctioned on September 4,   1962     and  that   it   was  a
matter of common knowledge that   the  master plan  was  under  preparation.
 The details relating  to   the master plan and the  plan  itself  had  been
published  in     the  local   newspapers  and  the  appellants  could  have
easily discovered what   the  proposed  scheme  was  with   regard   to  the
development  of the area in which they  were  interested.  In  view  of  the
peculiar circumstances of these cases we  gave  an  opportunity   to     the
state to apply for  amendment  of  its return     since  nothing   had  been
said  about  these  matters therein and to produce  additional  evidence  in
support  of  its  allegations.  Such   a   petition   was       filed    and
certain documents  were sought  to  be  placed  on  the  record.   after   a
careful consideration of  the  petition  for  amendment  and   the  evidence
sought to be adduced we dismissed the  prayer for amendment  as well as  for
production of additional  evidence  as   we  were  not  satisfied  that  the
documents sought  to   be  produced   were        either  relevant  or  were
required  to  enable this court to pronounce judgment.”

            It is apparent from the  aforesaid  discussion  made  in  Munshi
Singh's case  (supra)  that there was no master plan/zonal plan in vogue  in
the area.  Thus when there was no plan for the area, in that  context,  this
court has observed that mention in the Notification issued under  Section  4
of the act that it was acquisition for the purpose  of  planned  development
of the area was vague as such purpose should have  been  mentioned.  In  the
Munshi Singh's case  (supra)  the  facts  were  totally  different  and  the
decision in Munshi Singh's case  (supra) had  been  taken  consideration  in
the latter decision of Constitution Bench in  Aflatoon's  case  (supra)  and
the  similar  submission  raised  with  respect  to  the  vagueness  of  the
Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was not accepted.
            This court in Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors.  vs.  State  of  U.P.  &
Ors. [(2010) 10 SCC 282]  has also considered the concept of public  purpose
under Section 3(f) of the Act and it  has  been  discussed  that  a  purpose
complementary to public purpose is also a public  purpose.   When  the  land
had been acquired for construction of Yamuna Expressway which itself was  of
public importance the acquisition of the land  for   Yamuna  Expressway  for
development   of   the   same   for   commercial,   amusement,   industrial,
institutional and residential purposes was held to be complementary  to  the
creation of expressway hence amounted to  acquisition  for  public  purpose.
The planned development  of  Delhi  is  by  itself  a  public  purpose.  The
submission raised by the appellant is thus liable to be rejected.
            In view of the decision on merits,  we  need  not  go  into  the
question as to whether the petition was maintainable at the instance of  the
petitioners  on the strength of the lease deed. The fact remains that  owner
has not chosen at any point of time to question it.
            The acquisition is for public purpose.  In  our  opinion,  there
was no vagueness in the Notification.  It could not be said that  particular
property has been plucked out as there is  no  allegation  of  any  malafide
attributed in the matter of acquisition.  it was as per zonal plan which  is
binding upon all concerned and  could not be departed to having been  issued
under the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957.


       Thus we find no force in the appeal.  The same is liable  to  be  and
is hereby dismissed.    No costs.
                                                          ................J.
                                                                (ARUN MISHRA)


                                                           ...............J.
                                                           (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 29, 2017

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